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    Perez vs. The Medical City General Hospital

    DOMINADOR S. PEREZ and CELINE CAMPOS, Petitioners, vs. THE MEDICAL CITYGENERAL HOSPITAL, ALFREDO BENGZON, BENITA MACALAGAY and MARIANNEFRANCISCO, Respondents.

    G.R. No. 150198March 6, 2006

    AZCUNA, J.:

    FACTS:

    Petitioners were orderlies of respondent Medical City. In their lockers were foundsome medicines and supplies owned by the latter. After refusing to voluntarilyresign with separation pay, petitioners were dismissed from service. The LA foundrespondents guilty of illegal dismissal. On appeal to the NLRC, the LAs decision wasreversed and the complaint was dismissed. Petitioners then went to the CA on apetition for certiorari which issued the assailed decision, denying the petition andaffirming the decision of the NLRC. Hence, this petition.

    ISSUE: WON petitioners were illegally dismissed.

    RULING:

    In reversing the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC concluded: The hospital has convincingly established that all employees, including the hereincomplainants, are not allowed to place hospital items in their respective lockers asthis is contrary to the rules and procedures of the hospital x x x.

    Contrary to the position taken by the Labor Arbiter, the Hospitals dismissal of petitioners did not rest on speculative inferences. Petitioners themselves haveadmitted that properties belonging to the Hospital were found inside their lockers.As to how these items got inside the lockers, petitioners acknowledged havingplaced them there against company rules. In view of these admissions, there isample evidence to support a charge for pilferage unless petitioners cansatisfactorily explain their possession.

    St. Lukes Medical Center EmployeesAssociationvs. NLRC[G.R. No. 162053.March 7, 2007]

    Facts:Maribel S. Santos was an X-Ray Technician in the Radiology department of St. Lukes.

    Subsequently,Congress passed and enacted Republic Act No. 7431 known as the Radiologic Technology Act of

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    1992, which required that a person must obtain the proper certificate of registration from theBoard

    of Radiologic Technology for the practice or offer to practice as a radiology and/or x-raytechnologist

    in the Philippines. In turn, the Director of the Institute of Radiology issued a final notice to Santosrequiring her to comply by taking and passing the examination; otherwise St. Lukes may be

    compelled to retire her from employment should there be no other position available where shemay

    be absorbed. Despite extensions of time within which she could comply, Santos failed to complywith

    the requirement for her continued employment.Issue:

    Was Santos validly dismissed for failure to secure a certificate of registration from the Board of Radiologic Technology?

    Held:While the right of workers to security of tenure is guaranteed by the Constitution, its exercise may

    bereasonably regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace,education, order, safety, and the general welfare of the people. Consequently, persons who desire

    toengage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to

    takean examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. The most concrete example

    of this would be in the field of medicine, the practice of which in all its branches has been closely

    regulated by the State. It has long been recognized that the regulation of this field is a reasonablemethod of protecting the health and safety of the public to protect the public from the potentially

    deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance among those who would practice medicine. Thesame

    rationale applies in the regulation of the practice of radiologic and x-ray technology.The enactment of R.A. (Nos.) 7431 and 4226 are recognized as an exercise of the States inherent

    police power. It should be noted that the police power embraces the power to prescriberegulations

    to promote the health, morals, educations, good order, safety or general welfare of the people.The

    state is justified in prescribing the specific requirements for x-ray technicians and/or any other professions connected with the health and safety of its citizens. St. Lukes being engaged in thehospital and health care business, is a proper subject of the cited law; thus, having in mind the

    legalrequirements of these laws, the latte

    PLDT v NLRC and Marilyn Abucay, G.R. No. L-80609http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1988/aug1988/gr_80609_1988.htmlFACTS: Marilyn Abucay, a traffic

    operator of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, was accused by two complainants of havingdemanded and received from them the total amount of P3,800.00 inconsideration of her promise to

    facilitate approval of their applications fortelephone installation.

    1Investigated and heard, she was found guilty ascharged and accordingly separated from the service. 2

    She went to theMinistry of Labor and Employment claiming she had been illegallyremoved. Afterconsideration of the evidence and arguments of theparties, the company was sustained and the complaint

    was dismissed forlack of merit.Both the petitioner and the private respondent appealed to the NationalLaborRelations Board, which upheld the said decision

    in totoanddismissed the appeals.

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    4

    The private respondent took no further action,thereby impliedly accepting the validity of her dismissal. Thepetitioner,however, is now before us to question the affirmance of the above- quotedaward as having been

    made with grave abuse of discretion. The position of the petitioner is simply stated: It is conceded thatanemployee illegally dismissed is entitled to reinstatement and backwages asrequired by the labor laws.However, an employee dismissed for cause isentitled to neither reinstatement nor backwages and is not

    allowed anyrelief at all because his dismissal is in accordance with law. In the case of the private respondent,she has been awarded financial assistanceequivalent to ten months pay corresponding to her 10 yearservice in thecompany despite her removal for cause. She is, therefore, in effectrewarded rather than

    punished for her dishonesty, and without any legalauthorization or justification. The award is made on theground of equityand compassion, which cannot be a substitute for law. Moreover, suchaward puts a premiumon dishonesty and encourages instead of deterringcorruption.For its part, the public respondent claims thatthe employee is sufficientlypunished with her dismissal. The grant of financial assistance is notintended as areward for her offense but merely to help her for the loss of her employment after working faithfully with thecompany for ten years.ISSUE: The legality of the award of financial assistance to an employeewho had been

    dismissed for cause as found by the public respondent.HELD: The Court notes, however, that where theexception has been applied, thedecisions have not been consistent as to the justification for the grant of

    separation pay and the amount or rate of such award. Thus, the employeesdismissed for theft in theFirestone case and for animosities with fellowworkers in the Engineering Equipment case were both awarded

    separationpay not withstanding that the first cause was certainly more serious thanthe second. No lesscuriously, the employee in the Soco case was allowedonly one-half month pay for every year of his 18 years

    of service, but inFilipro the award was two months separation pay for 2 years service. InFirestone, theemployee was allowed full separation pay corresponding tohis 11 years of service, but in Metro, theemployee was granted only one-half month separation pay for every year of her 15year service. It

    wouldseem then that length of service is not necessarily a criterion for the grantof separation pay andneither apparently is the reason for the dismissal. The Court feels that distinctions are in order. We note that

    heretofore theseparation pay, when it was considered warranted, was requiredregardless of the nature ordegree of the ground proved, be it mereinefficiency or something graver like immorality or dishonesty.

    Thebenediction of compassion was made to cover a multitude of sins, as itwere, and to justify the helpinghand to the validly dismissed employeewhatever the reason for his dismissal. This policy should be re-

    examined. Itis time we rationalized the exception, to make it fair to both labor andmanagement, especiallyto labor. There should be no question that where it comes to such valid but notiniquitous causes as failure to

    comply with work standards, the grant of separation pay to the dismissed employee may be both justandcompassionate, particularly if he has worked for some time with thecompany. For example, a

    subordinate who has irreconcilable policy orpersonal differences with his employer may be validly dismissedfordemonstrated loss of confidence, which is an allowable ground. A workingmother who has to be frequentlyabsent because she has also to take careof her child may also be removed because of her poor attendance,

    thisbeing another authorized ground. It is not the employee's fault if he doesnot have the necessary aptitudefor his work but on the other hand thecompany cannot be required to maintain him just the same at the

    expenseof the efficiency of its operations. He too may be validly replaced. Underthese and similarcircumstances, however, the award to the employee of separation pay would be sustainable under the social justice policy even if the separation is for cause.But where the cause of the separation is more serious thanmereinefficiency, the generosity of the law must be more discerning. There is nodoubt it is compassionate to

    give separation pay to a salesman if he isdismissed for his inability to fill his quota but surely he does notdeservesuch generosity if his offense is misappropriation of the receipts of hissales. This is no longer mere

    incompetence but clear dishonesty. A securityguard found sleeping on the job is doubtless subject todismissal but maybe allowed separation pay since his conduct, while inept, is not depraved.But if he was infact not really sleeping but sleeping with a prostituteduring his tour of duty and in the company premises,the situation ischanged completely. This is not only inefficiency but immorality and thegrant of separationpay would be entirely unjustified.We hold that henceforth separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in those instances where the employee is validlydismissed for causes other than serious

    misconduct or those reflecting onhis moral character. Where the reason for the valid dismissal is,forexample, habitual intoxication or an offense involving moral turpitude, liketheft or illicit sexual relationswith a fellow worker, the employer may notbe required to give the dismissed employee separation pay, or

    financialassistance, or whatever other name it is called, on the ground of social justice.We hold that thegrant of separation pay in the case at bar is unjustified. The private respondent has been dismissed for

    dishonesty, as found by thelabor arbiter and affirmed by the NLRC and as she herself has impliedlyadmitted. The fact that she has worked with the PLDT for more than adecade, if it is to be considered at all, should be

    taken against her as itreflects a regrettable lack of loyalty that she should have strengthenedinstead of betraying during all of her 10 years of service with the company.If regarded as a justification for moderatingthe penalty of dismissal, it willactually become a prize for disloyalty, perverting the meaning of social justice

    and undermining the efforts of labor to cleanse its ranks of allundesirables. The Court also rules that theseparation pay, if found due under thecircumstances of each case, should be computed at the rate of one

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    monthsalary for every year of service, assuming the length of such service isdeemed material. This iswithout prejudice to the application of specialagreements between the employer and the employee

    stipulating a higherrate of computation and providing for more benefits to the dischargedemployee. Thepetition is GRANTED.

    PNOC-EDC, et al. vs Frederick AbellaG.R. No. 153904

    January 17, 2005

    FACTS:

    On 01 June 1989, Frederick V. Abella started working with PNOC-EDC as a probationary Security Assistant atits SNGP in Ticala, Valencia, Negros Oriental. Subsequently, he became a regular employee. On 20 April1990, Abella was informed that his employment with PNOC-EDC would be terminated effective 21 May 1990,allegedly due to a company-wide reorganization pursuant to its Manpower Reduction Program, wherein theposition of Security Assistant at PNOC-EDC SNGP had been abolished.

    Aggrieved, Abella filed a case of illegal dismissal, and for actual, moral, and exemplary damages with theNLRC at Dumaguete City. NLRC held that Abella was illegally dismissed as the company and its officers failedto show a "clear scheme and convincing proof of reorganization. All other claims are dismissed. An appealwas timely filed with the NLRC.

    Meanwhile, with said appeal still pending in the NLRC, the labor arbiter issued an order dated 20 November

    1991, directing the company to "admit back to work or reinstate the complainant under the same terms andconditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstatedin the payroll."

    Pursuant to the above order, Abella was reinstated in the payroll as a General Services Assistant (PAL II), hisoriginal position of Security Assistant having been abolished by virtue of the company-wide reorganization.Subsequently, he was re-slotted as a Pipeline Foreman, while he was actually discharging the functions of aSecurity Assistant. As insisted by the petitioners, this situation was due to the fact that the original positionof the private respondent had already been abolished in the previous company-wide reorganization in 1991.

    But then, the private respondent was re-slotted as Security Assistant when he was transferred to the LeyteGeothermal Project. He was, thus, performing the functions of a Security Assistant and at the same timeoccupying the official position of a Security Assistant though in a geographically different location, when saidposition became vacant.

    In the meantime, for failing to heed the directives of his supervisors, Abella received another "show cause"memorandum dated 14 July 1994, from Tongco, ordering him to explain in writing why no disciplinary actionshould be taken against him for insubordination and for being AWOL. Abella, in his reply dated 16 July 1994,countered that "he is not guilty of insubordination since he was not reinstated to his former position asSecurity Assistant at Ticala, Valencia, Negros Oriental, per Writ of Execution issued by the labor arbiter."

    Abella ended up filing three complaint before the NLRC for unfair labor practice, illegal suspension,nonpayment of mid-year bonus and 13th month pay for 1990 and 1991, claim for hazard pay, and annualsalary increase against the company and its officers. After hearing the parties, the Labor Arbiter GeoffreyVillahermosa rendered declaring the respondents not guilty of unfair labor practice and illegally dismissingthe complainant. On appeal, the NLRC reversed and set aside the Decision. The company came to the Courtof Appeal, wherein the appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

    ISSUE:

    Whether or not the reinstatement of respondent was a faithful compliance of the provisions of Paragraph 3,Article 223 of the Labor Code. RULING:

    Reinstatement presupposes that the previous position from which one had been removed still exists, or thatthere is an unfilled position more or less of a similar nature as this previously occupied by the employee.

    Accordingly, an employee who is separated from his employment on a false or nonexistent cause is entitledto be reinstated to his former position because the separation is illegal. If the position is no longer availablefor any other valid and justifiable reason, however, the reinstatement of the illegally dismissed employee tohis former position would neither be fair nor just. The law itself can not exact compliance with what isimpossible. Ad imposible tenetur. The employers remedy is to reinstate the employee to a substantiallyequivalent position without loss of seniority rights as provided for above.

    Of relevant significance in the case at bar is the right of the employer to transfer employees in their workstation. We have previously held that it is the employers prerogative, based on its assessment and

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    perception of its employees qualifications, aptitudes and competence, to move them around in the variousareas of its business operations in order to ascertain where they will function with maximum benefit of thecompany. This right flows from ownership and from the established rule that labor (law) does not authorizethe substitution of judgment of the employer in the conduct of his business, unless it is shown to be contraryto law, morals, or public policy.

    The rationale behind this rule is that an employees right to security of tenure does not give him such avested right in his position as would deprive the company of its prerogative to change his assignment ortransfer him where he will be most useful. Especially so in this case where the respondent was not appointedfor a security assistant for a specified place but was only designated therein. But of course, the managerialprerogative to transfer personnel must be exercised without grave abuse of discretion --- not unnecessary,inconvenient nor prejudicial to the displaced employee, meaning there is no demotion in rank or diminutionof salary, benefits and other privileges.

    THE COCA-COLA EXPORT CORPORATION v. CLARITA P. GACAYANG.R. No. 149433December 15, 2010LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

    FACTSClarita P. Gacayan was a Senior Financial Accountant of Coca Cola ExportCorporation.One of her

    benefits was the reimbursement of meal and transportationexpenses incurred while rendering

    overtime work. This reimbursement was allowedonly when the employee worked overtime. Themaximum amount allowed to bereimbursed wasP150.00 pesos. Because of theallegedalterations(date and foodpurchase) in three receipts (McDonalds and Shakeys) which Gacayan

    submitted tosupport her claim for reimbursement of meal expenses, Coca-cola called theattentionof Gacayan and required her to explain.Gacayan denied any personal knowledge inthe

    commission of the alterations in the subject receipts. She asserted that her sistersdriver/messenger may have caused the alteration, but she could not be certain aboutit.With regard to the Shakeys receipt, respondent maintained that what she orderedwas a buddypack with extra mojos. Her explanation was referred to the AssistantManager of the Shakeys

    Pizza Parlor and upon verification, it was discovered that thereceipt was actually for three ordersof Bunch of Lunch, and not for Buddy Pack whichhas a different item code.A memorandum was

    sent to Gacayan inviting her to a hearing and formalinvestigation and to give her an opportunity toexplain the issues against her.Gacayanappeared at the initial hearing but failed to appear on thesecond due to her doctorsadvice to rest since she was suffering from severe mixed migraine

    and musclecontraction headache.Gacayan also complained of the alleged partiality of theinvestigating committee against her. During that second hearing the personnel of Shakeys

    denied the allegations of Gacayan. Coca Cola then sent another noticeinforming Gacayan of there-setting of the continuation of the formal investigation butGacayan failed to attend such hearing.

    Coca Cola then concluded the formalinvestigation. In a letter,Coca Cola dismissed Gacayan for fraudulently submittingtampered and/or altered receipts in support of her petty cash

    reimbursements in grossviolation of the companys rules and regulations.Gacayan then filed acomplaint for illegal dismissal. Gacayan averred that,assuming that she altered the receipts in

    question, dismissal was too harsh a penaltyfor her considering that: (a) it was her first offense inher 9 years of service; (b)the offense imputed was minor, as only the dates and items, not the

    amounts, werealtered or the amounts involved were very minimal; (c) the company did notsuffermaterial damage, as she was really entitled to the P150.00 allowance even

    withoutaccompanying receipt; and (d) respondent acted without malice, as she reallyrendered(unpaid) overtime work on those three dates. Coca Cola maintained tha

    Gacayan was dismissed for cause, that of tampering official receipts to substantiateher claim for (meal) reimbursement which reflects her questionable integrity

    andhonesty.Petitioner added that in terminating the services of an employee forbreachof trust, it is enough that the misconduct of the employee tends to prejudicethe

    employers interest since it would be unreasonable to require the employer towait until

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    he is materially injured before removing the cause of the impending evil.The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Coca Cola and dismissed the complaint.It was held that Coca

    Cola complied with the notice requirement strictly and thatGacayan was terminated for repeatedly submitting fraudulent items of expense,clearly in violation of company rules

    and regulations which consequently resulted inloss of trust and confidence. NLRCaffirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed and setaside the Resolutions ruling that the

    penalty of dismissal imposed was too harsh.Coca Cola appealed, contending thatGacayans repeated submission of altered or tampered receipts to support her claim for

    reimbursement constitutes abetrayal of the employers trust and confidence and aserious misconduct, thus,giving cause for the termination of her employment.

    ISSUEWON there is serious misconduct.

    HELDThe Labor Code mandates that before an employer may validly dismiss anemployee

    from the service, the requirement of substantial and procedural dueprocess must becomplied with. Under the requirement of substantial due process,the grounds for

    termination of employment must be based on just or authorizedcauses.Article 282 of theLabor Code enumerates the just causes for thetermination of employment, thus:ART.

    282. Termination by employer. - An employer may terminate anemployment for any of thefollowing causes:(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the

    lawful ordersof his employer or representative in connection with his work;(b) Gross andhabitual neglect by the employee of his duties;(c) Fraud or willful breach by the

    employee of the trust reposed in him by hisemployer or duly authorized representative;(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of hisemployer

    or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorizedrepresentative; and(e)Other causes analogous to the foregoing.In the instant case, it was only in theReply to

    Respondents Comment, thatpetitioner made mention of another ground for thedismissal of respondent, that of serious misconduct, when she submitted altered or

    tampered receipts to support herclaim for reimbursement. Such allegation appears to bea mere afterthought, beingtardily raised only in the Reply.In a case, it was held that:

    Misconduct has been defined as improper orwrong conduct. It is the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willfulcharacter, and implies wrongfulintent and not mere error of judgment. The misconduct to

    be serious must be of such grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial andunimportant.Suchmisconduct, however serious, must nevertheless be in connection with

    theemployees work to constitute just cause for his separation. Thus, for misconductorimproper behavior to be a just cause for dismissal, (a) it must be serious; (b)mustrelate to the performance of the employees duties; and (c) must show that

    theemployee has become unfit to continue working for the employer. Indeed, anemployer may not be compelled to continue to employ such person whosecontinuance in the

    service would be patently inimical to his employers business.In this light, the allegedinfractions of respondent could hardly be consideredserious misconduct.

    It is well to stress that in order to constitute seriousmisconduct which will warrant thedismissal of an employee, it is notsufficient that the act or conduct complained of has

    violated someestablished rules or policies. It is equally important and required thattheact or conduct must have been done with wrongful intent.

    Such is, however,lacking in the instant case

    Maternity Childrens Hospital vs. Secretary of Labor G.R. No. 78909 June 30, 1989

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    EN BANC: MEDIALDEA, J.:

    Facts:

    Petitioner is a semi-government hospital, managed by the Board of Directors of the Cagayan deOro Women's Club and Puericulture Center, headed by Mrs. Antera Dorado, as holdover President. The hospital derives its finances from the club itself as well as from paying patients,averaging 130 per month. It is also partly subsidized by the Philippine Charity SweepstakesOffice and the Cagayan De Oro City government.

    Petitioner has forty-one (41) employees. Aside from salary and living allowances, theemployees are given food, but the amount spent therefor is deducted from their respectivesalaries

    On May 23, 1986, ten (10) employees of the petitioner employed in different capacities/positions

    filed a complaint with the Office of the Regional Director of Labor and Employment, Region X,for underpayment of their salaries and ECOLAS, which was docketed as ROX Case No. CW-71-86.

    On June 16, 1986, the Regional Director directed two of his Labor Standard and WelfareOfficers to inspect the records of the petitioner to ascertain the truth of the allegations in thecomplaints. Based on their inspection report and recommendation, the Regional Director issuedan Order dated August 4, 1986, directing the payment of P723,888.58, representingunderpayment of wages and ECOLAs to all the petitioner's employees.

    Petitioner appealed from this Order to the Minister of Labor and Employment, Hon. Augusto S.Sanchez, who rendered a Decision on September 24, 1986, modifying the said Order in that

    deficiency wages and ECOLAs should be computed only from May 23, 1983 to May 23, 1986,

    On October 24, 1986, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by theSecretary of Labor in his Order dated May 13, 1987, for lack of merit.

    Issue:

    Whether or not the Regional Director had jurisdiction over the case and if so, the extent of coverage of any award that should be forthcoming, arising from his visitorial and enforcementpowers under Article 128 of the Labor Code.

    Held:

    This is a labor standards case, and is governed by Art. 128-b of the Labor Code, as amendedby E.O. No. 111. Under the present rules, a Regional Director exercises both visitorial andenforcement power over labor standards cases, and is therefore empowered to adjudicatemoney claims, provided there still exists an employer-employee relationship, and the findings of the regional office is not contested by the employer concerned.

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    Labor standards refer to the minimum requirements prescribed by existing laws, rules, andregulations relating to wages, hours of work, cost of living allowance and other monetary andwelfare benefits, including occupational, safety, and health standards (Section 7, Rule I, Ruleson the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in the Regional Office, dated September 16,1987).

    Decision:

    ACCORDINGLY, this petition should be dismissed, as it is hereby DISMISSED, as regards allpersons still employed in the Hospital at the time of the filing of the complaint, but GRANTED asregards those employees no longer employed at that time. SO ORDERED.

    Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes,Grio-Aquino and Regalado, JJ., concur

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    Calalang vs. WilliamsG.R. No. 47800 2 December 1940

    FIRST DIVISION, LAUREL (J): 4 CONCUR

    Facts:

    A resolution by the National Traffice Commission that animal drawn vehicles be prohibited frompassing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias Street,from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extendingfrom the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., for aperiod of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic was approvedand adopted by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications upon indorsement by theDirector of Public Works pursuant to Commonwealth Act 548 with modifications that RosarioStreet and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points andduring the hours as indicated.

    The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to beenforced the rules and regulations thus adopted. Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a privatecitizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before the Supreme Court the petition for a writ of prohibition against A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; VicenteFragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works andCommunications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as

    Acting Chief of Police of Manila.

    Issue:

    Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director of Public Works infringe uponthe constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and

    economic security of all the people.

    Held:

    The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards anygiven group.

    Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but thehumanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that

    justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society,

    through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of themembers of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable,or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of allgovernments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.

    Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that shouldbe equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economiclife, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the

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    health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to thegreatest number."

    Decision:

    IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Writ of Prohibition Prayed for is hereby denied, with costsagainst the petitioner. So ordered.

    MARIVELES SHIPYARD CORP V CA (REGONDOLA)415 SCRA 573

    QUISUMBING; November 11, 2003

    NATUREPetition for review on certiorari of the decision of the CA

    FACTS- In Oct 1993, Mariveles Shipyard Corp engaged the services of Longest Force Investigation and Security Agency, Inc. to render security services at the formers

    premises.- Petitioner religiously complied with the terms and conditions of the security contract with Longest Force, promptly paying its bills and contract rates. However, itfound the services being rendered by the assigned guards unsatisfactory and inadequate, causing Mariveles Shipyard Corp to terminate its contract with LongestForce on April 1995. Longest Force, in turn, terminated the employment of the security guards it had deployed at the shipyard.- Private respondents filed a case with the Labor Arbiter. Longest Force, in turn, filed a cross-claim against Mariveles Shipyard.- Longest force admitted the following:

    > that it employed private respondents as security guards and assigned them to work at petitioners shipyard, rendering 12 hours duty per shift> it is liable as to the non-payment of the alleged wage differential, but passed liability to petitioner alleging that the service fee paid by Mariveles was waybelow the PNPSOSIA and PADPAO rates

    - Petitioner denied liability on account of alleged illegal dismissal, stressing that no employer-employee relationship exists between it and security guards- Labor Arbiter declared Mariveles and Longest Force jointly and severally liable to pay the money claims of private respondents, and ordered theirreinstatement.- NLRC affirmedin totothe decision of the Labor Arbiter. CA denied due course to petitioners appeal and dismissed the case

    ISSUEWON petitioner Mariveles should be held jointly and severally liable with Longest Force for the payment of wage differentials and overtime pay owing to privaterespondents

    HELDYES, petitioners liability is joint and several that of Longest Force pursuant to Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code.

    Art 106. CONTRACTOR OR SUBCONTRACTOR Whenever an employer enters into a contract with another person in the performance of theformers work, the employees of the contractor and of the latters subcontractor, if any, shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of this Code.

    In the event that the contractor or subcontractor fails to pay the wages of his employees in accordance with this Code, the employer shall be jointly and severally liable with this contractor or subcontractor to such employees to the extent of the work performed under the contract, in the samemanner and extent that he is liable to employee directly employed by him. Art 107. INDIRECT EMPLOYER The provisions of the immediately preceding Article shall likewise apply to any person, partnership, association orcorporation which, not being an employer, contracts with an independent contractor for the performance of any work, task, job or project. Art 109. SOLIDARY LIABILITY The provisions of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding, every employer or indirect employer shall be heldresponsible with his contractor or subcontractor for any violation of any provision of this Code. For purposes of determining the extent of their civilliability under this Chapter, they shall be considered as direct employers.

    - When petitioner contracted for security services with Longest Force, petitioner became anindirect employer of private respondents. When the agency ascontractor failed to pay the guards, the corporation as principal becomes jointly and severally liable to the guards wages. The security agency is held liable byvirtue of its status as direct employer, while the corporation is deemed the indirect employer of the guards for the purpose of paying their wages in the event of

    failure of the agency to pay them. This statutory scheme gives the workers the ample protection consonant with labor and social justice provisions of the 1987Constitution.- Labor standards are enacted by the legislature to alleviate the plight of workers whose wages barely meet the spiraling costs of basic needs. Labor laws areconsidered written in every contract. Stipulations in violation thereof are considered null. Similarly, legislated wage increases are deemed amendments to thecontract. Thus, employers cannot hide behind their contracts in order to evade their (or their contractors or subcontractors) liability for noncompliance with thestatutory minimum wage.- However, the solidary liability of petitioner with that of Longest Force does not preclude the application of the Civil Code provisions on the right ofreimbursement from his co-debtor by the one who paid.Disposition Decision of Appellate Court affirmed. Petitioner and Longest Force are held liable jointly and severally for underpayment of wages and overtime payof the security guards, without prejudice to petitioners right of reimbursement from Longest Force Investigation and Security Agency, Inc.

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    PNB vs CABANSAG Case Digest[G.R. No. 157010. June 21, 2005]

    PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. FLORENCE O. CABANSAG, respondent.

    FACTS In late 1998, [herein Respondent Florence Cabansag] arrived in Singapore as a tourist. She applied for employment, with the Singapore Branch of thePhilippine National Bank. At the time, the Singapore PNB Branch was under the helm of Ruben C. Tobias, a lawyer, as General Manager, with the rank of Vice-President of the Bank. She applied for employment as Branch Credit Officer, at a total monthly package of $SG4,500.00, effective upon assumption of duties after approval. Ruben C. Tobias found her eminently qualified and wrote on October 26, 1998, a letter to the President of the Bank in Manila, recommending theappointment of Florence O. Cabansag, for the position.

    On December 7, 1998, Ruben C. Tobias wrote a letter to Florence O. Cabansag offering her a temporary appointment, as Credit Officer, at a basic salary of Singapore Dollars 4,500.00, a month and, upon her successful completion of her probation to be determined solely, by the Bank, she may be extended at thediscretion of the Bank, a permanent appointment and that her temporary appointment was subject to certain terms and conditions.

    Cabansag accepted the position and assumed office. In the meantime, the Philippine Embassy in Singapore processed the employment contract of Florence O.Cabansag and, on March 8, 1999, she was issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, an Overseas Employment Certificate, certifying thatshe was a bona fide contract worker for Singapore.

    Barely three (3) months in office Tobias told Cabansag that her resignation was imperative as a cost-cutting measure of the Bank. Tobias, likewise, toldCabansag that the PNB Singapore Branch will be sold or transformed into a remittance office and that, in either way, she had to resign from her employment. Shethen asked Ruben C. Tobias that she be furnished with a Formal Advice from the PNB Head Office in Manila. However, Ruben C. Tobias flatly refused. FlorenceO. Cabansag did not submit any letter of resignation.

    On April 16, 1999, Ruben C. Tobias again summoned Florence O. Cabansag to his office and demanded that she submit her letter of resignation, with the pretextthat he needed a Chinese-speaking Credit Officer to penetrate the local market, with the information that a Chinese-speaking Credit Officer had already been hiredand will be reporting for work soon. She was warned that, unless she submitted her letter of resignation, her employment record will be blemished with the notation

    DISMISSED spread thereon. Without giving any definitive answer, Florence O. Cabansag asked Ruben C. Tobias that she be given sufficient time to look for another job. Ruben C. Tobias told her that she should be out of her employment by May 15, 1999.

    However, on April 19, 1999, Ruben C. Tobias again summoned Florence O. Cabansag and adamantly ordered her to submit her letter of resignation. She refused.On April 20, 1999, she received a letter from Ruben C. Tobias terminating her employment with the Bank.

    On January 18, 2000, the Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of the Complainant and against the Respondents. PNB appealed the labor arbiters Decision tothe NLRC. In a Resolution dated June 29, 2001, the Commission affirmed that Decision.

    Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered a decision in favor of Florence Cabansag.

    ISSUE

    Whether or not the arbitration branch of the NLRC in the National Capital Region has jurisdiction over the instant controversy.

    HELD

    The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC is specified in Article 217 of the Labor Code and more specifically, Section 10 of RA 8042 r eads in part:

    SECTION 10. Money Claims. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of anemployer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplaryand other forms of damages.

    Based on the foregoing provisions, labor arbiters clearly have original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising from employer-employee relations, includingtermination disputes involving all workers, among whom are overseas Filipino workers (OFW). We are not unmindful of the fact that respondent was directly hired,while on a tourist status in Singapore, by the PNB branch in that city state. Prior to employing respondent, petitioner had to obtain an employment pass for her from the Singapore Ministry of Manpower. Securing the pass was a regulatory requirement pursuant to the immigration regulations of that country.

    Noteworthy is the fact that respondent likewise applied for and secured an Overseas Employment Certificate from the POEA through the Philippine Embassy inSingapore. The Certificate, issued on March 8, 1999, declared her a bona fide contract worker for Singapore. Under Philippine law, this document authorized her working status in a foreign country and entitled her to all benefits and processes under our statutes. Thus, even assuming arguendo that she was considered atthe start of her employment as a direct hire governed by and subject to the laws, common practices and customs prevailing in Singapore she subsequentlybecame a contract worker or an OFW who was covered by Philippine labor laws and policies upon certification by the POEA. At the time her employment wasillegally terminated, she already possessed the POEA employment Certificate.

    Whether employed locally or overseas, all Filipino workers enjoy the protective mantle of Philippine labor and social legislation, contract stipulations to the contrarynotwithstanding.

    For purposes of venue, workplace shall be understood as the place or locality where the employee is regularly assigned when the cause of action arose. It shallinclude the place where the employee is supposed to report back after a temporary detail, assignment or travel. In the case of field employees, as well as

    ambulant or itinerant workers, their workplace is where they are regularly assigned, or where they are supposed to regularly receive their salaries/wages or workinstructions from, and report the results of their assignment to t heir employers.

    Under the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 (RA 8042), a migrant worker refers to a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has beenengaged in a remunerated activity in a state of which he or she is not a legal resident; to be used interchangeably with overseas Filipino worker.[21] Undeniably,respondent was employed by petitioner in its branch office in Singapore. Admittedly, she is a Filipino and not a legal resident of that state. She thus falls within thecategory of migrant worker or overseas Filipino worker.

    ISAE v Quisimbing G.R. No. 128845. June 1, 2000J. Kapunan

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    Facts:The ISM, under Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents.The local-hires union of the ISM were crying foul over the disparity in wages that they got compared to that of their foreign teaching counterparts.These questions are asked to qualify a teacher into a local or foreign hire.a.....What is one's domicile?b.....Where is one's home economy?c.....To which country does one owe economic allegiance?

    d.....Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in the School and was the Schoolresponsible for bringing that individual to the Philippines?Should any answer point to Philippines, the person is a local hire. The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits to the foreign hires such as housing,transportation, and 25% more pay than locals under the theory of (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure. The first was grounded on leaving his homecountry, the second was on the lack of t enure when he returns home.The negotiations between the school and the union caused a deadlock between the parties.The DOLE resolved in favor of the school, while Dole Secretary Quisimbing denied the unions mfr.He said, The Union cannot also invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of parity. It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranteeof equal protection of the laws is not violated by legislation or private covenants based on reasonable classification. A classification is reasonable if it is based onsubstantial distinctions and apply to all members of the same class. Verily, there is a substantial distinction between foreign hires and local hires, the former enjoying only a limited tenure, having no amenities of their own in the Philippines and have to be given a good compensation package in order to attract them to

    join the teaching faculty of the School.The union appealed to the Supreme Court.The petitioner called the hiring system discriminatory and racist.The school alleged that some local hires were in fact of foreign origin. They were paid local salaries.

    Issue:Whether or not the hiring system is violative of the equal protection clause

    Held: Yes, Petition granted

    Ratio:Public policy abhors discrimination. The Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures thatprotect and enhance the right of all people to human dignityThe very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, giveeveryone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."International law prohibits discrimination, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and CulturalRights. The latter promises Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind.In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of capital, inequality and discrimination by the employer are all the morereprehensible.The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor Code provides that the State shall "ensureequal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.In this jurisdiction, there is the term equal pay for equal work, pertaining to persons being paid with equal salaries and have similar skills and similar conditions.There was no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires.

    The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital. These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressedwith public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good.[For the same reason, the "dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates. The dislocationfactor and limited tenure affecting foreign-hires are adequately compensated by certain benefits accorded them which are not enjoyed by local-hires, such ashousing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances.In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to bean invalid classification. There is no r easonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires.Obiter:However, foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires. It does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to begrouped together with local-hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the Schoolalso shows that these groups were alwaystreated separately. The housing and other benefits accorded foreign hires were not given to local hires, thereby such admixture will nbot assure any group thepower to exercise bargaining rights.The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees'interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status.

    KASAPIAN NG MALAYANG MANGGAGAWA SA COCA-COLA (KASAMMA-CCO) V CACHICO-NAZARIO; April 19, 2006

    NATUREPetition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Decision of public respondent National Labor RelationsCommission (NLRC) dismissing petitioners complaint against private respondent

    FACTS

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    - On 30 June 1998, the CBA for the years 1995-1998 executed between petitioner union and private respondent company expired. Petitioner submitted itsdemands to the company for another round of collective bargaining negotiations. Said negotiations came to a gridlock as the parties failed to reach a mutuallyacceptable agreement with respect to certain economic and non-economic issues.Thereafter, petitioner filed a notice of strike on 11 November 1998 with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board on the ground of CBA negotiationdeadlock. Several conciliation conferences were conducted but the parties failed to reach a settlement. On 19 December 1998, petitioner held the strike inprivate respondents Manila and Antipolo plants.- Subsequently, both parties came to an agreement settling the labor dispute. Thus, on 26 December 1998, both parties executed and signed a MOA providingfor salary increases and other economic and non-economic benefits. It likewise contained a provision for the regularization of contractual, casual and/or agency

    workers who have been working with private respondent for more than one year. Said MOA was later incorporated to form part of the 1998-2001 CBA and wasthereafter ratified by the employees of the company.- Consequently, petitioner demanded the payment of salary and other benefits to the newly regularized employees retroactive to 1 December 1998, in accord with the MOA. However, the private respondent refused to yield to said demands contending that the date of effectivity of the regularization of said employees were 1 May 1999 and 1 October 1999. Meanwhile, a certification election was conducted on 17 August 1999 wherein the KASAMMA-CCO Independent surfacedas the winning union and was then certified by the DOLE as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of private respondentsManila and Antipolo plants for a period of five years from 1 July 1999 to 30 June 2004. On 23 August 1999, the KASAMMA-CCO Independent demanded therenegotiation of the CBA which expired on 30 June 1998. Such request was denied by private respondent as there was already an existing CBA which wasnegotiated and concluded between petitioner and private respondent which was yet to expire on 30 June 2001.- On 9 December 1999, despite the pendency of petitioners complaint before the NLRC, private respondent closed its Manila and Antipolo plants resulting in thetermination of employment of 646 employees. About 500 workers were given a notice of termination effective 1 March 2000 on the ground of redundancy. Theaffected employees were considered on paid leave from 9 December 1999 to 29 February 2000 and were paid their corresponding salaries. On 13 December1999, four days after its closure of the Manila and Antipolo plants, private respondent served a notice of closure to the DOLE.- Petitioner contends that respondent violated the MOA by not recognizing the regularization of the 61 employees as of December 1, 1998 and giving them fullbenefits retroactive to that date. Petitioner likewise claims the closure of the plants was in bad faith, done in order to avoid renegotiations of the CBA, andtherefore illegal.

    ISSUES1. WON the regularization of the 61 employees was effective December 1, 19982. WON the closure of the plants was legal

    HELD1. YESRatio It must be noted that both parties admit the existence of said MOA and that they have voluntarily entered into said agreement. Furthermore, neither of theparties deny that the 61 employees have indeed been regularized by private respondent.The MOA, being a contract freely entered into by the parties, now constitutes as the law between them, and the interpretation of its contents purely involves an evaluation of the law as applied to the facts herein.It is thecontention of petitioner that the date 1 December 1998 refers to the effective date of regularization of said employees, while private respondent maintains thatsaid date is merely the reckoning date from which the one year employment requirement shall be computed. We agree with petitioner. It is logically absurd thatthe company will only begin to extend priority to these employees on a date that has already passed, when in fact they have already extended priority to theseemployees by agreeing to the contents of the MOA and signing said agreement. It is erroneous for the NLRC to conclude that extending to them the benefits ofthe MOA would violate the principle of "no-work-no-pay" as they are actually rendering service to the company even before 1 December 1998, and continued todo so thereafter. Moreover, under Article 280 of the Labor Code, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, shall be considered a regularemployee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists. Also, under the law, a casualemployee is only casual for one year, and it is the passage of time that gives him a regular status. Even if we were to follow private respondents contention thatthe date 1 December 1998 provided in the MOA is merely a reckoning date to determine who among the non-regular employees have rendered one year ofservice as of said date, all those who have been with the company for one year by said date must automatically be considered regular employees by operation oflaw.2. YESRatio The characterization of the employees service as no longer necessary or sustainable, and therefore properly terminable, is an exercise of business judgment on the part of the employer. The wisdom or soundness of such characterizing or decision is not subject to discretionary review on the part of the LaborArbiter nor of the NLRC so long, of course, as violation of law or merely arbitrary and malicious action is not shown. The private respondents decision to closethe plant was a result of a study conducted which established that the most prudent course of action for the private respondent was to stop operations in saidplants and transfer production to other more modern and technologically advanced plants of private respondent. The subject closure and the resulting terminationof the 639 employees was due to legitimate business considerations, as evidenced by the technical study conducted by private respondent.Disposition The assailed Decisions are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The 61 subject employees are hereby declared regular employees as of 1December 1998 and are entitled to the benefits provided for in the Memorandum of Agreement.

    DOLE PHILIPPINES INC V PAWIS NG MAKABAYNG OBREROCORONA; (date) 2003

    NATUREPetition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals

    FACTS- The petitioner and the respondent executed a CBA for the period starting February 1996 to February 2001. Under the bonuses and allowances section of thesaid CBA, a P10 meal allowance shall be given to employees who render at least 2 hrs of overtime work and free meals shall be given after 3 hours of actualovertime work.- Pursuant to this provision, some departments of granted free meals after exactly 3 ours of work. However, other departments granted free meals only aftermore than 3 hours of overtime work.

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    - The respondent filed a complaint against Dole, saying that free meals should be granted after exactly 3 hrs of overtime work, not after more than 3 hrs. Theparties agreed to settle the dispute to voluntary arbitration. It was decided in favor of the respondent, directing the petitioner to grant free meals after exactly 3 hrsof overtime work. CA affirmed.

    ISSUES1. WON free meals should be granted after exactly 3 hrs of work2. WON the petitioner has the right to determine when to grant free meals and its conditions

    HELD1. YES- The same meal allowance provision is found in their previous CBAs, the 1985-1988 CBA and the 1990-1995 CBA. However, it was amended in the 1993-1995CBA, by changing the phrase after 3 hrs of overtime work to after more than 3 hrs of overtime work. In the 1996-2001 CBA, the parties had to negotiate thedeletion of the said phrase in order to revert to the old provision. Clearly, both parties had intended that free meals should be given after exactly 3 hrs of overtime work.- The disputed provision is clear and unambiguous, hence the literal meaning shall prevail. No amount of legal semantics can convince the Court that after morethan means the same as after.2. NO- The exercise of management prerogative is not unlimited. It is subject to the limitations provided by law. In this case, there was a CBA, and compliancetherewith is mandated by the express policy of the law.Disposition Petition denied

    AMERICAN WIRE AND CABLE DAILY RATED EMPLOYEES UNION V AMERICAN WIRE ANDCABLE CO., INC.

    CHICO-NAZARIO: April 29, 2005

    FACTS- American Wire and Cable Co., is a corporation engaged in the manufacture of wires and cables. On Feb.16, 2001, an original action was filed before the NCMBof the DOLE by the two unions (American Wire and Cable Daily Rated Employees and American Wire and Cable Monthly Rated Employees) for voluntaryarbitration. They alleged that respondent company, without valid cause, suddenly and unilaterally withdrew and denied certain benefits which they have longenjoyed. These are:a) Service Awardb) 35% premium pay of an employees basic pay for the work rendered during Holy Monday, Holy Tuesday, Holy Wednesday, December 23, 26, 27, 28 and 29c) Christmas partyd) Promotional increase.

    - A promotional increase was sought by 15 of its members who were given new job classifications. These new hob classifications according to the union are inthe form of a promotion. Increase was not given.Petitioners contention- withdrawal of the 35% premium pay for selected days during Holy Week and Christmas season, the holding of a Christmas party, and its incidental benefits,and the giving of service awards was a customary practice that can no longer be unilaterally withdrawn by respondent without consent of the petitioner. Thebenefits in question were given by respondent consistently, deliberately and unconditionally since time immemorial. The benefits given by the respondent cannotbe considered as a bonus as they are not founded on profit. Even assuming that it can be treated as a bonus, the grant of the same, by reason of its ling andregular concession, may be regarded as part of regular compensation.Respondents contention-The grant of all subject benefits has not ripened into practice that the employees concerned can claim a demandable right over them. The grant of these benefits was conditional based upon the financial conditions that existed before have indeed substantially changed thereby justifying the discontinuance of said grants.

    ISSUEWON respondent is guilty of violating article 100 of the Labor Code, when the benefits/entitlements given to the members of petitioner union were withdrawn

    HELD*preliminary issue raised by respondent was the error in the mode of appeal by the petitioners. Respondent contends that petitioner should have raised a petitionfor review on certiorari under Rule 45, and not through a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules on Civil Procedure. Thus, case should bedismissed outright.NO- Court ruled that the SC may brush aside the procedural barrier and take cognizance of the petition as it raises an issue of paramount importance.- ART. 100. PROHIBITION AGAINST ELIMINATION OR DIMINUTION OF BENEFITS.-Nothing in this Book shall be construed to eliminate or in any waydiminish supplements, or other employee benefits being enjoyed at the time of promulgation of this Code.- a determination must first be made on whether the benefits are in the nature of a bonus or no, and assuming they are so, whether they are demandable andenforceable obligations.- Definition of bonus (Producers Bank of the Philippines v. NLRC)

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    a bonus is an amount granted and paid to an employee for his industry and loyalty it is an act of generosity granted by an enlightened employer to spur theemployee to greater efforts the granting of a bonus is a management prerogative thus a bonus is not a demandable and enforceable obligation except whenit is made part of the wage, salary or compensation of the employee.- Court ruled that the benefits /entitlements subjects of the instant case are all bonuses given by respondent out of its generosity and munificence.Benefits/entitlements are all in excess of what the law requires each employer to give its employees. Since they are above what is strictly due, the granting of thesame was a management prerogative, which, whenever management sees necessary, may be withdrawn.- the consequential question therefore that needs to be settled is if the subject benefits, which are bonuses, are demandable or not.- the Court does not believe so. For a bonus to be enforceable, it has to be promised by the employer and expressly agreed upon by the parties or it must have

    a fixed amount and had been a long and regular practice on the part of the employer. To be considered regular practice the giving of the bonus should havebeen done over a long period of time and must be shown to have been consistent and deliberate.- the benefits in question were never part of any express agreement. They were never even incorporated in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. The Christmasparty and its incidental benefits and the giving of cash incentive together with the service award cannot be said to have fixed amounts. There was a downtrend inthe amount given for service awards. There was also a downtrend with respect to the holding of Christmas parties as the locations were changed from paidvenues to free ones. -The additional 35% premium pay for work during Holy Week and Christmas season cannot be held to have ripened into a companypractice that the petitioners have a right to demand. This practice was only granted for two years and with the express reservation from respondent corporationsowner that it cannot continue the same in view of the companys current financial condition.

    DAVAO FRUITS CORPORATION V ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU)

    QUIASON; August 24, 1993NATUREThis is a petition forcertiorari to set aside the resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)

    FACTS- On December 28, 1982 respondent Associated Labor Unions (ALU), for and in behalf of all the rank-and-file workers and employees of petitioner, filed acomplaint (NLRC Case No. 1791-MC-XI-82) before the Ministry of Labor and Employment, Regional Arbitration Branch XI, Davao City, against petitioner, for"Payment of the Thirteenth-Month Pay Differentials." Respondent ALU sought to recover from petitioner the thirteenth month pay differential for 1982 of its rank-and-file employees, equivalent to their sick, vacation and maternity leaves, premium for work done on rest days and special holidays, and pay for regularholidays which petitioner, allegedly in disregard of company practice since 1975, excluded from the computation of the thirteenth month pay for 1982.- In its answer, petitioner claimed that iterroneously included items subject of the complaint in the computation of the thirteenth month pay for the yearsprior to 1982, upon a doubtful and difficult question of law. According to petitioner, this mistake was discovered only in 1981 after the promulgation of theSupreme Court decision in the case ofSan Miguel Corporation v. Inciong(103 SCRA 139).- A decision was rendered on March 7, 1984 favoring ALU. That ordered Davao Fruits Corporation to pay the 1982 13th month pay differential to all its rank-and-file workers/employees herein represented by complainant Union. Petitioner appealed the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC, which affirmed the saiddecision accordingly dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. Petitioner elevated the matter to the Supreme Court.

    ISSUES1. WON the computation of the thirteenth month pay given by employers to their employees under P.D. No. 851, payments for sick, vacation and maternityleaves, premiums for work done on rest days and special holidays, and pay for regular holidays may be excluded in the computation and payment thereof,regardless of long-standing company practice2. WON the petitioner may invoke the principle of solution indebiti

    HELD1. The "Supplementary Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 851," which put to rest all doubts in the computation of the thirteenth month pay, wasissued by the Secretary of Labor as early as January 16, 1976, barely one month after the effectivity of P.D. No. 851 and its Implementing Rules. And yet,petitioner computed and paid the thirteenth month pay, without excluding the subject items therein until 1981. Petitioner continued its practice in December 1981,after promulgation of the afore-quotedSan Miguel decision on February 24, 1981, when petitioner purportedly "discovered" its mistake.From 1975 to 1981,petitioner had freely, voluntarily and continuously included in the computation of its employees' thirteenth month pay, the payments for sick,vacation and maternity leaves, premiums for work done on rest days and special holidays, and pay for regular holidays. The considerable length oftime the questioned items had been included by petitioner indicates a unilateral and voluntary act on its part, sufficient in itself to negate any claim ofmistake.

    - A company practice favorable to the employees had indeed been established and the payments made pursuant thereto, ripened into benefits enjoyed by them.And any benefit and supplement being enjoyed by the employees cannot be reduced, diminished, discontinued or eliminated by the employer, by virtue ofSection 10 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 851, and Article 100 of the labor of the Philippines, which prohibit the diminution or elimination bythe employer of the employees' existing benefits (Tiangco v. Leogardo, Jr., 122 SCRA 267, [1983]).2. Petitioner cannot invoke the principle ofsolutio indebiti which as a civil law concept that is not applicable in Labor Law. Besides, insolutio indebiti , the obligeeis required to return to the obligor whatever he received from the latter (Civil Code of the Philippines, Arts. 2154 and 2155). Petitioner in the instant case, doesnot demand the return of what it paid respondent ALU from 1975 until 1981; it merely wants to "rectify" the error it made over these years by excludingunilaterally from the thirteenth month pay in 1982 the items subject of litigation.Solutio indebiti , therefore, is not applicable to the instant case.Disposition finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC, the petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the questioned decision of respondent NLRCis AFFIRMED

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    Suico vs. NLRC

    - Petitioners Suico, Ceniza, and Dacut were employees of PLDT Cebu Jones Exchange and members of Manggagagaw Komunikasyon Pilipinas (MKP). They participated in the strike (by picketing) staged by MKP onSept. 1997. The DOLE assumed jurisdiction over the dispute and ordered the striking employees to return towork but this was not heeded and instead, an Opposition was filed. The Opposition was denied by DOLE but theemployees continued the strike. During the continuance of the strike, a managerial employee of PLDT wasinjured when strikers blocked her way to the premises of PLDT. Petitioners were implicated and were sentnotices to explain, within 48 hrs., why they should not be terminated. However, the petitioners did not give anyexplanation and two more notices were sent to them. Petitioners replied to the last notice by saying that theywished to exercise their right to be heard in a formal hearing to be set within 5 days from their receipt of formalwritten complaint and statements of witnesses. PLDT replied that the formal hearing is being deferred until thepetitioners file their answer to the complaints. Petitioners, however, merely reiterated their request for formalhearing. Thereafter, PLDT sent them notices of termination, citing as just causes therefor, the petitionersparticipation in the illegal strike, the physical assault on the manager, Art. 264 of the Labor Code, and theirrepeated failure to answer the charges against them.

    -

    - Petitioner Mariano is an employee of PLDT Laoag City Sub-Exchange and a member of MKP. Mariano participatedin the strike staged on Sept. 1997. During the strike, a PLDT subscriber was injured and humiliated. Thesubscriber identified Mariano as the culprit. PLDT sent a notice to Mariano, asking him to explain why he shouldnot be terminated for violation of Art. 264. Mariano did not reply to the notice and another letter was sent to himby PLDT. To this, Mariano replied that he wished to be heard in a formal hearing. For his failure to answer the

    charge against him, PLDT terminated his employment, saying that his actions were just causes for termination.-- Petitioner Borje was an employee of PLDT SFU Mother Exchange and a member of MKP. In the Sept. 1997 strike.

    He received a notice from PLDT, charging him with committing illegal acts (hurling stones at a supervisor,security guard, and PLDT vehicle) during the strike and asking for an explanation why he should not beterminated. In response, Borje invoked his right to be heard in a formal hearing. PLDT, in turn, sent atermination letter to Borje for his failure to give a written explanation.

    - 1. Whether the termination of the petitioners were based on just cause.- 2. Whether the termination followed the rudiments of procedural due process.-

    - 1. Yes. Art. 264 (a) and (e) are just causes for terminating employees by reason of strike-related cases.- 2. No. Even with strike-related cases, the procedure laid down by Art. 277 should be followed. Art. 277(b)

    provides that the procedure for termination prescribed therein is without prejudice to the adoption by theemployer of company policy on the matter, provided this conforms with the guidelines set by the DOLE such asRule XXII of the Implementing Rules of Book V. Company policies or practices are binding on the parties. Somecan ripen into an obligation on the part of the employer, such as those which confer benefits on employees orregulate the procedures and requirements for their termination.

    -

    - PLDTs company policy provides that an employee under investigation for the commission of an offense orinfraction shall be informed in writing of the particular act constituting the offense or infraction imputed to him.He may answer the charges against him in writing within a reasonable period of time (at least 48 hours but notmore than 72 hours) or be afforded the opportunity to be heard and defend himself with the assistance of hiscounsel or union representative, if he so desires. PLDT, however, refused to implement said policy, contendingthat it applies to administrative cases only and not to strike-related cases such as the ones involving Suico, et al.PLDT failed to prove that a termination proceeding arising from strike-related violence is not an administrativecase. If by administrative case, PLDT refers to cases arising from violation of company rules and regulations, thenthe proceedings against Suico, et al. were of that nature for the notices sent to said employees accused them not

    just of breach of Art. 264 of the Labor Code but also of behavior prejudicial to company operations and violativeof the company code of conduct. The termination proceedings against Suico, et al. were therefore administrativein nature,

    -

    - While PLDT complied with the two-notice requirement (the first set out in detail the nature and circumstances of the violations imputed to them, required them to explain their side and expressly warned them of the possibilityof their dismissal should their explanation be found wanting, the second informed them of the decision toterminate their employment and cited the evidence upon which the decision was based), this is not sufficient inthe light of the company policy quoted. The requests for formal hearing was an exercise of the option undercompany rules and this forms part of their right to due process.

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    - However, the violation of the rudiments of procedural due process did not invalidated their dismissal as thesubstantive bases therefor were never questioned. Petitioners entitled to nominal damages.