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ELI FRANCO

JNANASRIMITRA’S ENQUIRY ABOUT VYAPTI

Review of: Horst Lasic, Jnanasrımitras Vyapticarca. Sanskrittext,Ubersetzung, Analyse. Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhis-muskunde herausgegeben von Ernst Steinkellner, Heft 48. Arbeitskreisfur tibetische und buddhistische Studien Universitat Wien: Wien 2000.Pp. 188.

Erich Frauwallner seems to have been the first historian of Indianphilosophy who recognized the cardinal importance of Jnanasrımitra’sthought for the final phase of the Buddhist epistemological tradition inIndia. As early as 1932 he drew attention to the fact that Jnanasrımitra isreferred to by Udayana, Sayan.a-Madhava, Devabhadra and Ratnakırti,dated his floruit to 9251 and began to collect fragments from his thenstill lost works.2 At that time Jnanasrımitra was barely more than aname. Only one of his works was available in a Tibetan translationand none in the original Sanskrit. Frauwallner’s own attempt to recoverJnanasrımitra’s doctrines produced rather meagre results: only eightfragments, two of which he considered uncertain. This state of affairschanged dramatically thanks to the discovery of a extensive manu-script by Rahula Sankrityayana which contains the text of no lessthan twelve of Jnanasrımitra’s works. This manuscript was practic-ally the sole basis for Anantalal Thakur’s monumental edition, firstpublished in 1959, which runs to almost 600 densely printed pages.3

Since then, however, our knowledge of Jnanasrımitra’s thought hasnot been advanced substantially. The only “free translation” of any ofJnanasrımitra’s works that I am aware of is Yuichi Kajiyama’s transla-tion of the five-page Karyakaran. abhavasiddhi.4 “Unfree,” or rigoroustranslations were not attempted. Therefore, the recent translation of theVyapticarca is a cause for celebration, all the more so as the translationis excellent.

The reason why so little of Jnanasrımitra’s work has been translated sofar is, of course, its notorious difficulty. Jnanasrımitra entered the philo-sophical stage after centuries of discussions, conflicts and developmentsin the Buddhist epistemological tradition, and because he was writingfor his learned contemporaries he presupposes an intimate knowledge

Journal of Indian Philosophy 30: 191–211, 2002.c© 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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of the subject matter. Further, as pointed out by Lasic (p. 19), whenJnanasrımitra develops a certain topic in one of his works he does notrepeat himself in his other works, but only briefly refers the reader to theappropriate place, sometimes not even that. “Ein geduldiger Erklarer,”says Lasic (p. 20), “ist er in keinem Fall.” The same, by the way, couldbe said about Lasic. The introduction to his book is 10 pages shortand mostly devoted to an explanation of editorial conventions and theirnotations; the notes to the translation are kept to the bare minimum.The book contains basically what its subtitle announces: an edition(pp. 31–70), a translation (pp. 75–133) and a structural analysis of thetext (pp. 135–147). To these Lasic adds a word index (pp. 149–184), anindex locorum (pp. 185–188) and an index of modern authors (p. 188).The book commences with a bibliography (pp. 9–18) and introduction(pp. 19–28).

The edition provides us with a very precise picture of the manuscript,and we can now fully appreciate what a demanding task has been accom-plished by Thakur in correcting defective readings of the manuscript ina large number of cases (without, however, informing the reader abouthis deviations from the manuscript).5 Still, Lasic was able to improvesignificantly upon Thakur’s edition by obtaining many better readingsfrom the manuscript and adding some more conjectures. To these onemay suggest a few more.6 A further merit of the present edition liesin its pointing out a great number of parallel passages mainly fromthe Nyayavarttikatatparyat. ıka of Vacaspatimisra and from Ratnakırti’sVyaptinirn. aya. The former was Jnanasrımitra’s main opponent, thelatter was his disciple and wrote the Vyaptinirn. aya on the basis of theVyapticarca. Lasic’s edition and translation of the Vyaptinirn. aya whichwas submitted as an M.A. thesis in 1994 was published as the subsequentvolume in the WSTB and could be profitably read before one proceedto tackle the more difficult text of Jnanasrımitra.7 The single drawbackof the present edition is that it does not provide precise references toThakur’s edition which is always referred to by a mere “Th.” withoutpage and line number.

Lasic’s desire to keep the volume as lean as possible is also apparentin the translation which uses brackets much more sparingly than whatwe have grown accustomed to in publications of the Vienna tradition.8

Lasic also parts with the Viennese convention in using square bracketsto indicate “a larger interpretatorial effort” (“grossere interpretatorischeBemuhung,” p. 26) than in those cases where explications have beenadded in round brackets. However, this distinction is not consistentlyapplied. The translation itself, let me repeat, is really excellent and a

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pleasure to read. It is very precise, it testifies to a thorough understandingof Jnanasrımitra’s thought, and it is of real help for understanding theoriginal text. Moreover, it has the rare distinction of creating the illusion –and this it certainly is – that the Sanskrit text is easy. Stylistically Lasic’stranslation offers a successful mixture of neologisms and colloquialphrases that convey Jnanasrımitra’s language quite well. As examplesof the former one may mention “das Darausentstehen” for tadutpatti,“Mit-dem-Wesen-Gegebensein” for svabhavikatva, “Dessen-Sohn-Sein”for tatputratva, etc. As examples for the latter one may mention “Wassoll das also?” for yat kim. cid etat, “dann ware alles in Ordnung” for tadasarvam. sobheta, “der letzte Segen ware erteilt” for datto jalanjalih. , andmany more. Occasionally, however, Lasic seems to miss the point. “Hatder Erkennende (etwas davon)” (p. 88) for pratipattur kim ayatam is, Ithink, inadequate because kim ayatam conveys here lack of relevance,not lack of usefulness. nasmakam avasarah. (p. 54) could better beconveyed by “it’s none of our business” or “it does not concern us”than by “it’s not our turn” (“Wir sind (da) nicht an der Reihe”).

Next to idiomatic expressions, Jnanasrımitra’s variations of expressionand his occasional use of rare words present a challenge to any translator.To give a trivial example, Jnanasrımitra uses some ten different wordsfor “fire” (I recall agni, us.arbudha, citrabhanu, dhumadhvaja, dahana,pavi, pavaka, vahni, hutasa). Lasic translated them all by “fire” and inmy opinion he was right not to distract the reader from the philosophicalargument even if at the expense of the literary merits of the text. If Imay voice a single minor point of disagreement with Lasic, I considerhis treatment of sentences with iti occasionally unsatisfactory.9

Lasic makes an interesting remark about a little known technicalterm vyavaharasadhana (p. 104). He translates the term as “Beur-teilungsbeweis” and points out that the term is used for a basicallyredundant proof which “in Fallen wie einer auf der Begriffsstutzigkeit desGesprachspartners beruhenden Meinungsverschiedenheit aber dennochseine Berechtigung hat.” I agree that the term refers to a redundantproof, but Lasic seems to have conflated two different cases, that is,that of a disagreeing opponent and that of an imaginary dull-wittedperson who may disagree about some established fact. In all passagesadduced by Lasic to illustrate the application of a vyavaharasadhanathe redundant proof is advanced for the sake of a fool (mud. ha) whois obviously not the partner in a philosophical discussion.10 I am alsonot sure if “Beurteilungsbeweis” is an effective translation; literally Iunderstand the term as “a proof of [what is already established as/in]everyday practice.”

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∗∗∗The title of the work can be viewed as slightly misleading. Jnanasrımitrais not concerned with vyapti in general, but only with the vyapti betweentwo different entities such as smoke and fire, that is, other types ofvyapti, notably the one based on tadatmya, are not discussed in thepresent work. Jnanasrımitra’s thesis is that the vyapti between smoke andfire can be ascertained only if one determines that smoke is the productof fire. This can be proved by different combinations of perception andnon-apprehension (cf. below).

Jnanasrımitra defends his position against three opponents: somenot further identified “ancients” (pare purastanah. ), Trilocana andVacaspatimisra. The first group of opponents is identified by Ratnakırtias “Kumarila, etc.” (bhat.t.aprabhr. tayah. ). Lasic (p. 75, n. 2) voices somedoubts about the accuracy of this identification, but it seems to me thatit has to be accepted not only because of Ratnakırti’s privileged positionas Jnanasrımitra’s direct disciple, but also because the doctrine of the“ancients” according to which the reason and the property to be provedare connected or conjuncted (cf. p. 32.1–2: tasmat sannikars.aparyes.an. am.sam. yogenaiva kr. tartham. ata eva sam. yogı hetur ucyate vahner dhumah. ,na karyam iti; Lasic, however, translates sannikars.a as “Zusammen-hang”) fits quite well the known Mımam. sa terminology of inference.Already according to Sabara inference is based on a relation betweentwo parts (of a whole?): anumanam. jnatasambandhasyaikadesadarsanadekadesantare ‘sam. nikr. s. te ‘rthe buddhih. .11 While commenting on thisstatement by Sabara, Kumarila says that the “parts” are “characterizedby an aggregate” (samudayin)12 i.e., are components of an aggregateand it would be natural to assume that two parts/components that forman aggregate are in contact (sam. yoga) with each other. However, there isan important difference between the relation pertaining to the two partsof the inferential “aggregate” and a regular conjunction, namely, theformer is not reversible. An opponent speaking in Umbeka’s Vyakhya(quoted by Lasic p. 77) argues that the inferential relation inheres in therelata fire and smoke just as a conjunction (sam. yoga) inheres in the twosubstances it connects, and that therefore one could also infer smokefrom fire. Umbeka’s answer is that the inferential relation inheres only inone of the relata, namely, in the vyapya: nanu vyapteh. sambandhatvatsam. yogavad dhumagnisambandhisamavetatve sati dhumavad agnerapi gamakatvaprasanga iti . . . vyapyalaks.an. asambandhisamavetaivavyaptih. . na tv iyam. sam. yogavad ubhayasamaveta tathadarsanad ityarthah. .13 However, the objection itself seems to indicate that certainMımam. sakas conceived the vyapti relation to be similar to a conjunction.


Another point common to the positions of Jnanasrımitra’s opponentand the Mımam. sakas is that the vyapti is established by “frequentobservation” (bhuyodarsana).14 Sucaritamisra uses the idea of frequentobservation to solve the following dilemma. What is the whole (ekadesin)whose relation is known? Is it the subject of the inference (paks.a) or thesimilar instance (sapaks.a)? It cannot be the paks.a because its relation is(only) in the process of being known. It cannot be the sapaks.a becausethe sapaks.a need not be inferred as it is already established. This isno fault, says Sucarita, because the vyapti cannot be apprehended atonce.15 Of course, Sucarita’s date is much too late for him to representthe doctrine of the “ancients,” but perhaps an echo of it survives inthe following rejection: As for ekadesin and ekadesa, they are support(asraya) and what is characterized by support (asrayin); they should notbe considered as parts (avayava) and whole (avayavin).16 To conclude,although no texts of Jnanasrımitra’s “ancients” have survived, theiridentification by Ratnakırti as Kumarila and his followers does notseem to be far fetched.

Whatever the case may be, the position of the “ancients” that anvayaand vyatireka are determined by seeing smoke together with fire and notseeing smoke without fire was clearly obsolete at Jnanasrımitra’s time andwas easily dispensed with by him. Jnanasrımitra’s main opponents wereTrilocana and Vacaspati who founded the determination of vyapti on the“relation derived from own being” (svabhavikasambandha).17 Trilocana(p. 32.14–15) maintained that the svabhavikasambandha between twothings that belong to this kind18 is apprehended by the mind assistedby frequent observation: bhuyodarsanasahayena manasa tajjatıyanam.gr.hıto bhavati. Vacaspati (p. 33.1–6), however, differentiates. Thereis a svabhavikasambandha between smoke and fire, but not betweenfire and smoke. Fire is sometimes apprehended without smoke; it isconnected with smoke only when an additional condition (upadhi) ispresent, e.g., a connection with wet fuel. The determination of a relation,e.g. between smoke and fire, as svabhavika is due to the fact that nodeviation (vyabhicara) is ever seen. And there is no reason to assumethat something that was never seen exists (p. 33.7–10).

According to Vacaspati the svabhavikasambandha between percept-ible things is apprehended by perception. That is, contrary to Trilocana heassumes that the relation is not apprehended by the manas (p. 36.1) butby the external sense, e.g., in the case of smoke and fire it is apprehendedby the sense of vision (p. 36.9). In the case of things that are apprehendedby other praman. as the svabhavikasambandha is apprehended by theseother praman. as. The term svabhavikasambandha means or implies that

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a hetu which is related to a sadhya by svabhavikasambandha wouldlose its own being if it were without the sadhya (p. 36.14–15). Thus, arelation between being Maitra’s son (maitratanayatva) and having darkskin (syamata) is not a svabhavikasambandha; rather it is caused by anupadhi such as Maitra’s wife having digested certain food and drinkduring her pregnancy. Other patently false inferences such as “the fruiton top of this tree is ripe because it grows on this tree, like the fruit [onthe lower branch] that [we] tasted [and found to be ripe]” are explainedin the same manner as involving upadhis (p. 36.18–37.3). “Therefore,”concludes the opponent representing Vacaspati’s position, “that forwhich a relation based on its own being is restrictively determined, is amember (i.e. cause) of inference, [for instance] smoke, being produced,etc.” tasmad yasya svabhavikah. sambandho niyatah. , so ‘numanangam,yatha dhumakr. takatvadih. (p. 37.4–5).

Here I have to take issue with Lasic’s translation (p. 86): “Wemeine mit dem Wesen gegebene, (und somit) notwendige Verbindungzukommt, das ist Ursache einer Schlussfolgerung . . .” It is, I think,improbable that svabhavikah. , as a precedent attribute to sambandhah. ,could stand in a syntactical relation to a second attribute niyatah.placed after sambandhah. , with the implication of a consequence (“undsomit”). I would prefer to understand niyatah. as the nominal predicateof the relative clause, with svabhavikah. sambandhah. as its subject andthe genitive yasya as a “dative-like genitive,”19 rather than assume apossessive construction with svabhavikah. sambandhah. niyatah. as thething possessed and the “dative-like genitive” referring to the possessor.20

Further, in my opinion it is unlikely that niyata could mean “necessary”(relation) here, if the word is ever used in this sense.

In Lasic’s defence it has to be added that his interpretation is primafacie corroborated by another statement of Jnanasrımitra (p. 33.5–6),even though he himself does not say so here: tasmad vahnyadınamardrendhanadyupadhikr. tah. sambandhah. , na tu svabhavikah. . tato naniyatah. . “Therefore, the relation of fire, etc., [with smoke, etc.] iscaused by an upadhi such as wet fuel, etc., [it is] not, however, derivedfrom own-being. Therefore, it is not fixed/restricted/limited.” Here tooLasic translates niyata as “notwendig.” na niyatah. means here that therelation between fire, etc., and smoke, etc., is not fixed, i.e., that theoccurrence of fire, etc., is not restricted to the occurrence of smoke,etc., and therefore fire, etc., are not always connected to smoke etc.This obviously implies that there is no necessary relation betweenthe two; thus, the rendering of niyata as “necessary” is based on animplication, it is not a literal translation. Even if one accepts that niyata


means “necessary” here, could one simply superimpose this meaningonto the statement in p. 37.4–5, and assume a syntactical relation thereamounting to the positive counterpart of the connection between thetwo attributes expressed here by tatah. ? Is it advisable to rely on parallelpassages in such liberal manner?

Let me hasten to add, however, that Lasic does not rely only on thestatement in p. 33.5–6, but also on the original exposition of the doctrinein the Nyayavarttikatatparyat. ıka (Thakur’s ed., p. 135), which the abovestatements follow very closely. Furthermore, other scholars who dealtpreviously with Vacaspati’s doctrine of svabhavikasambandha havereached conclusions not dissimilar to Lasic’s understanding of the wordniyata as referring to an ontological aspect of the inferential relation.Already Gerhard Oberhammer translated21 yasyasau svabhaviko niyatah.as “dem eine aus dem Wesen kommende und konstante Verbindung (=Svabhavikasambandha) zukommt.” Similarly, Matilal who paraphrasedthis passage, in all probability without being familiar with, let alonebeing influenced by, Oberhammer’s article, says: “Thus, the relation thatthe hetu must have to the sadhya is one which is natural and invariable(niyata).”22 Without any apparent awareness of previous scholarship onthe topic Raghavendra Pandeya too suggests a similar interpretation:“Vacaspati maintains that the relation on which inference is to bebased, whatever else it may be, is both natural (svabhavika) and fixed(niyata).23

To sum up, all these scholars, including Lasic, consider thatsvabhavika and niyata are two distinct characteristics of the inferentialrelation and that niyata, whether it is rendered by “constant,” “fixed,”“invariable” or “necessary,” and regardless whether it is conjoined withor implied by svabhavika, is used here as an ontological term. In myopinion, however, niyata has to be understood as an epistemologicalterm, i.e., it does not suffice that there is a svabhavikasambandha inreality, one also has to determine it in a definite restrictive manner, toknow for sure that the relation is such and not otherwise, or else thereason cannot be gamaka, i.e., it cannot make the sadhya known. Inother words, I understand niyata as an equivalent to or even a strongerexpression than niscita. The passage in question reads as follows (NVTT.p. 135.8f.):

tasmad yo va sa vastu sambandhah. kevalam. yasyastu svabhavikoniyatah. , sa eva gamako gamya cetarah. sambandhıti yujyate. tatha hidhumadınam. vahnyadisambandhah. svabhavikah. , na tu vahnyadınam.dhumadibhih. . te hi vinapi dhumadibhir upalabhyante. yada tv

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ardrendhanadisambandham anubhavanti, tada dhumadibhih. sahasambadhyante. tasmad vahnyadınam ardrendhanadyupadhikr. tona svabhavikah. , tato na niyatah. . svabhavikas tu dhumadınam.vahnyadisambandhah. , tadupadher anupalabhyamanatvat, kvacidvyabhicarasyadarsanad anupalabhyamanasyapi kalpananupapatteh. .ato niyatah. sambandho ‘numanangam.

Therefore, the following is correct: Whatever a relation may be,24

only that [reason] for which the [relation] is restrictively determined(niyata) as svabhavika makes known, and that which is to be madeknown is the other related term (sambandhin). To explain, the relationof smoke, etc., with fire, etc., is derived from own-being (svabhavika),but not [the relation] of fire, etc., with smoke, etc. For these (i.e., fire,etc.) are perceived also without smoke, etc. But when [fire, etc.] areconnected (lit.: experience a relation) with wet fuel, etc., then they areconnected with smoke, etc. Therefore, for fire, etc., [its relation withsmoke in as much as it is] caused by the upadhi of wet fuel, etc., is notsvabhavika. Therefore, it is not restrictively determined (niyata). But therelation of smoke, etc., with fire, etc., is svabhavika because an upadhirelating to it is not being apprehended, as a deviation is not observedanywhere, [and] because it is not correct to assume [the existence ofan upadhi] even though it is not being apprehended. Therefore, [only]a restrictively determined (niyata) relation is a member (i.e., cause) ofinference.

In this passage the word niyata appears thrice. The second time it isambiguous; it may be understood epistemologically as translated above,but it may also be understood ontologically: niyata could mean herethat the relation between fire and smoke is not restricted, i.e., that firecan occur without smoke. This would be just another way of sayingthat fire deviates from smoke. In the third occurrence, however, thereis no ambiguity about the fact that niyata is used epistemologically:the relation is niyata (restrictively determined, ascertained) becausesomething is not being apprehended (anupalabhyamanatva), becauseone does not observe (adarsana).25 Now, which of the two meaningsapplies to the first occurrence of niyata? I believe the latter, for tworeasons. First, the interpretation of the passage by Oberhammer, Matilal,Pandeya and even Lasic26 would presuppose a syntactical awkwardnessof the underlying text. If it were correct, I would expect a ca to connectthe two predicates. In the case of Lasic’s interpretation I would expectsome element expressing the implicatory relationship between the two


predicates, such as svabhavikatvena or similar. Second, the interpretationby Oberhammer, etc., renders the term svabhavika redundant: if a relationis “invariable,” “fixed,” “constant,” etc., this already guarantees thatone of the related terms can be gamaka (provided that it is known tostand in such relation). Alternatively, this interpretation would implythat a relation could be svabhavika, but not niyata. Lasic may havefelt the redundancy; in any case this redundancy is not present in histranslation which suggests that svabhavika implies niyata. However,this interpretation by Lasic could imply that the ultimate definition of agamaka is that whose relation to the gamya is niyata, not svabhavika.Now, if this were the case, one should not expect to encounter definitionsor characterisations of gamaka or hetu where niyata is missing altogether.But there are such characterisations, for instance NVTT. p. 299.22 (on1.2.8): svabhaviko hi sambandho hetoh. sadhyena sahanumanangam.. . . The word niyata is not mentioned in this context. In p. 47.1f.Jnanasrımitra criticizes Vacaspati’s doctrine that svabhavikasambandhaconnects the universal to an individual (e.g. gotva to go). This is aclear reference to NVTT. on 5.1.3, p. 644, where gamaka is said to besvabhavikasambandhabhak. Again the word niyata does not appear evenonce in this context. This reference has escaped Lasic’s notice. Hadhe taken it and further parallel passages into account, he would havehad, I think, two options. He could either have modified his opinion orhe would have had to trivialize the word niyata in such a way that itsomission would cause no harm. The latter alternative, however, wouldrender niyata if not completely, then at least largely redundant.

The inadequacy of interpreting niyata as “necessary” is also apparentin a parallel passage in the Vyaptinirn. aya p. 39.12–13: yo yatropadhinavina niyatah. , tatra tasya svabhavikah. sambandhah. , yatha dahanedhumasya. Here Lasic does not translate niyata as “necessary,” but as“restricted”: “Was ohne bestimmenden Zusatz auf etwas eingeschranktist, das hat damit eine mit dem Wesen gegebene Verbindung . . .” Ofcourse, it would be non-sensical or tautological to say that something isnecessary somewhere without an upadhi, but even under the assumptionof the meaning of “restricted” (“eingeschrankt”) the statement is “doppeltgemoppelt” because if something is restricted ontologically in respect tosomething, then there can be no upadhi: the absence of an upadhi impliesthe presence of a svabhavikasambandha, which implies the presence ofontological restriction; as the ontological restriction would already beexpressed in this sentence by the reference to the absence of an upadhi(“without an upadhi”), it would hardly need to be expressed again bythe word niyata as referring to ontological restriction. Theoretically one

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could consider whether – as Lasic’s translation implies – somethingcould be niyata (ontologically) combined with an upadhi. For instance,one could say that fire occurring together with wet fuel is ontologicallyrestricted (niyata) to smoke. However, as far as I can see niyata is notused by Vacaspati in this manner; the passage from the NVTT. quotedand translated above speaks against such a usage: tasmad vahnyadınamardrendhanadyupadhikr. to na svabhavikah. , tato na niyatah. . If, on theother hand, one understands and translates niyata epistemologically, theredundancy disappears: “What is restrictively determined in respect toa certain [thing] without an upadhi [being involved], has a svabhavikarelation with that [thing].”

My assumption is also supported by a passage in Udayana’s Atmatat-tvaviveka which has been quoted and translated by Oberhammer:27

kah. punar ayam. pratibandhah. ? svabhavikasambandhah. . kah.svabhavarthah. ? nirupadhitvam. kah. punar upadhih. ? sadhyaprayojakam.nimittantaram. kim. vasya laks.an. am? sadhanavyapakatve satisadhyavyapakatvam. katham. punar evam. laks.an. ako ‘rthah. pratyetavyonirakartavyo veti? viparyayavirodhabadhakabhyam. kim. badhakam?anvayavyatirekavis.ayabhuyodarsanasahayyakam acarann anuttarastarkah. .

Here again, the svabhavikasambandha is not just a condition fora necessary relation between the two terms of inference. Ratherthe svabhavikasambandha itself forms the inferential relation(pratibandha),28 and as such it has to be ascertained, ultimately bytarka which sublates the possibility of an upadhi.

Further, one may consider parallel passages such as theone on p. 53 where the words gamaka and niscaya appeartogether: svabhavikasambandhabalena ca dhumo gamakah. . katham.tadaniscaye gamakatvena gr.hyeta? . . . tasman niscayapratibandhah.svabhavikatvapratibandha evarthatah. , niscayam antaren. agamakangasya svayam akincitkaratvat. “And smoke makes[fire] known by the force of svabhavikasambandha. When the[svabhavikasambandha] is not determined, how could [smoke] beapprehended as [something that] makes [fire] known? . . . Therefore,an obstacle to the determination amounts actually (arthatah. ) to anobstacle to being svabhavika, because the member (i.e., cause) thatmakes known (i.e., the reason) does not accomplish anything by itselfwithout determination.”


If niyata(sambandha) would refer to a necessary (relation), onewould expect that at some point the requirement of a determina-tion of this relation would mentioned. However, reading through theentire Vyapticarca, Vyaptinirn. aya and the relevant passages on thesvabhavikasambandha in the NVTT. , I did not find a single instancewhere ∗niyatasambandha is referred to as an object of determination;its is always svabhavikasambandha which is determined.

Independently of the issue of svabhavikasambandha, I would like toraise a question about the term “necessary relation.” In what sense canit be said that the relationship between smoke and fire is necessary?The “main stream” of the Western philosophical tradition in the lastfew centuries – from Hume and Kant to Wittgenstein (“every necessityis a logical necessity”) and analytical philosophers in general – doesnot allow necessary relations between natural phenomena. These arerestricted to logic, mathematics, geometry, but not to the relation amongentities that are or, more precisely, are supposed to be, in a relationof cause and effect. More recently, “necessary” is often defined interms of what is true in all possible worlds. Obviously, this meaningof “necessary” too could not apply to the relation between smokeand fire. I do not want to claim, of course, that the Indian traditionshould not have conceived of necessary relations in a different manner– indeed there is a great variety of usage within the Western traditionitself beginning with Plato and Aristotle. It would be conducive to abetter understanding of Indian philosophical doctrines if we knew moreprecisely what was meant by necessary relations in a specific historicalcontext.

∗∗∗

Turning to the siddhanta part (p. 37.7ff.), Jnanasrımitra begins the discus-sion by offering two alternative definitions of vyapti which correspondto the positive and negative formulations of the concomitance (anvayaand vyatireka): vyaptir nama vyapakasya tatra bhava eva vyapyasya vatatraiva bhava iti . . . Here too I find myself in slight disagreement withLasic who translates as follows (pp. 86–87): “Die Umfassung bedeutetdas ausschliessliche (eva) Vorliegen des Umfassenden dort [wo dasUmfasste ist] oder das Vorliegen des Umfassten ausschliesslich (eva)dort [wo das Umfassende ist].”

To say that vyapti means “the exclusive presence” (“das ausschliess-liche Vorliegen”) of the embracer (or pervader) where the embracedis found, implies consequences that Lasic certainly did not intend.The expression “exclusive presence of something somewhere” (and

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its German counterpart) is used primarily in two meanings: (1) thatsomething is present only at a certain place (and nowhere else), and (2)that only something (and nothing else) is present at a certain place. Forinstance, to speak of the exclusive presence (and sale) of Meinl productsin Meinl shops would mean either that Meinl products are found onlyat Meinl or that Meinl shops sell only Meinl products. Similarly, theexclusive presence of the pervader where the pervaded is found wouldmean either that fire exists only where smoke is present or that onlyfire (i.e., no objects other than fire) is present where smoke is present.

Jnanasrımitra’s formulation of vyapti repeats verbatim Dharmakırti’sformulation in the PVSV (Gnoli’s ed. p. 2.12f.) and HB (Steinkellner’sed. p. 2.7f.). Commenting on the latter, Arcat.a rightly observes thateva in the expression bhava eva conveys ayogavyavaccheda (exclusionof non-connection).29 Therefore, logically speaking there is no harmin not translating it at all. Or, if one wishes to keep the translationmore literal eva could be translated as an emphatic, namely, “presenceindeed” or similar, meaning presence and not at all/never non-presence,or presence at the exclusion of absence. This, however, cannot besuccessfully conveyed by “exclusive presence.”

The first objection by Trilocana to be tackled by Jnanasrımitra (p.42.16f.) concerns the range of perception and non-apprehension. Thesetwo, says Trilocana, have the particular as their object (vises. avis.ayatva).Thus, they cannot apprehend the vyapti-relation between two universals(samanya). Jnanasrımitra’s reply (p. 43.2f.) reflects the final stage ofdevelopment of the Buddhist doctrine of two praman. as. Both praman. ashave the particular and the universal as their objects according to adistinction between the object to be perceived (grahya) and the objectto be determined (adhyavaseya). What appears in the cognition is theperceived object; the object towards which the cognition “proceeds”(pravartate), i.e., in which it is engaged, is the determined object. In thecase of perception the perceived object is a particular (svalaks.an. a) andthe determined object is a universal (samanya); in the case of inferenceit is the other way round, that is, the perceived object is a universaland the determined object a particular. Thus, the perception of a singlephase (ks. an. a) can have the universal as its object when one takes intoconsideration the continuum which is determined by it (santanapeks. a),because perception is a means for attaining something within the samecontinuum as the perceived object.

Now, concerning the apprehension of the vyapti, even though onesees merely a single individual, perception has a universal as its objectby having all individuals that belong to the same kind as its object.


For instance, when one says “I determine by perception that smokearises from fire” the scope of this perception includes all individualsthat belong to the same kind, or more precisely, all individuals thatare excluded from those which are different from smoke and fire(sakalatadanyapod. havyaktijata). The fact that the scope of a cogni-tion is larger than its actual object is illustrated by a perception ofthe jar. When one sees a jar, one perceives only colour, but due tothe determination of this perceived object in respect to a jar whichconsists in a specific aggregate of colour, flavour, smell and touch(ruparasagandhasparsasamudayavises.a-) perception has a jar as itsobject. And it is not correct to say that conceptual constructions (vikalpa)have unreal objects because in respect to the determination of their objectsubsequent relational-identificatory cognitions (anusandhana) and infer-ences have real things as their objects. Thus, concludes Jnanasrımitra,when the inferential relation is perceived a certain individual, such assmoke or fire, is perceived; however, every individual that belongs tothe same kind is the determined object of this perception because, giventhe fact that all individuals that belong to the same kind do not appear,30

if there would not be such a determination, then the inferential relationcould not be established by perception.

Most of the siddhanta part consists of criticism of the opponents’views. On the establishment of his own doctrine Jnanasrımitra hasrelatively little to say. Basically he argues that unless a causal relationshipis established between two entities, an inference from one entity toanother will always remain doubtful. In this connection Jnanasrımitraalso undertakes an extensive discussion on the nature of doubt and theconditions of its arising.31 However, the crucial question as to how acausal relation can be determined is dealt with only in a subordinateclause where a verse from the Karyakaran. abhavasiddhi is quotedwithout further explanations.32 Jnanasrımitra was a Trikavadin, thatis, he maintained that causal relations can be determined by threesuccessive moments of perception and non-apprehension: (1) fire andsmoke are perceived, (2) fire is not perceived, (3) smoke is not perceived.Alternatively, the three moments leading to the determination can be(1) fire and smoke are not perceived (2) fire is perceived (3) smoke isperceived.33

The difficulties in ascertaining a svabhavikasambandha are nicelyillustrated by the case of the jewel and the “scratchability” by meansof iron. There is no unanimity in Nyaya texts concerning the elementof which diamonds are constituted. Some consider them to be madeof fire34 because they are observed to shine, others say that they are

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composed of earthy parts. Jnanasrımitra presupposes that diamondsare made of earth. Now, many earthy objects can be scratched withan iron-tipped instrument. Thus, one could suspect that there is asvabhavikasambandha between the property of being an earthy object(parthivatva) and the property of being scratchable by means of iron(lohalekhyatva). However, as is well known jewels cannot be scratchedby means of iron.35 Therefore, says the opponent, there is an upadhi,namely, having loose parts (prasithilavayavatva). This is not correct,replies Jnanasrımitra, because the property of having compact parts(ghanavayava) is seen in crystal too which can be scratched by meansof iron.

Consider a person who has not been able to observe that diamondscannot be scratched. Such a person would make diamonds the subject ofhis thesis (satasikharapaks. ıkaran. amatra36) and, unable to observe theupadhi which is only apparent in the case of diamonds themselves, wouldhave to conclude that there is a svabhavikasambandha between beingearthy and being scratchable by means of iron. Thus, operating withthe theory of svabhavikasambandha would lead to the false conclusionthat diamonds are scratchable. After several attempts to salvage hisdoctrine the opponent points out that there is a gradation or difference indegree of hardness (kat.hinyataratamya) in earthy objects. Because oneobserves this gradation one understands that at some stage scratchabilitymay no longer be there, and although many earthy objects are seen tobe scratchable by means of iron one would refrain from postulating asvabhavikasambandha and inferring that diamonds too can be scratched.In the case of smoke and fire, however, one observes no gradation inthe dependence of smoke on fire.

Udayana elaborates further on the difference of degree.37 As thelooseness of parts decreases, the effort of the scratcher increases(NVTP, p. 192.3–4: yatha yatha saithilyapakars.as tatha tatha lekhituh.prayatnaprakars.ah. ). If, however, the looseness or density of parts wereirrelevant, the activity of scratching would not yield results even whenone increases one’s effort in the case of clay, wood, stone, etc., becausethe earthiness is the same in all these cases. However, if this is the case,how is it known that the parts of a crystal are loose? Precisely becauseit can be scratched. There is a concomitance between scratchabilityby means of iron and having loose parts. Therefore, when the oneis present or absent, the other is present or absent. However, whenearthiness is present or absent the scratchability by means of iron isnot present or absent accordingly because one does not observe in thecase of diamonds (that they are scratchable, although they are earthy,


and that they are non-earthy, although they are unscratchable), andone observes in the case of water, etc. (that they are “scratchable,”38

although they are not earthy, and that they are non-earthy, althoughthey are not unscratchable).

Jnanasrımitra rejects the difference construed by his opponent betweenthe svabhavika relation of fire and smoke, and the aupadhika relationof earthiness and scratchability. The fact that one observes gradationin scratchability while earthiness remains the same is not sufficient toestablish the independence between the property “being scratchableby means of iron” from the property “being earthy.” Independence(nirapeks.ata) means separation (viccheda). And separation does notnecessarily occur by degrees, as for instance, in the case of a man andhis shackles (nigad. a).39 Moreover, smoke can also be observed to bewithout fire for a few moments when the fire has been extinguishedand its smoke lingers on. The difference between the two cases is thatunlike in the case of the man and his shackles there is no mere contact(sam. yoga) between smoke and fire, but origination of smoke fromfire. Thus, no suspicion arises whether smoke could be separate, i.e.,independent of fire. As regards the relations between fire and smoke,and earthiness and scratchability by iron, repeated observation andnon-observation cannot distinguish between them: it is not observed,due to some impediment,40 that a nature separate from fire occurs insmoke and that unscratchability occurs in earthy things, and it is alsoobserved many times that smoke is not separate from fire and thatearthy things can be scratched by iron. Therefore, the establishment ofsvabhavikasambandha is not conclusive.

In the conclusion Jnanasrımitra again takes up the crucial issueof the object of perception. Let it be admitted, says the opponent,that the apprehension of a vyapti between two different entities couldonly be an apprehension of tadutpatti; nevertheless, this apprehensioncannot be arrived at by means of perception and non-apprehensionbecause they are restricted to the present moment. As for the so-calleddetermination of all individuals that belong to the same kind, it isnothing but a conceptual construction (vikalpa) that follows immediatelyupon perception. Therefore, to say that perception has as its object allthings that belong to the same kind amounts to a borrowed ornament(yacitakaman. d. ana). It is better to accept that a conceptual constructionwhich is based on two universals (in the Buddhist sense of the term)apprehends that smoke arises from fire, and constitutes another meansof knowledge or (at least) a further perception because it apprehends a

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previously unapprehended object and arises at the time of the activityof the perception (of individuals).41

Jnanasrımitra replies that this objection is worthless (asara). Inthe case of a conceptual construction, too, having everything of thesame kind as its object follows from a determination because theparticular (svalaks.an. a) does not appear in it distinctly. Thus, for theapprehension of a vyapti the conceptual construction is not more suitablethan perception. The difference between the two is that in the case ofa conceptual construction the determination of the specific object isestablished merely in dependence on a later sequence of cognitions,such as the subsequent determination that corresponds to it (i.e., tothe conceptual construction itself), etc.42 The determination of thecorresponding object in the case of perception, however, is establishedin dependence on such a subsequent determination, etc., and on this veryconceptual construction. Neither perception nor conceptual constructioncan “touch” (i.e., apprehend individually and distinctly) the entire object(i.e., all objects of the same kind) (samastavastusparsa). Therefore, theestablishment by determination of the object, namely, all objects thatbelong to the same kind, which is established in everyday practice, cannotbe rejected and is common to both direct experience and conceptualconstruction. Thus, when the relation between cause and effect hasbeen made the object of perception, the conceptual construction whichconsists in mental activity is nothing but a recollection, not a meansof knowledge. And it is fitting for perception, not for conceptualconstruction, that it can apprehend all individuals of the same kindbecause it can “touch” the whole aggregate (samudaya) even by wayof a part only.

Dharmakırti would have turned in his grave. Or would he?

NOTES

1 This date is certainly too early. It is odd, but typical of Lasic’s laconism thatJnanasrımitra’s date, nowadays widely assumed to be ca. 1000, is not even mentionedin the book under review.2 Cf. E. Frauwallner, “Jnanasrı.” WZKM 38, 1932, 229–234; repr. in G. Oberhammerand E. Steinkellner (eds), Erich Frauwallner. Kleine Schriften. Wiesbaden 1982,pp. 361–366.3 Cf. A. Thakur (ed.), Jnanasrımitranibandhavali (Buddhist Philosophical Works ofJnanasrımitra). Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series No. 5. Kashi Prasad Jayaswal ResearchInstitute. Patna 1987 (1st ed. Patna 1959). Except for the above-mentioned manuscript,a defective copy of another manuscript could be used additionally for the edition ofthe Ks.an. abhangadhyaya.4 Cf. Y. Kajiyama, “Trikapancakacinta. Development of the Buddhist Theory on theDetermination of Causality.” Miscellanae Indologica Kiotiensia 4/5, 1963, 1–15; repr. in


K. Mimaki et al. (ed.), Y. Kajiyama, Studies in Buddhist Philosophy (Selected Papers).Kyoto 1989, pp. 475–489. The Karyakaran. abhavasiddhi is translated on pp. 5–11 [=479–485]. Kajiyama’s interpretation was revised by Lasic in “Dharmakırti and hisSuccessors on the Determination of Causality”, in S. Katsura (ed.), Dharmakırti’sThought and Its Impact on Indian and Tibetan Philosophy. Proceedings of the ThirdInternational Dharmakırti Conference, Hiroshima, November 4–6, 1997. Wien 1999,233–242. In this connection one may also mention Akihiko Akamatsu’s translationof the Apohaprakaran. a, unpublished dissertation, Paris 1983, which, however, wasnot available to me.5 Except in the case of the edition of the Ks.an. abhangadhyaya for which a secondmanuscript was used, Thakur never points out where he departs from the manuscriptevidence. A quick glance at Lasic’s footnotes will immediately reveal how oftenThakur rightly corrected the manuscript: one just has to look for the abbreviation“verb. Th.” (= corrected by Thakur).6 P. 31.14: utpatti- → tadutpatti- (so also in the parallel passage in VyN); p. 44.15: kascid → ka cid; p. 45.19: the text seems corrupt; perhaps pascimas ca → pascimasya,further emendations may be necessary in this sentence; p. 54.20: niscaya- → naniscaya-; cf. however, Lasic’s attempt to explain the text as it stands on p. 111, n.78; p. 65.11: satasikhara- → satasikha-? p. 69.6–7: bhavac → ‘bhavac?7 Cf. Horst Lasic, Ratnakırtis Vyaptinirn. aya. Sanskrittext, Ubersetzung, Analyse.Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde herausgegeben von ErnstSteinkellner, Heft 49. Arbeitskreis fur tibetische und buddhistische Studien UniversitatWien: Wien 2000. Pp. 95.8 With all the sympathy and appreciation of Lasic’s style I think he goes too far whenhe conserves the ambiguities of the original in his translation. For instance p. 106:“Und dabei nimmt [die Definition] (auch) ohne Beschrankung auf ein (bestimmtes)Ausmass uberhaupt keinen Schaden, wie bei der Beschrankung des Ausmasses derZeit (die notig ist), damit ein Same einen Keim hervorbringt.” Is the amount of timerestricted or not?9 Here are some examples.(1) Text p. 39.10–13: atha pratyasannayor api karabhagardabhayoh.svatantryen. opalaks. yamanayoh. pasyami tavat kim ekam apasaryaman. am anyo‘nudhavati dhenum iva vatsa iti jijnasaya tathanutis. t.han na tatha pratipadyate.Translation p. 90: “(Einwand:) Einer, der sich durch den Wunsch, zu wissen, obvon einem Kamel und einem Esel, die, obwohl sie beieinanderstehen, offensichtlich(pasyami) als (voneinander) unabhangig erkannt werden, nun dem einen, wenn erweggefuhrt wird, der andere nachlauft, wie das Kalb der Kuh, entsprechend verhalt,erkennt (es) nicht so.” Lasic considers that the scope of iti-clause commences imme-diately after the introductory atha, but in my opinion it only starts with pasyami.Lasic’s translation of pasyami as “offensichtlich” seems to conceal a contradiction:if it is already obvious that the camel and the donkey are independent of each other,I would hardly have the wish to know whether they are dependent on each other. Iwould therefore translate the iti-clause expressing the jijnasa in respect to the cameland the donkey as follows: “Ich guck’ (or: schau’) zunachst mal, ob dem einen,wenn er weggefuhrt wird, . . .” This use of pasyami (roughly “let me see”) is, as faras I know, rare in classical Sanskrit and should perhaps count as a colloquialism.(2) Text p. 43.17–18.: bhedavivecane tu pratyekam. svalaks.an. am iti svasabdenaivavyavaharah. . Tr. p. 96: “Wenn aber die Verschiedenheiten unterschieden werden, (wird)jede einzelne ein Individuelles (svalaks.an. a) (genannt). Dabei wird [die Tatsache,dass jedes einzelne gemeint ist] gerade durch den Ausdruck “eigen” (sva) (im Wortsvalaks.an. a) ausgedruckt.” I see no reason why the sentence has to be split intotwo and a new subject (“die Tatsache, dass jedes einzelne gemeint ist”) be assumedfor the second sentence. One could also translate meaningfully: “Wenn aber die

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Verschiedenheiten unterschieden werden, gibt es fur jede einzeln (pratyekam, adv.)die Benennung eben mittels des Wortes sva [wenn man in Bezug auf sie] ‘svalaks.an. a’(‘Individuelles’) [verwendet].”(3) Text p. 48.15–17: . . . ity aupadhikasankayam. na vipaks. an vinivr. ttir dhumasyetisthitam. Tr. p. 103: “Wenn somit ein Verdacht auf eine durch einen bestimmendenZusatz gegebene (Verbindung) besteht, gibt es kein (festgestelltes) Fehlen des Rauchesim Ungleichartigen. Das steht fest.” Lasic construes the final iti with the entire sentence,but this is obviously problematic because the absence (or presence) of somethingcannot be determined in the case of doubt. For this reason Lasic adds “(festgestelltes).”It would be equally possible to assume that the scope of the iti-clause begins only afterna: “Wenn somit ein Verdacht auf eine durch einen bestimmenden Zusatz gegebene[Verbindung] besteht, steht es nicht fest, dass der Rauch beim Ungleichartigen fehlt.”(4) Text p. 49.16–17: tatas ca na kvacid vyabhicara ity atah. svabhavikatvam ayuktam.Tr. p. 104: “. . . und daher liegt nicht in jeglichem Fall ein (sichtbares) Abweichen(vor). Daher ist das Mit-dem-Wesen-Gegebensein falsch.” Lasic obviously understandsiti as concluding the formulation of a fact referred to with atah. . One could alsounderstand iti as concluding the formulation of the content of a cognition referred towith atah. and translate correspondingly: “Und somit ist es nicht richtig [anzunehmen,]dass [eineVerbindung] mit dem Wesen gegeben ist [nur] wegen [der Erkenntnis] ‘[Eswird] nirgendwo ein Abweichen [gesehen].’ ”10 Cf. for instance J (i.e., Jnanasrımitranibandhavali, cf. note 3 above) p. 110.20–23quoted by Lasic in n. 67: na casiddhih. , idantaya darsayitum asakyasya bahyavastunah.pratibhasavyavaharabhavat, idantaya nirdesanıye ca vivadabhavat. na hi dan. d. o‘pi dan. d. ipratıtya sadhyo ‘dhyaks. asiddhatvat. mud. ham. prati vyavaharasadhane ‘pinedantaya nirdesah. , vises.ato locanagocare.11 Cf. Sabarabhas. ya 1.1.5 in E. Frauwallner, Materialien zur altesten Erkenntnislehreder Karmamımam. sa. Wien 1968, p. 30.18–19. Madeleine Biardeau makes an inter-esting remark in this connection (cf. Theorie de la connaissance et philosophie dela parole dans le brahmanisme classique. Paris/La Haye 1964, p. 97): “[C]’est larelation elle-meme qui est connue, qui donc a ete percue, et les termes n’en sontque des ‘parties’ – ekadesa –; l’inference est donc en somme la reconstitution d’untout primitivement percue, grace a la perception actuelle d’une partie seulementde ce tout: c’est un souvenir que la perception d’une partie aide a reveiller.” It isnot certain, however, that the whole implied by the parts (ekadesa) is the relationitself, as clearly assumed e.g., by Biardeau who interprets jnatasambandhasya as akarmadharaya-compound (and not as a bahuvrıhi relating to the cognizing subject).One can also understand Sabara’s statement as referring to a relation between twoparts of an unmentioned whole or aggregate. In the classical period, in any case, arelation was not considered to have parts.

Various interpretations of Sabara’s definition by later Mımam. sakas such as Kumarila,Prabhakara and their followers are clearly presented in G.P. Bhatt, Epistemology ofthe Bhat.t.a School of Purva Mımansa. Varanasi 1962, pp. 206ff.12 Cf. Slokavarttika of Srı Kumarila Bhat.t.a with the Commentary Nyayaratnakara ofSrı Parthasarathi Misra. Ed. Dvarikadasa. Varanasi 1978. Anumanapariccheda 3cd:tasyaikadesasabdabhyam ucyete samudayinau. Cf. also Nyayaratnakara ad loc., p.247.1–2: yad lingalingidvayam. tat samudaya eva jnatasambandhah. . tasyaikadesah.samudayı. tasya darsanat samudayyantare buddhir iti samudayivacanav ekadesasabdaviti. Cf. also Umbeka, Slokavarttikavyakhya (ed. S.K.R. Shastri, Madras 1940), p.305.11–12: purvavad arambhakatvena samudayasya samudayinav ekadesinav (readekadesav?) iti.13 Cf. Slokavarttikavyakhya, p. 306.17–20.14 Cf. Vyapticarca, p. 37.17. I do not claim, of course, that the tenet of frequentobservation as leading to the apprehension of the vyapti is unique to the Mımam. sakas.


On the contrary, this idea is used prominently in the doctrines of Trilocana andVacaspati.15 Cf. Mımam. saslokavarttika of Kumarilabhat. t.a, with the commentary Kasika ofSucaritamisra. Ed. V.A. Ramaswami Sastri. Trivandrum 1943. Part III, p. 5.9f.:kah. punar ekadesı jnatasambandhah. – paks.ah. sapaks.o va? na tavat paks.ah. ,jnayamanasambandhatvat. na ca sapaks. ah. siddhatvenananumeyatvat. nais.a dos.ah. .vyaptir hi na sakr.d darsananirgrahya.16 Ibid., p. 5.17–18: ekadesy[ai]<e>kadesau (or: ekadesaikadesinau) casrayasrayin. avasamitau. na punar avayavavayavinav iti dras. t.avyam iti.17 The pioneering study of this concept by Oberhammer is clearly outdated, butunsuperseded. Cf. G. Oberhammer, “Der Svabhavika-sambandha. Ein geschichtlicherBeitrag zur Nyaya-Logik. WZKS 8, 1964, pp. 131–181. Some points have recentlybeen discussed and rectified by Helmut Krasser in a forthcoming study (Wien 2001?)of Sankaranandana’s refutation of God.18 The term tajjatıya usually means “belonging to the same universal.” This meaning,however, cannot be assumed here because things like smoke and fire do not belongto the same universal. I suggest, therefore, to understand the term to refer to thingsthat belong to the same two kinds as those frequently observed (i.e., of fire andsmoke respectively). Lasic’s precise understanding of the term is not clear to me,but his translation seems to exclude my interpretation. In any case, I fail to find thereferents of “derartigen [Elementen]” (p. 79) in the previous passage.19 Cf. Speijer, Sanskrit Syntax, Leiden 1886, §129.20 Cf. Speijer, ibid., §130.21 Cf. G. Oberhammer, “Der Svabhavika-sambandha,” p. 157.22 Cf. his summary in K.H. Potter (ed.), Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. IndianMetaphysics and Epistemology: The Tradition of Nyaya-Vaises. ika up to Gangesa.Delhi 1977, p. 464.23 Cf. R. Pandeya, Major Hetvabhasas. A Formal Analysis (With Reference to Nyayaand Buddhism). Delhi 1984, p. 14.24 I am not familiar with the expression yo va sa vastu; the translation followsOberhammer’s.25 Note also that the next sentence is formulated against Dharmakırti’s positionand that a half-verse (PV 1.326cd = PVin 2.46cd) containing the word niyamaka isquoted: avasyam. sankaya bhavyam. niyamakam apasyatam. “A doubt must necessarilyarise for those who do not see a factor conducive to a restrictive determination.”26 Cf. n. 15: “. . . mit dem Wesen gegeben ist, [und somit] notwendig . . .” Lasicexplains “und somit” as conveying “eine notwendige und zwingende Bedingung.”27 Cf. Oberhammer, ibid., pp. 164–165 (Chowkambha ed. pp. 403–405, Dvivedinand Dravida ed. p. 863).28 That pratibandha here means an inferential relation is clear from the previouspassage.29 As opposed to anyayogavyavaccheda which is the function of eva in the second,alternative definition. Cf. Hetubindut. ıka of Bhat.t.a Arcat.a with the sub-commentaryentitled Aloka of Durveka Misra. Ed. S. Sanghavi and Muni Jinavijayaji. Baroda 1949,p. 18.16–17: purvatrayogavyavacchedenavadharan. am uttaratranyayogavyavacchedeneti. . . . Cf. also E. Steinkellner Dharmakırti’s Hetubinduh. . Wien 1967. Teil II, n. 20.Lasic’s translation follows Steinkellner’s, ibid., p. 34.30 My interpretation of the syntax here differs slightly from Lasic’s (p. 98).31 According to Lasic’s analysis this section covers pp. 22.7–30.11 [= 52.7–60.11],but perhaps the section continues until 32.19 [= 62.19].

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32 Cf. p. 50.15–16 quoted from J (Thakur) 319.22–23:pragadr. s. t.au kramat pasyan vetti hetuphalasthitim |dr. s. t.au va kramaso ‘pasyann anyatha tv anavasthitih. ||Translated by Kajiyama, ibid. (cf. n. 4 above), p. 8 [= 482]: “Perceiving successively the(two things) which were not seen before, or perceiving successively the disappearanceof the two things which were seen before, we come to know the definite relation ofcause and effect; otherwise it would require an infinite series (of cognitions) (v. 8).”33 On the doctrine of the trikavadin as opposed to that of the pancakavadin whoassumes five moments, cf. Lasic 1999 (in n. 4 above).34 Cf. K. Preisendanz, Studien zu Nyayasutra III.1 mit dem Nyayatattvaloka VacaspatiMisras II. Stuttgart 1994, Part 2, p. 550.35 The example of diamonds and “scratchability” by means of iron is already usedby Dharmakırti, though not in connection with the svabhavikasambandha; cf. PV IV240. Further references are given by Lasic in Vyaptinirn. aya, p. 59, n. 34, but oddlyenough, only a single reference in Vyapticarca p. 127, n. 118, which should readNVTP 191.21–192.10.36 satasikhara is not recorded in the dictionaries; perhaps satasikha, as the originalreading of the manuscript, is to be preferred, cf. Kumarasambhava 2.38.37 Cf. Nyayavarttikatatparyaparisuddhi of Udayanacarya. Ed. A. Thakur. Delhi 1996,p. 191.21f.38 In the case of water, etc., “scratchability” presumably means that a line or afurrow can be drawn in them at least temporarily.39 I assume that the separation from nigad. a is an example for lack of gradation:either one is a 100% shackled or not at all.40 It is not entirely clear to me whether an impediment(?) (ahatya?) is responsiblefor non-observation in both cases or only in the case of non-scratchability. Smokeis dependent on fire, i.e., it is not separate from fire, and this means that thenon-observation of its separateness (viccheda) should not be due to an impediment.However, Jnanasrımitra admits that smoke can be separate from fire for a few moments(katipayaks.an. a), and thus it is possible that an impediment could prevent one fromseeing that smoke lingers on for a few moments without fire.41 Cf. p. 69.5–7: . . . praman. antaram. pratyaks. antaram. va, anadhigatadhigamadadhyaks.avyaparakale bhavac ceti cet.Lasic p. 131, however: “. . ., (als) weiteres Erkenntnismittel, da sie etwas Nichterkannteserkennt, oder, da sie zur Zeit der Tatigkeit einer Wahrnehmung besteht, als weitere(Unterart der) Wahrnehmung?” (The question mark is only a typo).I am not sure whether there is actually a yathasam. khya relation between the nominativesand ablatives: the qualification anadhigatadhigama qualifies every praman. a (includingperception) and thus could apply as a reason to both nominatives. However, grantedthat there is a yathasam. khya relation between the nominatives and ablatives, I stilldo not understand why a cognition has to be another perception just because it existsat the time of the activity of perception. (Is the time of the activity of perceptionthe same time as the time of the existence of perception?) Perhaps one shouldread ‘bhavac instead of bhavac. The argument could be interpreted as follows. Theconceptual construction which apprehends the relation between the two universalsis another means of knowledge or (if one does not want to abandon the doctrine oftwo praman. as then) it is another (type of) perception because it does not arise atthe time when the individual smoke and fire are being perceived. In other words,because the mode of arising of the conceptual construction, even if it is consideredas perception, is different from the mode of arising of a regular sense perception, itshould at least be considered as another type of perception. I want to emphasize,however, that this interpretation is only tentative.


42 This interpretation is suggested only tentatively; cf. p. 69.10–11: kevalam.svanurupanuvyavasayadyuttaraprabandhapeks.aya vikalpe vis.ayadhyavasayavyavastha.Lasic’s translation (p. 132) differs considerably from the above interpretation: “Alleindies ist der Unterschied: Bei der Vorstellung (erfolgt) eine Zuordnung eines Objektesvermittels Bestimmung (vis.ayadhyavasayavyavastha) abhangig von einer Reihe vonfolgenden (Momenten), sekundaren Bestimmungen usw.”I have to admit that this translation is incomprehensible to me. This is one of manypassages where one wishes that some explicative notes would accompany the transla-tion. For instance, I fail to understand what is meant by “sekundare Bestimmungen”and why Lasic does not understand the fairly common term anuvyavasaya in thesense of the subsequent apprehension of an earlier cognition by a later cognition. If Iunderstand correctly, what Jnanasrımitra claims is that both in the case of a conceptualconstruction and of a perception the determination of the object, i.e., of the fact thatall smoke depends on fire, is established by subsequent introspection (anuvyavasaya),etc., and neither conceptual construction nor perception can apprehend individuallyand distinctly all individuals of the same kind. Therefore, there is no gain to assumethat the apprehension of a vyapti occurs in a conceptual construction and not in aperception. The only difference between the two would lie in the fact that in thecase of perception there is an additional moment: (1) perception, (2) conceptualconstruction, (3) determination through subsequent introspection, etc. In the case ofa conceptual construction, only (2) and (3) are necessary for the determination ofthe object in question.

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