competitve info
TRANSCRIPT
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Economics of the Firm
Competitive Pricing
Techniques
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Market Structure Spectrum
Perfect Competition Monopoly
One Producer With 100%market share
The market is supplied by manyproducers each with zero marketshare
Firm Leel !emand !O"#$OT eual industry demand
Firm Leel !emand"&'(L# industry
demand
When makin) pricin) decisions* you need to be aware o+ what your marketstructure is
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,ecall the characteristics we laid out +or a competitie market
-1. /any buyers and sellers
no indiidual buyer+irm hasany real market power
-. 2omo)eneous products
no ariation in productacross +irms
-3. $o barriers to entry it4scostless +or new +irms to
enter the marketplace
-5. Per+ect in+ormation prices and uality o+ products
are assumed to be known toall producersconsumers
-6. $o "7ternalities (LLcostsbene+its o+ the productare absorbed by the
consumer
-8. Transactions are costless buyers and sellers incur no
costs in an e7chan)e
9an you think o+ situations where all these assumptions hold:
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/easurin) /arket #tructure 9oncentration ,atios
#uppose that we take all the +irms in an industry and ranked them bysize. Then calculate the cumulatie market share o+ the n lar)est +irms.
# ofFirms
Cumulative MarketShare
100
80
40
20
01 32 4 !0 " 2010
$C
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/easurin) /arket #tructure 9oncentration ,atios
# ofFirms
Cumulative MarketShare
100
80
40
20
01 32 4 !0 " 2010
$
C
/easures the cumulatie market share o+ the top +our+irms
4CR
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9oncentration ,atios in '# manu+acturin); 1 1
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/easurin) /arket #tructure. The 2er+indahl>2irschmanAnde7 B22AC
% Market share of firm i
&ank Market Share
1 2 !22 2 !2
3 2 !2
4 2
2
! 2
" 2
8 2''( % 2)000
==
N
i
isHHI1
2
is2
is
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Cumulative MarketShare
100
80
40
20
01 32 4 !0 " 2010
$ ''( % 00
''( % 1)000
*he ''( in+e, penali-es a small num.er of total firms
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Cumulative MarketShare
100
80
40
20
01 32 4 !0 " 2010
$
''( % 00
''( %
*he ''( in+e, also penali-es an une/ual +istri.ution of firms
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9oncentration ,atios in For #elected Andustries
(n+ustry C&4 ''($reakfast Cereals 83 244!
utomo.iles 80 28!2
ircraft 80 2!2
*elephone /uipment 10!1omens Foot5ear 0 "6
Soft 7rinks 4" 800
Computers Peripherals 3" 4!4
Pharmaceuticals 32 44!Petroleum &efineries 28 422
*e,tile Mills 13 64
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,ecall that in a per+ectly competitie world* price euals mar)inalreenue
The market determines theeuilibrium price o+ D1E55 and500*000 +ish sold by the 1*000
+ishermen
/arket
!ollars
0
D1E55
!emand
#upply
500*000
!ollars
0
1E55
Andiidual
(t the preailin) market price o+D1E55* each +isherman supplies 500+ish
/9
/,
500
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An a monopolized market* the sin)le +irm in the market +aces the industrydemand cure
500*000 +ish are sold at a marketprice o+ D1E55
/arket
!ollars
0
D1E55
!emand
500*000
!ollars
0
1E55
Andiidual
The sin)le +irm in the market haschosen that price o+ D1E55 based o++o+ industry demand
/9
500*000
!emand
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We will be assumin) that pricin) decisions are bein) made to ma7imizecurrent period pro+its
Total ,eenueseual price timesuantity
Total 9osts Bnote that total costshere are economic costsE That is*we hae already included areasonable rate o+ return oninested capital )ien the risk in
the industryC
Pro+its TCPQ =
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(s with any economic decision* pro+it ma7imization inoles ealuatin) eerypotential sale at the mar)in
2ow do my pro+itschan)e i+ Aincrease my sales
by 1:
2ow do myreenues chan)e i+
A increase my salesby 1: B/ar)inal,eenuesC
2ow do my costschan)e i+ Aincrease my salesby 1: B/ar)inal9ostsC
TCPQ =
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An a world where +irms hae market power* they control their leel o+ sales by settin) their priceE#uppose that you hae the +ollowin) demand cure B( relationship between price and uantityC.
Total#ales
?our listed price
For e7ample. A+ you were to set aprice o+ D0* you can e7pect 80sales
PQ 2100=
Q
P
60=Q
20$=P
D
( ) 60202100 ==Q
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We could also talk about inerse demand Ba relationship between uantity and priceC.
For e7ample. A+ you wanted to
make 50 sales* you could set a D30price
( pricethat will hitthat tar)et
?our tar)et +or sales
PQ 2100=
Q
P
40=Q
30$=P
D
30
260
210040
=
=
=
P
P
P
QP 5.50=
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"ither way* i+ we know price and total sales* we can calculate reenues
Total ,eenues
GBD30CB50CG D100
Total ,eenues G Price&uantity
9an we increase reenues pastD100 and* i+ so* how:
Q
P
40=Q
30$=P
D
QP 5.50=
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"ither way* i+ we know price and total sales* we can calculate reenues
Turns out lowerin) price was the ri)htthin) to do to raise reenuesE
Total ,eenues GBD36CB30C G D1060
Total ,eenues GBD6CB60C G D160
Q
P
40=Q
30$=P
D
QP 5.50=
50=Q30=Q
35$=P
25$
=P
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7
Anitially* you hae chosen a price BPCto char)e and are makin) & salesE
Total ,eenues G P&
#uppose that you want to increase your salesE
What do you need to do:
Q
p
Q
p
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7
?our demand cure will tell you how much you need to lower your price to reachone more customer
This area represents the reenuesthat you lose because you hae tolower your price to e7istin) customers
This area representsthe reenues that you
)ain +rom attractin) anew customer
Q
p
p
Q
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7
?our demand cure will tell you how much you need to lower your price to reachone more customer
,eenues GBD30CB50C G D100
BDE60CB50C GD0
BD
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Demand curves slope downwards this reects the negativerelationship between price and quantity Elasticity of Demand measuresthis e!ect quantitatively
"uantit
y
Price
#$%&
%
#$'%
(
( )000,50$=ID
%20100*5
54=
%10100*
50.2
50.275.2=
210
20
%
%=
=
=
P
QDD
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)ote that elasticities vary along a linear demand curve
"uantity
Price
#*%
*& +& ,&
#$&
P Q % Changein Q
%Changein P
Elasticity
#*% *&
#*( *$ +' -$. -$*
#$& +&
#/. +$ ** -% -+/
#/& ,&
#. ,$ $% -/& -$%%
-/&
-.
-,
-'
-+
-%
-(
-*
-$
-/
&
D
3.2=D
61.=D
PQ 2100=
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Let4s calculate the elasticity o+ demand at a uantity o+ 50 BaEkEaE a price o+ D30C
(t a uantity o+ 50* theelasticity o+ demand isbi))er that 1 in absolutealue
Q
P
40=Q
30$=P
D
QP 5.50=
41=Q
50.29$=P7.1% =P
5.2% =Q
47.17.1
5.2
%
%=
=
=
P
Q
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Let4s calculate the elasticity o+ demand at a uantity o+ 50 BaEkEaE a price o+ D30C
A+ A want to increase my salestar)et* A need to lower my priceto all my e7istin) customers
Total ,eenues GBD
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(n elasticity o+ demand that is )reaterthan 1 in absolute alue indicates thatlowerin) price will increase reenues
Total ,eenues GBD
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(n elasticity o+ demand that is less than1 in absolute alue indicates that raisin)price will increase reenues
Total ,eenues GBD10CB@0CG D@00
Total ,eenues GBD10E60CB=
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-/&
-.
-,
-'
-+-%
-(
-*
-$
-/
&
Elasticity
&
$&&
(&&
+&&
,&&
/&&&
/$&&
/(&&
Total Revenues
,eenues are ma7imized when the elasticity o+ demand euals >1
/a7 ,eenues&uantity G 60Price GD6,eenues G D1*60
&uantity G 60Price GD6"lasticity G >1
"lasticity is lessthan >1. raise price
"lasticity is )reaterthan >1. lower price
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-+&
-(&
-$&
&
$&
(&
+&
P
/,
P G D30
/, G D
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-+&
-(&
-$&
&
$&
(&
+&
&
$&&
(&&
+&&
,&&
/&&&
/$&&
/(&&
P
/,
P G D6
/, G /9 G D0
$ote that because we hae i)nored the cost side* we are assumin) mar)inalcosts are eual to zeroI
,eenues G D160
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$ow* let4s brin) in the cost sideE For simplicity* lets assume that you +ace aconstant mar)inal cost eual to D0 per unitE
Quanti
ty
Price Total
Revenue
Margi
nalRevenue
Total
Cost
Margi
nalCost
Proft
/ #(.%& #(.%& #(.%& #$& #$& #$.%&
$ #(. #., #(,%& #(& #$& #%,
* #(,%& #/(%%&
#('%& #+& #$& #,%%&
( #(, #/.$ #(+%& #,& #$& #//$
% #('%& #$*'%&
#(%%& #/&& #$& #/*'%&
+ #(' #$,$ #((%& #/$& #$& #/+$
' #(+%& #*$%%
&
#(*%& #/(& #$& #/,%%
&9ontinuin) on downJ
$. #*%%& #/&$.%&
#$/%& #%,& #$& #((.%&
30 $35 $1050 $2050 $!00 $20 $"50
*/ #*(%& #/&+.%&
#/.%& #+$& #$& #((.%&
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-%&&
&
%&&
/&&&
/%&&
Total 0evenue Total Cost
Pro1t
#lope G 0
Pro+its G D560
( pro+it ma7imizin) price sets mar)inal reenue eual to mar)inal costE /ar)inalreenue is the chan)e in total reenue BiEeE the slopeC
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-*&
-$&
-/&
&
/&
$&
*&
(&
%&
+&
Price 2arginal Cost
2arginal 0evenue
P G D36
Pro+it G BD36>D0C30G D560
Price G D36&uantity G 30"lasticity G >E38
( pro+it ma7imizin) price setsmar)inal reenue eual to mar)inalcost
This is not a coincidenceE (
monopoly sets a markupthat is inersely proportionalto the elasticity o+ demandI
42.35$
20$35$=
=
P
MCP
42.36.2
11==
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/arkups +or #elected Andustries
(n+ustry 9(
Communication :6"2Paper llie+ Pro+ucts :630
lectric) ;as Sanitary Services :621
Foo+ Pro+ucts :880
;eneral Manufacturin< :"""Furniture :"31
*o.acco :!38
pparel :444
Motor =ehicles :433Machinery :300
#uppose that weassumed theautomobileindustry weremonopolizedJ
#o* a 1% increase in automobile prices will lower sales by E3%
433.=
P
MCP
3.2433.
1==
( it i.l t tt t t ith t l i i t
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7
9oss from char
Q
p
Q
p
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!ollars
0
D50
50*000
Let4s suppose that $otre dame has identi+ied three di++erentconsumer types +or $otre !ame +ootball ticketsE Further*assume that $otre !ame has a mar)inal cost o+ D0 per ticketE
D10
D@0
=0*000 @0*000
(lumni
Faculty
#tudents
A+ $otre !ame had toset one uni+orm price toeerybody* what price
would it set:
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!ollars
0
D50
50*000
Let4s suppose that $otre dame has identi+ied three di++erentconsumer types +or $otre !ame +ootball ticketsE Further*assume that $otre !ame has a mar)inal cost o+ D0 per ticketE
D10
D@0
=0*000 @0*000
(lumni
Faculty
#tudents
Price Quantity TotalRevenue
Total Cost Proft
#/$& (&3&&& #(,2 #,&&3&&& #(&2
$#0 0000 $5!M $1"M $"2M
#(& ,&3&&& #*$2 #/+2 #/+2
D0 /9
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!ollars
0
D50
50*000
$ow* suppose that $otre !ame can set up di++erential pricin)E
D10
D@0
=0*000 @0*000
(lumni
Faculty
#tudents
Price Quantity
TotalRevenue
TotalCost
Proft
#/$& (&3&&& #(,2 #(&&3&&&
#((2
#,& *&3&&& #$(2 #*&&3&&& #$/2
#(& /&3&&& #(&&3&&&
#$&&3&&&
#$&&3&&&
Total ,&3&&& #'+2 #.&&3&&&
#+'2
D0 /9
Pricin) #cheduleK ,e)ular Price. D10
K Faculty#ta++. D@0K #tudent. D50
What would $otre !ameneed to do to accomplishthis:
"7ample. !! codes are a di)ital ri)hts mana)ement techniue that allows +ilm
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"7ample. !! codes are a di)ital ri)hts mana)ement techniue that allows +ilmdistributors to control content* release date* and price accordin) to re)ionE
!! codin) allows +or distributors to price discriminate by re)ionE
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Why is moie theatre popcorn so e7pensie:
!ollars
0 00
D16
300
Meneral
Public
#enior9itizens
D@
This would be an easy pricediscrimination problemJ
Pricin) #cheduleK ,e)ular Price. D16K #enior 9itizens. D@
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$ow* suppose that the identities are unknown: 2owcan the theatre e7tract more money out o+ the aidmoie)oer:
!ollars
0 00
D16
300
(id
/oie)oer
Occasional/oie)oer
D@
Tic&etPrice
Po'cornPrice
Total
4ption 5/ #/( #/ #/%
4ption 5$ #, #' #/%
4ption 5* #$ #/* #/%
(s lon) as the totalprice Bpopcorn N
ticketC is D16 or less*aid moie)oers willstill )o
Which pricin) option would you choose:
# h !i ld k hi b h
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#uppose that !isneyworld knows somethin) about the aera)econsumer4s demand +or amusement park ridesE !isneyworld hasa constant mar)inal cost o+ DE0per ride
!ollars
0
E60
!emand
60
Price ('er ri)e* Quantity (ri)es*
#/ .. /
#., $
#& /&&
PQ 100100=
(s a +irst pass we could sole +or a pro+it ma7imizin) price per
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(s a +irst pass* we could sole +or a pro+it ma7imizin) price perride
!ollars
0
E61
!emand
5E0C&
D1 Fee G B1CBD1>PC&
Price('erri)e*
Quantity(ri)es*
Ri)eRevenue
,eeRevenue
TotalRevenues
MarginalRevenues
Marginal Cost
#/ & #& #& #& --- ---
#.. / #.. #&&% #..% #..% #&$
#., $ #/.+ #&$ #/., #.,% #&$
#&* .' #$./ #('&%
#(..+
#&* #&$
$02
+# $1+! $"#02
$"++#
$02 $02
#&/ .. #.. #(. #(...
#&/ #&$
Total Pro+it G D5@E0
We are still lookin) to wheremar)inal reenues eualmar)inal costsE
PQ 100100=
The optimal pricin) scheme here is to set a price per ride eual
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The optimal pricin) scheme here is to set a price per ride eualto mar)inal costE We then set the entry +ee eual to theconsumer surplus )eneratedE
!ollars
0
!emand
E0C
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!ollars
0
E61
!emand
5seniorsE We could discriminate based on price per ride Bassume there is oneo+ each typeC
$on>#eniors
!ollars
0
E51
!emand
3D00
P & T, Pro+it
D560 1 D560 D300
D=6 D660 D60D0 3 D880 D10
D60 5 D00 >D500
Pro+uct 1 MC % ?100C Pro+uct 2 MC % ?10C
Profits % ?40 B ?300 % ?"0
P H dli d t ll th d t t b ld t l
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9onsumer Product 1 Product #um
( D60 D560 D600
H D60 D=6 D66
9 D300 D0 D60
! D560 D60 D600
Pure Hundlin) does not allow the products to be sold separately
Pro+uct 2 MC % ?10C
Pro+uct 1 MC % ?100C
With a bundled price o+ D600* all +our consumers buy
both )oods.Profits % 4?00 A?100 A ?10 % ?1)000
/i7ed Hundlin) allows the products to be sold separately
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9onsumer Product 1 Product #um
( D60 D560 D600
H D60 D=6 D66
9 D300 D0 D60
! D560 D60 D600
) p p y
Pro+uct 1 MC % ?100C
Pro+uct 2 MC % ?10C
Price 1 % ?20
Price 2 % ?40
$un+le % ?00
9onsumer (. Huys Product BPro+it G D300C or HundleBPro+it G D60C9onsumer H. Huys Hundle BPro+it G D60C
9onsumer 9. Huys Product 1 BPro+it G D160C
9onsumer !. Huys Only Product 1 BPro+it G D160C
Pro+it G D@60
or D@00
/i7ed Hundlin) allows the products to be sold separately
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9onsumer Product 1 Product #um
( D60 D560 D600
H D60 D=6 D66
9 D300 D0 D60
! D560 D60 D600
) p p y
Pro+uct 1 MC % ?100C
Pro+uct 2 MC % ?10C
Price 1 % ?40
Price 2 % ?40
$un+le % ?20
9onsumer (. Huys Only Product BPro+it G D300C
9onsumer H. Huys Hundle BPro+it G D=0C
9onsumer 9. Huys Hundle BPro+it G D=0C
9onsumer !. Huys Only Product 1 BPro+it G D360C
Pro+it G D1*1
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9onsumer Product 1 Product #um
( D300 D00 D600
H D300 D00 D600
9 D300 D00 D600
! D300 D00 D600
Pro+uct 1 MC % ?100C
Pro+uct 2 MC % ?10C
) ywith respect to the indiidual )oods* but little ariation with respect to thesumI:
Andiidually Priced. P1 G D300* P G D00* Pro+it G D1*000
Pure Hundlin). PH G D600* Pro+it G D1*000
/i7ed Hundlin). P1 G D300* P G D00* PH G D600* Pro+it G D1*000
#uppose that you sell laser printersE To create printed pa)es* you need both a printer
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and an ink cartrid)eE For now* assume that the toner cartrid)es are sold in acompetitie market and sell +or D eachE (n ink cartrid)e is )ood +or 1*000 printedpa)esE
!ollars
0
D
!emand
15
D18&uantity o+printed pa)es
B000sC
Toner cartrid)eprice
What price would yousell the printer +or:
9# G QBD18 > DCB15C G D
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only you produceE What would you do i+ you could choose a printer priceand a cartrid)e price:
!ollars
0
D DCB=C G D5E60
/,
/9D
Q P TR TC MR MC Proft
/ #/% #/% #$ #/% #$ #/*
$ #/( #$, #( #/* #$ #$(
* #/* #*. #+ #// #$ #**
( #/$ #(, #, #. #$ #(&
% #// #%% #/& #' #$ #(%
+ #/& #+& #/$ #% #$ #(,
$+ $!3 $1" $3 $2 $"+
, #, #+( #/+ #/ #$ #(,
We could make our money on thecartrid)es and sell the printerscheapJ
PQ =16
(lternatiely* we could do somethin) like the amusement parkE We
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ma7imize pro+its combinin) cartrid)e reenue ($! printer reenue
!ollars
0
!emand
15
D18&uantity o+printed pa)esB000sC
Toner cartrid)eprice
9# G QBD18 > DCB15C G D
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#uppose that you can easily identi+y them and preent resaleE We coulddiscriminate on both the printer price and the cartrid)e priceE
!ollars
0
D D DCB6C G D1E60
/,
/9D
Pro+it G BDDC= ND5E60 G D=3E60 Pro+it G BD=>DC6 ND1E60 G D3=E60
Total Pro+it G D111
PQ =12PQ =
16
(lternatiely* we could essentially )ie the cartrid)es away and discriminate on
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the printer Blike !isneyworldCE
!ollars
0
!emand
15
D189# G QBD18 > DCB15C G D DCB10C G D60
/9D
Pro+it G D
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you hae a hi)h alue and low alue demander* but you don4t know who is whoELet4s +irst try and do this like the amusement park
!ollars
0
!emand
15
D189# G QBD18 > DCB15C G D DCB10C G D60
/9D
15 9artrid)e Packa)e G D
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you hae a hi)h alue and low alue demander* but you don4t know who is whoELet4s +irst try and do this like the amusement park
!ollars
0
!emand
10
D189# G QBD18 > D 10 9artrid)e Packa)e G D=0
Total Willin)ness to Pay G D110
9onsumer #urplus G D50
15 9artrid)e Packa)e G D18
> reuired consumer surplus G D50
!iscounted Price G D@8
15 9artrid)e Packa)e G D@810 9artrid)e Packa)e G D=0
Pro+it G D@8 N D=0 > D5 G D10@
PQ =16
Let4s try a di++erent strate)yE #uppose that you char)e a markup on the cartrid)esd th h i + th i t t h W ld t th i
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and then char)e a common price +or the printer to eachE We would set the priceo+ the printer eual to the consumer surplus o+ the lower alue demander o+ insurethat both )roups buy the printerE
!ollars
0
!emand
1>P
D19# G QBD1 > DPCB1>PC
D80
DP
"7ample.
9artrid)e Price. D39onsumer #urplus G QBD1 > D3CBDCB1C G D103
PQ =12
We need to +ind the best cartrid)e priceJ
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Price Quantity1
Quantity 2
TotalRevenue
Consu.er-ur'lus
PrinterRevenue
TotalRevenue
TotalCost
Proft
#& /+ /$ #& #'$ #/(( #/(( #%+ #,,
#$% /%'% //'% #+,'% #+.&* #/*,&+ #/((.* #%% #,..*
#%& /%% //% #/*%& #++/*% #/*$$% #/(%'% #%( #./'%
#* /* . #++ #(&% #,/ #/(' #(( #/&*
$" 12 # $#0 $32 $!" $1"" $"0 $10"
#($% //'% ''% #,$,'%
#*&&* #+&&+ #/($.* #*. #/&*.*
PQ =16PQ =12
( )21
QQP +
( ) 2
125. QP CS*2 ( )212$ QQ +
Let4s try a di++erent strate)yE #uppose that you char)e a market on the cartrid)esd th h i + th i t t h W ld t th i
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and then char)e a common price +or the printer to eachE We would set the priceo+ the printer eual to the consumer surplus o+ the lower alue demander o+ insurethat both )roups buy the printerE
!ollars
0
!emand
@
D19# G QBD1 > D5CB@C G D3
D80
D5
Hest 9hoice.
9har)e D3 +or the printerBHoth customers will buyC
9har)e D5 +or cartrid)esLow alue customers buy @
cartrid)es2i)h alue customers buy 1
cartrid)es
Pro+it G D3 N BD5>DCB0C G D105
PQ =12
One last e7ampleE 9onsider the market +or hot do)sE
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p )/ost people reuire a bun +or each hot do) they eatBwith the e7ception o+ the (tkins diet peopleIC
Price of a 'ot 7o< Price of a 'ot 7o< $un
2ot !o)s and Huns are made by separate companies eachhas a monopoly in its own industryE For simplicity* assumethat the mar)inal cost o+ production +or each euals zeroE
( )BH PPQ +=12
For simplicity A will assume that mar)inal costs are zero
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BiEeE we are ma7imizin) reenuesC
#uppose that you knew that the buns were sellin) +or D*
what should you char)e:
Quantity Price TotalRevenue
MarginalRevenue
/ #. #. #.
$ #, #/+ #'
* #' #$/ #%
( #+ #$( #*
5 $5 $25 $1
+ #( #$( -#/
?ouchar)e D6
( ) PPQ H =+= 102$12
Hut* i+ the bun )uy sees you char)in) D6* he needs to
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react to thatJ
Quantity Price TotalRevenue
MarginalRevenue
/ #+ #+ #+
$ #% #/& #(
* #( #/$ #$
" $3 $12 $0
% #$ #/& -#$
+ #/ #+ -#(
Hun Muychar)e D5
( ) PPQ B =+= 75$12
Hut* i+ the bun )uy is char)in) D5* you need to react to thatJ
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Quantity Price TotalRevenue
MarginalRevenue
/ #' #' #'
$ #+ #/$ #%
* #% #/% #*
" $" $1! $1
% #* #/% -#/
+ #$ #/$ -#*
?ouchar)e D5
( ) PPQ B =+= 84$12
$ th t th i d i t
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$ow* suppose that these companies mer)ed intoone monopoly
Quantity Co./ine)Price
TotalRevenue
MarginalRevenue
/ #// #// #//$ #/& #$& #.
* #. #$' #'
( #, #*$ #%
% #' #*% -#*
! $! $3! $1
' #% #*% -#/
, #( #*$ -#*
. #* #$' -#%
?ouchar)e D8+or hotdo)bun
( ) PPPQ HB =+= 812
Look at what happened hereJ
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#eparate 2ot !o)Hun #uppliers
9onsumer Pays D@ +or a
hot do)bun pair
#in)le 2ot !o)Hun #uppliers
9onsumer Pays D8 +or a
hot do)bun pair
"liminatin) a company bene+its consumersIII
( )HB PPQ +=12
4$4$
=
=
B
H
PP 6$=+ BH PP
"7ample. /icroso+t s $etscape
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"7ample. /icroso+t sE $etscape
The ar)ument a)ainst /icroso+t was usin) its monopoly power in
the operatin) system market to +orce its way into the browsermarket by bundlin) Anternet "7plorer with Windows