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    JQ1725.A55 K36 2001320,95195 - dc212001025806ISBN 0 521 80817 0 ba cngISBN 0 521 00408 X ba mm

    Ni dungDanh sch hnhTrangviii

    Danh mc cc bngix

    Li cm nxiii1

    CC TR CHI V L S12So snh Hn Quc v Philippines213Cc t chc: cc quan chc v nh cm quyn614Mutual con tin Hn Quc965BANDWAGONING CHNH TR TRONG PHILIPPINES1226DN CH TRONG V TI CHNH nm 1980Cuc khng hong ca 19971517

    Kt lun: THAM NHNG V PHT TRIN181Ch s195

    Nhn vt1.1 Bn loi tham nhngtrang15

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    2,1 Hn Quc v Philippine GDP bnh qun u ngi nh l mt phn trmGDP ca M bnh qun u ngi (1951-1990)41u t 2,2 Real nh mt phn trm GDP42M vin tr 2,3 nh l mt phn trm ca Trung ngChi tiu Hn Quc v Vit Nam, 1957-198044Xut khu l 2,4 phn trm GDP, 1961-199049C cu ca Qu 5,1 chnh tr trong k nguyn dn ch1275,2 C cu chnh tr Qu theo Marcos: Chia vConquer1396.1 Thay i mi quan h gia kinh doanh v

    Nh nc trong nhng nm 1980152T gi 6,2 lch s caPeso vt173Bn2.1Hn Quc v Philippines: Mt chng ng pht trintrang25

    2.2So snh GNP v Per GNP u ngi, Bcv Hn Quc352.3Hot ng qun s Bc Triu Tin, 1965-1970362.4So snh hiu sut kinh t: Hn Quc vVit Nam

    412.5M vin tr nhn c, cc nc khc nhau, 1946-1980432.6nh hng ca tng trng vn nc ngoi45

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    2.7Tit kim nh l mt phn trm tng sn phm trong nc462.8

    Ngun gc ca GNP ca Hn Quc v Philippines472.9Hn Quc v Philippines xut khu theo ngnh482.10

    Ngun gc ca Ch tch Hi Nm mi chaebolln nht542.11V tr cao nht ca th h th hai ca cc sng lptrong mi tp on chaebol542.12Tu gio dc ca cc quan chc Philippines Top,1946-1963552.13College gi ca nhiu ngi quyn qu Philippine, 1963562.14

    Gio dc ca quan chc ti Ten nhng ln nht Hn QucChaebol, 1989572.15Gio dc cao hn cng chc trong kinh t Hn QucB nm 1989572.16Chi tiu cho gio dc nh l mt phn trm ca Trung ngChnh ph Chi, Hn Quc v Vit Nam,

    1950-1980582.17Trnh gio dc Hn Quc v Philippines,1950-1980593.1

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    Ni cc Doanh thu ti Hn Quc theo Rhee v Park67Bn3.2Cao hn dch v dn s thi, 1949-1979683.3M hnh tuyn dng v khuyn khch nng cao dn sCng chc703.4M hnh tuyn dng v khuyn khch nng cao dn sCng chc theo Rhee v Park713.5Tng trng ca cc quan liu Philippine783.6Thnh tu ca gio dc cao hn cng chc Philippines793.7Tuyn dng cng chc Philippines cao hn793.8

    Mt mu ca-hc vn k M trongMarcos chnh813.9Chuyn Thnh phn ni cc theo qun lut863.10Cu s quan qun s nh B trng hoc Th trng863.11

    Cu s quan qun s gia cc quc gia Assemblymen, ban,873.12Hng hnh nn ca cc Th trng v cao hn,1963-198388

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    5.4Nhm Lopez, 19721426.1c tnh chi tiu bu c, 1980-19971606.2c tnh thu Quasi, 1980-19871626.3c tnh thu Quasi ln nht cho cc chaebolMi,1994-19981626.4Gi tr gia tng cho GNP ca cc chaebolln nht ca Four Hn Quc,1986-19951646.5Hn t ng Cung v cu1706.6

    N / vn c phn T l chaebolHn Quc nm 19961706.7

    N-vn c phn ca cng ty Philippine, 19951726.8Philippines ch s kinh t, 1991-19971746.9Lao ng c tay ngh cao chu 1766.10Bo lc chnh tr Vit Nam, 1965-1998

    1766.11Quyn s hu tp trung ca ngnh cng nghip c la chn nm 19971776.12C phn ca tp on Philippine chn178

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    1Cu v l thuyt caTi tin, do , rng chnh tr Hn Quc s khng c ci cch, tr khicc tiu chun ca ngi dn c nng ln, mt s thay i ca cc th hc y mnh, cc

    Ni dung ca cuc bu c c nghin cu, v m mt h thng mua smqu chnh tr c tnh bng phng tin ca chnh sch nht qun.- Park Chung-heeChng ta c ginh c quyn tip tc yu cu. . . tip tc tin tng v confi-Cng dn ca trong chng ta? Tr khi chng ti t tin c th tr li nhng cuhi ny, chng ti khng dmtin hnh. . . . By gi l thi gian ct b cc b phn b nhim bnh ca xhi t hot ngcng cuc sng, trc khi chng gy nguy him cho chnh tr ton b c th.- Ferdinand MarcosKhi Hanbo Cng ty thp ca Hn Quc b ph sn vo u

    Nm 1997, mt cuc iu tra pht hin c t nht hai t la bc hit ti khon ca mnh, rt c th kt thc trong nhng ti tin ca chnh tr hayBusi-

    Ness gii tinh hoa.1Sau khi b bt cho hi l, Ch tch Hanbo, Chung Tae-soo, t nhn cho n c bit rng nu chnh ph p i vi trng hp camnh

    anh ta qu mnh, ng s m ra mt "qu bom nguyn t" (poktan) vlin can ch ngn hng v cc chnh tr gia, nhng ngi tham gia viHanbo hnnhng nm qua.2Chung b kt n, mc d v n khng c theo ui vic bit sc sng. Trong khi nhiu nh quan st cng khai b sc -B sc! - Ti nhng tit l, trong thc t v b bi nh vy l mt ch thng xuyntrong lch s chnh tr Hn Quc, v trao i tin cho influ chnh tr

    ence c khng ch l mt b mt m, n c kin thc chung.T khi c lp nm 1948, Hn Quc chng kin mt dng chy bt tndng nh ca

    Trang 9

    Ban thn thit ngha t bnv b bi tham nhng lm gim im s ca cc tng lp. Trong s nhngngi c

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    thi gian phc v trong nh t hoc b lu y l cu tng thng Chun Doo-hwanv Roh Tae-woo, cc thnh vin ca nhiu nhn vin tng thng, v mt ls quan qun i, chnh tr gia, quan chc, ch ngn hng, doanh nhn, v thuthu gom.3Trong nhiu thp k cc ti liu hc thut phn ln b b qua s ph binchnh tr tin nh nht hoc l ngoi vi ca cc "cu chuyn thc s"Hn Quc: tng trng kinh t dn u bi k meritocratic vcc tng qun s khc kh. Tng trng rt ngon mc m thc t catham nhng c che du hoc b ui ra khi tay. S tng trng nhanhca cc nn kinh t chu khi dy mt hn hp ca t hi v s hi. i khigi l php l, hoc H, cc nc nh Hn Quc, i Loan, Singapore, vHng Kng nhy khi i ngho giu c trong vng mt th h. V cho nkhicui thng Mi Mt nm 1997 v ma thu tuyt p ca ng won HnQuc, cc quan st vinlp lun rng tt hn chnh ph chu l mt l do chnh cho rng khu vctng trng ngon mc. Quan im ny t chc ln ca chu c v nhtrung lpquan liu, cc chnh tr gia c hiu qu, v cc doanh nhn lm vic chm chnh lyu t trung tm trong tng trng kinh t.4

    Ngc li, cc hc gi t chc thnh Vit Nam nh l paradigmaticnh nc tham nhng, tiu biu l cu tng thng Marcos ca Ferdinand. CcVit Nam khng pht trin nhanh chng v s can thip ca chnh ph,mnh kinh doanh cc lnh vc thu c li ch c hng li t chnh phkhoan i, cng chc khng nng lc. Ton b th gii bit vImelda Marcos ca 2.000 i giy v v cc vi phm xy rati dinh tng thng Malacaang. Vic Vit Nam, cho n ngy nay, c mtcng chng hnh nh ca cronyism, tham nhng, v chnh ph xu lm chmca n

    pht trin.

    Cc cuc khng hong ti chnh chu cui nm 1997 t ngt thay iphng Ty xem lca chu . Ngh m, Hn Quc c gp vo vi Philippines v xungquanhch trch v mi quan h m cng-kinh doanh chnh ph - trong pierc-23

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    i vi cc tng quan tt ca v b bi nm 1995, xem Ahn Byoung-yong,"Taekwon Kwa pichagumyokui chuakhan janch'i "(Cc l gh tm ca cc qu bt hp php v i tngthngin), Shindonga (thng 12 nm 1995): 112; v Kim Yong-Suh, "No-ukusokgwa Tae YS uisontaek "(Vic tm gi Roh Tae-woo v Kim Young-sam ca s lachn), Sisa Wolgan(Thng 12 nm 1995): 56-65.4i vi quan im i din, xem Peter Evans, nhng t tr (Princeton:Princeton Uni-versity Press, 1995); Alice Amsden, chu tip theo Giant(Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress, 1989); v Chalmers Johnson, "t chc v thnh qu kinh t NamHn Quc v i Loan, "trongKinh t chnh tr ca chu New

    Industrialism, doFrederic Deyo (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), trang 152-155.

    Trang 10

    Cu v l thuyt caing nhn thc mun mng ca cc chuyn gia ngay lp tc - c r rng ltham nhng, khng hiu qu, vlc hu. Ch tp trung vo gii thch kt qu thnh cng, cc conven-tional m hnh cung cp khng c cch phn tch lm cho tinh thn ca cuc

    khng hong nm 1997.Cc nc trc y c coi l php l hin nay khng c g hnni tr n cho cc nh t bn thn thit ngi giu c mt cch d dng. Ktqu l mttranh ginh din gii li cc nc cng nghip mi. Nhng btdulum c th vung qu xa - t khen ngi qu mc cho ly gernaut trong nhng nm 1980 coi thng qu mc cho cc tp qun kinhdoanh chu nhng nm 1990.Lm th no chng ta c th dung ha s tng trng nhanh ng trc

    khi nm 1997 vibo co ca cc chnh tr tin bc rng ri cc nc cng vo nm 1998 vNm 1999? Lm th no chng ti gii thch chnh tr tin bc rng ri chu ? Lm th nochnh tr tin bc nh hng n s hiu bit ca chng ta v tnh trng phttrin?I. i s

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    Chnh tr l trung tm ca cu tr li. Trong nghin cu ny, ti lm cho hai is. Trc tin,c Hn Quc v Vit Nam c kinh nghim tham nhng lntrong sut thi k postindependence. Th hai, chnh tr - khng phi kinh t -xem xt hoch nh chnh sch thng tr c hai nc. Tp trung vovic trao i cc u tin cho hi l gia nh nc v kinh doanh, ti cho rngli xe la chn chnh sch chnh tr, m quan chc khng c t tr tchnh tr can thip vo thit lp chnh sch, v cc doanh nghip v gii tinhhoa chnh trvt ln vi nhau v vic ai s gt hi c thu. Ngay c Hn Quc, tham nhng l ln hn nhiu so vi s khn ngoan thng thngcho php- V vy l tham nhng trn lan m chng ta khng th b qua n, ng hn,chng ta cngii thch n.Mc d chnh tr tin bc - tham nhng v cronyism - thng thynh tng trng kinh t c ch, c nhng iu kin nht nh, trong n cththc s c li. nc ang pht trin thng c th ch yutional cu trc. Trong trng hp , nu c mt cn cn quyn lc trong mtdoanh nghip nh vn nh tp hp cc tng lp kinh doanh ca chnh ph, chnh tr tin bc thc

    s c th gimchi ph giao dch v thc hin tha thun di hn v u t hn na hiu qu

    iu-cient, ngay c trong khi lm phong ph thm nhng ngi may mn t ngithng ng vi nhau.535i vi cc tng quan ca chi ph giao dch, xem David C. Kang, "Nam Hn vi LoanPht trin v Kinh t t chc mi, "Tchc Quc t49, khng c. 3(Summer 1995): 555-587; Oliver E. Williamson, Cc t chc kinh t ca ch

    ngha t bn(New York: The Free Press, 1985); Douglass North, "A Chi ph giao dch Lthuyt

    Trang 11

    Ban thn thit ngha t bnGi thuyt chnh tr c th phn bit Hn Quc v Philippinestrong khi cng lm cu ni nhng nm bng n v cuc khng hong.

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    6i vi cc hc gi qu lu tp trung vo cc quan chc v trn kt qu. hiu c con-trasting kt qu kinh t ca Hn Quc v Philippines, ngi ta phitrc tip a ch tham nhng v chnh tr.cuc khng hong ny khng gy ra qua m, v cc cu trc lch s dn n cuc khng hong s chu ng lu sau khi cc s kin nm 1997

    phai m tb nh. S dng Hn Quc v Philippines l nghin cu trng hp, ti khmphchnh tr ca nh nc pht trin bng cch tp trung vo s tc ng qua ccth chchc v chnh tr tin bc. Trong c hai nc, tng trng v tham nhng tnticnh nhau trong nhiu thp k. Ngay c trong thi k tng trng nhanh chngca Hn Quc, mttnh ton chnh tr, kinh t khng hiu qu, l yu t quan trng trong vic ngnchn-khai thc chnh sch kinh t. Tuy nhin, cu hnh ca cc din vin to iukinnhanh chng pht trin ti Hn Quc trong nhng nm 1960 lm suy yu bis thnh cng ca n rtv cui cng dn n cuc khng hong nm 1997. Ti Philippines, mt conkhc nhau

    biu hiu din vin chm pht trin trong nhiu thp k. C v nh cui cngc thay i, v c l s tng trng mnh m ca nhng nm 1990 l s khiuca mt xu hng i ln.Cc gi thuyt chnh tr tin tin trong nghin cu ny cho thy mt mi direc-tion cho nghin cu ca chng ti v tnh trng pht trin. Ta lc ti lin

    phn ca quan h quc t v chnh tr so snh, v bao gmmt tp hp cc tng v th ch v s la chn chnh sch,quan im pht trin ca nh nc t chc lp trung lp ca vn phng c vnh ti chu

    cracies, chnh tr gia c hiu qu, v chnh sch thng mi ph hp l yu ttrung ngtrong tng trng kinh t.74Chnh tr, "Tpch Chnh tr l thuyt2, khng c. 4 (1990): 355-367; vWeingast Barry, "Con-

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    stitutions nh Qun tr cu trc: Cc c s chnh tr ca th trng anton, "Tpchca l thuyt kinh t v th ch149 (March 1993): 286-311.6i vi mt nghin cu vi mc tiu ging nh ti nhng i vi Nht Bn,xem Robert Bullock, "chnh tr haPht trin ca Nh nc: Nng nghip v Lin minh Bo th ti Nht Bn thihu chin "(MS,UC Riverside, 2001).7S tp trung vo cc t chc nh nc bao gm cc quan liu Weber c ttr tchnh tr v x hi nhiu. Trong s rt nhiu ngi gi quan im ny, PeterEvans lp lunrng "tnh chn lc cao meritocratic tuyn dng v thi hn ko di s nghipthng to com-mitment v thc v s gn kt ca cng ty. "Evans, nhng Tch, trang 12. AliceAmsden cng vit rng "kinh t thnh cng ti Hn Quc thch thc nhng ginh. . . mchnh ph can thip thoi ho thnh 'thu-tm kim.' "Amsden, chu Giant's

    Next, trang327. i vi trng hp c th khc, xem Karl Fields, "Strong Hoa v Kinhdoanh t

    tion ti Hn Quc v i Loan, "trong kinh doanh v cc nh nc nc angpht trin, do SylviaMaxfield v Schneider Ross Ben (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997),

    p. 126; Johnson,Trang 12

    Cu v l thuyt caTuy nhin, cc ti liu v cc nh nc pht trin dn chng ti xung

    phn tch sai ng dn. iu ny hm rng vn hc tham nhng v tngtrngn gin l khng th cng tn ti. Kt qu l, im ca chng ti chu

    tr thnh qu mctp trung vo vic gii thch hoc l do ti sao cc nc ny khng b hnghoc l do ti saotng trng khng c nh ngon mc nh l ph bin tin.8

    Nam Triu Tinbo co hin tng tng trng trong nhng nm qua ba mi lm; cc Philip-

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    cy thng khng c. Cng tc kinh t lc hu t kt qu thnh cng, mtd dng ri vo gi nh rng Hn Qucphi c t tham nhngv chnh ph tt hn so vi Vit Nam ch v n nh vynhanh chng tng trng.9y khng phi l tranh lun rng c khng c hc bng vo cor ruption. c bit trong bi cnh ca cuc khng hong ti chnh nm 1997, vaquanm thy mt s nghin cu bt u gii quyt vn tham nhng chu . Nhng tc phm ny, tuy nhin, c xu hng tp trungtrn hai lnh vc nghin cu c thng khng phn ng vi nhau.Khu vc u tin tp trung vo gii thch cc loi hnh tham nhng, vich i tham kho lm th no ny nh hng n s hiu bit ca chng tav kinh ttng trng.10Khu vc th hai phn ln c tp trung vo vic nh gi liuv n mc no tham nhng l mt yu t gp phn vo nm 19975"T chc v qu kinh t Hn Quc v i Loan," p. 152; v ZiyaOns, "The Logic ca Nh nc pht trin," Chnh tr so snh 24 (1991):114. Cctp trung chnh sch ln l cng nghip ha theo nh hng xut khu, vi nhnc m "trong ch o

    trao i vi tr cp. . . exacts tiu chun thc hin t cc cng ty."Amsden, chu tip theoKhng l, trang 146.8V tin thu tm kim, xem James Buchanan, Robert Tollison, v GordonTullock, bin sonHng ti.,mt hc thuyt v cc-Tm kim Hi thu (College Station: Texas A & MUniversity Press, 1980);v Anne O. Krueger, "Kinh t chnh tr ca x hi thu-Tm kim," ngi MTp ch Kinh t64 (1974): 291-303. i vi mt xem xt li s tng trng

    chu , xem AlwynYoung, bi hc t ng NICS: A View tri ngc (NBER liu lm vic4482,1993).9"NuH, sau ti. Ti l ng, do Hl ng s tht." Carl Hempel, Trithc Khoa hc T nhin

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    (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall-, 1966), p. 7. Trn thin v la chn, xemGary King,Robert Keohane, v Sidney Verba, Thit k iu tra x hi (Princeton:PrincetonUniversity Press, 1994).10Xem-Seog Park Byung, "Tham nhng chnh tr Hn Quc: Tp trung vong thi ca Chnh tr ng, "chu quan nim 19 (Spring / Summer 1995):163-193; Bea-Trice Weder, Model, Chuyn hoang ng, hoc Miracle: nh gi li vai trca Chnh ph ng

    Kinh nghim (New York: United Nations University Press, 1999); RichardMitchell, Chnh tr

    Hi l ti Nht Bn (Honolulu: Nh in i hc Hawaii, 1996); v Jeffrey A.ma ng,"Suharto ca Indonesia: Thnh vng, T do cho ngi, t"Lch s hin ti 94(1995):420-424.

    Trang 13

    Ban thn thit ngha t bnkhng hong ti chnh.11V d, Stephan Haggard vit rng " phng Ty

    bnh lun, nhng [nguyn nhn] thng gim tham nhng, bn thn thit-

    ism, v gia nh tr. . . nhng nhng ngun d b tn thng. . . mc tchnh tr cam kt ca chnh ph. "12

    Nhng c th ca vn hc c xu hngkhng phi tm hiu lm th no cc nc chu tng trng nhanh chngtrongu tin din ra. Trong khi c hai si ca nghin cu l quan trng, mt mrngi thoi v cc mi quan h gia chnh tr tin bc v chu -develtrin ch bt u xy ra, v iu tr ton din ca

    vn vn cha xut hin.13Cc kinh nghim Hn Quc v Philippines cho thy ngha rng hncho vic nghin cu mi quan h kinh doanh chnh ph cc nc ang phttrin.Quan trng nht, mt m hnh ca chnh tr l trung tm ca s hiu bit devel-

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    opmental nh nc. Chng ta khng th gi s lng nhn t trn mt phn cadevel-opmental nh nc. Mt "cng" xem tnh trng pht trin - rng nh ncl trung tnh, chn ngi chin thng, v cung cp hng ho cng cng v dnsdch v c cch ly khi nhng nh hng x hi - l kh khn duy trempiri-Cally. Tuy nhin, ngay c nhng "mm" xem - chnh ph c th c mtBene-ficial hiu lc tuy nhin hnh ng ca chnh ph l t c - cn c mtchnh trgii thch. Cc nh nc Hn Quc pht trin - n cung cp cng cnghng ho, bi dng, u t v c s h tng to ra. Nhng nghin cu nycho thy rng iu ny l khng nht thit phi c . Tham nhng lan trn Hn Quc, v nh nc can thip vo cch m n lm v n lmnh vy l v li ch ca mt nhm nh ca gii tinh hoa chnh tr v kinhdoanh. Ccsn xut hng ho cng cng thng l do may mn, sn phm ca cc dinvincnh tranh t c nhng li ch ring ca cc ngun lc nh nc.611

    Ngy cronyism v tham nhng l nguyn nhn ca cuc khng hong ti chnh,xem Giancarlo Corsetti, "giy

    H? Mt m hnh ca cuc khng hong chu , "Tpch Kinh t chu u 43,khng c. 7 (Thng 6 nm 1999):1211-1236; Segal v Davis, Goodman bin son. Gerald, hng ti phc hitrong khu vc chu Thi Bnh Dng(London: Routledge, 2000); Callum Henderson, chu ri: To cm gic vchu Cuc khng hong v hu ca n (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1998), TJ,Pempel ed. V, Cc Poli-tt my ca khng hong ti chnh chu (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,1999). i vi mt counterar-

    gument, xem Ha-Joon Chang, "Cc mi nguy o c Hazard: Untanglingkhng hong chu ,"Pht trin Th gii 28, khng c. 4 (thng 4 nm 2000): 775-788.12Stephan Haggard,Kinh t chnh tr ca cuc khng hong ti chnh chu

    (Washington, DC:Vin Kinh t Quc t, 2000), p. 10.

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    13Hai cng trnh tt trong tnh mch ny l Richard Doner v Ansil Ramsey,"Thi Lan: TKinh t thn k n khng hong kinh t ", trong ly lan Chu : Cc nguynnhn v hu quca mt cuc khng hong ti chnh, do Karl D. Jackson (Boulder, CO:Westview Press, 1998);v Andrew Wedeman, "k cp, thu-chc, v c tc, thu gom: Tham nhngvTng trng Zaire, Hn Quc, v Philippines, "Tpch Pht trin khu vc 31(Summer 1997): 457-478.

    Trang 14

    Cu v l thuyt ca l khng khn ngoan khi tp trung vo cc la chn chnh sch c nhn (v

    d, xut khunh hng cng nghip ha, hoc EOI) hoc th ch c th(S quan liu) nh cc vn b c lp. Cc th ch v chnh sch can thip,ing bin, v cc t chc mi trng ln hn - trong trng hp nycc chnh ph quan h kinh doanh - nh hng n bt k vn c th.14C hait chc v chnh sch bao gm mt lot cc vn . T chc cnhiu t chc ch ca nh nc - chng c th c php lut hoc cc mc-t l cng - trong khi chnh sch bao gm thng mi, qun l v ti chnh

    chnh sch. Mt hnh nh mo m s xut hin nu chng ta tp trung ch yuvo insti nh nctutions v b qua t chc cng nghip, hoc nu chng ta tp trung vo chnhsch thng miv b qua quy nh v chnh sch ti chnh lng lo. Cc trng hp nghincu trongCun sch ch ra rng doanh nhn chnh tr v kinh t kh ti nguynv c thit k hoc ch chnh sch la chn ful c th manipula-tion, trn, v sa i.15

    Ngoi ra, chi ph giao dch - cc chi ph gim st, lm cho, vthc thi cc tha thun gia cc din vin - b nh hng bi cc th ch lnhntional mi trng. Nghin cu ny cho thy rng mt s cu hnh ca gov-

    bt buc cc tng lp kinh doanh (nhng g ti gi l "con tin ln nhau") c thgimchi ph giao dch v thc s thc y tng trng. Lp lun cho rng sau

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    cho rng hiu c hoch nh chnh sch cc nc ang pht trin, mttrong

    phi u tin hiu, i vi mi nc, nhng thch thc chnh tr c bitphi i mt vi cc nh lnh o c nhn, v ng h gn gi ca h, v phongcch trongm doanh nghip c gng nh hng n chnh sch. Vic phn b chinlc cachnh sch kinh t v li ch l mt ngun lc chnh tr quan trng. Cc miquan-tionship gia chnh ph v gii tinh hoa kinh doanh khc nhau mi nc,v mt ngun ca rng buc l h thng quc t. Khc nhaucc nc ang phi i mt vi p lc quc t khc nhau, v khng phi tt ccc cuc ua quc giat vch xut pht cng cng khng chy trong iu kin tng t. Hu ht tmquantrng trong h thng quc t l nhng mi e da t bn ngoi c th gycc nh lnh o quan tm hn na tng trng v hiu qu.Mt l do m cc hc gi khng gii quyt nhng vn c th l mt mi bn tm p o vi gii thch kt qu kinh t.

    Nhng nh phn tch ngi khng phi l c gng gii thch s tng trng cxu hng v mt xa714Douglass North, "Kinh t hc th ch mi," Tp ch l thuyt v th ch

    tional Kinh t142 (1986): 230-237; v Oliver Williamson, "so snh kinh tT chc: Phn tch cc kt cu khc nhau ri rc, "Khoahc hnh chnhHng qu 36 (1991): 269-296.15Oliver Williamson, Cc t chc kinh t ca ch ngha t bn (New York: FreePress, 1985).

    Trang 15

    Ban thn thit ngha t bnsm mu hn v nhiu hn na lm dng hnh nh ca chnh tr Hn Quc hnso vi nhng c gng

    gii thch ti sao nhng g c c bn gangster quy tc Hn Quc thcs ttcho s tng trng. Mark Clifford Hn Quc m t nh l mt "nn vn haca cn gin d," GregoryHenderson m t Chung-hee Park ca quy tc nh mt dng nc xoy ca cc

    phe phi khng thmch lc, v Bruce Cumings thy mt m hnh ca strongmen c.

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    16Mc d n c th kh khn m t chnh tr Hn Quc trong mitiu khon v sau gii thch ca Hn Quc kt qu kinh t ng k, chng ta

    phitrnh ri vo ci by ca quyt nh l tin l chnh tr Hn Quc c th khng c tham nhng v t nc tng trng mnh m.

    Ngoi ra, chng ta cn phi gii thch cc m hnh ca cc chnh tr tin bctrongVit Nam, khng ch khng nh s tn ti ca n.Ti bt u vi mt tng quan ca Hn Quc v Philippines, trong tinhn mnh c hai ging v khc nhau gia hai nc.chnh tr trong nc, cc t chc x hi c hai nc, ctng t nh nhiu hn l ni chung c cng nhn, v phn ln sinh thismnomics c hai nc cng tng t. Tuy nhin, Hn Quc v Philip cc-cy thng khc nhau trong cch c ch ngha thc dn v mi trng bn ngoic lp b nh hng chng. Hn Quc, Nht Bn v M nh hngc xu hng ph v trt t c, v nng mt mi e da t Bc Triu Tin nghvided mt ng lc cho tng trng. Ngc li, Philippines, Ty Ban Nha vM c xu hng cng c ch ngha thc dn truyn thng chnh tr v sinh thimu nomic, v s vng mt ca bt k mi e da thc t cung cp Philippinelnh o vi ng c nh lm thay i sp xp hin ti.

    Nghin cu ny tip theo tp trung vo vai tr ca chnh ph. Mt trong ligio l ca nh nc quan im pht trin l vai tr quan trng caquan liu. Tuy nhin, quan liu theo Park Chung-hee khngng k t tr nhiu hn hoc cht ch hn theo SyngmanFerdinand Marcos Rhee hay. Ngoi ra, Hn Quc khng c mt phi cng "B "ch o pht trin. Cui cng, chnh ph tr cp khngtrao i cc tiu chun hiu sut - c hu ca cc tha

    Ngnh cng nghip Hn Quc thot nhn bng chng cho thy chnh sch kinht quyt nh c thc hin v l do chnh tr. Ngc li, quan liu Philippine

    c thm rt nhiu thm quyn hn l ph bin tin. Trong c hai Hn Quc vVit Nam cai tr cai tr v cai tr, v quan liu khngc t tr t li ch ch chnh tr. S khc bit v cht lng816Mark Clifford,Kh Tiger(New York: ME Sharpe, 1994), p. 11; GregoryHender-

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    con trai, Chnh tr ca Vortex (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,1967); v BruceCumings,Hn Quc Place trong Mt Tri (New York: WW Norton, 1997).

    Trang 16

    Cu v l thuyt cagia Philippines v Hn Quc quan liu l phng i. Mc dPhilippines b lnh o chnh tr ngi ngho, cc quan chcmnh c o to v chuyn dng.Sau ti chuyn sang chnh tr trong nc. Sc mnh tng i ca nh ncvkhu vc doanh nghip xc nh hnh thc v mc chnh tr tin bc, mn lt n c tc ng vo qu o pht trin ca mt quc gia. Ti cung cpmtxy dng da trn m hnh tng t mt vi v d kinh t ca th trng

    m t cc m hnh tham nhng ti Hn Quc v Philippines.iu ny c cch iu m hnh nh gi cao tham nhng da trn s tngt gianh nc / doanh nghip sn xut / ngi tiu dng. Nhn vo cc lnh vckinh doanhhoc l tp trung hoc phn tn, v lnh o chnh tr hoc lmch lc hoc b nt, dn n mt ma trn c th d on mc v loitham nhng. Trong s kt hp th v nht, c hai nh nc v doanh nghiprt mnh v tp trung, dn n tnh trng ca "con tin ln nhau"ni m c hai bn c tim nng hng li, v ngha c hi v khai thc

    hn ch.Chnh ph cc nc tham gia vo ba loi chnh sch kinh t chung: thng michnh sch, chnh sch ti chnh, v chnh sch quy nh. Hn Quc, mc dthng michnh sch trong nhng nm 1960 ni chung l h tr xut khu, ti chnh vreg-chnh sch ulatory c xu hng lm vic ti qua cc mc ch. Kim sot ca

    Nh nckhu vc ti chnh to ra ng lc cho doanh nghip tp trung vo vic mrng hn

    hiu qu, v v mu thun quy nh v chnh sch thu rng ri choquyn lc nh nc ty trong cng ty. Cc chi phi cc cng ty trong viHn Quc (cc chaebol) nn nui dng cc kt ni chnh tr ca h l rt quanmt-tant thnh phn ca chin lc kinh doanh. S gn kt ca nh nc v cckinh doanh lnh vc ngn chn hoc t cc s kin a ra mnh lnh, v mcd

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    chnh tr tin bc tn ti, n c hn ch.Tm hiu v quyt nh chnh sch cn phi hiu bit cc chnh trkhuyn khch c cu trong cc din vin a ra quyt nh kinh t. Politi-lnh o cal s dng tht ln v hng ha cng chin lc: tht ln khng cngkhngchnh sch c xc nh trc, v c hai u c li ch chnh tr v chi

    ph. Hn Quctheo Park c th khng c khc nhau t Hn Quc theo Syngman Rhee mc m b my quan liu c chnh tr ha. Tuy nhin, trong khiHn Quc c rt nhiu tham nhng v chnh tr trong cc cng trnh cng cnghp ngv phn b vn vay, ti ca b my hnh chnh c nhn vin vi edu-tp v nhng ngi c o to tuyn dng thng qua thi tuynqu trnh. Park Chung-hee to ra mt b my quan liu chn xe cho phpanh ta p ng yu cu s bo tr ca ng v vn theo ui hiu qu iuhnh kinh tciency. Nh mt ch chia hai cho php Park theo di c mt chng trnhngh s ni b9

    Trang 17

    Ban thn thit ngha t bnnhm duy tr quyn lc chnh tr v "mua chuc" ngi ng h v mtngoi chng trnh ngh s tp trung vo pht trin kinh t.Mc d Vit Nam trng by mt s cc c im c in ca

    v n tht mt nh nc yu, khc bit quan trng cn tn ti. Cc democratic thi i Philippines thy tham nhng, thm quyn ti phn gia cctrn nhhnh php v lp php, v quan liu mt trn ngp bi bn ngoili ch. Nh nc khng th xy dng hoc gn kt sinh thi ph hp-nomic chnh sch. Theo Marcos, tuy nhin, nh nc tr thnh c hai nhiuhnmch lc v t tr nhiu hn t cc nhm li ch x hi. Cc vn theo v php lut khng phi l mt thiu sc mnh nh nc nhng s dngm

    sc mnh c t. Marcos, nh Park, theo sau l mt chnh tr r rngchin lc, tiu dit hu ht cc kh nng nguy him gia nh u t, ngchn ngi khc, v b qua phn cn li. Chin lc ca Marcos tm suc-ceeded; c ng k phc tng cai tr ca ng i vi na uv php lut. Tuy nhin, chnh sch ca chnh ph Phi Lut Tn vn lun lunth thao tc, vi chnh sch thng mi tp trung vo substitu nhption, chnh sch ti chnh khng bao gi nht qun thc hin, v iu tit

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    chnh sch thng l mt hn hp tri ngc ca dispensations c bit athch

    bn ni kh.Cc m hnh ca chnh tr tin bc Philippine ong a nh mt con lc tqu mc tin thu t di ln tm kim bng x hi trong thi k dn ch, n tht trn xung qu mc ca Marcos v bn b ca mnh theo mn v

    php lut. T nm 1946 n nm 1972, t m nhu cu t doanh nghip quawhelmed kh nng ca nh nc p ng cho h, dn n tham nhnghoch nh chnh sch khng mch lc. Vi thit qun lut bt u t nm1972, cc direc-tion tham nhng o ngc, v Marcos s dng sc mnh ca nh nc chim ot s giu c cho bn thn v cng s ca ng. Theo Marcos, ccVit Nam c tim nng theo ui mt pht trin hn na x l k lutcon ng, vi mt b my quan liu cht ch v quyn lc nh nc ngk. NhngMarcos thiu bt c rng buc v thi qu ca mnh, v nh l kt qu caPhilip-cy thng b mt c hi ca mnh pht trin nhanh chng.Cc mu trong c hai Hn Quc v Philippines thay i ng kvi qu trnh chuyn i dn ch ca h trong nhng nm 1980 gia. Ti HnQuc, transi-tion cho dn ch vo nm 1987 khuch tn sc mnh ca nh nc. iu nydn nincreased demands for political payoffs as politicians began to genuinely

    compete for electoral support and to decreased ability of the state to resistor contain the demands of the business sector. The small number ofmassive Korean firms, unrestrained by any market forces because of theirsize, made increasingly risky decisions. Thus too much democracy com-10

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    The Puzzle and the Theorybined with a still collusive business-government relationship resulted inincreasingly ineffectual policy making, and the Asian financial crisis of1997 brought this to light.

    In contrast, by the early 1980s Ferdinand Marcos had run the Philip-pines into the ground. The dramatic uprising of People Power in 1986leveled the playing field for both state and business. As the Philippinesslowly recovered, state and business were less powerful and less coherent,leading the Philippines in the early 1990s to begin a painful restructuringqu trnh. The Philippines was less affected by the crisis of 1997 becausesome of those collusive government-business ties had been broken by the

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    downfall of Marcos, speeding the process of reform. Largely owing topolicy reforms and increased regulation of the financial sector, the Philip-pines fared relatively well in the crisis of 1997. The prospect for contin-ued economic and political growth appears, if not inevitable, quite likely.This book is about politics, and it centers on explaining the patterns ofmoney politics. The argument adduced here, however, leads naturally toa question about economic growth. If both Korea and the Philippinesexperienced extensive corruption, why did Korea grow much faster thanthe Philippines? In the concluding section of the book I shift the empha-sis from explaining money politics to exploring the relationship betweenmoney politics and development. Simply put, the balance of power amongelites in Korea reduced transaction costs, while bandwagoning politics inthe Philippines raised transaction costs. Although an imbalance betweeneconomic and political elites can lead to corruption spiraling out of controland choking off growth, where a rough balance does exist, corruption ischa. However, corruption is only one of many variables that affectdevelopment, and to answer the larger question of why Korea has devel-oped but the Philippines has not we must be sensitive to a number of otherfactors that existed in Korea but not in the Philippines, including an exter-nal threat, extensive US aid, and land reform, in addition to the balancethat limited corruption and that is described in this book.Leaders of states make deliberate choices about whether to constraintheir ability to steal domestic capital. Standing at the intersection ofdomestic and international politics, and restrained by domestic institutions

    and international pressures, the leaders must deal with foreign countries,survive in domestic politics, and also craft economic policies. In makingsense of why Korea initially succeeded, but the Philippines did not, wehave to understand the broad contours of the relationship between big

    business and the state. By comparing the two countries, this book not only11

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    Crony Capitalismsharpens our perspective on the individual countries but also leads tofurther comparative research on politics, corruption, and development.

    II.The Theory: Money Politics, Rent Seeking, and CorruptionI focus on the rent seeking and corruption that occur between public andprivate actors. At the heart of the model is the idea that those actors withexcessive power will tend to abuse it. The dependent variable is theexchange between state and business of favors for bribes. The indepen-dent variable is the relationship between state and business. My analyticfocus is on this larger institutional environment the actual institutions

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    of governance all exist within this larger relationship, and each specificinstitution is affected by this environment.I use the term money politics because it is less normative than cor-ruption and also because it highlights public-private interaction. C haicorruption and rent seeking are broader terms, describing activitiesthat can occur at the private-private level as well as vis--vis the state.James Buchanan defines rent seeking as that part of the payment toan owner of resources over and above that which those resources couldcommand in any alternative use.17Thus rents are created when an actormanipulates prices and causes them to diverge from competitive levels, andthe existence of rents can lead to corruption by various actors attemptingto gain access to the rents. By manipulating prices, the actor himself, orsome other actor on whose behalf the price manipulator is acting as anagent, is able to reap excess profits.18Rents can be created in a number of ways, but a principal way is throughstate intervention.19The state uses its power to manipulate prices and1217James Buchanan, Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking, in Towards a Theory of

    the Rent-SeekingSociety , edited by James Buchanan, Robert Tollison, and Gordon Tullock(College Station:Texas A&M University Press, 1980), p. 3.18Pranab Bardhan, Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues,Journalof Economic

    Literature 35 (1997): 13201346; Serguey Braguinsky, Corruption andSchumpeterianGrowth in Different Economic Environments, Contemporary Economic

    Policy 14 (1996):1425; Kofi O Nti, Comparative Statics of Contests and Rent-SeekingGames,Interna-tional Economic Review 38, no. 1 (1997): 4359; and Yoram Barzel,Measurement Cost andthe Organization of Markets,Journal of Law and Economics 25 (1982): 2748.

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    19Ha-joon Chang, The Political Economy of Industrial Policy (New York: St.Martin's Press,1994); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption: A Study in Political Economy (NewYork: Acade-mic Press, 1978); Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishney, Corruption, Quarterly

    Journal ofEconomics 108 (August 1993): 599617; Margaret Levi, Of Rule andRevenue (Berkeley: Uni-

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    The Puzzle and the Theorymarkets to generate rents. For example, import licenses confer rents byrestricting the amount of goods that come into a country; actors who canimport the restricted goods are able to sell those goods at a higher than

    market price, thereby obtaining rents.20By intervening, the governmentcreates incentives for business to try to influence policy decisions. Cor-ruption occurs when businessmen use bribery, personal connections, orsome other means to attempt to influence policy decisions and gain rents.The distribution and volume of rents are thus a function of the relativestrengths of the state and the business sector.1.The Politics of CorruptionWere there no government distributing rents, there would be no corrup-

    tion, and thus a key issue is how to model the government-businessmi quan h. In examining both the supply and the demand for politicalcorruption, this simplified model of the government-business relationshipnecessarily abstracts from a rich reality.Following Shleifer and Vishney, a state can range from coherent to frac-tured.21A state is coherent if it can formulate preferences independent ofsocial influences and if political leaders have internal control over their

    bureaucrats.

    22Although there are many possible configurations of the rela-tionship among political leaders, bureaucrats, and political organizations(domestic politics: parties, associations, etc.), for the sake of simplicity I13versity of California Press, 1988); Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, BargainingCosts,

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    Influence Costs, and the Organization of Economic Activity, inPerspectiveson Positive

    Political Economy , edited by James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle(Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1990); Parimal Kanti Bag, Controlling Corruption inHierarchies,

    Journal of Comparative Economics 25 (1997): 322344; and Mushtaq Khan,The EfficiencyImplications of Corruption,Journal of International Development8, no. 5(1996): 683696.20Corruption is thus a subset of rent seeking. Rents may be allocated purely onmerit, orthey may be allocated toward bribes.21Shleifer and Vishney model different types of government structures, but theyavoid study-ing how business organization may affect corruption. Shleifer and Visheny,Corruption.Susan Rose-Ackerman discusses types of state organization similar to mywork, althoughshe does not use the terminology I employ here. See Rose-Ackerman, Corruption .22

    On autonomy and state strength, see Peter Katzenstein, ed.,Between Powerand Plenty:Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States (Madison: Universityof WisconsinPress, 1978). On internal control (agency costs), see Matthew McCubbins andThomasSchwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus FireAlarms,

    American Journal of Political Science 28 (1984): 165179; and FrancesRosenbluth and Mark

    Ramseyer,Japan's Political Marketplace (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UniversityPress, 1993),CHS. 6 and 7.

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    Crony Capitalismfocus on only two polar cases. The most coherent situation exists when

    political leaders have full control over their political organizations and

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    their bureaucrats, and in this case leaders actively use domestic politics asa means of ensuring continued rule. At the other pole, the most fracturedsituation exists when leaders survive only tenuously, when they engage inconstant conflict with political organizations over the form and content ofthe state, and bureaucrats can play off multiple principals to their ownadvantage.23At the heart is the question of control.It is the interaction of government and business that is of interest,however, and we therefore need to understand business organization aswell as government organization. My view of the business sector builds onthe work of Michael Shafer.24He argues that the organizational charac-teristics of the predominant economic sector (eg, mining or agriculture)have different implications for its relationship to the state. In sectors withhigh asset specificity and high production inflexibility, companies will beless responsive to market signals, and it will be harder for them to adjustquickly to exogenous shocks, either political or economic. These types offirms will have more incentive to resist attempts by the state to intervene.Alternatively, in sectors with low asset specificity, low production inflexi-

    bility, and low factor inflexibility, firms will be more easily influenced byexogenous forces.The approach used here examines business more broadly than does

    Shafer. In this model, a strong concentrated business sector is the diver-sified business group, comprised of well-organized firms that cover manycc lnh vc ca nn kinh t.25As Ben Ross Schneider puts it, big (and encom-

    passing) is beautiful.26This definition of diversified firms is one inwhich companies cover many sectors rather than one, may have import-competing subsidiaries as well as export-oriented subsidiaries, and may

    have agricultural and urban firms. Given their cross-ownership of varioussubsidiaries and the range of their interests, these firms' interests cannotbe neatly categorized. In addition, the larger that diversified business1423Pablo Spiller, Politicians, Interest Groups, and Regulators: A Multiple-Principals Agency

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    Theory of Regulation, or 'Let Them Be Bribed,' The Journal of Law andEconomics 33(April 1990): 65101.24Michael Shafer, Winners and Losers: How Sectors Shape the Developmental

    Prospects of States(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994).25Amsden,Asia's Next Giant, p. 8.26Ben Ross Schneider, Elusive Synergy: Business-Government Relations andDevelop-ment, Comparative Politics 31, no. 1 (October 1998): 109.

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    The Puzzle and the Theorygroups are relative to the economy as a whole, the more they are likely toattempt to influence government policy and the more they are likely towield political influence. These conglomerates can be differentiated fromsingle-sector, smaller, and less-diversified firms. On a spectrum, we might

    put individual artisans at one end, with Japanese keiretsu , Korean chaebol,Philippine family conglomerates, and Mexicangrupos at the other end.27We can now build the analogy for politics and corruption, with acoherent/fractured state along one axis and a concentrated/dispersed busi-

    ness sector along the other (Figure 1.1). In this model I take as given theinitial distribution of rights and the type of actors. These are exogenousto the model, and I remain agnostic as to why and how society came tolook a certain way.2.Types of Corruption: Bottom-Up or Top-DownAlthough the model is a simplified abstraction of the government-businessrelationship, it allows us to parsimoniously capture the underlying dynam-ics of how corruption occurs. There are two analytically distinct types of1527

    On Latin American conglomerates, see Kurt Weyland, 'Growth with Equity' inChilesNew Democracy?Latin American Research Review 32 (1997): 3768.nh nckinh doanhcoherentfractured

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    small-N(concentrated)large-N(dispersed)I: mutual hostagestype: PD collusionamount: mediumIII: predatory statetype: top-downsngPD = Prisoner's Dilemmaount: largeII: rent seekingtype: bottom-upamount: largeIV: laissez-fairetype: residualamount: smallFigure 1.1. The Four Types of Corruption

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    Crony Capitalismcorruption: the top-down predation by a strong state on society, and the

    bottom-up rent seeking of powerful groups that overwhelm the abilityof the state to contain and channel their demands. Neither one of these

    is analytically prior to the other, and both can occur under the right cir-cumstances.Top-down corruption has been best explicated in the notion of a preda-tory state.28The predatory state is one in which the state takes advantageof a dispersed and weak business sector. Political elites pursue outrightexpropriation; they also solicit donations from businessmen who in turnare either shaken down by the regime or who volunteer bribes in returnfor favors, and employ other means as well.

    29In contrast, bottom-up cor-ruption occurs when social actors have the power to overwhelm the state.When the strength of the business sector is enough to force concessionsfrom the state, rent seeking behavior results. Potential state influence overeconomic life is vast, and those businessmen or groups privileged enoughto receive low-interest loans or import quotas will benefit at the expense

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    tee. A business sector composed of strong interest groups may overwhelmthe state with its various demands, leading to either policy incoherence or

    policy indecision. Many analyses of third-world countries emphasize thatthe state is a relatively recent, and hence weak, addition to the politicalcnh. Strong interest groups may be able to capture control of the stateand use the power of the state for their own ends.Two other possibilities exist. In Cell IV there are numerous interestgroups and diffuse power within the state. In this situation, no single groupcould have too much influence, and the political market would comeclose to clearing. This builds on Susan Rose-Ackerman's notion that therole of competitive pressures in preventing corruption may be an impor-tant aspect of a strategy to deter bribery.32When both state and businessare weak, rents are all but eliminated. Neither state nor business is pow-erful enough to take advantage of the other, and so exploitation is diffi-gio phi. Many of the advanced industrial democracies at least whencompared with less-developed countries (LDCs) may approximate thistnh hnh. As bureaucrats compete with each other to offer policy, thusdriving the cost of a bribe toward zero, numerous capitalists also competewith each other for the policy, also driving the price toward zero. In CellIV, corruption is lowest.The final and most interesting case is Cell I, where both governmentand business are equally strong: there is a relatively coherent state but also

    a small number of powerful interest groups. In this instance, the level ofrents is limited and the division relatively equitable. The result is mutualhostages in which the state and those powerful groups may collude withone another, but neither has the advantage. Cell I reflects the old saw: Ifyou owe the bank a little money, the bank owns you. If you owe the banka lot of money, you own the bank. In this mutual hostage situation, boththe political and economic elites are powerful enough to harm the other

    but are deterred from such actions by the damage that the other side can1732

    Susan Rose-Ackerman, Bribery, in The New Palgrave Dictionary ofEconomic Thought,edited by John Eatwell, Murray Milgate, and Peter Newman (London:Macmillan, 1988),

    p. 278. See also Christopher Bliss and Ragael Di Tella, Does Competition KillCorrup-

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    tion?Journal of Political Economy 105, no. 5 (1997): 10011023; andShleifer and Vishney,Corruption.

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    Crony Capitalisminflict.33As will be argued more fully in Chapter 7, this situation reducestransaction costs for both government and business elites.In Cell I, rents can be had and corruption can occur, but the level ofrents is constrained by the power of the other group. Small-N (businessconcentration) reduces transaction costs, and hence rent seeking, becausea small-N eases monitoring and enforcement costs. Trong tnh trng ny,although there are rents to be earned by both business and state, the

    amount will be less than in the polar cases where one group dominates theother, and more than in the case where both groups are dispersed into alarge number of small actors.In this sense, strategic interaction between state and business corre-sponds to a prisoner's dilemma. Although in the short run either actor may

    be better off by defecting and gaining all the rents, the other actor retainsthe ability to punish defection over time, and thus grudging cooperationmay ensue.34Cooperation in the strong/strong (Cell I) is not automatic.

    As in a prisoner's dilemma, both sides are better off defecting and grab-bing all the rents for themselves. Indeed, Cell I could lead to a war of attri-tion, with both sides slugging it out. Even without active cooperation,however, exploitation will be limited by the power of the other side. TrongKorean example, we will see that Park initially tried to take advantage ofthe business sector but then realized he was unable to do so.35Thus the least corruption would occur in situations where both stateand business are weak and disorganized, for neither group could takeadvantage of the other and all the groups would compete against each

    other, driving the price of corruption close to zero. The most corruptionwould occur when only one side is coherent, either state or business. Amiddle position exists when both state and business are strong and can take

    partial but not total advantage of each other.3.o lngThe theoretical concepts in this book are widely accepted and used in thesocial sciences, even though the difficulty in measuring them is also widely

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    1833This is based on the idea of bilateral monopoly. See DavidKreps, Microeconomic Theory(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 551573. See also RogerBlair, DavidKaserman, and Richard Romano, A Pedagogical Treatment of BilateralMonopoly,Southern Economic Journal55, no. 4 (April 1989): 831841.34Robert Axlerod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books,1984).35The 1961 Illicit Wealth Accumulation Act, orpuchong ch'uk'je an , is anexample of this.

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    The Puzzle and the Theoryacknowledged.36Recognizing this difficulty, in this study I focus on the

    polar cases in an attempt to lay out the ranges of the variables and test themodel's plausibility.Measuring the dependent variable of corruption and influence peddlingl kh khn. By their very nature these are acts that their actors wish to keep

    n. Although other scholars have used as evidence polls of perceptionsof corruption, traced one pattern of corruption, or relied on corruptionscandals, there is no comprehensive indicator of corruption.37But a varietyof indicators can give us a sense of the size and pattern of corruption.38Occasional scandals reveal the pattern of influence. Estimates of campaignspending, kickbacks, and secret funds are useful first approximations.Tracing patronage and cronyism requires deep ethnographic knowledge.

    Measuring the independent variables is only marginally easier. measure the strength of the business sector I focus on a series of indica-tors, including sectoral concentration, employment, sales, and peak asso-ciations. Firms' value added as a proportion of gross domestic product(GDP) gives an indicator of their market and political power, and the1936

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    See Stephen Krasner's discussion inDefending the National Interest: RawMaterials Invest-ments and US Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978),esp. Ch. 1.37Daniel Treisman, for example, uses the Transparency International index of

    perceived cor-ruption as his measure of actual corruption in The Causes of Corruption: ACross-national Study (MS, UCLA, 1997); Robert Wade traces the sale of office inIndia in TheMarket for Public Office: Why the Indian State is Not Better atDevelopment, World

    Development13, no. 4 (April 1985): 467497; and Chalmers Johnson followsthe corrup-tion scandals in Japan in Tanaka Kakuei, Structural Corruption, and theAdvent ofMachine Politics in Japan,Journal of Japanese Studies 12, no. 1 (Winter1986): 128. Khctheoretically informed empirical work includes Stephen D. Morris, Corruptionand Politicsin Contemporary Mexico (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1991);Richard Donerand Ansil Ramsey, Rents, Collective Action, and Economic Development in

    Thailand,paper prepared for presentation at the conference on Rents and Developmentin South-east Asia, Kuala Lumpur, August 2728, 1996; Edgar Kiser and Xiaoxi Tong,Determi-nants of the Amount and Type of Corruption in State Fiscal Bureaucracies: AnAnalysisof Late Imperial China, Comparative Political Studies 25, no. 3 (October1992): 300331;Richard Levy, Corruption, Economic Crime, and Social Transformation since

    theReforms: The Debate in China,Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 95, no.33 (1994):125; and Andrew Wedeman, Systemic Change and Corruption in China,

    paper deliv-ered at the 95th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association,Atlanta,

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    GA, September 25, 1999.38Paul Hutchcroft, Obstructive Corruption: The Politics of Privilege in thePhilippines,inRent-Seeking and Development: Southeast Asia's Political Economies ,edited by KS Jomoand Mushtaq Khan (forthcoming); Wayne Sandholtz and William Koetzle,Accountingfor Corruption: Economic Structure, Democratic Norms, and Trade (MS, UCIrvine,1998).

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    Crony Capitalismcomposition and concentration of their bank loans indicate the firms' vul-

    nerability to the state and other actors. Measuring state strength is neces-sarily more qualitative. To measure state coherence and low agency costs,I rely mainly on detailed case studies that follow the process of policymaking, and I do not attempt to provide a single quantifiable measure forthe variables. Case studies can reveal whether leaders act on their partiesand domestic politics or whether they respond to them. Process tracing of

    both policy decisions and institutional origins can reveal whether there isagency slack between leaders and bureaucrats.III.Kt lunKorea and the Philippines both had extensive corruption that permeated

    the normal politics of elections, economic policy making, taxation, and theday-to-day running of the country, and similar institutional structures ledto similar patterns of money in both countries. However, Korea and thePhilippines had different social organizations and different constraintsand incentives that affected their pattern of money politics. Corruption inKorea, although endemic, was constrained by the collusion of a powerful

    business class and a coherent state. Each major group was able to benefitfrom its close relationship with the other, but neither could ever gain theupper hand. Despite each group's constant bemoaning of its counterpartsutter lack of qualifications, each needed and relied upon the other. Trong con-

    trast, corruption in the Philippines swung like a pendulum. As one groupor the other gained predominant power, it would busily set about liningits own pockets, aware that in the next round its fortunes might well bereversed.The key to understanding patterns of money politics is the government-

    business relationship. Too much power in the hands of either political oreconomic elites invites abuses in the form of rent seeking and corruption.

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    A balance between elites allows less discretion and less abuse. To explorethe abstract propositions presented in this chapter, we now turn to adetailed study of Korea and the Philippines