Dharmakīrti on pratyakṣa -Translations (summarized by S.S. Liu/ Oct. 1 ‘12 )

Pramāṇavārttika Pratyakṣapariched

PV 3 : 1-7, 123-133 (Singh 1984: 142-144) PV 3 : 1-10, 194-224 (Dunne 2004: 391-411)

English translations:

The Heart of Buddhist Philosophy—Dinnaga and Dharmakīrti: Appendix IV

Dharmakīrti on Sensation (pratyakṣa) (Amar Singh, 1984:142-4)

Singh, Amar. (1984) The Heart of Buddhist Philosophy—Dinnaga and

Dharmakīrti. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers

Japanese translations are available in:

戶崎宏正 (1979)《仏教認識論の研究》上卷: p. 55-68, 202-214.東京：大

東出版社。

Tosaki, Hiromasa “Bukkyō-ninshikiron no kenkyū”, vol.1: p. 55-68, 202-214)

本多惠譯 (2005) Dharmakīrti’s「認識批判」。東京：平樂寺書店。

For detail available translations check on: EAST -Epistemology and Argumentation in

South Asia and Tibet http://east.uni-hd.de/buddh/ind/7/16/

mānaṃ dvividhaṃ meyadvaividhyāt śaktyaśaktitaḥ | arthakriyāyāṃ keśādir nārtho 'narthādhimokṣataḥ || (PV 3.1)

[Singh] The means of knowledge is of two kinds, because there are two kinds of objects, as there is or is not a capacity for action towards an object. Hair and such things are not objects, because there is no reliance on them of the kind that occurs towards objects. [Dunne] Instrumental cognitions are of two kinds because there are two kinds of objects. There are two kinds of objects because some objects are capable of telic function while others are not. [Illusions such as] the

hairs [that appear in the visual perceptions of a person with cataracts] are not objects (arthas) because they are not considered to be objects

sadṛśāsadṛśatvāc ca viṣayāviṣayatvataḥ | śabdasyānyanimittānāṃ bhāve dhīḥ sadasattvataḥ || (PV 3.2)

[S] And (also) because of similarity and non-similarity, because of being and not being within the scope of language, and because, when other signs (than the object) are present, intellect occurs with respect to one but not with respect to the other. [D] There are two objects because some are similar across instances and others are not similar; because some are the objects of words and others are not the objects of words; and because the cognition of some occurs when there are causes other than the object, and the cognition of others does not occur when there are causes other than the object.

arthakriyāsamarthaṃ yat tad atra paramārthasat | anyat samvṛtisat proktaṃ te svasāmānyalakṣaṇe || (PV 3.3)

[S] That object with respect to which (purposeful) action is possible is called the ultimate real, whereas the other is the conventionally real. These are respectively the unique particular and the universal. [D] In this context, that which is capable of telic function is said to be ultimately real. The other one is said to be conventionally real. They are, respectively, the particular arid the universal.

aśaktaṃ savam iti cet bījāder aṅkurādiṣu | dṛṣṭā śaktiḥ matā sā cet samvṛtyāstu yathā tathā || (PV 3.4)

[S] If it is argued that nothing has a causal capacity, (we point out that) the causal capacity of seeds, etc. towards sprouts, etc., you may argue that the capacity is regarded to be merely conventional. So be it.

[D] "But nothing is capable of telic function." We observe that things such as seeds have a capacity for telic function in the case of sprouts, and so on. "Such things are considered to have such a capacity conventionally, not ultimately." Let it be so in the way as you have said.

sāsti sarvatra ced buddher nānvayavyatirekayoḥ | sāmānyalakṣaṇe 'dṛṣṭaś cakṣurūpādibuddhivat || (PV 3.5)

[S] If it is argued everything has causal capacity, we reply that there is none in universals, because of the not seeing of the cognition of logical agreement and non-agreement like the cognition of a visible object through the eye.* [D] "That capacity for telic function is found in all objects." It is not found in universals, which are not observed to have either positive concomitance [in which a universal necessarily exists when there is a cognition of a universal] or negative concomitance [in which such a cognition exists in the presence only and merely of a universal] with the cognition of a universal. An example in which these relations do occur is that of the eye faculty and the form perceived in relation to the cognition of that form. *Text with Prajnakaragupta reads: It is not seen of the cognition of agreement and non-agreement in the universal characteristic like the cognition of a visible object through the eye.

etena samayābhogādyantaraṃgānurodhataḥ | ghaṭotkṣepaṇasāmānyasaṅkhyādiṣu dhiyo gatāḥ || (PV 3.6)

[S] By this (absence of causal capacity in the universal, its effect being mere knowledge) the notions of such things as a pot, up- ward motion, general characteristic and number are explained due to conformity with such things of the mind as convention, enjoyment, etc.

[D] The fact that a universal is not invariably concomitant with the cognition of a universal explains cognitions of supposedly extra-mental entities, such as substantial wholes-i.e., a water-jug-projections, universals, numbers, etc. They are also not invariably concomitant with their cognitions because, like universals, the cognition of them follows from the presence of other factors, such as signs and mental effort.

keśādayo na sāmānyam anarthābhiniveśataḥ | jñeyatvena grhād doṣo nābhāveṣu prasajyate || (PV 3.7)

[S] Hair, etc. are not universal, because there is no desire for them of the kind that occurs towards real objects. In the case of absent things, there is no fault (of their having the features of a universal), because they are grasped as knowables. [D] Things such as the hairs [that appear to a person with cataracts] are not universals because they are not considered to be objects [by persons who act upon them]. This fault does not ensue for absences because they are apprehended as knowable.

teṣām api tathābhāve'pratiṣedhāt sphuṭābhatā | jñānarūpatayārthatvāt keśādīti matiḥ punaḥ || 3.8 ||

[D] The fault also does not ensue for those hair-like appearances when they are apprehended in that fashion [i.e., as objects by some other awareness]. This is so because there is no reason to deny that they are apprehended as knowable objects. The clarity of the appearance of hairs in cognition is due to the fact that they are objects [i.e., particulars] in that they are of the nature of awareness.

sāmānyaviṣayā keśapratibhāsam anarthakaṃ | jñānarūpatayārthatve sāmānye cet prasajyate || 3.9 ||

[D] However, thoughts such as "These are hairs" have universals as their objects; but the appearance of hairs does not have any object. [PV3.8-9ab]

tatheṣṭatvād adoṣaḥ artharūpatvena samānatā | sarvatra samarūpatvāt tadvyāvṛttisamāśrayāt || 3.10 ||

[D] "If a universal is also a [real] object in terms of having the nature of awareness, then you would have to conclude that it is a particular." Since we do indeed assert that a universal is a particular/ your statement poses no problem for us. But in terms of having the nature of other objects, it is a universal in that it has the same form for all [the objects that it seems to qualify]. It has that same form because it is based upon their exclusion [from other objects that do not have the expected causal characteristics]. [PV3.10]

* PV3: 123-133 ﹣Singh pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍhaṃ pratyakṣeṇaiva sidhyati | pratyātmavedyaḥ sarveṣāṃ vikalpo nāmasaṃśrayaḥ ||123||

123. Sensation, which is free of conceptualization (imagining), is established only by means of sensation itself. The conceptualization (imagining) of all (beings), which is cognized individually (subjectively) is dependent on names.

saṃhṛtya sarvataś cintāṃ stimitenāntarātmanā | sthito 'pi cakṣuṣā rūpam īkṣate sākṣajā matiḥ ||124||

124. One who remains with a tranquil mind, having withdrawn his thought from all (concepts), looks at a visible object with his eye: that thought is born of sensation.

punar vikalpayan kiṃcid āsīd vo kalpanedṛśī | iti vetti na pūrvoktāvasthāyām indriyād gatau ||125||

125. Then, forming a judgment he knows “There was something like my (present) imagining” . There is no access of the sense-organ to the situation just stated.

ekatra dṛṣṭo bhedo hi kvacin nānyatra dṛśyate | na tasmād bhinnam asty anyat sāmānyaṃ buddhyabhedataḥ ||126||

126. For a particular observed in one place is never seen elsewhere. Therefore, it is not the case that owing to a non-difference in cognitions there exists another, a universal which is separate (from the particular).

tasmād viśeṣaviṣayā sarvaivendriyajā matiḥ | na viśeṣeṣu śabdānāṃ pravṛtter asti sambhavaḥ ||127||

127. Therefore, every thought born of sensation has a particular as its object. There is no possibility of the functioning of words with respect to particulars.

ananvayād viśeṣāṇāṃ saṅketasyāpravṛttitaḥ | viṣayo yaś ca śabdānāṃ saṃyojyata sa eva taiḥ ||128||

128. Particulars have no agreement (with words) because no convention functions: and the object of words may be connected with them (with words, not with particulars),

asyedam iti sambandhe yāv arthau pratibhāsinau | tayor eva hi sambandho na tadendriyagocaraḥ ||129||

129 For when there is a relationship of the form “ this (expression) is of that (object)” , the relationship is between only those two

objects, which are imaginings; then it is not within the range of the senses.

viśadapratibhāsasya tadārthasyāvibhāvanāt | vijñānābhāsabhedo hi padārthānāṃ viśeṣakaḥ ||130||

130. Then, because there is no (longer) a discovery (as in sensation) of an object with a clear image, a difference of form in consciousness is what distinguishes objects.

cakṣuṣo 'rthāvabhāse 'pi yaṃ paro 'syeti śaṃsati | sa eva yojyate śabdairna khalv indriyagocaraḥ ||131||

131. Even when an object appears through the eye of which one says: “ It is other than that” only that (conception, imagining) is connected with words, surely not the range (object) of the senses.

avyāpṛtendriyasyānyavāṅmātreṇāvicāraṇāt |

na cānuditasambandhaḥ svayaṃ jñanaprasaṅgataḥ ||132||

132. Because there is no discovery, that which is not engaged with the senses merely through the other word and an unexpressed relationship (between word and object) itself is not connected with cognition.

manasor* yugapadvṛtteḥ savikalpavikalpayoḥ | vimūḍho laghuvṛttervā tayor aikyamvyavasyati ||133||

133. (If) there were a simultaneous functioning of without-imagining (sensation) and with-imagining (sensation), affecting the mind, (then) there would be bewilderment. Or (If) their functioning were extremely rapid their unity would tend to result (they would appear in the mind to be the same, resulting in the same confusion).

PV3: 194-224 –Dunne

[ka. akṣāṇāṃ gamakatvāt pratyakṣam] sañcitaḥ samudāyaḥ sa sāmānyaṃ tatra cākṣadhīḥ | sāmānyabuddhiś cāvaśyaṃ vikalpenānubadhyate || 3.194 ||

"That which is aggregated (sa'f!lcita) is a conglomerate (samudaya), and in that sense it is a universal (samanya). [According to Buddhists such as Vasubandhu], one has perception of such things. Furthermore, any cognition of a universal is necessarily associated with conceptuality. [Hence, it is wrong to say that perception is free of conceptuality]."

atrāha – arthāntarābhisambandhāj jāyante ye 'ṇavo 'pare | uktās te sañcitās te hi nimittaṃ jñānajanmanaḥ || 3.195 ||

Due to a relation with other things [i.e., other particles], infinitesimal particles that are different than their own previous moments arise [from their own previous moments such that they can produce an awareness]. In that sense, they are said to be "aggregated," and as such, they are said to be a condition for the production of awareness.

aṇūnāṃ sa viśeṣaś ca nāntareṇāparānaṇūn | tadekāniyamāj jñānam uktaṃ sāmānyagocaraṃ || 3.196 ||

Moreover, the distinctive quality that particles obtain does not occur without the other particles with which they are in proximity. Hence, since awareness does not have any necessary relation to a single particle, awareness is said to have a universal [in the sense of a group of aggregated particlesP as its object.

athaikāyatanatve 'pi nānekaṃ dṛśyate sakṛt | sakṛdgrahāvabhāsaḥ kiṃ viyukteṣu tilādiṣu || 3.197 ||

"Even though they occur in the same perceptual field, if they do not form a new, distinct substance, then those various particles are not observed simultaneously." Then how does one experience the simultaneous apprehension of small things such as sesame seeds that are disjunct [i.e., that are not forming a separate entity that is a whole]? pratyuktaṃ lāghavañ cātra teṣv eva kramapātiṣu | kiṃ nākramagrahas tulyakālāḥ sarvvāś ca buddhayaḥ || 3.198 || The objection that awareness occurs quickly and hence one mistakenly apprehends them as one entity has already been refuted [at PV3.I35]. And why would sesame seeds and so on that are falling down sequentially not be apprehended simultaneously? Moreover, all cognitions are equal in duration, so why would some have sequential conceptual appearances while others are simultaneous? One would be forced to conclude that the apprehension of any object is non-sequential. [PVJ.I98-199] kāścittāsvakramābhāsāḥ kramavatyoparāś ca kim | sarvārthagrahaṇe tasmād akramoyaṃ prasajyate || 3.199 || kiñca (|) naikaṃ citrapataṅgādi rūpaṃ vā dṛśyate katham | citraṃ tad ekam iti ced idaṃ citratarantataḥ || 3.200 || And how could one see a variegated form such as a multicolor (citra) butterfly? "That multicolor is a single real color." Then that multicolor is even more psychedelic than that multicolored butterfly!

naika-svabhāvaṃ citraṃ hi maṇirūpaṃ yathaiva tat | nīlādipratibhāsaś ca tulyaś citrapaṭādiṣu || 3.201 || There is no single entity, "multicolor," just as a form composed of an arrangement of jewels is not a single entity. This case is the same as the

conceptual appearance of blue and so on in the observation of multicolored (citra) things such as cloths [that are composed of threads of different colors]. tatrāvayavarūpañ cet kevalaṃ dṛśyate tathā | nīlādīni nirasyānyañ citraṃ citraṃ yadīkṣase || 3.202 || "In those cases where one sees a single color and not the multicolor, one is just seeing the color that is a part [of the whole]."If after eliminating the constituent colors such as blue, you can still see some multicolor that is other than those constituent colors, then what you see is indeed psychedelic! tulyārthākārakālatvenopalakṣitayor dhiyoḥ | nānārthā kramavaty ekā kim ekārthākramāparā || 3.203 || Two [cognitions, one of a manufactured butterfly made from different colored thread or paints and one of a natural butterfly,F are both determined to have the same cognitive appearance of their object and to have the same duration. So why do you say that one is a sequential cognition of various objects and the other is a non-sequential cognition of a single object? vaiśvarūpyāddhiyām eva bhāvānāṃ viśvarūpatā | tac ced anaṅgaṃ keneyaṃ siddhā bhedavyavasthitiḥ || 3.204 || For we posit that things are various because cognitions are various; [and when one sees a variegated or multicolored (citra) object, the variegation remarked in cognition must reflect a variety of things that produce that cognition]. "The difference remarked in cognitions does not contribute [to establishing that things are different]." What then would establish that things are different? vijātīnām anārambhād ālekhyādau na citradhīḥ | anrūpatvān na saṃyogaścitro bhakteś ca nāśrayaḥ || 3.205 || Because heterogeneous substances do not combine to form [a distinct substance, a whole], one would have no cognition of variegated color in the case of paintings and such. And the conjunction relation (sa'f!lyoga)

[whereby the substances of the painting are held together] cannot itself be multicolored because it has no visible form. 8 Nor can conjunction serve as a locus of a metaphor because there is no variegation in the individual [parts of a painting]. It cannot serve as a metaphor also because there is no variegation in the individual [colors].9 [PVJ.205-206a] pratyekam avicitratvād gṛhīteṣu krameṇa ca | na citradhīsaṅkalanam anekasyaikayā'grahāt || 3.206 || And things that have been grasped sequentially cannot be conflated by a cognition that construes them as a singular multicolor because [on your view] that which is non-singular cannot be grasped by a single cognition. [PV 3.2o6b-cd] nānārthaikā bhavet tasmāt siddhā 'to 'py avikalpikā | vikalpayann ekam arthaṃ yato 'nyad api paśyati || 3.207 || Therefore, a single cognition that has various [simultaneous] objects should be established to occur. Hence, [perception, even though caused by multiple particles] is established to be non-conceptual, since when conceptualizing one object, what one sees is another. citrāvabhāseṣv athaṣu yady ekatvaṃ na yujyate | saiva tāvat kathaṃ buddhir ekā citrāvabhāsinī || 3.208 || "If singularity is not possible in the case of objects [such as a butterfly's wing] that have variegated appearances, then how can there be a single cognition whose cognitive appearance is variegation?" idaṃ vastubalāyātaṃ yad vadanti vipaścitaḥ | yathā yathārthāś cintyante viśīryante tathā tathā || 3.209 || Those who analyze reality make a statement that is entailed by real things themselves-namely, that the way in which they think of objects is the way in which those objects disappear."Might there be variegation in a single cognition?" kiṃ syāt sā citrataikasyāṃ na syāt tasyāṃ matāv api | yadīdaṃ svayam arthānāṃ rocate tatra ke vayaṃ || 3.210 ||

There should be no variegation in the cognition as well. But if one is contentto have this be the objects' essence, who are we to object to that? [PV J.209-2IO] [p.182] tasmān nārtheṣu na jñāne sthūlābhāsas tadātmanaḥ | ekatra pratiṣiddhatvād bahuṣv api na sambhavaḥ || 3.211 || Therefore, neither the objects nor the awareness has a spatially extended appearance because, since that kind of property-svabhava [-namely, spatial extension-] has already been disproved in the case of a singular entity, it is also not possible in the case of what is many. [PV3.211] paricchedontaranyo ʼyaṃ bhāgo bahir iva sthitaḥ | jñānasyābhedinau bhinnau pratibhāso hy upaplavaḥ || 3.212 || This part of awareness-namely, the one that is established such that it seems external-is different from the internal determination [which is the part of awareness that seems to be the subjectivity that apprehends that apparently external part]. Awareness is not differentiated, but its appearance is differentiated into two. That being the case, that dualistic appearance must be cognitive confusion. tatraikasyāpy abhāvena dvayam apy avahīyate | tasmāt tad eva tasyāpi tattvaṃ yā dvayaśūnyatā || 3.213 || The nonexistence of one of the two in awareness eliminates the existence of both. Therefore, the emptiness of duality is the suchness (tattva) of the awareness. tadbhedāśrayiṇī ceyaṃ bhāvānāṃ bhedasaṃsthitiḥ | taduaplavabhāve ca teṣāṃ bhedopy upaplavaḥ || 3.214 || The definition (sa'f[lsthiti] of things as different is based on the difference between those [i.e., the object and the subject]. 16 If the awareness is erroneous (upaplava), then their difference is also erroneous. na grāhyagrāhakakārabāhyam asti ca lakṣaṇam | ato lakṣaṇaśūnyatvān niḥsvabhāvāḥ prakāśitāḥ || 3.215 || There is no definition of things outside of the definition of them as either

objects or subjects. [Those definitions do not ultimately make sense;] therefore, since things are empty of any definition, it is explained that they are essenceless.vyāpāropādhikaṃ sarvaṃ skandhādīnāṃ viśeṣataḥ | lakṣaṇaṃ sa ca tattvan na tenāpy ete vilakṣaṇāḥ || 3.216 || All distinctive definitions of things such as the aggregates are delimited by activity. That activity is not ultimate; therefore, those things are also devoid of [ultimate] definition. yathāsvaṃpratyayāpekṣād avidyopaplutātmanām vijñaptir vitathākārā jāyate timirādivat || 3.217 || & is the case with persons who have cataracts, those who are by nature confused by ignorance have cognitive presentations (vijiiapti) with false images that arise in dependence on their respective conditions. asaṃviditatattvā ca sā sarvāparadarśanaiḥ | asambhavād vinā teṣāṃ grāhyagrāhakaviplavaiḥ || 3.218 || The ultimate nature of the cognitive content [in perception] is not known by any [ordinary beings] whose vision is not supreme; they do not know that ultimate nature because it is impossible for them to experience that content without the error (viplava) of subject and object. tad upekṣitatattvārthaiḥ kṛtvā gajanimīlanaṃ | kevalaṃ lokabuddhyaiva bāhyacintā pratanyate || 3.219 || Therefore, [the buddhas], ignoring the ultimate (upekfitatattviirtha), close one eye like an elephant19 and propagate theories that involve external objects merely in accord with worldly conceptions. nīlādiścitravijñāne jñānopādhir ananyabhāk | aśakyadarśanaḥ (3.220abc) taṃ hi patatyarthe vivecayan || 3.220d A color such as blue in a variegated or multicolored awareness is a quality contingent on awareness (jfiiinopiidhi)0 and as such it does not participate in any other awareness [such as the awareness of just blue]. Hence, it cannot be seen [as distinct from the variegation] because when analyzing it [as distinct], one is focusing on the object (artha) [that produced the awareness, not the awareness itself]. yad yathā bhāsate jñānaṃ tat tathaiva prakāśate |

iti nāmaikabhāvaḥ syāc citrākārasya cetasi || 3.221 || An awareness is experienced in whichever way that awareness appears. 22Therefore, indeed (niima), the variegated or multicolored image in awareness should be simple. paṭādirūpasyaikatve tathā syād avivekitā | vivekini nirasyānyadā viveki ca nekṣate || 3.222 || If the colors of a cloth and such also formed a simple or single entity, then they should not be analytically distinguishable from each other. And when the analyzed parts are eliminated, a remaining unanalyzable whole is not observed. ko vā virodho bahavaḥ sañjātātiśayāḥ sakṛd (: pṛthag) | bhaveyuḥ kāraṇaṃ baddher yadi nāmendriyādivat (: nātma°) || 3.223 || And what is the contradiction if many [particles] that have the special characteristic [of producing awareness] when aggregated are not the cause of awareness individually, as is the case with the senses and such? hetubhāvād ṛte nānyā grāhyatā nāma kācana | tatra buddhir yadākārā tasyās tad grāhyam ucyate || 3.224 || And except for something being a cause, there is nothing else that could constitute that thing's being the apprehended object. That is, the apprehended object of an awareness is said to be that in the image of which awareness arises.

i sakṛd (Tib. cig car, Tosaki 319): pṛthag (K)

ii nāmendriyādivat (Tib. dbaṅ po la sogs bźin Tosaki 319): nātmendriyādivat (K)