Studien zu Nyāyasūtra III. 1, mit dem Nyāyatattvāloka Vācaspati Miśras by Karin PreisendanzReview by: Ludo RocherJournal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 120, No. 1 (Jan. - Mar., 2000), pp. 131-132Published by: American Oriental SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/604913 .

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Reviews of Books Reviews of Books

be spoken in different places simultaneously. It is obvious, that itindravad visayah parallels ity ddityavad visayah, and that the two particles iti must be explained in the same way. Just as vart- tika 41 quotes Vyadi's statement (varttika 48) with iti and counters it with an argument, so does varttika 56; Patafijali then

replaces the argument. The original error of the interpreters consisted in taking the phrase ittndravad visayah after varttika 40 as a varttika. It created the absurd scenario according to which Vajapyayana allegedly bolstered his claim with an argu- ment (Indra) that was not opposed by Vyadi but was then qui- etly dropped and replaced by another (the sun) when Katyayana summed up the discussion, taking more or less Vfijapyayana's side; but Patafijali rejected-with reasons-the "new" argument and revived the "old" one. Actually, Katyayana's reference to the sun as an example matches Mimarmsasutra 1.1.15 yauga- padyam adityavat "Simultaneousness is like [in the case of] the sun," whereas Patanjali's reference to Indra is a newer refinement of the argument. Of course, all this has been known for some time,1 and one has to wonder why the author chose to brush aside this evidence.

These reservations should not, however, detract from the value of Scharf's nearly exhaustive treatment of a complicated and philosophically interesting topic. Indian thinkers struggled with many of the same problems as Western philosophers, and the days are gone when Indian philosophy can be dismissed as

dealing only with religion or mysticism.

be spoken in different places simultaneously. It is obvious, that itindravad visayah parallels ity ddityavad visayah, and that the two particles iti must be explained in the same way. Just as vart- tika 41 quotes Vyadi's statement (varttika 48) with iti and counters it with an argument, so does varttika 56; Patafijali then

replaces the argument. The original error of the interpreters consisted in taking the phrase ittndravad visayah after varttika 40 as a varttika. It created the absurd scenario according to which Vajapyayana allegedly bolstered his claim with an argu- ment (Indra) that was not opposed by Vyadi but was then qui- etly dropped and replaced by another (the sun) when Katyayana summed up the discussion, taking more or less Vfijapyayana's side; but Patafijali rejected-with reasons-the "new" argument and revived the "old" one. Actually, Katyayana's reference to the sun as an example matches Mimarmsasutra 1.1.15 yauga- padyam adityavat "Simultaneousness is like [in the case of] the sun," whereas Patanjali's reference to Indra is a newer refinement of the argument. Of course, all this has been known for some time,1 and one has to wonder why the author chose to brush aside this evidence.

These reservations should not, however, detract from the value of Scharf's nearly exhaustive treatment of a complicated and philosophically interesting topic. Indian thinkers struggled with many of the same problems as Western philosophers, and the days are gone when Indian philosophy can be dismissed as

dealing only with religion or mysticism.

HARTMUT SCHARFE

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, Los ANGELES

HARTMUT SCHARFE

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, Los ANGELES

1 H. Jacobi, in Indian Studies [Fs. Ch. R. Lanman] (Cam- bridge, 1929), 151; H. Scharfe, Grammatical Literature (Wies- baden, 1977), 136-38.

Studien zu Nydyasatra III. 1, mit dem Nyayatattvaloka Vacaspati Misras. Two volumes. By KARIN PREISENDANZ. Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien, vols. 46.1 and 2. Stuttgart: FRANZ STEINER VERLAG, 1994. Pp. lii + 858. DM 188.

Tempus fugit! While reading the introduction to these two learned volumes I was vividly reminded of the time, nearly half a century ago, when I too, was collecting materials on the life and works of Vacaspatimisra. The only difference is that I concen- trated on Vacaspati's writings on Dharma, whereas Preisendanz zeroes in on his texts dealing with Nyaya (thirty and ten, respec- tively, according to his last work, the Pitrbhaktitaratgini). I felt

1 H. Jacobi, in Indian Studies [Fs. Ch. R. Lanman] (Cam- bridge, 1929), 151; H. Scharfe, Grammatical Literature (Wies- baden, 1977), 136-38.

Studien zu Nydyasatra III. 1, mit dem Nyayatattvaloka Vacaspati Misras. Two volumes. By KARIN PREISENDANZ. Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien, vols. 46.1 and 2. Stuttgart: FRANZ STEINER VERLAG, 1994. Pp. lii + 858. DM 188.

Tempus fugit! While reading the introduction to these two learned volumes I was vividly reminded of the time, nearly half a century ago, when I too, was collecting materials on the life and works of Vacaspatimisra. The only difference is that I concen- trated on Vacaspati's writings on Dharma, whereas Preisendanz zeroes in on his texts dealing with Nyaya (thirty and ten, respec- tively, according to his last work, the Pitrbhaktitaratgini). I felt

rewarded by the fact that the data I collected many years ago (Vacaspati Misra, Vyavahdracintdmani: A Digest on Hindu Le-

gal Procedure [Gent, 1956]) are still of some relevance to the discussion of Vacaspati's work and his date. (I placed his works between C.E. 1450 and 1500; Preisendanz dates him between 1410, or rather 1420, and 1490).

A number of things again struck me about the works of one of the most prolific writers in fifteenth-century Mithila. First, with rare exceptions, his works have been preserved in very few manuscripts. For several texts, to which Vacaspati himself refers in his other works-and he does so quite often-we have no manuscripts whatever. On the other hand, at least one of his works on dharma, the Dvaitanirnaya, was commented on not once, but twice.

Second, even fewer texts by Vfcaspati have been published. In the area of dharma, the principal exception is the Vivddacin- tamani, which was edited and translated twice, for the obvious reason that, under the Raj, this text became recognized as a source book of Hindu law in the Mithila school. The Tirthacin- tdmani was published in the Bibliotheca Indica. (One of my students, David P. Gold, is working on a critical edition and translation.) I note that, in the introduction to the Vyavahira- cintdmani, I refer to a couple of texts that were published, but in such places that I could not trace the editions even in the major libraries in London. Vacaspati's works on Nyaya did not fare much better. Preisendanz observes that the Khandanoddhdra, in which Vacaspati refutes Sriharsa's Khandanakhandakhadya, "ist das einzige bis jetzt edierte Nyaya-Werk Vfc's" (p. 6).

The importance of the Nydyatattvaloka (also called Nayatat- tvaloka, pp. 10-11), part of which is the object of Preisendanz's

study, lies in the fact that it is "der erste uns bis jetzt sicher bekannte Direktkommentar zum NS nach Gaigesa" (p. 7; Vardha- mana's Anviksdnayatattvabodha may be the very first one, p. 11). Except for Vatsyayana's Bhdsya, it is also "wohl der ausfiihr- lichste erhaltene Direktkommentar zum NS" (ibid.). Since the 1992 edition by K. N. Jha "in keiner Hinsicht als kritisch zu betrachten ist" (ibid.), the new edition (of adhyaya III, dhnika 1; the edition and translation of III.2 are under preparation, p. 28) is based on manuscripts, one from the India Office Library, and two from the National Archives in Kathmandu (microfilmed by the Nepal-German Manuscript Preservation Project).

It is not possible, in this review, to do justice to a book of more than nine hundred pages. The first volume contains forty-three pages of abbreviations and bibliography, followed by an intro- duction on Vacaspati's date, life, his works generally, and the Nyayatattvaloka, in particular. The rest of the volume (pp. 31- 161) is devoted to the edition and translation which, for the reader's convenience, are printed on facing pages. Even though the edition pages also include (occasionally long and interesting) variant readings, they most often still occupy less space than the translation. The reason for this is that the author decided to add,

rewarded by the fact that the data I collected many years ago (Vacaspati Misra, Vyavahdracintdmani: A Digest on Hindu Le-

gal Procedure [Gent, 1956]) are still of some relevance to the discussion of Vacaspati's work and his date. (I placed his works between C.E. 1450 and 1500; Preisendanz dates him between 1410, or rather 1420, and 1490).

A number of things again struck me about the works of one of the most prolific writers in fifteenth-century Mithila. First, with rare exceptions, his works have been preserved in very few manuscripts. For several texts, to which Vacaspati himself refers in his other works-and he does so quite often-we have no manuscripts whatever. On the other hand, at least one of his works on dharma, the Dvaitanirnaya, was commented on not once, but twice.

Second, even fewer texts by Vfcaspati have been published. In the area of dharma, the principal exception is the Vivddacin- tamani, which was edited and translated twice, for the obvious reason that, under the Raj, this text became recognized as a source book of Hindu law in the Mithila school. The Tirthacin- tdmani was published in the Bibliotheca Indica. (One of my students, David P. Gold, is working on a critical edition and translation.) I note that, in the introduction to the Vyavahira- cintdmani, I refer to a couple of texts that were published, but in such places that I could not trace the editions even in the major libraries in London. Vacaspati's works on Nyaya did not fare much better. Preisendanz observes that the Khandanoddhdra, in which Vacaspati refutes Sriharsa's Khandanakhandakhadya, "ist das einzige bis jetzt edierte Nyaya-Werk Vfc's" (p. 6).

The importance of the Nydyatattvaloka (also called Nayatat- tvaloka, pp. 10-11), part of which is the object of Preisendanz's

study, lies in the fact that it is "der erste uns bis jetzt sicher bekannte Direktkommentar zum NS nach Gaigesa" (p. 7; Vardha- mana's Anviksdnayatattvabodha may be the very first one, p. 11). Except for Vatsyayana's Bhdsya, it is also "wohl der ausfiihr- lichste erhaltene Direktkommentar zum NS" (ibid.). Since the 1992 edition by K. N. Jha "in keiner Hinsicht als kritisch zu betrachten ist" (ibid.), the new edition (of adhyaya III, dhnika 1; the edition and translation of III.2 are under preparation, p. 28) is based on manuscripts, one from the India Office Library, and two from the National Archives in Kathmandu (microfilmed by the Nepal-German Manuscript Preservation Project).

It is not possible, in this review, to do justice to a book of more than nine hundred pages. The first volume contains forty-three pages of abbreviations and bibliography, followed by an intro- duction on Vacaspati's date, life, his works generally, and the Nyayatattvaloka, in particular. The rest of the volume (pp. 31- 161) is devoted to the edition and translation which, for the reader's convenience, are printed on facing pages. Even though the edition pages also include (occasionally long and interesting) variant readings, they most often still occupy less space than the translation. The reason for this is that the author decided to add,

131 131

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Journal of the American Oriental Society 120.1 (2000) Journal of the American Oriental Society 120.1 (2000)

in parentheses and square brackets, anything that might help the reader better understand the extremely terse Sanskrit text. For instance, the sentence

tad iha sariram visayah (p. 82),

is translated (p. 83):

Daher (d.h. weil somit eine Uberpriifung durchaus gerecht- fertigt ist) ist der Korper hier [in der Welt] (d.h. im

Gegensatz zu den aus Wasser, Feuer und Wind beste- henden Korpern in der Welt Varunas, der Sonne und des

Windes) der Gegenstand [des Abschnitts].

And, in addition, after "hier [in der Welt]" there is a reference to note 119, in volume 2, to justify that iha indeed means "in dieser Welt," rather than "in diesem Abschnitt" (p. 397).

The second volume is nearly exclusively devoted to notes on the translation (pp. 161-784). These notes are occasionally brief, as the one I quoted, but they are most often extensive. Whenever

Vacaspati quotes the Bauddhas, the Vaisesikas, the Samkhyayi- kas, and others, as he is wont to do, and even when he does not

quote them explicitly, Preisendanz pursues in detail the ideas of the rival schools, and places the Nyayatattvaloka in the broadest

possible context of Indian philosophical thought. Not everyone is

likely to read these six hundred plus pages of notes from begin- ning to end, but the several detailed indices (pp. 785-858, in Sanskrit "alphabetical" order-even for Western names, so that "Ptolemaus" and "Pythagoras" appear between "purvacaryah" and "Prataparudra," p. 845) facilitate easy reference to hundreds of names and concepts that are discussed in the volume.

Preisendanz's painstaking research provides us with an ency- clopedic survey of the commentarial literature on anything re- lated to the first four prameydni (itman, Sarira, indriya, and

artha) of Gautama's Nydyasutras.

LUDO ROCHER UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

Religion, Civil Society and the State: A Study of Sikhism. By J. P. S. UBEROI. New Delhi: OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1996. Pp. 166, 4 plates. $18.95.

To demonstrate that Sikhism is the herald of Indian modernity is the ambitious project that J. P. S. Uberoi's latest book under- takes. To this end there is scattered throughout the book an im-

plicit critique of "modernity" and the positings of a modernism which resulted from India's, rather than Europe's, specific histor- ical trajectory. What this modernism displaces is what Uberoi terms Indian "medievalism," a discourse which his third chapter

in parentheses and square brackets, anything that might help the reader better understand the extremely terse Sanskrit text. For instance, the sentence

tad iha sariram visayah (p. 82),

is translated (p. 83):

Daher (d.h. weil somit eine Uberpriifung durchaus gerecht- fertigt ist) ist der Korper hier [in der Welt] (d.h. im

Gegensatz zu den aus Wasser, Feuer und Wind beste- henden Korpern in der Welt Varunas, der Sonne und des

Windes) der Gegenstand [des Abschnitts].

And, in addition, after "hier [in der Welt]" there is a reference to note 119, in volume 2, to justify that iha indeed means "in dieser Welt," rather than "in diesem Abschnitt" (p. 397).

The second volume is nearly exclusively devoted to notes on the translation (pp. 161-784). These notes are occasionally brief, as the one I quoted, but they are most often extensive. Whenever

Vacaspati quotes the Bauddhas, the Vaisesikas, the Samkhyayi- kas, and others, as he is wont to do, and even when he does not

quote them explicitly, Preisendanz pursues in detail the ideas of the rival schools, and places the Nyayatattvaloka in the broadest

possible context of Indian philosophical thought. Not everyone is

likely to read these six hundred plus pages of notes from begin- ning to end, but the several detailed indices (pp. 785-858, in Sanskrit "alphabetical" order-even for Western names, so that "Ptolemaus" and "Pythagoras" appear between "purvacaryah" and "Prataparudra," p. 845) facilitate easy reference to hundreds of names and concepts that are discussed in the volume.

Preisendanz's painstaking research provides us with an ency- clopedic survey of the commentarial literature on anything re- lated to the first four prameydni (itman, Sarira, indriya, and

artha) of Gautama's Nydyasutras.

LUDO ROCHER UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

Religion, Civil Society and the State: A Study of Sikhism. By J. P. S. UBEROI. New Delhi: OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1996. Pp. 166, 4 plates. $18.95.

To demonstrate that Sikhism is the herald of Indian modernity is the ambitious project that J. P. S. Uberoi's latest book under- takes. To this end there is scattered throughout the book an im-

plicit critique of "modernity" and the positings of a modernism which resulted from India's, rather than Europe's, specific histor- ical trajectory. What this modernism displaces is what Uberoi terms Indian "medievalism," a discourse which his third chapter

attempts to reconstruct structurally by employing a synchronic analysis of religion, society, and state, respectively, in both the Hindu and Islamic cultures of the subcontinent.

Such critiques of modernity are, of course, not new. Members of the Subaltern Studies group, for example, have been deploying them since the early 1980s. What is novel in Uberoi's book is his

attempt to demonstrate that Sikhism in and of itself (like "Gan- dhism" in the early twentieth century-which for Uberoi bears a strong structural resemblance to Sikhism) presents a radical

rupture, a fundamental discontinuity in this medievalist course and is thus part and parcel of the Indian modernist project which

attempts to bring together, face to face, "the three spheres of re-

ligion, state and society," spheres which were "walled off from each other" in medieval India (p. 84). The key to this rupture and the harbinger of Indian modernity, he proclaims, is in the figure of the martyr in Sikhism, specifically its first traditional martyr, the fifth Sikh Master, Guru Arjan (d. 1606). According to Uberoi,

[b]y the example of his life, work and non-violent self- sacrifice or martyrdom, the fifth guru folded up the... structure of the medieval regime and its intersecting dualisms of status and power. . . and found for good and all the true centre of freedom, self-rule and self reform. (p. 89)

attempts to reconstruct structurally by employing a synchronic analysis of religion, society, and state, respectively, in both the Hindu and Islamic cultures of the subcontinent.

Such critiques of modernity are, of course, not new. Members of the Subaltern Studies group, for example, have been deploying them since the early 1980s. What is novel in Uberoi's book is his

attempt to demonstrate that Sikhism in and of itself (like "Gan- dhism" in the early twentieth century-which for Uberoi bears a strong structural resemblance to Sikhism) presents a radical

rupture, a fundamental discontinuity in this medievalist course and is thus part and parcel of the Indian modernist project which

attempts to bring together, face to face, "the three spheres of re-

ligion, state and society," spheres which were "walled off from each other" in medieval India (p. 84). The key to this rupture and the harbinger of Indian modernity, he proclaims, is in the figure of the martyr in Sikhism, specifically its first traditional martyr, the fifth Sikh Master, Guru Arjan (d. 1606). According to Uberoi,

[b]y the example of his life, work and non-violent self- sacrifice or martyrdom, the fifth guru folded up the... structure of the medieval regime and its intersecting dualisms of status and power. . . and found for good and all the true centre of freedom, self-rule and self reform. (p. 89)

The problems with this book are many, not the least of which is its convoluted and unconvincing argument. It is particularly unimpressive because the historical supports on which the argu- ment rests are seriously fractured. As Uberoi is powerfully caught up in the Sikh tradition he readily affirms many claims on which critical scholars must suspend their judgment. What I, as a historian of Sikhism who also have focused upon martyrdom in the tradition, find the most troubling is Uberoi's selective use of textual sources and oral traditions, his essentialist (mis)under-

standing of Sikhism, and his idealistic language. At the outset of the book Uberoi honestly claims that he

lacks the "linguistic proficiency to study the original Punjabi [texts]" (p. 2). This is of course a huge problem (especially if

one wants to be taken seriously), but it is not insurmountable, as a great deal of excellent Sikh scholarship is available in

English. Unfortunately, he makes little or no use of this scholar-

ship. His narrow reliance on dated and highly biased texts, such as M. A. Macauliffe's The Sikh Religion: Its Gurus, Sacred

Writings and Authors (1909), and on, at best, peripheral articles

by non-experts, such as Fredric Pincott's "Sikhism" (1895), makes the fundamental base of his theoretical argument dubi-

ous. (Uberoi's selective tendency is also apparent in his sections

dealing with renunciation in Indian religious traditions and

martyrdom in Shiah Islam. Nowhere do we find references to Patrick Olivelle's many works on samrnyasa or Mahmoud Ayoub's Redemptive Suffering in Islam: A Study of the Devotional

The problems with this book are many, not the least of which is its convoluted and unconvincing argument. It is particularly unimpressive because the historical supports on which the argu- ment rests are seriously fractured. As Uberoi is powerfully caught up in the Sikh tradition he readily affirms many claims on which critical scholars must suspend their judgment. What I, as a historian of Sikhism who also have focused upon martyrdom in the tradition, find the most troubling is Uberoi's selective use of textual sources and oral traditions, his essentialist (mis)under-

standing of Sikhism, and his idealistic language. At the outset of the book Uberoi honestly claims that he

lacks the "linguistic proficiency to study the original Punjabi [texts]" (p. 2). This is of course a huge problem (especially if

one wants to be taken seriously), but it is not insurmountable, as a great deal of excellent Sikh scholarship is available in

English. Unfortunately, he makes little or no use of this scholar-

ship. His narrow reliance on dated and highly biased texts, such as M. A. Macauliffe's The Sikh Religion: Its Gurus, Sacred

Writings and Authors (1909), and on, at best, peripheral articles

by non-experts, such as Fredric Pincott's "Sikhism" (1895), makes the fundamental base of his theoretical argument dubi-

ous. (Uberoi's selective tendency is also apparent in his sections

dealing with renunciation in Indian religious traditions and

martyrdom in Shiah Islam. Nowhere do we find references to Patrick Olivelle's many works on samrnyasa or Mahmoud Ayoub's Redemptive Suffering in Islam: A Study of the Devotional

132 132

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