Ślokavārtika: A Study by K. K. DixitReview by: John A. TaberJournal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 107, No. 1 (Jan. - Mar., 1987), pp. 203-204Published by: American Oriental SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/603014 .

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Reviews of Books 203

concept of kist or monthly installment payments and the right of the Lucknow Court to payments through mid-May, it insisted that the mid-May through December kist be paid in two equal installments. This was not only an economic blow to talukadari and zamindari interests but a shock to the entire rural economy. In addition, since the terms of the Settlement of May 1856 clearly stated that the village-by-village reassess- ment would not be revised for three years, there was no immediate policy to redress obvious inequities resulting from the fallout of the Settlement. These are the events which Mukherjee emphasizes translated the emotional grievances at the time of annexation and removal of the Lucknow Court into basic bread-and-butter issues which progressively affected the economic interests of rural populations, specifically the peasantry. He emphasizes that it is this widespread economic impact of the Settlement of May 1856 which explains not only the combined military efforts of talukdar, peasant and sepoy in Awadh in 1857-1858 but the notable lack of tension between talukdar and peasant during the Mutiny period in Awadh. He attacks the common assumption in Mutiny literature that the peasant participated in the strife only under magnate leadership. Although he doesn't dispute the fact that talukdari leadership was dominant in the revolt in the country- side, he documents numerous interesting instances of popular involvement despite talukdari restraint. References to the loyal Raja of Balrampur who could not rally more than three hundred soldiers because the others were in sympathy with the rebels or Talukdar Digbijar Singh of Morarmow who never waivered in his support of the British-even while his men joined the rebels at Lucknow-offer two among several interesting examples of independent action taken by non-elite elements.

Prof. Mukherjee has succeeded in projecting an image of popular involvement in the events of 1857-1858 in Awadh which is free of cliques and firmly grounded in scholarly documentation. As such it is a valuable addition to Mutiny literature which will interest historians of the period especially those who can appreciate the comprehensive nature of the author's exhaustive study of local revenue records.

ROBERT J. YOUNG

WEST CHESTER UNIVERSITY

Slokavartika: A Study. By K. K. DIXIT. Pp. 7 + 116. (L. D. Series, 92.) Ahmedabad: L. D. INSTITUTE OF INDOLOGY.

1983.

K. K. Dixit undertakes in this volume a "critico-analytical summary" of the great work of Kumarila, that is, a summary and analysis of its most important arguments and an indication of "the most glaring weaknesses" of the arguments. This

volume appeared previously as part of a series of three studies (although bibliographical details are not given and could not be found out) which also included a summary of Dharmakhrti's Pramdnavarttika and another of Jayanta's NydyamanjarT. In his preface Dixit declares these works to be "the three most outstanding works of [the] three most outstanding schools of ancient Indian philosophy," insofar as they contain the "most mature-that is, most logical" discussion of philosophical issues (p. 5). Issues of the theory of knowledge, logic, and philosophy of language are of central importance in these works, and they are treated with great clarity and thorough- ness. Just as one might focus on the writings of Locke, Hume, and Kant to get at the heart of modern Western philosophy, so indeed might one concentrate on these works to master the major themes of classical Indian philosophy. Yet surely it is overstating matters to say, as Dixit does, that what went before the period of these works was Indian philosophy in its infancy and what came after Indian philosophy in its "senility."

Dixit provides a useful organization of the topics of the SV into problems of epistemology and problems of ontology. The first division includes discussions of verbal testimony and the otherpramdnas, the second the refutation of idealism and the doctrine of the soul. Drawing together passages pertaining to each topic from diverse adhikaranas, Dixit arranges them in a logical sequence and expounds them virtually Rloka by Rloka. Thus he gives a coherent, extensive, and for the most part clear and accurate summary of Kumarila's views.

Perhaps, though, due to the amount of ground to be covered Dixit does not dig very deep. There is some attempt to develop a philosophical understanding of the issues, but it may not satisfy the reader with formal training in philosophy. The author does not really make good on his promise to evaluate the arguments. One-line challenges are thrown in here and there, but the criticisms are not sustained, and it is sometimes not clear that a particular objection could not be dispelled by more careful reflection on the text itself. (In general, textual problems are not taken up.) For example, Dixit charges that when Kumarila says in the Codandsatr&dhi- karana that the validity (prdmanya) of knowledge is inherent (svatah), he means that all cognition is valid-which is patently absurd insofar as subsequent experience frequently invalidates an initial cognition (p. 44). But Kumarila in fact means that the validity of an act of knowledge, when it is valid, is inherent insofar as it is vested in the essential "presenting" nature (bodhatmakatva) of cognition. When a cognition is recognized as valid, it is simply allowed to stand as presenting what it presents; when invalidated, it is revoked in favor of a different cognition (the validity of which will be inherent), but that does not deny inherent validity of a cognition that remains valid. This idea is developed in a passage which Dixit neglects to discuss (SV, Codandsatra, 47ff.). Elsewhere, in a discussion of Kumarila's appeal to the cognition of a "running white horse" in support of the

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204 Journal of the American Oriental Society 107.1 (1987)

abhihitdnvayav&da (SV Vdky&dhikarana, 358-61), Dixit accuses Kumarila of the "howler" that in order for one to comprehend the meaning of a sentence one must be in the actual presence of the state of affairs it depicts (p. 42). But that is not implied in Kumarila's account at all. The passage in question is intended simply to establish the abhihitdnvayavada by positive and negative concommitance: When you compre- hend meanings (paddrthas, which in this context can be taken to mean ideas usually associated with certain words) but do not hear any words uttered, you can still grasp the idea of a complex state of affairs which ordinarily would constitute the meaning of a spoken sentence-as when one realizes, "A white horse is running," just from seeing a flash of white and hearing the sound of neighing and rapid hoofbeats; but when you hear a sentence uttered but, for whatever reason, do not comprehend the meanings of the individual words that com- prise it, you cannot grasp the meaning of the sentence. Hence, the cause of sentence meaning is the comprehension of individual word meanings, not the cognition of the uttered words, as the anvitabhidhanavddin claims.

The presence of a few such errors, however, does not detract from the value of the book as a concise introduction to the most important issues dealt with by Kumarila and the other great figures of his time. What is especially missed, however, is a characterization of Kumarila's thought as a whole-revelation of the thread that runs through all his arguments. (The book ends abruptly with the summary of the dtmavdda; there is no concluding section.) It is not enough to say that he was chiefly concerned with defending the authority of the Veda. That distinguishes him neither from other Mimamsakas nor Naiyayikas like Jayanta. What we need to understand is why Kumarila chose to develop his defense in the way he did. At the heart of the matter is, on the one hand, a profound commitment to realism, in some ways more rigorous than that of Nyaya, and on the other, an insight into language as being sui generis, revealing truth independently of other processes of knowledge. Future critical-analytical studies of Kumarila will need to come to grips philosophically with the latter of these ideas in particular, and to determine the systematic role each plays in his thought.

JOHN A. TABER

CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY

Dangerous Wives and Sacred Sisters: Social and Symbolic Roles of High-Caste Women in Nepal. By LYNN BENNETT.

Pp. xiii + 353, 15 figures, 5 charts, 15 B&W photos. New York: COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS. 1983. $30.00

Dangerous Wives and Sacred Sisters is a study of the Hindu view of women as it grows out of what Lynn Bennett

calls the "ideology of patriline" (p. viii). Many scholars have observed the ambivalent attitude toward women inherent in Hindu culture, from Manu's Dharmasstra to the phenome- non of Goddess worship. Bennett goes beyond merely identify- ing this ambivalence to explore its roots, its many types and levels of expression, and its reinforcement within Hindu society. Drawing on years of fieldwork in Nepal's Kathmandu Valley, Bennett presents Hindu culture as represented by high-caste Nepalis in a Brahman-Chetri (Brahmana-Ksatriya) community. From this community she draws vivid pictures of the ambivalent attitude toward women and the underlying tensions that support it.

Bennett's thesis is that Hindu patrilineal ideology gives rise to and reinforces this deep ambivalence toward women. To argue this position, Bennett first looks at the social, ritual, and ideological framework of Hindu culture, primarily as it is reflected in the family and the village (Chaps. 1-3). She then examines the symbolic dimensions of this ambivalence, using examples from myth and ritual (Chaps. 6-8).

Chapters 4 and 5 are pivotal for the understanding of Bennett's thesis. Here Bennett looks at ambivalence towards women in terms of a "dual status" of women indicated in two models set forth by Bennett, the "primary" or "dominant" model being "patrifocal" and the "secondary" or "alternate" model being "filiafocal." This term "filiafocal," coined by Bennett and key to her argument, is used early on in the book but is not defined until page 144: "This term parallels 'patri- focal,' which indicates a system of relations based on respect and obedience to the father-i.e., a male relative of the first ascending generation with respect to ego.... the focal point of the filiafocal model is the daughter, a female relative in ego's first descending generation." Many readers may object that the daughter is the central focus in few if any Hindu families, and thus take issue with Bennett's use of this term "filiafocal." However, in spite of the use of this term (Bennett may wish to search out a more appropriate one), the point Bennett is trying to make in distinguishing between a patri- focal and a filiafocal household is clearly made: that the focus on, treatment of, and attitude toward a woman is significantly different in her parental home than in her conjugal home.

Bennett argues that these two models present radically different views of women. In the patrifocal model, affinal women (wives and sisters-in-law) are considered a threat to the solidarity of the agnatic males, and are given low status; in this model males are superior, and age ranks over youth. In the filiafocal model, the consanguineal women (daughters and sisters) have high status, youth ranks over age, and wife- takers rank over wife-givers. Bennett characterizes the rela- tionship between men and women in the patrifocal model as based on duty and obedience, while that of the filiafocal model is based on affection. Bennett makes the important point that, despite the inferior position of women in the dominant, patrifocal model, it is in this affinal household that

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