hornlike madhyamaka - notes on madhyamaka

8/10/2019 Hornlike madhyamaka - Notes on Madhyamaka

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A hornlike rabbit escaping

Whosoever knows so-called conventional truth as totally dependentlyarisen,suppose to be a all-knowing Buddha only,ultimate truth is not even called truth too,

because the total freedom from all reference points,pointing out the unblurred, unimpaired vision.

Whatever your Vajrayana lineage/tradition is, so far as genuine Madhyamaka is

concerned, it is crucial to not take it for granted, but investigate. Here in the end you have

o rely on your investigation only.

According to books there are many modifications in Tibetan uddhism, such the distinction

bet!een "vatantrika and #rasangika, !hich !ere not em$hasised in original %ndia at all,

such marginali&ation of uddha 'ature teachings lineage of Asanga, !hich according to

he sources !as the to$ of Mahayana teachings in %ndia but in Tibet !as deviated to (the

Mind only) *+ittamatra inter$retation in order to sho! a su$remacy of Tibetan

"vatantrika/#rasangika. And of course in $resent Tibetan Madhyamaka there are also ne!

other inter$retations as -elug #rasangika or "hentong.

n original %ndia $rogressive meditations on em$tiness used to be standard $re$arations for


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his $roblem...

..%n other !ords, our clinging to $ersonal and $henomenal identities does not concern

some abstract, none?istent notion of 1real e?istence1 but !hat a$$ears right in front of our

eyes...

As AtisaCs Entrance into two realitiesdractically clarifies2[The ultimate being reali!ed neither through"onceptual nor nonconceptual consiousnessess.

"antidevaCs odhisattvaCs !ay of life agrees2

The ultimate is not the sphere of cognition.t is said that cognition is the seeming.$

The above verses contradict Tsongkha$aCs claim that even ordinary beings can reali&e the

ully @ualified ultimate reality through a correct reasoning consciousness... just in a

conce$tual !ay. This leads to $arado? that ordinary beings reali&e ultimate reality, !hile

he noble ones, such as buddhas and bodhisattvas, do not.1 *$age.7F

n other !ords, the valid cognition is only the seeming, as above verses said. ut !hat the

seeming is 1-enerally s$eaking, if a given $hiloso$hical system differentiates the t!o

evels of seeming and ultimate reality, then in !hatever !ay it does so, one it s$eaks about

seeming, relative, or deceiving $henomena, it must also acce$t this mean that such

$henomena are $recisely something that is not established. Jther!ise, !hy differentiate

bet!een t!o such levels

Tsongkha$a claims the o$$osite !hen he says that even #rasangikas acce$t seeming

eality as being established through conventional valid cognition.1*The +enter of the "unlit

"ky> $age.78E.

n contrast, $%agar&una and "andrakirti demonstraded so e'tensilvly is precisely thatnothing makes sense when it is analy!ed$. There is not correct assum$tion !ith regard to

em$tiness. And it is should be reali&ed until not reference $oints at all.


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There is not anything to reali&e, neither conventional truth nor ultimate. 1...distinction

bet!een e?$edient and definitive meaning is itself only made on the level of the e?$edient

meaning1*The +enter of the "unlit "ky> $age.74I. "o it is the seeming only, the deceiving.

f you find anything here, congratulations, but unfortunately it !ill be just one moreeference $oint, let alone em$tiness *"unyata. 'agarjuna !rote2$(or those for whom

emptiness is not possible, nothing is possible$.

Tsongkha$a claims that one of the uni@ue features of +andrakirtiCs system is

disitegratedness as a funcional entity serves as the su$$ort to connect $ast actions and

heir results1*$age.76> cha$ter. +an an absence $erform a funtion ..... ut 1to abstainrom reifying things such as karma, cause and effect, in no !ay makes these things lack

heir justification or functioning. To the contrary... ((or those for whom emptiness is

possible, everything is possible)as 'agarjuna !rote *The +enter of the "unlit "ky>

$age.7I5. "o may % ask !hat the $ur$ose for findabilityC

When you try to understand ultimate truth, % guess you should try conventional firstbecause there is not $ossible in other !ay. ut the $roblem is2 you never even be close to

!hat only seems to be ultimate. 1%n terms of the actual definitive meaning the uddha

never taught anything !hatsoever1. ;onCt you kno! buddha is only ;harmakaya, but

seems to be $age.9E42

he more reification is !eakened through +entrist analysis, the more vividly the certainty


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about em$tiness is e?$erienced. Kinally, such certainty does not need to be further

enhanced...

The +enter of the "unlit "ky> $age.9E72 1Kor e?am$le, as children, many of us belivied inhe real e?istence of "anta +laus here on earth... *but someday started to develo$

doubts... investigated further, @uestioned $arents...finally discovered that the "anta +laus

!hom !e sa! at home every year !as our uncle. Jnce !e become absolutely sure there

!as no "anta +laus, !e did not need to analy&e....1 *mental nonengagement...1or kee$

e$eating to ourselves 1there is not "anta +laus, there is not "anta +laus1 *prapanca

reference pointthat !e kee$ s$inning according to Tsongkha$a.

Here, the uddhas are like 1$arents1, they told about "anta +laus to us in order to

liberate1 us from it *svatantraarguments although they already have reali&ed there is no

such. ut for Tsongkha$a svatantraarguments seem to be not useful, as % think. Kor nonG

Tsongkha$a the both tools, "vatantrika and #rasangika, hel$ to be closer to 1liberation1

hrough this mental nonengagement, u$ to the freedom from reference $oints.

$age.78AtLsa says in his +entrist #ith %nstructions2(or e'ample, if you rub two sticks [against each other, fire comesforth. Through this condition, the two sticks are burned and becomenone'istent. Thereafter, the fire that has burned them also subsides bytself. ikewise, once all specifically characteri!ed and generally characteri!edphenomena are established as none'istent [through knowledge,

his knowledge itself is without appearance, luminous, and notestablished as any nature whatsoever.

#a!o


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of this e'amining and analy!ing knowledge itself through seeing that it is baselessand without root. Then one rests in meditative e+uipoise in that which doesnot involve any sense of negation or affirmation whatsoever.

'evertheless, these days % donCt think you can find Madhyamaka teacher !ho is e?$ert ont alone although reali&ed. As % !rote Madhyamaka studies can be su$$lementary to

Mahamudra and ;&ogchen $ractice in Tibetan uddhism but not necessary and you can

ind reali&ed master through HT or ;&ogchen methods only. Jf course these masters can

advise if Madhyamaka suits you com$letely or not, but in some e?tent you should be

amiliar !ith it, see the 9 $reliminary tantra to$ics2 renunciation, odhicitta, "unyata.

Maybe the biggest difference bet!een $resent Tibetan uddhism Madhyamaka andoriginal indian Madhyamaka is that $resent Tibetan Madhyamaka can not be !ithout tantra

o bring the com$lete result

According to "antideva there is an infinite regress of any analysis *The +enter of the "unlit

"ky> $age.452

f what has been analy!eds analy!ed through further analysis,

There is no end to it,Because that analysis would be analy!ed too.

0nce what had to be analy!ed has been analy!ed,The analysis has no basis left.*ince there is no basis, it does not continue.This is e'pressed as nirvana

.."ince there is no $ur$ose left for such analysis,

once its s$ecific task has been accom$lished, it does not continue after the mistaken

dea in @uestion has been $ut to an end. The analysis sto$s on its o!n, just

as a fire dies do!n as soon as the fire!ood has burned u$. Jnce all clinging in

erms of su$erim$osition and denial has come to an end in this !ay, nothing but

he em$ty and luminous nature of the mind in !hich there is nothing to be

emoved or to be added is laid bare as the fundamental state of all $henomena.

This is said to be $rimordial nirvana.


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"vatantrikas !hen $resent seeming reality, they say no more or less than that the seeming

$henomena that $erform functions o$erating through the $o!er of illusionlike entities, as

!ell as the illusionlike valid cognitions through !hich these $henomena are established,

e?ist as such illusionlike $henomena. Jne can only talk about such entities in relation tocertain causes and conditions that in turn $erform functions and bear characteristics only

hrough the $o!er of still other entities that serve as the factors for $resenting the former

causes and conditions. %n contrast, the false seeming is something that a$$ears but cannot

$erform a function that corres$onds to the !ay that it a$$ears, such as a mirage, a

hologram, or the notion of $ermanent sound.

The intention behind this $resentation is to eliminate the $oison of clinging

o inner and outer entities by acce$ting de$endent origination and valid cognition

hat o$erate through the $o!er of seeming, illusionlike entities. ecause of

such descri$tions, in %ndia Autonomists !ere called =the +entrists !ho establish

llusion through reasoning.)

Ho!ever, even if it !ere just on the seeming level that such illusionlike $henomena

!ere to o$erate through the $o!er of seeming entities and !ere established

hrough valid cognition, they !ould have to e?ist as such entities in an

undeceiving !ay. %f they really and undeceivingly e?isted as such entities, all

seeming, conditioned $henomena !ould not be delusive.

The +enter of the "unlit "ky> $age.989 %n terms of a +onse@uentialist

#rasangikassystem of their o!n, there is no $resentation of anything to be $roven or any

means of $roof. 'evertheless, they $ronounce negation and $roof in accordance !ith the

!orld for the sake of eliminating the im$utations of others. %n the Autonomists o!n system,

n terms of ultimate reality, there is also nothing to be $roved nor any means of $roof.

Ho!ever, in terms of seeming reality, through the justified $resentations of !hat is to be

$roved and the means of $roof as the techni@ue to investigate for true reality, Autonomists

"vatantrikas $ronounce $articular negations and $roofs that eliminate the im$utations of

others. ...%n brief, the V%%% arma$a says, !ith regard to the manner of !hat is to be $roven


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and the means of $roof in terms of em$tiness, the intentions of Autonomist and

+onse@uentialist masters are not different. The only distinction lies in their slightly differing

a$$roaches as to ho! the correct vie! of the ultimate is generated in the mind stream and

accordingly communicated to others.

"o they both *"vatantrikas, #rasangikas lead to the same basisGless 1kno!ledge1 !ithout

eference $oints, conce$tuality and duality.

Moreover, *The +enter of the "unlit "ky> $age.7IE Tsongkha$a critici&es autonomous

easoning on the basis of s$ecifically characteri&ed $henomena established throughconventional valid cognition,

but at the same time he claims that +onse@uentialists engage in negation

and $roof based on subjects, $redicates, and reasons that are established through

conventional valid cognition as a$$earing in common for both $ro$onents and

o$$onents. Ho!ever, such establishment through valid cognition as !ell as something

a$$earing in common for +entrists and their realist o$$onents is denied indetail by +andrakLrti....

Kinally, Tsongkha$as +onse@uentialist system also makes use of the distinction

bet!een nominal and nonnominal ultimate reality, a feature that !as clearly

develo$ed in %ndian te?ts unanimously regarded as Autonomist.1

"o thare are many Autonomist *svatantra Blements in -elug$a +onse@uentialism, even!ith 1u$side do!n1 +andrakLrti made of e$istemological system of ;ignaga and

;harmakLrti.

n his use of the logicoGe$istemological system of ;ignaga and ;harmakLrti, Tsongkha$a

definitely follo!s the main and most controversial innovation by the Autonomist

havaviveka, !ho !as the first to introduce that system into +entrism. %n many res$ects, in

his version of +onse@uentialism, Tsongkha$a even em$loys it in a far more e?tensive !ay

han %ndian Autonomists, not!ithstanding the fact that +andrakLrti re$eatedly rejected that

system in detail.


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'onnominal ultimate reality reffers to, as says *$age.44 havavivekas "ummary of the

Meaning

of +entrism2The ultimate is freedom from discursiveness.Being empty of all discursivenesss to be understood

1s the nonnominal ultimate.

ongtrul the -reat *$age.69I The Treasury of no!ledge summari&es +onse@uentialism

n five main $oints *!ith the first2

All $henomena are only nominally e?istent. 3et alone from the $ers$ective of reasoning,

all $resentations in terms of conventional valid cognition or nonvalid cognition and of

anything that could be established by such valid cognition are rejected even on the

conventional level. All $henomena are just mental im$utations through language, thinking,

and means of e?$ression> that is, they e?ist only nominally. Thus, it is e?$lained that

horses and o?en in a dream and in the !aking state are com$letely e@ual in terms of being

eal or false. This includes the rejection of autonomous reasoning in the sense that the

subject and the three modes are established through valid cognition as commonly

a$$earing to both $arties.

n fact, any reali&ation of the ultimate by ordinary beings as a nonim$licative negation for a

correct reasoning consciousness can only refer to nominal ultimate reality, !hich still

belongs to seeming

eality. Ho!ever, Tsongkha$a insists that this reali&ation of ordinary beings is a reali&ation

of actual ultimate reality, just in a conce$tual !ay. ut if actual ultimate reality is indeed

eali&ed by a conce$tual consciousness, it follo!s that the ultimate itself is a conce$tual

object, !hich in turn rules out that it can be the object of the nonconce$tual !isdom in the

meditative e@ui$oise of noble ones. This leads to the $arado? that ordinary beings reali&e

ultimate reality, !hile the noble ones, such as uddhas and bodhisattvas, do not.

The +enter of the "unlit "ky> $age.9E8 Thus, from the $ers$ective of the ultimate


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e?$anse of em$tiness, to claim that the conce$tual object of the nominal ultimateNthe

absence of real e?istence by the negation of real e?istenceNis the actual ultimate is

nothing but a case of confusing the finger that $oints to the moon !ith the moon itself.

The +enter of the "unlit "ky> $age.79 Ho!ever, it can only be re$eated that all

easonings and negations !ork solely on the level of seeming reality. At best, as

nonim$licative negations, they can refer to the nominal ultimate but never to the actual

ultimate free from all discursiveness and reference $oints, such as e?istence,

none?istence, affirmation, and negation.

ongtrul the -reat e?$lains differences bet!een "autrantika, +ittamatra and "vatantrika

Damg0n ongtrul 3odr0 TayO2 1The Treasury of no!ledge. ook "i?, #art Three2

Krame!orks of uddhist #hiloso$hy1> "ection %%2 Mahayana> trans. Bli&abeth M. +allahan>

"no! 3ion #ublications> %thaca, 'e! ork> 455F2

2iven the *autr3ntikas4 position that e'ternal referents are hidden [phenomena,

hey 5*autr3ntikas6 are similar to "hittam3tra 7roponents of 8eal #mages inconsidering dualistic appearances to be cognition 5shes pa6. %evertheless,hese systems differ as to whether what casts [images) 5gtod byed6 is an

e'ternal referent or not9 [for *autr3ntikas, it is an e'ternal referentthatcasts the image for "hittam3tra 7roponents of 8eal #mages, it is not.

"ittamatra The imagined [characteristic is twofold95:6 #magined [characteristics devoid of any characteristics 5mtshan nyidchad pa4i kun brtags6 are what in fact do not e'ist, but are conceptuallymputed, such as the belief in a self 5bdag lta6 or something beingsubstantially established.5;6 %ominal imagined [characteristics 5rnam grangs pa4i kun brtags6are ob&ect-universals 5artha-s3m3nya, don spyi6, which appear tohoughts, and the appearance of the dualism of perceived ob&ects and

perceiving sub&ectsfor the nonconceptual sense consciousnesses.

*autrantika-*vatantrika accepts outer referents simply as

conventionsand discuss them in ways that concur with *autr3ntikas.


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1s a convention, they accept mere consciousnessbut not, however, outer

referents. #n this regard, their presentation is likethat of the "hittam3tra-?asubandhu6

"o let me investigate. "vatantrikaCs conventions means it acce$ts outer referents object or

mere consciousness object only from the $ers$ective of others for the analysis of the

debate !ith them to lead them to the freedom from all reference $oints, including !hole the

seeming. Jriginal ogacara also leads to this freedom because does not $ointGout this

reedom as the 1Mind Jnly1 and never did although many nonGindians did so mistakenly.

"o according to these @uotes % donCt agree !ith regard to 1so called objects1 in "vatantrika

or ogacara.

n his 'e! ork 455F>

$age.E582

According to the -elug$a "chool, buddha nature means nothing but sentient beings

em$tiness, !hich is held to be a nonim$licative negation in the sense of the sheer lack of

eal e?istence *Tib. bden grub.


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Jn the more technical side, also in the -elug$a system, a nonim$licative negation is

categori&ed as a generally characteri&ed $henomenon, !hich is defined as =that !hich is

not able to $erform a function.) "o if buddha natureNand thus buddhahoodNis nothing but

a nonim$licative negation,by definition, it could not have any @ualities, let alone those of a uddha, such as unlimited

$rajRP, com$assion, omniscience. 'or could it $erform even so much as a !ink of

enlightened activity.

There are anecdotes of -elug$as !ho, u$on being asked in conversation !hether a

uddha has !isdom or not, became more or less offended by such a =heretical) @uestion.At the same time, in formal debate, they !ould strictly deny that a uddha has !isdom.

"imilarly, it may be safely assumed that none of them !ould say =no) to the @uestion, =;o

you as$ire to become a uddha) ut does that mean that they are really ins$ired by the

notion of !anting to become a nonim$licative negation

The sutra says2What is the nature of the Thus-2one 0nes the nature of beings.

The Thus-2one 0ne is without nature1nd all beings are without nature.

Vasubandhus Thirty Verses says2Based on the three kinds of lack of nature

0f the three kinds of nature,t is taught that all phenomena

1re without nature.

n The "utra That Snravels the %ntention the uddha also said2/aving this threefold lack of nature in mind@the lack of nature inerms of characteristics, the lack of nature in terms of arising, and the

ultimate lack of nature@# have taught, 1ll phenomena lack a

nature.$

Moreover, if you do not $ractice teachings on buddha nature, the mere vie! is just like the

"Pkhya Hindu $osition. Du Mi$ham


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concludes even !hen considering ;&ogchen2

Without finding certainty in primordialpurity 5ka dag6, &ust mulling over some ground that is neither

e'istent nor none'istent) will get you nowhere. #f you apprehendhis basis of emptiness that is empty of both e'istence and none'istence

as something that is established by its essence separately [fromeverything else, no matter how you label it@such as an inconceivableself, Brahm3, ?isnu, Avara, or wisdom@e'cept for the merename, the meaning is the same. *ince the basic nature free from thereference points of the four e'tremes, that is, C!ogchen@the luminosityhat is to be personally e'perienced@is not at all like that, its important to rely on the correct path and teacher. Therefore, youmay pronounce illusionlike,) nonentity,) freedom from referencepoints,) and the like as mere verbiage, but this is of no benefitwhatsoever, if you do not know the [actual way of being of theTath3gata4s emptiness 5which surpasses the limited [kinds of emptiness[asserted by the tDrthikas6 through the decisive certainty thats induced by reasoning.

think it is also of De Tsongkha$a !hen considering HT, although His marginali&ation of

uddha 'ature teachings lineage of Asanga *!hich according to the sources !as the to$

of Mahayana teachings in %ndia to +ittamatra inter$retation only in order to sho! a

su$remacy of His #rasangika. Tsongkha$a modified ogacara e$istemology of

;ignaga/;harmakirti into His $rasangika also. % !as !ritten *3etter 'o. E about -elug

#rasangika and "hentong vie! at lamrimnotes.!ebs.com that during the generation stage

bskyedGrim one has to use +ittamatra in -elug.

Tsongkha$aCs Kinal B?$osition of Wisdom1 *y Deffrey Ho$kins> "no! 3ion #ublications>

thaca, 'e! ork> 455 @uotes2

the necessity of notGsto$ing the analysis and inherent e?istence as 1just one1

as % $osted on 1$ra$anca that !e kee$ s$inning1 and inherent e?istence as 1hornlike

object of negation12

$age.E85 With res$ect to sustaining QmeditationU !ithin analysis in this !ay,

t is not correct to sto$ analytical meditation u$on holding that all conce$tuality


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!hatsoever is a$$rehension of signsNthat is, a$$rehension

of true e?istence. Kor earlier % have $roven in many !ays that conce$tuality

a$$rehending true e?istence is just one class of conce$tuality.

'PgPrjunas statement in the 1Bssay on the Mind of Bnlightenment12/ow could emptiness be where"onceptuality has appearedThe 0nes-2one-Thus do not perceive=inds having the aspect of ob&ect analy!ed and analy!er.Enlightenment is not present where0b&ect of analysis and analy!er e'ist.

ndicates that those !ho have a$$rehension of true e?istence !ith res$ecto object analy&ed and analy&er have no attainment of enlightenment.

but the analysis is not $erformed during HTantra

Tsongkha$aCs Kinal B?$osition of Wisdom> $age.E7 Jur o!n system is as follo!s2 Bven

n the conte?t of Highest oga QMantraU the system *Vajrayana of generatingunderstanding of the vie! must be done in accordance !ith !hat occurs in the Middle Way

e?ts. With res$ect to ho! it is sustained, on some occasions during states subse@uent to

meditative e@ui$oise on the stages of generation and com$letion,

one takes suchness to mind !ithin analy&ing it, but !hen those on the stage of com$letion

!ho have attained the ca$acity to $ut $enetrative focus on essential $oints in the body

sustain suchness in meditativee@ui$oise, although they definitely must meditate !ithin setting Qthe mindU in the conte?t of

he vie!, they do not $erform the analytical meditation of s$ecial insight as it occurs in

other te?ts. Therefore, !ith res$ect to that occasion, do not $osit analytical meditation as

oneG$ointed meditation on suchness from !ithin the conte?t of the vie! ancillary to

stabili&ing QmeditationU.

"o Tsongkha$a found something 1just one1 !hat even 'agarjuna didnCt, instead of

elin@uish subjective clinging to it. %agar&una and "andrakirti demonstraded so e'tensilvlys precisely that nothing makes sense when it is analy!ed, not even such ordinary,


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everyday things as goingGit is called "amsara and it is !hy you suffer *dukkha.

Why the lineage of vast activity of Asanga/Vasubandhu is the most $erfect su$$lement, the

o$ of Mahayana ecause of this soteriologically efficiency2

The +enter of the "unlit "ky> $age.674 Then there are those !ho talk in a oneGsided !ay

n terms of Mere Mentalism *+ittamatra and say that the otherGde$endent nature em$ty of

he imaginary nature is the

$erfect nature. This is just something that is set u$ by their o!n minds, !ithout

an understanding of the true intention of the lineage of vast activity. Kor, follo!ingThe *utra That Fnravels the #ntention, the lineage of vast activity e?$lains

hat the imaginary nature is like being affected by the disease of blurred vision>

he otherGde$endent nature is like the manifestations that a$$ear due to blurred

vision> and the $erfect nature is like the natural object of clear vision u$on being

cured.

This means that once the disease of blurred vision has been cured, the

a$$earance of floating hairs vanishes. 3ike!ise, !hen the fundamental disease of

he most subtle level of the imaginary natureNminds nature or the e?$anse of

dharmas being blurred by the dualistic s$lit into subject and objectNis eradicated,

hen the seeming a$$earances of the otherGde$endent nature !ill vanish.

At that $oint, the more coarse levels of the imaginary natureN!hich come abouthrough focusing on the a$$earances of the otherGde$endent nature and labeling

hemNautomatically do not remain either. What remains is the $erfect nature,

he e?$anse of dharmas as it is, seen by the unim$eded, natural vision of $ersonally

e?$erienced !isdom.

=Maitreyas ;istinguishing #henomena and #ure eing)> The +ommentary by Mi$ham

Damyang 'amgyal *E68GEIE4, transl. Dim "cott under the guidance of hen$o Ts:ltrim

-yamtso "no! 3ion #ublications> $.F7 e?$lains2


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$/ere the traits of phenomena are defined1s duality plus assumption and formulation,Whose appearance is the mistaken conceptual process,*ince what appears is not and is thus not real.%o referents have ever e'isted either

1nd, being but concept, consist of conceptuali!ation.$

Du Mi$ham comments it2

n line !ith the immediately $receding e?$lanation, the traits of "amsara

tself, here called =$henomena,) are defined as the realm of manifestation,

!hich consists of a$$earances involving a duality of $erceived and $erceiver$lus the assum$tion that anything a$$earing in such a !ay actually e?ists in

hat !ay> this is accom$anied by formulation, !hich a$$lies terminology.

This is com$arable to a !ellGcom$osed $ainting in !hich there a$$ears

o be a background and a foreground, even though there is none. The dualistic

a$$earance of $erceived and $erceiver is merely ones o!n mistaken conce$tual

$rocess, since !hat a$$ears to the mind, namely the object, is note?istentNeven !hile it a$$ears. This is illustrated by such e?am$les as the

strands of hair !hich a$$ear to a victim of cataracts, because these do not

e?ist as the objects they a$$ear to be.

When a child ask you !hat is an iceGscream, !hat you !ill do ou may say 1it is not a

stick or stone1 *$rasanga, you can say 1it is a dessert1 *svatantra or 1very delicious fro&endessert1 *buddha nature describing but you can buy one and say 1taste it and you !ill

kno!1 *$ointing out.

ut the $roblem is if one take these u$side do!n !hen looking al!ays and al!ays again

or the 1didactically1 valid object *lack of inherent e?istence, al!ays kee$ it s$inning,

nstead of actual shamata/vi$assana !hen !orking directly ho! to access the actual

suchness, in other !ords ho! sto$ clinging, ho! sto$ suffering *dukkha. %f so, it !ill u$side

do!n everything. Moreover it !ill be just as u$side do!n "hentong , Bm$ty of the 1actual1

but not the 1hornGlike1.


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The +enter of the "unlit "ky> $age.E94 Ho!everNand this cannot be re$eated too often

Nthe actual target in the conte?t of negating the t!o kinds of identity is the clinging to

hese identities on the

subject side. %n other !ords, the object of negation is a mistaken cognition, a!rong conce$tion that a$$rehends something none?istent as e?istent. "ince there

s no actual object of negation on the objective side, there never !as anything

objective to be relin@uished. "o =negating an identity) is just another e?$ression

or the $rocess of letting go of our subjective clinging to imaginary identities. Jf

course, from the +entrist $oint of vie!, this clinging itself is not something real

either. Ho!ever, as long as there is an individual mistaken notion of an object,here is also the notion of a subject. +onse@uently, !ith the reali&ation that an

object is illusory, the subject that held on to it dissolves naturally. Jn the other

hand, if there !ere an object of negation that !as established as an actual object,

!e !ould not be able to relin@uish it any!ay, no matter ho! hard !e tried. Kor

no one can successfully negate something that actually e?ists or, for that matter,

$rove the e?istence of something that does not actually e?ist.

Thus, for uddhist reasoning and meditation to be soteriologically efficient,

t is crucial to ackno!ledge that their actual target lies not at the level of the

a$$rehended objectsNthe notions of a real $ersonal or $henomenal identityN

but at the level of the a$$rehending subjectNthe largely unconscious and instinctive

clinging to such identities.

'onGfinding 1this1 object is not the same as to sto$ dukkha caused by 1it1 *sravaka let

alone to attain omniscience *buddhahood. %t !ill be just one more reference $oint to bind

you more to cyclic suffering *samsara. Whatever the 1actual1 object, 1hornGlike1 object,

metaforic kno!ledge1 object, 1buddha nature1 object, 1svatantra1 object, 1$rasanga1

object, 1non1 object, 1nonim$licative negation1 object, 1freedom from reference $oints1

object.

When the fundamental disease of the most subtle level of the imaginary nature blurred byhe dualistic split into sub&ect and ob&ect is eradicated, then the seeming appearances of


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he other-dependent nature will vanish.1t that point, the more coarse levels of the imaginary nature@which come about throughfocusing on the appearances of the other-dependent nature and labeling them@

automatically do not remain either. What remains is the perfect nature, the uddha 'ature.

-endun +ho$el in his 1The MadmanCs Middle Way) *the university of chicago $ress

chicago and london> transl. ;onald s. 3o$e& Dr.> $age.I5 e?$lains by using some stories

and @uotes "antideva2

GHH #n brief, that which e'ists within the conception of true e'istence andwhich is being seen in the presence of the conception of true establishments left as it is, and then something else is refuted. #t does not pass beyond what

he foremost cang skya rin po che said9 eaving this vivid appearance wheret is, they search for something protruding to refute.)G:II When the great tantric master *angs rgyas rgya mtsho was asked by theforemost 4Jam dbyangs b!had pa what the difference of view was between7rasangika and *vatantrika, he pointed at a pillar in his room and said9#n the *vatantrika system, this wooden thing standing alone is the pillar.n the 7rasangika system, this is the basis of designation of the pillar.t is there that a pillar e'ists in name alone, merely imputedly e'istent.

) The great geshe 1rig 5:K;LM:NIO6 met Wa mang 7an.d.ita 5Cbal mang dkon mchog

rgyal mtshan,:KLPM:NQO6, who said [to the geshe, Which of the five books are you versed in)[The geshe said, # have studied =adhyamaka the most.) [Wa mang said,Then, what is this in the 7rasangika system) 5O:;6 and pointed his finger athe table in front of him. [The geshe said, That is a table.) [Wa mang said, #t

follows that it is not a table because of being the basis of designation of a table,)o which he [1 rig was left with no reply. These two stories definitely pointo a critical issue concerning the views of 7rasangika and *vatantrika. Thus,

one should know that the conception that this s+uare piece of wood which

stands in front is a table is the conception of true e'istence in the 7rasangikasystem, and is valid conventional knowledge in the *vatantrika system.*imilarly, one should know that saying that this four-cornered piece of wood thatstands in front is a table is an assertion for others in the 7rasangika system, ands an autonomous assertion in the *vatantrika system...G:IO Even the great 7rasangika masters did not see anything beyond &ust thisas the basis for positing the root of the conventional. Therefore, they assertsomething renowned to the world as the presentation of the conventional.G:IP...

..#t is a little closer to the tenets of "ittamatra, but the


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G:IL ...the master "andrakSrti said that if one utterly destroys in theface of reasoning all of these presentations of appearances, the afflictive obstructionsare abandoned, and that the utter destruction of them in the face ofperception is the abandonment of the obstructions to omniscience [accordingo him it seems that such [appearances no longer e'ist for the Buddha who

has e'hausted the two obstructions.G:IK *eeing a table wholeheartedly is an afflictive obstruction, and merely seeingt to e'ist with one4s eyes is an obstruction to omniscience. *antideva said[at Bodhicaryavatara #.OIMO: that the way in which people at a magic showust for an illusory woman is an e'ample of the afflictive obstructions, and theway in which the magician himself lusts for the illusory woman is an e'ample

of the obstructions to omniscience.

There is the big difference bet!een the afflictive obstructions and the obstructions toomniscience indeed. Jnly after the later you !ill be totally 1beyond all reference $oints

unblurred vision *;harmakaya, "ambhogakaya, 'irmanakaya.

The +enter of the "unlit "ky> $age.7FE 1%n general, the arma$a says,

any meditation or conduct based on the notion

of an isolated nature of $henomena that is not connected to anything that bearshis nature is not a$$ro$riate as either the foundation for the $ath to liberation

or the remedy for obscurations. Kor any meditation or conduct based on a nature

of $henomena that is unrelated to these $henomena cannot relin@uish the t!o

obscurations of clinging to the reality of these very $henomena as the seeming

bearers of this nature. %n terms of such a disconnected nature of $henomena, it

does not matter !hether it is said to be a nonentity that is a nonim$licative negationas held by Tsongkha$a or a $ermanent ultimate entity *as maintained by

;0l$o$a and others. oth are e@ually soteriologically ineffective...

n contrast to all the above misconce$tions of em$tiness, according to Miky0

;orje, Autonomists and +onse@uentialists understand em$tiness in a !ay that

s soteriologially effective.1

Mental or nonGmental is not enought, conce$tul or nonconce$tual also. As % @uoted2 $[Theultimate being reali!ed neither through conceptual nor nonconceptual consiousnessess.$

Bven using common sense, !hen you not find out 1there1 for e?am$le a bacteria, it is not


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he same as cured your body 1there1, not suffering. These days modern science is looking

or 1The Higgs $article1 but if !ill not find it, it !ill be not the same as the end of the

Sniverse, although ="tandard Model of #articles and Korces of the Sniverse) !ill be still

ailed. ut according to modern science everything eventually !ill make sense... donCt!orry, !e !ill be enlightened soon by taking some kind of 1hornGlike1 $ill .

When a child kee$ re$eating 11there is not "anta +laus, there is not "anta +laus1 in lonely

oom, ho! he !ill discover that the "anta +laus is his uncle during the holiday $arty

outside

er&inarchives.com adds2 1The nonGd&ogchen systems of -elug, "akya, and agyu

analy&e three levels of mind or mental activity2

-ross mental activity is sensory cognition, !hich is al!ays nonconce$tual.

"ubtle mental activity includes both conce$tual and nonconce$tual mental cognition.

The subtlest mental activity underlying them all is clear light * XodGgsal, !hich is

e?clusively nonconce$tual, but subtler than gross or subtle nonconce$tual mental activity.

"utra and the lo!er classes of tantra em$loy subtle mental activity for the cognition of

voidness. Jnly anuttarayoga, the highest class of tantra, accesses and uses clear light

mental activity for this $ur$ose.

#arallel to this $resentation, sutra and the lo!er classes of tantra in the 'yingma system

em$loy sem for the cognition of voidness. Jnly d&ogchen accesses and uses


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HT "o De Tsongkha$a to me is the best tibetan o$$onent for other tibetan Madhyamaka

masters so far, even better than ;ol$o$a, maybe this !as His main sutra $ur$ose

;:djom $age.788 =


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of one not e'isting in an other, [such as the eye is empty, sincet lacks an inner agent) or it is empty of the nature of apprehender and

apprehended.)

The +ommentary on odhichitta *odhichittavivaraYaGnPma, yang chub sems grel $a

&hes bya ba, by 'PgPrjuna says2When we awaken from a dream [we see that dream ob&ects and waking ob&ects do notdiffer in their performance of functions.

ongtrul the -reat 1Treasury121s is said, horses and elephants in dreams or illusions and actual horses and elephants,as well as cows in drawings and actual cows, are e+uivalent in the way that they performfunctions from a mistaken perspective.

Du Mi$ham lists in Asanga *=Maitreyas ;istinguishing #henomena and #ure eing)> The

+ommentary by Mi$ham Damyang 'amgyal *E68GEIE4, transl. Dim "cott under the

guidance of hen$o Ts:ltrim -yamtso "no! 3ion #ublications many levels

!hich obscured the reali&ation of uddha 'ature2

What appears to the nonconceptual sensory faculty as a duality of perceivedand perceiver

The process of formulation conducted by the rational mind, which isconceptual and first makes the assumption that whatever appears to bea duality actually e'ists that way and then formulates it by assigning aspecific term this is a process which is internal and e+uivalent to therational mind4s conceptuali!ation of percept and perceiver

The inner faculties, that of the eye and so on

0uter ob&ects, form and so onThe principles of awareness, the eye consciousness, and so on?essel-like worlds4 appearances e'perienced in common.

*ince these are all absent, suchness free of all these types of differentiation appears in itsone taste. This is what is referred to as the subsiding of dualistic appearance intoemptiness.).../ence, wisdom devoid of appearances is one which transcends the parameters definingappearance as described above and is itself the clear light, all pervasive as space. This is

called nonconceptual original wisdom free of appearance.) #t is essentially beyondconsciousness and is thus not restrictedo any domain whatsoever, whether that of the composite, the non-composite or any other.

*ince this means original wisdom itself does not fall into the category of appearances, it isnot something distinct from pure being but is its intrinsic luminous clarity....Because it rests in suchness, the abiding nature free of overestimation and denial wherein


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hewo truths are inseparable, it eliminates all wrong views, which fi'ate on theoretical

conclusions.

There is the traditional uddhist scheme of %ndian uddhist schools for the $edagogical$ur$ose. All distinctions are not solid and only, but just for gradual $edagogical refine our

$ersonal insights, ste$ by ste$s. Jnly according to this $ers$ective distinction bet!een

the ne!1 +ittamatra, "vatantrika, #rasangika is correct. %f one are using other order of

ste$s than usual, it is only as a tool but not as the annihilation of the the traditional

uddhist scheme. Bverybody can do it, not only the !ell res$ected masters, and one

should it of course, if is useful. The best is the $ointingGout to $age.77F2not accepting that the view of true reality is generated in the continuum of an opponenthrough autonomous probative arguments.

Jur reference $oints can meet each other. %n other !ords !e have our collective karma to

debate inside "amsara $lace of dukkha. "o reference $oints *slightly different objects of

he debate can cause less reference $oints to occur or even colla$se all of them in the

bet!een moment !here not conce$tuality at all but bliss for a !hile.

3ooking briefly, it guess it deals !ith a +ha$ter of 3amrim +henmo 1'ot negating enough1The -reat Treatise on the "tages of the #ath to Bnlightenment> TsongGkhaG$a, translated

by the 3amrim +henmo Translation +ommittee> "no! 3ion #ublication> 'e! ork.

$age.455 %ow when you as an ordinary being determine that phenomena lack even aparticle of essential of intrinsic nature, you find that emptiness - emptiness of intrinsicnature - is an attribute of the phenomena, such as form, that serve as its substrata. *ince

you have not stopped dualistic appearance, that emptiness is a nominal rather thanultimate truth.By accustoming yourself to that view which knows the absence of intrinsic nature, you willknow it by perceiving it. (or such a consciousness, all mistaken appearances stop.


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This refers to 1'egating enough1.

Very e?cuse me if % error it, but % guess Tsongkha$a find this 1lack of intrinsic nature1 !hich

can be $erceived during shamata directly and there is no need to colla$se all reference$oints in order to discover !hat is beyond them, the some kind of basisless ground called

metaforically1 nonconce$tual !isdom !here the lo! of causes and effects *karma could

be someho! 1unclear1. The more you $erceiving directly this 1lack of intrinsic nature1 the

better you are enlightened until com$lete $erceiving this 1lack of intrinsic nature1 !hen all

mistaken a$$earances sto$. %s it not

Zuote from TsongGkhaG$as Kinal B?$osition of Wisdom2

$age.E85 $With respect to sustaining [meditation within analysis in this way,t is not correct to stop analytical meditation upon holding that all conceptualitywhatsoever is apprehension of signs@that is, apprehensionof true e'istence. (or earlier [# have proven in many ways that conceptualityapprehending true e'istence is &ust one class of conceptuality.

This refers to 1'ot negating enough1.

$age.I9 $#n order for such to happen, it is necessary to differentiate between9inherent e'istence and mere e'istenceabsence of e'istence by way of its [the ob&ect4s own character and

non-e'istence

...When those are not differentiated, you do not pass beyond the twoe'tremes of superimposition and deprecation since then once a thinge'ists, it e'ists by way of its own nature, and once something does note'ist by way of its own nature, it is totally non-e'istent.$

$age.E5EThis is like propounding that in order to remove the suffering offright upon apprehending a snake in the east despite there being no

snake there, the demonstration that there is no snake in the east willnot serve as an antidote to it, but rather one should indicate, There isa tree in the west.) (or, one is propounding that in order to remove thesuffering upon adhering to the true e'istence of what appears in thisway to sentient beings, reali!ation that those bases [that is, ob&ects@


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which are apprehended to truly e'ist@do not truly e'ist will not serveas an antidote, but that rather one must indicate that some othersenseless base truly e'ists.

;o all reference $oints colla$se Kor me not, because the lack of intrinsic nature accordingo @uotes is also a reference $oint *although nonim$licative negation % guess and should

be in this !ay 1$erceived1.

The +enter of the "unlit "ky> $age.EF The definition of a nonim$licative negation is

something that is to be cogni&ed by a cognition that directly cogni&es it through merely

e?cluding its s$ecific object of negation.

The +enter of the "unlit "ky> $age.EI4 A sutra states2Those who understand this dharma of being nothing whatsoever)Will be without attachment toward all phenomena.

n this !ay, it is clear that such a nonim$licative negation is just a ste$ to!ard

he direct reali&ation of actual ultimate reality. Jther!ise, if ultimate reality itself!ere nothing but a nonim$licative negation, then it !ould just be some conce$tual

kind of none?istence in the sense of nothing !hatsoever. Jn the other

hand, if ultimate reality !ere an im$licative negation or something affirmative,

hen it !ould be something actually e?istent. Jbviously, none of these categories

a$$lies to the actual or nonnominal ultimate, and there is no third $ossibility.

The Bighth arma$a denies both the $osition that ultimate reality is a nonim$licative

negation *or even one that is su$$osed to !ithstand analysis and the

$osition that ultimate reality is com$letely ine?$ressible. %t seems that the first

scholar to e?$licitly identify the ultimate as a nonim$licative negation !as +haba

+h0kyi "enge. 3ater, Tsongkha$a and his follo!ers also ado$ted this $osition

and held that actual em$tiness is a nonim$licative negation that !ithstands analysis.Ho!ever, if it !ere $ossible to arrive at something that !ithstands analysis,

such as the nonim$licative negation =the lack of real e?istence,) this !ould turn


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he !hole $roject of +entrismNthe demonstration that there is nothing that

!ithstands analysisNu$side do!n.

The definition of a nonim$licative negation is =something that is to be cogni&ed by acognition that directly cogni&es it through merely e?cluding its s$ecific object of negation.

y using it *this cognition nothing !ithstands analysis. "ince it is only the cognition, it is

not the ultimate. As "antidevaCs odhisattvaCs !ay of life agrees2The ultimate is not the sphere of cognition.t is said that cognition is the seeming.$

"o !hat is reali&ed by this cognition of the lack the seeming only % guess.Moreover if it is still a reference $oint ho! does it act as an antidote to "amsara This is

our $ra$aRca kee$ s$inning only *reference $oint> sanskrit. $ra$aRca> tib. s$ros $a.

AtLsas Bntrance into the T!o


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seeing may be illustrated by an e?am$le. When $eo$le !ith blurred vision consult

a doctor, they might be told, =There is no doubt that you see all these things

ike floating hairs, but none of them really e?ists.) y kee$ing this in mind, the

$atients may eventually cease to be confused and u$set by these a$$earances.Ho!ever, merely cultivating this notion of the actual none?istence of !hat they

see does not eliminate the a$$earances themselves. Jnce the $atients become

cured and thus see unobscured, o$en s$ace !ithout floating hairs, they obviously

do not see =the nonim$licative negation of the real e?istence of floating

hairs.) Technically s$eaking, one may say that they see s$ace =@ualified) by the

absence of floating hairs, but in terms of immediate e?$erience, they just see!hat is as it is,) since it is no longer obscured by anything.

Kurthermore, since also Tsongkha$a and his follo!ers say that the meditative

e@ui$oise of noble ones is !ithout a$$earance, ho! could a nonim$licative negation

be $erceived in such a meditative e@ui$oise, if it does not even a$$ear for it

And if something does not a$$ear in the meditative e@ui$oise of noble ones, ho!can it be said to e?ist as ultimate reality What does not a$$ear in their meditative

e@ui$oise could only be either their =mere seeming,) the seeming reality of

ordinary beings, or the false seeming *such as a hallucination.

Bvery master has oneCs o!n 1better1 inter$retation and even o!n mode of translation, and

t is obvious also in the case of De Tsongkha$a. To give e?am$les of His inter$retationrom +handrakirti *TsongGkhaG$as Kinal B?$osition of Wisdom> $.EE62

n that !ay also +handrakirtis "u$$lement

o *'agarjunas =Treatise on the Middle)says2[Buddha said that all things have two natures,Those found by perceptions of the real and of the false@0b&ects of perceptions of reality are suchnesses,[1nd ob&ects of perceptions of the false are obscurationalruths.

This indicates that !ith regard to the natures of a s$rout there are

!oNthe natures of the t!o truthsNand that the ultimate is found by


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he former consciousness, !hereas the conventional is found by the

atter consciousness. %t does not indicate that one nature of a s$rout

tself is the t!o truths in relation to the former and latter consciousnesses.

This is called the object side $ers$ective.

And His inter$retation from "hantidevas 1Bngaging in the odhisattva

;eeds1*TsongGkhaG$as Kinal B?$osition of Wisdom> $.4442

The ultimate is not an ob&ect of activity of an awareness.1warenesses are said to be conventionalities.

..Q"hantidevasU identification of obscurational truths does not mean

hat only a!arenesses are $osited as obscurational truths> rather, they

are objects of a!arenesses.

This is also the object side $ers$ective.

nstead of2

The ultimate is not the sphere of cognition.t is said that cognition is the seeming.

This is called the subject side $ers$ective according to nonGTsongkha$a.

n (The T!o Truths ;ebate. Tsongkha$a and -oram$a on the Middle Way)> y "onam

Thakchoe> Wisdom #ub. ostan 455F the author $ersonally found Tsongkha$a more

convincing. Here indeed Tsongkha$a claims that every $henomenon has the t!o natures

!hich can be $erceived as object2 conventional and ultimate. The t!o natures corres$ond

o dece$tive or nondece$tive modes of a$$earances. ut -oram$a holds that the t!o

ruths do not have any objective basis *like the arma$a. All divisions belong to the

seeming not to the buddhas.


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Ho! the conventional object, !hich is $erceived by various sentient beings in their limitless

various !ays *e.g. animal, human, $reta, can be the same also for uddha !ho is no

onger a sentient being %f it is the same, !hat about the suffering dukkha Kor e?am$le for

!ater by a hell being is $erceived as lava and it suffers. ;oes uddha also suffer

Tsongkhapas The two natures) correspond to deceptive or nondeceptive modes ofappearances. (or e'ample the table is perceived and the tables emptiness of inherente'istence is also perceived. The agent who cogni!ed the two truths may be one and thesame individual. 0rdinary beings have only conceptual access to ultimate, while aryas athe path direct access. 0nly Enlightened beings have simultanous access to both truths.

According to Tsongkha$a conventional is not ho! a thing is but ho! it seems to be,

ultimate is not ho! thing seems to be but ho! it is. %n other !ords conventional is the

de$endent arisen and ultimate is the lack of inherent e?istence. The both necessary should

be reali&ed, but only uddhas $erceive both2 the de$endently arising 1it1 and lack of

nherent e?istence of 1it1.

Without $erceiving ho! $recisely 1they1 are de$endent arisen one can not accom$lish theaccumulation of merit for


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beyond1 be discovered !ith all its @ualites *;harmakaya,


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Kor $ers$ective of De Tsongkha$a there is $recisely de$endently arisen 1object1 since

beginningless time and from infinitive causes/conditions and only buddhas are able to

$erceive ho! 1it1 is made by sentient beings. We *sentient beings should =kee$ s$inning)his object side until omniscient $erceiving ho! this 1infinity1 $recisely *buddhahood.

What a tremendous !ork

Kor $ers$ective of nonGTsongkha$a, since the seeming is $recisely de$endently arisen

object1 since beginningless time from infinitive causes/conditions, so 1it1 never !as at the

irst $lace but only the subject side of sentient being made 1this1 division. Kor buddhas 1thisdivision1 is no longer.

What a direct $ointing out

uddhas 1Ho! it is made by sentient beings1 object side sentient being actual subject

side 1dukkha1 *not for buddhas.

"o Tsongkha$a and nonGTsongkha$a *-oram$a, arma$a Mikyo ;orje, Mi$ham !ould fit

ogether at last. 1They1 both are useful to 1colla$se1 all $ers$ectives. Are they not

Unfortunately,not e?actly. This $recisely de$endently arisen 1it1 since beginningless

ime from infinitive causes/conditions is the object only by just one class of conce$tuality

according to 1final1 Tsongkha$a *1Tsongkha$aCs Kinal B?$osition of Wisdom1. y DeffreyHo$kins> "no! 3ion #ublications> %thaca, 'e! ork> 455> $age. E85. "o this 1lack1 is the

same for all other objects made of their infinitive causes/conditions and should be kee$

orever s$inning although !ill be very different objects. "ome kind of shortcut from the !ay

of the infinite.

What a sim$le !ork

3ike +ittamatra 1Mind Jnly1 "chool, it seems to me to be 1Dust Jne Jnly1 "chool but

Hornlike1 for nonGTsongkha$a *-oram$a, Mikyo ;orje, Mi$ham.

guess this (lack) should be done for the actual object according to ho! it is made


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$recisely by $resent cause/condition and !hen ne?t moment or condition !ill occur, or

another object !ill be chosen, than should be also another (lack) res$ectively ut is it

$ossible since moments arisen instantly and cause/conditions are nearly $erceived (A

ack) should be of individually/uni@uely made inherent e?istence, not the lack of the samefor all e?istence, some kind universal.

f you !ant kno! ho! is the seeming $recisely *e.g. hand, it is im$ossible for you sentient

being, because infinite causes/conditions since beginigless time. 'othing functions,

nothing makes sense for you sentient being. % guess only allGkno!ing buddhas could kno!

t $recisely *e.g. ho! you 1finally get1 this hand since beginnigless time of your $reviousifetimes. This is !hat 'agarjunaCs The king of reasonings Gthe reason of de$endent

originationG is all about. 3ook for e?am$le on interde$endent connection bet!een ordinary

hings on earth and the sun, gala?ies... since beginningless time. Bverything has influence.

Kor e?am$le ordinary atoms of the iron inside your body !ere made by the e?$losions of

su$ernovas milliards years ego. That is interde$endent link !hen you looking for e?am$le

ho! is your hand, one among million other e@ually im$ortant links. "o are you able todentify them % guess De Tsongkha$a !as not a!are of it.

"amsara doesnCt function, it just seems to function What about e.g. a hand es, it

seems from object side, but you should object the hand by lack of its uni@ue inherent

e?istence, not lack of the same *universal for all $henomena inherent e?istence, if you

!ant 1ho! the seeming1. es, it seems from subject side, but you should subject the actual

hand 1in front of your eyes1, if you !ant to sto$ the seeming *dukkha.

f you someho! $rotect the 1functional1 seeming conventionally and lack of inherent nature

ultimately, you only $rotect 1de$endent nature1 reference $oints and 1the imaginary1

eference $oints. "o you !ill be safe as the 1the best and only1 #rasangika free from some

kind of 1meta$horical1 +ittamatra. Jk, your choice. ut !hat !ill you do !ith these t!o

kinds of reference $oints

ut !hy are !e so interested ho! is the seeming although this tremendous infinite !ork


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but not interested ho! sto$ this seeming 1Kind1 subject $ers$ective, not object. We have

no choice because !e can not take !hat is im$ossible for us sentient beings.

s there a great need to understand $ramana #artially, because it is tool only. "hould bea!are2 ;onCt look at the finger instead of the moon. "to$ 1kee$ s$inning1.

"o nothing functions, nothing makes sense in "amsara dukkha. There is no nonGmistaken

or e?am$le a hand. ou have to be free from all reference $oints com$letely. As %

understand, Tsongkha$a insists the freedom only from some kind of universal inherent

e?istence, the same for all $henomena, not from the functioning seeming, e.g. the

unctioning hand itself. 'onGTsongkha$a insists the freedom from the !hole seeming, not

only $artially *because also free from the functioning seeming, let alone 1hornlike1

universal !hich is not even $artial but $arado?. ou are looking only because you are

sentient being, although there is neither the $erceiver, $erceived nor the $rocess of

$erceiving the hand.

Jne should choose object to analy&e it in order to reali&ation, ho! it is really like. The main

$oint % have in mind, % should not analy&ing ho! it is functioning but analy&ing ho! to sto$

his functioning for me. Kor e?am$le 1the hand1 of enemy can hit me. "o it !ill function as

$ain for me, right here 1in front of my eyes1 !hen my nose turned red. ut % ho$e it !ill

unction no more !hen enlightenment, !hen the functioning seeming is no more. Kor me to

have some kind of lack of universal inherent e?istence !ill not $revent my $ain of the nose

urned red also

The actual objects are 1made1 by sentient beings only. Ho$efully 1there are1 uddhas too,

and there 1is 1 the #ath for us to 1be1 also uddhas 1like1 them, no longer 1functional1

sentient beings. Bven !hen you are some kind of "autrantikaGleaning, it is not $ossible for

you to totally 1$rotect1 the actual objects because they are interde$endent arising from

imitless causes/conditions since beginningless time, so they never !ere at the first $lace.

ogtrul the -reat 1Treasury1 *Damg0n ongtrul 3odr0 TayO2 1The Treasury of no!ledge.

ook "i?, #art Three2 Krame!orks of uddhist #hiloso$hy1> "ection %%2 Mahayana> trans.


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Bli&abeth M. +allahan> "no! 3ion #ublications> %thaca, 'e! ork> 455F says2

"autrPntikas believe that B?ternal referents *$hyi don are considered to be hidden.

ecause

e?ternal referents objectsU are $ast Q!hen a consciousness arisesU, theyare not !hat a consciousness sees. Thus, Q"autrPntikas $ositU !hat is

called =an image,) !hich is an a$$earance of consciousness that has

been cast by the referent. Although the referent has ceased, the image

hat is consciousness set by that QreferentU is e?$erienced as the likeness

of the referent. This is designated as the e?$erience Qof the referentU. A

consciousness a$$rehending an object $erceives by means of an imageactingU as an intermediary *bar du chod $a.

"autrPntikas state that $erce$ts and their $erceivers, as causes and

esults, arise se@uentially, not simultaneously.

Among the five bases *!hich are kno!able objects, forms, mind, and

either t!o or three of the mental eventsNfeelings, discriminations, and,

in some cases,U intentionsNe?ist substantially. Bverything else isasserted to be im$utedly e?istent entitiesNmeaning that they are designated

as entities sim$lyU in relation to Qhaving someU as$ects Qof entitiesU

Nor to be im$utedly e?istent nonentities *dngos med.

They maintain that Qthe $henomena ofU the three times are not substantially

established, that they are mentally im$uted entities.

As for forms, like Qthe VaibhP[hikasU above, they say that there are t!oy$es2 minute $articles, !hich are building blocks> and gross $henomena,

!hich are constructed !ith those. "autrPntikas, ho!ever, say that

minute $articles circle Qeach otherU and do not join, but they also have

no interstices bet!een them. Hence, they are $erceived as touching, like

the $ages ofU a bound book...

"tudy the most fundamental reasonings of 'agarjuna to cure yourself from 1the actual

objects out there in front of yours eyes1 until any blurred vision left but the 1unblurred12

there is no any cause for arising of $henomena because they do not arise from itself,


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other, both of these or neither of these *Vajra "livers, the second reasoning of 'agarjuna,

$henomena have been never created, it is not $ossible to have the actual objects

negating arising, the third reasoning of 'agarjuna *Kour 3imits, the fourth reasoning of

'agarjuna.

Moreover, !ithout the $ossibility of the 1unblurred1 and the continuation to!ards it there

!ill be 1no business even saying Arya 'agarjunaCs name1. This is !hat connect us !ith

buddhahood during the #ath, because of the uddha nature, =the $erfect nature) $ossibility

and the skilful usage of 1illusory1 the de$endent *nature during this #ath. This 1illusory 1the

de$endent1 of course is needed, not only ogacara says it, but "vatantrika also.

The +enter of the "unlit "ky, $.6F5 The imaginary nature is like mistakenly a$$rehending

he visual a$$earances that are caused by blurred vision to be floating hairs and such.

"ince this is nothing but names and su$erim$ositions, it does not e?ist at all. Therefore,

he imaginary nature is =the lack of nature in terms of characteristics.)

The otherGde$endent nature consists of de$endently originating a$$earances, like the $lain

visual a$$earances seen by someone !ith blurred vision. These a$$ear in an illusionlike

manner but are !ithout any nature of their o!n and do not really arise. Therefore, the

otherGde$endent nature is =the lack of nature in terms of arising.)

The ultimate lack of nature of the $erfect nature has t!o as$ects. Kirst, although there is

no $ersonal identity, the $erfect nature is !hat functions as the remedy for the notion of a

$ersonal identity. Dust as an illusory shi$ to cross an illusory ocean, it serves as the means

o cross the ocean of cyclic e?istence to the other shore of 'irvana. This remedial as$ect is

actually contained !ithin the otherGde$endent nature, but it is the cause for reali&ing the

ultimate. Therefore, it is included in the category of =the ultimate lack of nature.) The

second as$ect of the $erfect nature is the one from !hich enlightenment is attained

hrough actively engaging in it. This as$ect is undifferentiable from $henomenal

dentitylessness. 3ike s$ace, it is omni$resent and not established as anything !hatsoever.

t can be com$ared to the free s$ace that is the natural object of unim$aired vision !hen

he eye defect of blurred vision has been cured and one reali&es that !hat a$$eared as


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loating hairs never actually e?isted any!here. This as$ect is =the ultimate lack of nature)

$er se.

There is the need to kno! the difference bet!een actual im$utation and abstract 1hornlike1m$utation, let alone the difference bet!een otherGde$endent nature and imaginary

nature. %f you acce$t that de$endent is !holly im$uted, you acce$t e?istence of abstract

hornlike1 im$utation only *some kind of universal no matter if the im$utation refers to this

able or something other instead of actual im$utation for e?am$le the table itself as

uni@uely a$$ears right in front of our eyes *otherGde$endent nature. "o your !orld !ill be

only fiction like 1kee$ s$inning1 abstract something =there is in not "anta +laus, there is innot "anta +laus), even !hen beautiful !oman is !alking in front of your eyes.

ou should consider the actual im$utation is only uni@uely made because of individually

corres$onding uni@ue a$$earance of otherGde$endent, not abstractly 1hornlike1 something.

ou need the otherGde$endent to be finished, not only the im$utations, for the successful

#ath.

The +enter of the "unlit "ky> $age.787 %f a table is different from its real e?istence, in

erms of affecting the clinging to this table, !hat does it do to the table itself if one negates

some hy$othetical =real e?istence) that is different from the table and is even said to be

none?istent

$age.788 %n other !ords, our clinging to $ersonal and $henomenal identities does not

concern some abstract, none?istent notion of =real e?istence) but !hat a$$ears right inront of our eyes, !hich is !hat !e then reify as tables, books, or $ersons.

$age.78I The actual target in the conte?t of negating the t!o identities is the clinging to

hese identities on the subject side. "ince there is no

actual object of negation on the objective side, there is nothing to be relin@uished there.

%n #raise of ;harmadhPtu. 'PgPrjuna and the Third arma$a, transl.

arl runnh0l&l> "no! 3ion #ublications> 'e! ork 455F> $age.85 says2

To give &ust a brief and general idea, the other-dependent natureis the mistakenmagination thatappears as the unreal entities of sub&ect and ob&ect, because these are appearances


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under the influence of something other, that is, the latent tendencies ofgnorance. #t appears as the outer world with its various beings and ob&ectsas one4s own body as the sense consciousnesses that perceive these ob&ectsand the conceptual consciousness that thinks about them as the clinging to apersonal self and real phenomena and as the mental events, such as feelings,

hat accompany all these consciousnesses.The imaginary naturecovers the entire range of what is superimposedby false imagination onto the various appearances of the other-dependentnature, from the most basic sense of sub&ect-ob&ect duality via a self and reallye'istent phenomena up through the most rigid beliefs about what we and theworld are. #n other words, what appear as one4s own body and mind form

he bases for imputing a personal self.

When your have reali&ation that an object has no nature of its o!n *the imaginary naure,

he subject that holds on to this object dissolves naturally *the otherGde$endent nature,

until unblurred vision beyond all reference $oints, to reveal the $erfect nature.

"oGcalled 1Mere Mentalists1, for some kind of unclear business, describe the $erfect nature

as the really e?istent otherGde$endent nature being em$ty of the imaginary nature. They

even say2 =the !hole universe !hich consists of the three !orlds is mere mind), 1only mind

s real and that everything in the universe is nothing other than mind and created by it1 .

To conclude, ogacara and "vatantrika are both soteriologically efficient. "vatantrika leads

o the same result as #rasangika2 the freedom from all reference $oints. +ittamatra also is

useful for gradual $edagogical meditations on em$tiness *"unyata as a ste$ to

Madhyamaka !here the 1Mind Jnly1 is taken as one more reference $oint to be 1$assedbeyond1. ogacara is useful as the 1su$$lement1 of Madhyamaka 1!hat is beyond1. They

all can be useful as $re$aration to Highest oga tantra/;&ogchen. The best is the $ractice

according to 1$ointing out instructions1 of oneCs o!n HTantra/;&ogchen 1s$iritual friend1

o be directly cured.

To locate the center of the sky is just im$ossible,never can be found,

this ty$e of the center,


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like any other ty$e of 1the center1 Qa$$earencesU,

the unfindable.

"o$2ive up the surroundings,

Cont defend your head+uarters1nd con+uer the citadel of self-surrender$

for everything and everyone,

according to time and s$ace,

but full of energy and life,

like the sun lights the darkness,

the illusionlike.

Mariusz Mantur, 21.10.2010

[email protected] of my posts from http://www.dharmawheel.netforum

Appendix 1

donCt think there is 1archeological1 need for finding indian Madhyamaka again. % !onder if

t is even $ossible The same is for %ndian Vajrayana, !hich is no! tibetan 1modified1.

Madhyamaka can be investigated successfully no! and in tibetan version !orks

com$atible !ith the tibetan Mahamudra or ;&ogchen today.

'evertheless there is the link bet!een conce$tual analysis and reali&ation of sunyata. Kor

Tsongkha$a it is gradual and constant until uddhahood. 3ike some kind of very !ell oiledmachine, but not the mere illusionGlike interde$endent connection never ever 1arisen1 like

n "vatantrika or ogacara. To define conventionality, 1the seeming1, as 1faulty1 is not

correct, because it suggests 1useless1. % $refer a term 1the seeming1 because is 1useful1
mailto:[email protected]://www.dharmawheel.net/http://www.dharmawheel.net/mailto:[email protected]://www.dharmawheel.net/


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although in illusionGlike manner only. As for e?am$le "antideva e?$lained in 1His Way of

he odhisattva> odhicharyavatara1 the colla$se of any analysis using valid cognition,

until reali&ation of "unyata2

$#f what has been analy!eds analy!ed through further analysis,

There is no end to it,Because that analysis would be analy!ed too.

0nce what had to be analy!ed has been analy!ed,The analysis has no basis left.*ince there is no basis, it does not continue.

This is e'pressed as nirvana.$

$The ultimate is not the sphere of cognition.t is said that cognition is the seeming.$

hen$o arl runnhol&l often use in His 1THB +B'TB< JK THB "S'3%T "1 an

alternative term 1the deceiving1 !hich % like because doesnCt suggest useless2 1-enerally

s$eaking, if a given $hiloso$hical system differentiates the t!o levels of seeming andultimate reality, then in !hatever !ay it does so, one it s$eaks about seeming, relative, or

deceiving $henomena1, it must also acce$t this mean that such $henomena are $recisely

something that is not established. Jther!ise, !hy differentiate bet!een t!o such levels1

The ultimate can have alternative term 1undeceiving1 here. Here % think everyone is free to

nvestigate the meaning of Madhyamaka using terms that !ork. When one !ould use also

a terms2 the seeming as the 1deceiving1, the ultimate as the 1undeceiving1, it !ill soundsmuch better. ut define the seeming as sim$ly 1the seeming1 and the ultimate as ultimate,

because it not seems to be, !ill be even more better.

The all 1the seeming1 *even if seems to be false can be useful in Madhyamaka $ractice,

et alone in Mahamudra or ;&ogchen, so one can not say it is totally false. %tCs all about the

selfGliberation1, is not Kor e?am$le ;&ogchen #onlo$ in His book 1M%'; BJ';

;BATH1 $ointedGout 2

$Therefore, =adhyamaka continually emphasi!es no arising,)which cuts the process at the very beginning.


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ike =ahamudra and C!ogchen, =adhyamaka does not apply anyantidotes to suppress or destroy the arising of emotions, other than theanalysis that produces insight into their nature. When we analy!e theemotions in this way, they are self-liberated. #t is important to understandhat these methods are not mere philosophy.$

n Mahamudra and ;&ogchen or Madhyamaka you cherish everything. Bverything is

useful, not sim$ly the faulty. All is the $lay of Mahamudra, ;&ogchen or #rajna$aramita.

Bverything is the =selfGliberated). Here the intention is the same although another

erminology designed for the $ur$ose of their $ractice.

Moreover, the seeming can be the 1selfGlibarated1. Bvery 1$erceived object1 is the selfGiberated because 1it1 had not e?isted in the first $lace, never ever 1!as1, al!ays

unarisen1, so there is nothing to liberate at all. %n the book 1W%";JM 'B+TA


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hey will naturally spread. This is called the chain of delusion,)he root of samsara. *imple recognition of thoughts as they arise breaks their flow.

8elease thoughts within that recognition. When you remain in that state, arisinghoughts will all be liberated e+ually within awareness, the e'panse of

dharmakaya. This is the main practice in which the view and meditation of

"utting through *olidity 5khregs chod6 are cultivated as one.$

Kurthermore, % !as adviced one can integrated it !ith oneCs o!n $ractice. "im$ly

comfortably sit !ith these $rofound $ointingGout instructions in FG$oint Vairochana $osition

Glegs are crossed in vajra $osition or leveled on floor !ith left leg inside and right leg

outside, Ghands are $laced right u$on left !ith $alms u$ at a distance 6 fingers belo! the

navel or hands are on knees, Gback is straight like an arro!, Ghead is slightly inclinedor!ards, Gshoulders are level resting naturally like =the !ings of a vulture) not connected

!ith belly, but here2 Grela? !ith eyes o$en straigth into s$ace about 7 meters !ithout

glaring or moving the focus, Gbreathing comfortably !ith slightly o$en mouth !here tongue

can be $laced behind the u$$er teeth. Kor more details $lease find a @ualified ;&ogchen

eacher.

The $roblem is in the objectGside $ers$ective, the very reference $oint itself.

Madhyamakas !ould say that objects are not $erceived at all1. ut one can add They are

not $erceiving this very 1not $erceived at all1 too because the total freedom from all

eference $oints including this very freedom itself. These reference $oints are for e?am$le2

object, nonGobject, !isdom, inherent e?istence...and so on. There are many $arado?es

!hen one is going to use the objectGside $ers$ective, for e?am$le treating a uddha like

an object 1out there1, for e?am$le2 the 1fault1 is in Him %Cm not liberated, the 1error1 is in my

oot 3ama % have not recogni&ed


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arhats.... When the colla$se all the seeming you !ill be a uddha !hen there is no more

any division, reference $oints like conce$tual or nonGconce$tual.

When one is using the subjectGside $ers$ective everything !ill !ork % think. +ontrary to ones using the objectGside $ers$ective !hen one have to built e$istemological very

com$licated system that should fit together and there is 1infinitive regress1 !ithout ho$e to

com$lete it, as % understand for e?am$le Tsongkha$a.

The subject side $ers$ective is clear and easy like it21nimals, /umans, 7retas perceive differently. But there is the 7ath. Because of this 7ath,

sentient beings by sub&ect side perceive gross %irmanakaya, bodhisattvas free fromclinging perceive subtle *ambhogakaya, buddhas.... because there is not any division athis level $they$ can not continue to perceive but the Charmakaya. The ob&ect of all ofhese is what The division is where %ever was at the first place but only seems to. But

until it seems to be division is also the 7ath. This 7ath leads to the no division. Whendivision between $Buddha$ and $sentient being$ is completely no more, it means the all+ualities 5Charmakaya, 8upakaya6. This # meant by my sentence9 1ll divisions belong tohe seeming not to the buddhas.

Bven !hen conventional $henomena =seem to be) also not disa$$eared for

'irmanakayasGbuddhas, their the seeming is very different. 'irmanakayas have reali&ation

of ;harmakaya 1nonGdivision1 and can emanate "ambhogakayas for odhisattvas. There

s traditional analogy for it2The seeming is like the dream. %irmanakayas although e'perience dreams they are awarehis is only dreaming and do not suffer but are free like in $lucid dreaming$. *entient beingsake dreaming to be real and suffer whatever nightmare they are e'periencing.

'PgPrjunas 'irau$amyastava says2

ord, you have reali!ed that sa s3ras free from permanence and e'tinction

1nd lacks characteristics and what is to be characteri!ed,Just like a dream or an illusion.)

\ryadevas DRPnasPrasamucchaya21 something that has parts) does not e'ist,

=inute particles do not e'ist,1nd what appears distinctly is unobservable@E'periences are like a dream.)


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'amgyal *E68GEIE4, transl. Dim "cott under the guidance of hen$o Ts:ltrim -yamtso

"no! 3ion #ublications2

1s duality plus assumption and formulation,

Whose appearance is the mistaken conceptual process,*ince what appears is not and is thus not real.%o referents have ever e'isted either1nd, being but concept, consist of conceptuali!ation.

And is elaborated by Du Mi$ham2

1ll phenomena, which are composed of dualistic appearance 5 the other-dependent

nature6 to which dualistic assumption is added 5conceptually the imaginary nature6, arenothing other than complete imputations having no e'istence with an actual constituent ofheir own, while nevertheless appearing 5by such e'amples as the strands of hair which

appear to a victim of cataracts, as the other-dependent nature is not &ust nothingness6.

This ogacara here is com$atible !hat Madhyamaka says2

Everything is interdependent and created by causes and conditions, ultimately there are

no any inherently, independently e'isted phenomena but also because conventionallyeverything e'ists relatively depending on something else there is no total nothingness5view beyond e'tremisms, the middle way, analyse through interdependent arising, thefifth reasoning of %agar&una, the king of all reasonings6

Du Mi$ham further e?$lains the $rocess of enlightenment according to the 9 natures2

What appears to the nonconceptual sensory faculty as a duality of perceived and

perceiverThe process of formulation conducted by the rational mind, which is conceptual and firstmakes the assumption that whatever appears to be a duality actually e'ists that way andhen formulates it by assigning a specific term this is a process which is internal and

e+uivalent to the rational mind4s conceptuali!ation of percept and perceiverThe inner faculties, that of the eye and so on0uter ob&ects, form and so onThe principles of awareness, the eye consciousness, and so on?essel-like worlds4 appearances e'perienced in common.

*ince these are all absent, suchness 5the perfect nature6 free of all these types ofdifferentiation appears in its one taste 5beyond reference points unimpaired vision, bye'ample when the eye defect of blurred vision has been cured and one reali!es that whatappeared as floating hairs is no longer obctructive for the vision after the cure6. This is


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what is referred to as the subsiding of dualistic appearance into emptiness 5*unyatabeyond e'tremes6.)

The otherGde$endent nature is not totally faulty but the imaginary nature as the

conce$tual designations, because the $erfect nature can be $ointedGout using the

de$endent nature. The $erfect nature is not the de$endent nature let alone the imaginary

nature, because is $ointedGout beyond them2 beyond the duality of the de$endent nature,

and beyond *conce$tual designations of the imaginary nature concerning this duality *of

$erceived and $erceiver.

n other !ords, 1the nonGe?istence of the imagined nature in the otherGde$endent nature1makes $ossible to $ointGout the $erfect nature and makes therefore the de$endent nature

useful or not totally faulty.

This has an analogy to2

he seeming is not totally faulty because can be the selfGliberated. This very selfGliberation

s !hen there is no more conce$tuality.

Here @uotes that agree !ith it2

' #


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Ho! 'irmanakaya could be born out of ;harmakaya 1nonGdivision1, and so on % guess

'irmanakayaGbuddha does not need conce$ts because already kno!s $recisely the

seeming of students *the omniscience. The omniscience is not only the freedom from

conce$ts, but from all =the seeming) as ogacara e?$lained in 1The Treasury ofno!ledge.Krame!orks of uddhist #hiloso$hy1 by Damg0n ongtrul 3odr0 TayO2

The dependent and imagined [characteristics are e+ual in that theydo not really e'ist 5bden par med6 e+ual in being delusive appearancesand e+ual in being conventionalities and false. #t is necessary, however,o distinguish them in terms of their respective characteristics9 imagined

[characteristics do not e'ist even on a conventional [level, whereas thedependent do e'ist conventionally.$

Kor sure !e are not able to understand !hat the omniscience of a uddha is. All !e have

ts our sentient beingCs cognition. uddhahood is attained !hen all clingings are no more

Fth level =Kar gone) of odhisatt!a !here oneCs !isdom outshines "ravakas and

#ratyekabuddhas and all cognitive obcurations are no more *EEth level of uddhahood.

We are sentient beings because !e e?$erience suffering *dukkha from clingings to

eference $oints and !e are not able to be beyond the cognition of the seeming !hich iseven more subtle to attain than clingings *cognition of these very reference $oints, very

subtle dualism.

+lingings to reference $oints are the cause for our suffering *;ukkha because for

e?am$le2

!e locate the single se$arated selfGidentity although there is not such at allbecause there !ould be e?ist only oneCs o!n single self !ithout any danger of destroying

by itself because of nonGe?istence of com$onents of this self or by others because of

se$aration from outside

!e locate $ermanent selfGidentity although there is not such at all

because one !ouldnCt be !orried !hat !as going to ha$$en to him the ne?t moment, also

dentity is not in oneCs body and mind because they are totally changed many times duringoneCs lifetime

!e locate inde$endent selfGidentity although there is not such at all

because one shouldnCt be !orried !hat ha$$ened to him than to others


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+ognitive obscurations to the omniscience *cognition of these very reference $oints are

even far beyond conce$tuality. "o if there is an e?am$le in !hatever "utra that uddha

had some $ain or difficulties it !as for sure a 1dis$lay1 only of the seeming. When there is

any $ain or suffer there has to be a sentient being.

'evertheless, !hen the seeming is 1selfGliberated1 it is not fault or benefit from any uddha

some!here 1out there1 outside us. The freedom from all reference $oints sim$ly means the

unblurred unim$aired vision *omniscience because already no more obscured by

eference $oints and clingings to them, not because reference $oints someho! lead to it.


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uture be $ossible to kno! they !ould be $ossible only by allGkno!ing buddhas 1out there1,

so out of our reach 1out here1. Jne more objectGside $ers$ective $arado?. To e?$erience

he kno!able things is 1otherGde$endent nature1 *the seeming !hich is not totally faulty.

oth of them are just the seeming, e?$erienced by sentient beings as reference $oints forheir clingings and cognitive obscurations. 1The $erfect nature1 is beyond these reference

$oints because liberation from samsara *;ukkha including all the seeming, the deceived

not only conce$ts and reali&ation of the 9 ayas *;harmakaya, "ambhogakaya,

'irmanakaya.

According to Madhyamaka the =T!o Truths) division is only from deceiving $ers$ective ofsentient beings *the seeming2 conventional G it is not $ossible to kno! by them the

nfinitive causes/conditions or cognitions of any object, ultimate G is not $ossible for sentient

beings to have the freedom from all reference $oints. +onventional reality of any object is

!orkable daily life1 consensus only as far as not analy&ed. When analy&ed is com$letely

ost.

n uddhahood there is no such division2 if uddha !ould kno! $recisely the seeming *theomniscience it !ill be the total freedom from all reference $oints.

The both 1the t!o truths1 are the same im$ossible for sentient beings, and the same

beyond 1the mind of sentient being1 from the $ers$ective of buddhas. "o there is no any

basis for divisions at all.

The objectGside $ers$ective is not soteriologically efficient for sentient beings, in contrast to

uddhahood !here there is no need to catch anything *e.g. !isdom because everythingalready the 1selfGliberated1, !hich means 1the omniscience of uddhahoodunblurred

unim$aired vision1.

Mariusz Mantur, 15.12.2011

[email protected] of my posts from http://www.dharmawheel.netforum

A

hornlike madhyamaka - notes on madhyamaka

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