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THE RCN ANDTHE POSTWAR NAVAL REVOLUTION,1955-1964

Michael A. Hennessy

Hennessy: The Postwar Naval Revolution 143

Two options explored by the RCN to address developing threats, but which did not come to fruition,

were the nuclear-powered submarine (here the preferred candidate, USSThresher , SSN 593) and the

General Purpose Frigate (here as an artist’s concept). (US Naval Institute and RCN photos)

Deux options étudiées par la MRC pour faire face aux nouvelles menaces, mais qui n’ont jamais vu le

jour : le sous-marin à propulsion nucléaire (le modèle privilégié était l’USSThresher , SSN 593) et la

frégate polyvalente (conception de l’artiste). (photos du US Naval Institute et de la MRC)

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The decade from 1945 to 1955 was a period of rapid

technical and structural change described by Norman

Friedman as the “postwar naval revolution.” This marked

the shift away from escort strategies to concepts such as

attack-at-source, ocean barrier, and the reliance on undersea

sound surveillance systems. The fast modern forces required

for these various missions rendered many fleets built during

the Second World War obsolete or at best in need of extensive

modernization. The RCN attempted to parallel the changes

in British and American fleet structures and roles that

combined constitute Friedman’s naval revolution; it did so,

however, with considerable lag time and under tremendous

financial and technological pressures.

La décennie 1945-1955 fut une période de changement

technique et structurel rapide, ce que Norman Friedman a

décrit comme étant la « révolution navale de l’après guerre ».

Cette période marque l’abandon des stratégies d’escorte au

profit de concepts tels que l’attaque à la source, la barrière

océanique et le recours aux systèmes de détection acoustique

sous-marine. Des forces modernes et rapides nécessaires àl’accomplissement des diverses missions, et de nombreuses

flottes construites pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale

étaient devenues obsolètes ou devaient faire l’objet d’une

vaste modernisation. La MRC tenta de suivre l’évolution des

changements de structure et des rôles des flottes britannique

et américaine, qui représentent ensemble la révolution navale

de Friedman, mais avec un retard considérable et sous

d’énormes pressions financières et technologiques.

Through the decade from 1945 to 1955, both Britain and the United States (US)

framed naval forces in response to the new global military threat of the Soviet Union.

In doing so they sought to incorporate rapidly changing technologies and frame

effective strategies within severely constrained naval defence budgets. Beyond

nuclear weapons, they faced the world’s largest submarine force, and a slowly

developing surface navy. Through this period of rapid technical and structural change,

a period described by Norman Friedman as the “postwar naval revolution,” mostnavies of the NATO western alliance relied on Britain and the United States to indicate

the proper role and composition of a navy in the nuclear age.1 According to Friedman,

7th MARCOM Historical Conference Proceedings144

1 Norman Friedman, The Post War Naval Revolution (Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 1986), esp9-10, 29.

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the British and American navies came to denigrate the role of general escort and anti-

submarine forces in favour of forces required for offensive operations. This was a

restructuring of forces shaped largely in response to the fast submarine, guided missile,

and jet aircraft. Because of the inherent difficulties of intercepting these forces near

their intended targets, both the RN and USN adopted strategies and structures that

equated sea control with power projection missions. Following Friedman, this marked

the shift away from escort strategies to concepts such as attack-at-source, ocean

barrier, and the reliance on undersea sound surveillance systems.2 The fast modern

forces required for these various missions rendered many fleets built during the

Second World War obsolete or at best in need of extensive modernization.

Whether or not these trends affected Canada’s navy cannot be determined from

Friedman’s account, because he did not address it. Canada’s response to the

postwar naval revolution is the subject of this paper. As will be demonstrated

below, the RCN attempted to parallel the changes in fleet structures and roles that

combined constitute Friedman’s naval revolution; it did so, however, with

considerable lag time and under tremendous financial and technological pressures.

That the following period, from 1955 to 1964, was a tumultuous era for Canadian

defence policy is well demonstrated. But accounts of this period have tended to

concentrate on issues of continental air defence, particularly the NORADagreement, the cancellation of the Avro Arrow, and the indecision and deceit of the

Diefenbaker administration’s acquisition of nuclear weapons.3 Undeniably this

issue largely determined the election of 1963. Still, accounts have focused on

Diefenbaker being cast from office and the fundamental reforms and reorganization

of Canadian defence policies and forces under the Liberal government of Lester B.

Pearson. These large issues were not without consequence for the RCN, which

after all was dissolved under the direction of the incoming Minister of National

Defence, Paul Hellyer. Although these issues would affect the RCN, the primaryfocus of this essay is fleet planning within the RCN up to that point.

An overview of the entire postwar period, from 1945 to 1964, could be

constructed according to several epochs: from the initial down-sizing of the

fleet; through the beginning of the Cold War and the founding of NATO; the

Korean War; the development of nuclear deterrence strategy; to unification.

However one chooses to compartmentalize the account there are several key


2 Friedman is arguably remiss in not assessing the internal institutional pressures for the adoption of offensive force postures.3 Representative of these themes are Joseph T. Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United

States, and the Origins of North American Air Defence (UBC Press, 1987); J.L. Granatstein, Canada

1957-1967: The Years of Uncertainty and Innovation (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1986), espChaps 5, “The Defence Debacle, 1957-1963,” and 9, “Unification: The Politics of the Armed Forces”;Robert Bothwell, Canada and the United States (University of Toronto Press, 1992), 70-98.

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turning points. Although the following account is largely monochromatic and

narrowly focused, the RCN’s response to the postwar naval revolution lends

itself to the following periodization. The first and longest period, 1948-54, is

one of hasty birth and specialization. The second period matched financial

austerity with rapid technical change: the years 1955 through 1961 witnessed the

increased specialization of the fleet in ASW operations in accord with allied

strategies, sound surveillance systems, and a rapidly changing submarine

menace. The RCN’s efforts to respond with “better ships but fewer ships” and

comply with the “come-as-you-are” war scenario of MC-48 came in the face of

extreme financial austerity, but rapid technological change.

The third period, from late 1960 to early 1963, brought short relief to that austerity.

In the expectation of increased money, the RCN tried to reconstitute a balanced

surface capability. The budget increases promised under the MC-70 concept,

however, did not formally encourage RCN participation in the forward maritime

strategy that the primary navies of the alliance had come to substitute for tactical

ASW operations. Instead, tactical ASW in the western Atlantic remained the only

accepted raison d’être. Efforts by the RCN to re-invent itself and create a new

balanced fleet capable of contributing to UN actions or limited war must also be

seen as an effort to create a fleet capable of contributing to forward operations in

the eastern Atlantic. Certainly there were efforts to manipulate the government intoallowing a force structure able to contribute to those operations – witness the

pressure by SACLANT for a second carrier and the General Purpose Frigate (GPF).

In the fourth phase, coinciding with the initial steps taken by Paul Hellyer in

1963 and 1964 to integrate the armed forces, retrenchment and austerity moved

the RCN back into its strictly ASW role in the western Atlantic. The subsequent

steps taken by the navy to restore its mission flexibility following this period

have not been addressed.

In 1961 the RCN had more than sixty warships in commission. It was a sizable and

modern fleet of which many were proud. As Vice-Admiral Herbert Rayner, the

Chief of the Naval Staff, explained at the time: “All efforts are directed towards the

support of the fleet –for it is the fleet that is the true expression of the Navy’s

worth.”4 The vessels included the aircraft carrier Bonaventure, fourteen modern

Canadian-built destroyer escorts of the St. Laurent and Restigouche classes, and a

number of war-built but modernized vessels, including eleven destroyers (seven of the powerful Tribal class, the remainder “emergency-built” classes) 5 and eighteen

frigates of the Prestonian class. A submarine on loan from the USN operated on the


4 Crowsnest , XIV:1 (November 1961), 7.5 See the subsequent paper in this volume by Peter Haydon on RCN postwar destroyer policy.

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Pacific coast and another two from the RN operated on the Atlantic. The RCN fleet

included ten minesweepers, two escort maintenance ships, and seven smaller craft.

In addition there were over one hundred auxiliary vessels, ranging from research

ships to oil scows and yard craft. The RCN provided three first-line air squadrons

consisting of CS2F Trackers, Banshee fighters and anti-submarine helicopters.

Four other squadrons engaged in training and evaluation duties. Nearly fifty-one

per cent of its uniformed personnel were at sea, a very high sea-to-shore ratio in

comparison to other NATO navies. Building in Canadian shipyards were several

destroyer escorts and the 22,000-ton tanker-supply ship Provider .

Although the fleet may not have been the true measure of the navy’s worth,

addressing the changing composition of the fleet helps foreshorten discussion of

how the RCN faced the postwar naval revolution. At the same time, by 1961 the

fleet’s continued existence was in doubt. Much of the RCN was approaching

block obsolescence. The carrier required replacement before 1975, and the eleven

war-construction destroyers and eighteen frigates were due for retirement before

1970. Bi-lateral agreements under the Canada-United States Regional Planning

Group (CUSRPG) for the defence of the Pacific coast and NATO multi-lateral

arrangements for the Supreme Allied Command Atlantic (SACLANT) committed

Canada to providing twenty-nine anti-submarine warfare escorts to SACLANT

and fourteen to the Canada-US region. With so many vessels requiringreplacement, the RCN would have a net deficiency from agreed force goals of

twenty-three ships by 1970. Living up to that commitment would require a

continuing ship replacement program. The navy largely determined what types of

vessels it required, but obtaining the funding to build ships entailed many others.

As one former insider has recalled, the power to shape the fleet was in the hands of a

very small circle of men.6 The Naval Board bore responsibility for establishing naval

policy. Unlike its namesake created during the Second World War, which included acivilian deputy minister responsible for financial and administrative oversight, the

Naval Board from 1957 consisted of seven senior naval officers: the Chief of the

Naval Staff, the Vice-Chief, the Navy Comptroller, the Director of Personnel, the

Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Plans), and the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Air &

Warfare). These last two members controlled the two functional directorates of the

Naval Staff responsible for force planning and reported to the Vice-Chief of the Naval

Staff. The coordination of technical, financial and operational requirements was

facilitated through the Programme Policy Coordinating Committee,7

chaired by the


6 This according to the former Director General of Ships, Commodore S.M. Davis, “The ‘St Laurent’Decision: Genesis of a Canadian Fleet,” in W.A.B. Douglas (ed), The RCN in Transition (UBC Press,1985), 194.7 The Policy and Planning Coordinating Committee (PPCC) would be renamed the Naval PolicyCoordinating Committee (NPCC) in 1960.

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Vice-Chief, which vetted most proposals moving forward for consideration by the

Naval Board. If a collective biography of the Naval Board through this period were

to be prepared, it would demonstrate that almost every member had considerable sea

combat experience, ranging from small ship ASW operations to large fleet unit

bombardment missions and even carrier operations. Most had withstood the test of

war and many experienced their war far from Canadian home waters – this despite

the pre-war policy of preparing the navy primarily to operate “over here”. Most had

direct experience of the darkest days of the Battle of the Atlantic and Canada’s hastily

constructed small ship navy. Those shared experiences influenced greatly their desire

to remain technologically advanced and prepared to operate across the great global

seas that admit no artificial boundary. In a future war, as in the last, the Navy would

have to be able to go to the fight.

Despite these shared experiences and perceptions, there remained considerable

leeway to argue about the composition of the RCN. Moreover, fleet planning for most

of the period in question involved making repeated compromises between new

technology, new commitments, and simply maintaining commitments. Simply

maintaining commitments during the period from 1955 to 1960 proved exceedingly

difficult. To illustrate the nature of the problem requires identifying the primary

double bind placed on fleet planning through those years, namely keeping abreast of

the technologies required for a changing NATO maritime strategy, within the direfinancial strictures placed on the Department of National Defence in the late 1950s.

Reflecting the financial problems and priorities of the government, the naval

appropriation was progressively reduced from $326 million in 1957 to $271 million

by 1961. In real dollars the naval budget in 1961 was only nineteen per cent greater

than it had been in 1951. But within these declining estimates RCN personnel

strength increased from 13,500 to over 20,000, and the size of the fleet had trebled

since 1950. Technological changes compounded the effects of the financial strictures.

At NATO’s inception, the large submarine fleet of the Soviet Union posed the

primary naval threat. In 1948, Cabinet authorized the first postwar naval

building program, comprising an arctic icebreaker, three modern ASW escort

frigates, and several small harbour craft. The ASW frigates (the lead ships of the

St. Laurent class) were to be ultramodern ships of Canadian design and

manufacture, capable of locating and destroying the advanced type of U-boats

that Germany had been on the verge of bringing into service in the closing

months of the war.8

Most of the technologies that would have allowed theseboats to operate with near impunity in the North Atlantic were known to have

been captured by the Soviet Union. Following the Chinese intervention in the


8 “Oral Presentation to the Chiefs of Staffs Committee, Russia’s Naval Capabilities,” Captain H.N. Lay,7 June 1946, LAC, RG 24, box 8067, file NSM 1270-15-7 vol 1.

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Korean War, Canadian Cold War rearmament moved into full swing, with an

increase in the scale and scope of the St. Laurent building program and the major

refit of the Tribal class destroyers and the rechristened Prestonian class frigates

for escort and ASW duties to fill a glaring gap in Canada’s ability to patrol its

coastal areas. Further, the government placed orders for an additional seven

slightly modified St. Laurents (renamed the Restigouche class), all joining the

fleet over the course of 1955-59.

The construction of these vessels proved a major technological feat for

Canadian industry, but the perceived likelihood of general war distracted the

government’s attention from matters of ultimate cost.9 Hasty mobilization

measures bore financial consequences for the future. As the minister of defence

during the Korean era mobilization, Brooke Claxton, discovered shortly before

leaving office, the cost of sustaining the Canadian air commitment alone

promised to require 25 per cent of the department’s budget for the next seven

years.10 As for the RCN, once Canada had committed itself to supplying a set

number of vessels to NATO, that number received a degree of inviolability in

naval planning. The original contributions to NATO for SACLANT and to the

forces under the CUSRPG for Pacific defence had not been based on any cold

calculation of what forces were essential, but rather on what forces Canada

could quickly make available. Canada’s army and air force commitments weresimilarly premised on filling an immediate gap. The costs of sustaining those

commitments through the long haul soon threatened to overwhelm the

government’s financial resources.

Fleet planning within the resulting constricted budget was further complicated

by three developments: NATO naval strategy was changing; the submarine threat

was increasing; and many of the vessels brought into service were expected to

be obsolescent by the mid-1960s. The problem of ship replacementconsequently plagued naval planning from 1955 to 1963.

The efficacy of escort and tactical ASW operations in the age of thermonuclear war

faced serious reconsideration within NATO. Between 1955 and 1962, two

fundamental restatements of NATO’s defensive strategy were made that sorely

tested the RCN’s capacity to respond. The first of these came with the adoption in

1954 of MC-48 marking NATO’s “massive retaliation” reliance on thermonuclear

weapons. The second key policy statement came with promulgation of the MC-70war fighting doctrines aimed at keeping deterrence credible by providing standing

combat forces capable of combat below the nuclear threshold. The debates


9 Robert Bothwell and William Kilbourn, C.D. Howe: A Biography (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1979), 257.10 Brooke Claxton Papers, memoirs, LAC MG 32-B5, vol 222.

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surrounding the origins of this policy statement in 1958 need not delay us.11 What

is important for discussion here is the “new look” and then the “new new look”

capabilities the RCN framed in response.12 In short, the escort and ASW strategies

that were clear, unambiguous missions at NATO’s inception waned in importance.

The Chief of Naval Technical Services framed the first guidelines for fleet

planning during this period. Given the anticipated slow or negative growth of the

annual naval budget, Rear-Admiral J.G. Knowlton argued that the RCN adopt a

policy of “fewer ships... but better ships....” 13 While the full implications and

operational requirements were being developed for the support of the MC-48

war concept, the planned fleet replacement building program was postponed. To

replace vessels retiring from the fleet was expected to require a building

program laying down four new ships each fiscal year from 1957 to 1960,

followed by two ships a year from 1960 to 1966/67.

Operationally, the role of ASW forces was no longer clearly one of facilitating

passage on the high seas. For the Navy this meant no longer preparing simply

to re-fight the Battle of the Atlantic. Instead two clear missions developed. The

defence of continental North America now entailed preventing the approach of

Soviet submarines capable of launching nuclear missiles. From late 1954 the

RCN participated in the American development of an extensive under-watersound surveillance system (SOSUS), codenamed project CAESAR.14 For the

CAESAR line to secure the strategic approaches to North America, naval forces

and maritime patrol aircraft were essential for responding to SOSUS contacts

and localizing the submerged threat. A fleet capable of exploiting SOSUS

contacts required greater endurance, speed and improved weapons systems.

The concept of operations in the North Atlantic, in support of SOSUS, required

RCN ASW forces to patrol an area approximately 700 by 300 miles, sufficiently


11 See Sean M. Maloney, Learning to Love the Bomb: Canada’s Nuclear Weapons During the Cold War

(Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007), for the most authoritative account of these developments ina Canadian context. See also the subsequent papers in this volume by Isabel Campbell and John Orr onCanadian involvement in strategic ASW.12 On the consequences of MC-48 for naval plans see, (Naval) Policy Planning CoordinatingCommittee, minutes, “Ad Hoc Committee on the Reappraisal of Current War Plans”, 17 September1956, DHH 79/249; and Chiefs of Staff Committee, “Minutes of Special Meeting,” 26 October 1955,DHH 73/1223, file 1303.13 Memo Rear-Admiral (E) J.G. Knowlton to VCNS, “RCN Estimates”, 31 May 1955, LAC, RG 24, Acc83-84/167, box 3549, file 8000-35, pt 1.14 Canada joined the project shortly after inception, and participated as well in an abortive British

inshore system, which SOSUS eventually replaced. Most details of this system remain classified,although it appears the Soviet Union was kept abreast of most technical aspects of these developmentsthrough an operative placed in charge of the Admiralty’s underwater research establishment. See,Minutes of the Naval Board, “Special Meeting”, 16 November 1953, and “Special Meeting”, 5 October1954, DHH. On the agent (Alister Watson), see: Peter Wright, Spy Catcher (New York: Viking, 1987),251-60, 267, 291, and 332; and John Costello, Mask of Treachery (London: Collins, 1988), 145, 156-7,474, 561, 598, 605, and 614.

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far from landfall to negate the range of Soviet missiles.15 To cover the patrol

areas, ships were to operate in pairs, with twenty-four ships required to cover the

search area. Given that number of ships, one hour and fifty minutes would be

required to respond to a SOSUS contact for vessels capable of 27 knots (that is,

the St. Laurent class) or two hours and fifteen minutes for ships of 18 knots

(Prestonian class). These operational requirements highlighted some of the

deficiencies of the current destroyer escort forces. The RCN expected to have

fourteen 27-knot St. Laurent/Restigouche destroyer escorts (DDEs) and four

Tribal class destroyers in service by the end of 1958. 16 There were eleven other

escorts in the fleet (four Tribals and seven Prestonians), but they possessed

neither the speed nor ASW gear suitable for these missions. As well, all the

Tribals and Prestonians were due for retirement by 1970. To achieve the

required twenty-four long-range patrol vessels, six additional ships were

required. Further, to keep ships operating at maximum efficiency within the

patrol areas, two tankers were essential for the Atlantic coast and one for the

Pacific.17 Obtaining vessels for these various missions became the priority of the

ship replacement plan.

However, the defence mission in the western Atlantic was growing quite distinct

from the operational methods being contemplated for the eastern Atlantic. The

maritime strategy shaping the British and American navies required thedevelopment of balanced fleets, based on carrier task forces, capable of offensive

operations against the major Soviet naval bases. As well, ASW barrier operations

were being developed. These entailed securing various choke points through

which Soviet naval forces would have to pass to gain the high seas and North

American approaches. The RCN did not restructure itself to participate in the

strike operations against the Soviet Union, but it had a long-standing commitment

to contribute one aircraft carrier and six escorts for operations under SACLANT

control. In keeping with the changing focus of proposed operations, the carrier’sarea of operations progressively moved into the eastern Atlantic.18

The ability to localize and engage modern submarines became a pressing

concern for two reasons: an unanticipated failure of strategic surveillance


15 In 1956 that range was only 200 nautical miles, but by 1960 it was judged to be between 1000 and1500 nautical miles. See, “Some Factors Pertinent to the MC 48 War Concept”, esp “Annex I – ForceRequirements for the Support of Sound Surveillance Systems,” memo Director Naval Plans to ACNS(Plans), 14 February 1956, LAC, RG 24, Acc 83-84/167, box 457, file 1650-26, vol 15.16 If there were one helicopter per two ships, then not more than forty minutes was required to reach the

DATUM (submarine’s estimated position) point. As for maritime patrol aircraft, maintaining three oncontinuous patrol would give a time on datum of 40 minutes. With those performance requirements, afleet of 40 Neptune patrol aircraft was required to provide twenty-four hour patrol.17 “Annex I – Force Requirements for Support of Sound Surveillance Systems,” LAC, RG 24, Acc 83-84/167, box 457, file 1650-26, vol 15.18 These forces were to be stationed at Brest and Milford-Haven in the event of hostilities, and wouldoperate at the discretion of NATO’s Supreme Commander, Atlantic, SACLANT.

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systems; and the improved capabilities of Soviet submarines. Of immediate

concern was the advent of the Soviet Union’s missile carrying submarine

program. The success of the nuclear-powered submarine USS Nautilus in

travelling under the polar ice-cap in 1957 demonstrated to the Naval Board both

the viability of the propulsion plant and that Canada’s northern waters were no

longer immune to submarine operations. The potent combination of nuclear

missiles in nuclear submarines proved a spectre that the Chief of the Naval Staff

explained to the Chiefs of Staff Committee “left anti-submarine warfare far

behind....”19 Further, the ability of the Soviet Union to sortie a large number of

long-range boats was demonstrated during the Cuban missile crisis, when from

23 October to 15 November 1962, some 136 Soviet submarines appeared within

proximity to the Canadian area of responsibility in the Atlantic.20 The anticipated

solution – the SOSUS deep-water sound surveillance system – became

operational in 1957, but did not live up to expectations.21 As late as November

1961, it is clear that SOSUS remained virtually unable to detect Soviet

submarines. The Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff informed the Navy’s senior

officers, “we have virtually no ability” to stop missile firing submarines.22

While studying the ASW problem the Naval Board authorized reductions in the

fleet and declined additional missions for the Navy. After long debate, the Naval

Board voted to dispose of the two cruisers Ontario and Quebec. Though onlybeing used for training missions, the cruisers had been promised to SACLANT for

operations in the eastern Atlantic after mobilization. But the cost of maintaining

that commitment threatened to expend funds that were more urgently required for

addressing the submarine threat in the western Atlantic.23 In the name of economy,

the fleet’s general service capability was further reduced when the navy’s only

icebreaker, HMCS Labrador , was transferred to the Department of Transport.24


19 At one point the Americans sought Canadian adoption of new rules of engagement that would have

authorized ship’s captains to force a vessel within or in proximity to territorial waters to the surface byfire if necessary. Although the Canadians prevailed in stating such a response was unacceptable to theCanadian government it illustrates the level of concern: Navy Board minutes, 592-6, 8 April 1959; andRaymont collection, memo Chief of Naval Staff to Chairman, Chief of Staffs, “RCN SubmarineProgramme”, 18 November 1959, DHH 73/1223 series 1, file 379.20 “Prediction of Operational Exposure Periods in ASW,” in ASW Operational Research Team, ClosedCirculation Report, cited in Tony German, The Sea is at Our Gate, 272.21 For instance, in late 1958 the RCN responded to a submarine operating in conjunction with Soviettrawlers, detected by SOSUS some ten miles off Shelburne, Nova Scotia. The vessels took five hoursto reach the contact datum point. Six vessels conducted the search, but with their sonars limited todetection ranges of about 2000 yards (a range only marginally better than ones obtained during theSecond World War), only a twelve square mile search area was covered before the hunt terminatedunsuccessfully: message to Naval Secretary from Canadian Maritime Commander, Atlantic, “Analysisof the Operations, September 7 and 8, 1958, analysis of contact P-86,” 14 December 1958, LAC, RG

24, Acc 83-84/167, vol 455. On the later “apparent ineffectiveness of SOSUS arrays,” see Minutes, SeaAir Warfare Committee, 39th meeting, 12 September 1960, LAC, RG 24, Acc 83-84/167, vol 89, file1270-78-1, vol 6.22 “Notes on NSS 1279-118”, Brock to 12th Senior Officer’s Meeting, 20 November 1961, DHH, NavalPolicy 1650-1, vol III.23 DHH Navy Board minutes, 564-3, and 570-4, 1958.24 DHH Navy Board minutes, 540-2, 28 August 1957.

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Additionally, in focusing on the submarine threat in the western Atlantic, the Navy

Board declined participation in an American plan to extend the Distant Early

Warning radar system at sea.25 And a Canadian contribution to ASW barrier

operations closer to the Soviet Union, for instance in the Greenland-Iceland-

United Kingdom (GIUK) gap was similarly declined, so as to allow concentration

of resources in the western Atlantic.26

Before any construction began, however, the Liberals were turned from

office. The new Conservative government requested a review of the

proposals before finally giving authorization on 8 August 1957. Finally,

faced with the need to replace retiring vessels, and the need to maintain a

basis of skill among the shipyards, four more destroyer escorts were ordered,

with an additional two authorized the following year.27 For the first four

vessels the infelicitous name “repeat Restigouche” gave way to the

designation “Mackenzie class” – even though they were not the Mackenzie

class as originally designed. The final two repeat Restigouche vessels also

emerged from the shipyards under a new name, the Annapolis class. During

construction, their design under-went substantial modernization,

incorporating those features prepared for the St. Laurent class modernization.

Although the St. Laurents only really joined the operational fleet from about1955 (having been designed in 1948, and laid down in 1949) the pace of

technological change had rendered them nearly obsolescent. They had barely

become operational when a major modernization program was first mooted. This

included incorporation of a helicopter hanger and flight deck, and the

installation of the Canadian designed variable depth sonar (VDS). 28 The potential

of the VDS and helicopter were recognized very early by the RCN. Consisting

of a large active sonar towed array capable of being lowered through the ocean’s

distinct surface temperature layers that particularly disrupted sonar effectivenessin the western Atlantic, the VDS had by late 1958 achieved effective active sonar

detection beyond 21,000 yards, and was exceedingly reliable for ranges up to

11,000 yards at 15 knots – that is, two to three times the effective range of hull

mounted sonars. Consequently, two ships operating with VDS could search the


25 Cabinet Minute, 19 December 1956, LAC, RG 2 (Privy Council), vol 5775.26 “RCN Position Regarding G-I-UK Study Group Recommendations” “Appendix A”, 26 September1960, LAC, RG 24, Acc 83-84/167, box 89, NSS 1270-78-1, vol 6.27 DHH Minutes Chiefs of Staff Committee, 588-9, 9 February 1956; minutes PPCC, 56-8, 19 March1956; Naval Board Minutes, 482-2, 10 April 1956; Chiefs of Staff Committee, 592-4, 12 April 1956;

record of Cabinet Defence Committee, 111th meeting, 13 August 1956, and 113th meeting, 6-7February 1957, LAC, RG 24, Acc 83-84/167 box 3549, file 8000-35, pt 2; DHH Naval Board minutes,517, 19 January 1957; letter MND George Pearkes to CNS, 8 August 1957, LAC, RG 24, Acc 83-84/167, file 3549, pt 2; and, 114th Cabinet Defence Committee, minutes 19 August 1957.28 For this analysis, see “Message from Maritime Commander Atlantic to Naval Secretary, Analysis of Operations September 7 and 8, 1958 Analysis of Contact P-86,” 15 September 1958, LAC, RG 24, Acc83-84/167, vol 455.

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same area previously demanding six. After a period of design development and

sea trials their incorporation into the fleet was delayed only by the rate of

production and an orderly shipyard schedule.29

The fitting of helicopters and VDS to the original St. Laurents was undertaken during

their mid-life refits,30 but the modernization program had been in planning since

August 1957.31 Authority for an extensive modernization program came with little

debate because it was apparent that the delays experienced in ordering the “repeat

Restigouche” vessels had threatened to seriously reduce the improvement of the fleet.

The Chief of the Naval Staff gained authority to plan the modernization program after

a private meeting with the ministers of National Defence, External Affairs, and

Finance.32 Once the minister authorized preparation for a major modernization

program, studies commenced in 1958 that focused on improving the ASW

effectiveness of the fleet.33 These studies demonstrated fleet effectiveness would be

greatly improved by the deployment of submarines, helicopters and fixed wing

aircraft working in combination to support the SOSUS barrier. Improving the on-

station time of the ASW vessels was judged critical to meeting the increasing

operational requirements of the ASW forces, and to this end the first of three fleet

replenishment/tankers was undertaken.34 Beyond improving the on-station time of the

fleet, drastic improvements were sought in the ASW vessels. Present forces required

immediate improvement,35 leading to the modernization program that saw theconcepts tested on the converted wartime construction destroyers Sioux and Crescent .

Less immediate was the solution to the shape of the next class of ASW vessels.

Submarines, it was argued, could be incorporated into the annual estimates for


29 Development of these systems followed long running scientific trials and evaluations, for VDS datingfrom immediately after the war. See, “The Canadian Development of VDS,” 45-53, and “The Marriageof the Small Ship and the Large Helicopter,” 66-74, in Maritime Warfare Bulletin: Commemorative

Edition 1985 (Maritime Warfare School Halifax/ Department of National Defence, 1985). The VDS theprogram can be traced in PPCC Files, project EE-5 “A/S Detection Equipment--

Variable Depth Sonar--AN/SQS 504”, DHH 79/246.30 “The Conversion Program,” Crowsnest 115:4 (April 1963), 9.31 PPCC minutes, 103-3, 17 March 1958, DHH 79/246; Naval Board meeting, 564-4, 2 April 1958. See“ASW Weapons Effectiveness Study, 1957-1967,” Director of Undersea Warfare, 18 September 1957,discussed 120th PPCC, 15 November 1957, and Naval Staff, 24-1957, 29 October 1957, Naval Board,meeting 552, 20 November 1957.32 See marginal note by CNS on Cabinet memo 4-57, 14 August 1957, LAC, RG 24, Acc 83-84/167, box3549, file 8000-35, vol 2.33 Naval Board minutes, 575th meeting, 10 September 1958; PPCC files, project D-4, memo VCNS toCNS “Policy on Bringing Fleet to Maximum A/S Capability,” 23 September 1958, DHH 79/246; on therecommendation to hurriedly fit the VDS see “Message from Maritime Commander Atlantic to NavalSecretary,” 15 September 1958, LAC, RG 24, Acc 83-84/167, vol 455.34 These vessels were essential to allow the fleet to operate for prolonged periods in search areas

approximately 1000 nautical miles from Canada’s shores. The draft characteristics were approved atNaval Board, 573-4, 1958, and 583-5, 1958. See the subsequent paper in this volume by Ken Reynoldson the development of the RCN’s replenishment at sea capability.35 On helicopter effectiveness and need for VDS see Naval Board 576-4, 24 September 1958. As well,an examination was to be made of converting the five frigates with longest remaining operationalservice to carry up to three helicopters. Note that the Naval Board’s hesitancy to convert the St.Laurents so soon after their incorporation into the fleet is apparent in this meeting.

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1958/59.36 If the RCN was to create a submarine branch focussed on ASW it was

fair to ask what future surface combatants should have as their primary role. But

in considering the usefulness of surface escorts the fleet anti-aircraft capacity

also required consideration. Maintaining an anti-air capability while improving

the ASW effectiveness of the fleet and meeting the replacement schedule

evolved into a long-running question for naval planners, and could not be

disentangled from the submarine building initiative.

Allied navies were demonstrating that submarines promised to make the most

effective means of hunting other submarines. As well the development of

nuclear submarines by both the United States and Great Britain saw Canada’s

major naval allies choosing a technology that would be difficult but not

impossible for Canada to acquire. Certainly Canada explored the possibility of

indigenous production of nuclear boats, but eventually settled upon the

compromise purchase of the conventional Oberon class submarines that served

until the late 1990s. At the 564th meeting of the Naval Board on 2 April 1958, the

requirement for nuclear submarines was agreed. A detailed feasibility study on

Canadian construction facilities was undertaken by the Nuclear Submarine

Survey Team, which experienced no luck in securing detailed information from

the United States on either the hull or propulsion characteristics of their vessels

in 1958. In early 1959, a “Scope and Means” agreement was negotiated with theUnited States Navy and Atomic Energy Commission, allowing the exchange of

some detailed information. The final report of the Survey Team was completed

by July 1959, and an extensive survey of Canadian shipyards and discussion

with manufacturers concluded Canadian industry could build nuclear

submarines, the only limiting considerations being time and cost.37

These too-generous caveats prompted the Chief of Naval Staff, Vice-Admiral

H.G. DeWolf, to call into question the findings of the survey. For theconservative cost estimate of one nuclear submarine, the RCN could gain three

to five conventional submarines.38 As it was then argued, the latest conventional


36 PPCC minutes, 103-3, 17 March 1958, Naval Board meeting, 564-4, 2 April 1958, DHH 79/246. See“ASW Weapons Effectiveness Study, 1957-1967,” Director of Undersea Warfare, 18 September 1957,discussed 120th PPCC, 15 November 1957; Naval Staff, 24-1957, 29 October 1957; Naval Board,meeting 552, 20 November 1957, DHH 79/246.37 “Progress Report on the RCN Nuclear Submarine Study”, Project L-2, NSS 8000-SSN, DHH 79/246.38 The Canadian Nuclear Submarine Survey team concluded an atomic boat could be built in Canadaaccording to an American design for approximately $65 million, whereas a British designed conventionalboat of the Porpoise (progenitor of the Oberon) class could be constructed for $15-18 million in Canada or

$9 million in the UK; see “RCN Submarine Programme” 1959, 2; for the entire Nuclear Submarine Survey,see DHH 79/246 project files, L-1 and L-2. However, the ability of the nuclear submarine to generateelectricity was also of great benefit: while Britain and the United States were employing submarine-mountedpassive sonar with increasing effect, achieving quite exceptional detection ranges (in the order of 125 miles),active sonar was still considered an essential requirement, even if the power requirements of long rangeactive sonar could quickly drain a conventional submarine’s batteries. At the time a good range for activesonar was 10 miles, with some demonstrated capacity out to the first convergence zone (35 miles).

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boats possessed many of the same operational advantages as other submarines,

the only real disadvantage being submerged endurance and speed – limitations

that eventually proved decisive against an immediate program to build nuclear

boats, in light of the tremendous cost differential.

These were the major points of DeWolf’s criticism. The tactics and training for

ASW had yet to take account of the speed advantages of nuclear boats. Most

tactics and methods had been developed against conventional submarines with

submerged speeds of 3-5 knots. Against such slow targets ships were given a

five-to-one speed advantage and aircraft a forty-to-one advantage. But with

nuclear boats capable of high-speed operations in excess of 20 knots, the surface

craft often had a speed disadvantage, and maritime aircraft were reduced to an

approximately seven-to-one advantage. These operational conditions were not

widely known at the time, and for the minister speed proved the decisive issue.

As he saw it high speed was not essential for “defensive A/S operations in the

Atlantic.” Consequently, the Chief of Naval Staff recommended that, unless

additional funds could be made available to the Navy to meet the cost of

building nuclear boats, conventional submarines should be undertaken on the

basis of equal priority with the surface vessels of the planned replacement

program.39 However, until the submarine program was settled the surface fleet

replacement program was also delayed.

In recognition of the demise of the nuclear program, the RCN made an interim

submission to the minister on 27 October 1960. The Chief of the Naval Staff

compared the costs of building six US Barbel class conventional boats in Canada

(at $164 million) to building six British Oberon class boats in the United

Kingdom: of all available conventional submarine designs only the Oberons

approached the operational profile of the Barbels, yet for the same money the

Oberons would allow the Navy to obtain an additional four surface ASW vessels,at the cost of $22 million dollars each. Although the CNS concluded the Barbels

would make the most effective ASW force, the usefulness of additional ASW

ships could not be discounted.

In the absence of ministerial decision the RCN persisted with the Barbel

proposal, taking it to the Chiefs of Staff Committee on 18 May 1961. The

program for ship replacement then discussed included not only the six


39 Minister to Cabinet Defence Committee, 9 January 1961, cited, R.J. Pickford, Director of Naval Plansto VCNS, 12 November 1961, LAC, RG 24, Acc 83-84/167, box 3549, file 8000-35, pt 4. On theoperational advantages and disadvantages see, J.C. Arnell, Science Advisor to the Chief of the NavalStaff, comments on “A Nuclear Powered Submarine Program” by Dr. R.J. Sutherland, Memo to Chief of Naval Staff, 16 March 1964, PPCC Files, project AA-4, DHH 79/246; and Directorate of NavalOperational Requirements, “Operational Requirements for RCN Submarines”, 17 June 1963, project M-4, DHH 79/246.

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submarines, but also an eight-vessel General Purpose Frigate (GPF) program.

Had both programs been adopted, the resulting fleet would include twenty-six

ASW escorts, nine submarines, and eight general purpose frigates. Once the

submarines and GPFs were completed the RCN would commence a six-vessel

ASW frigate program. This building program was markedly more ambitious

than that proposed to the Minister only nine months previously.

What were the origins of the modified program? The most important event was

the promise of additional money. In accordance with NATO strategy, articulated

under the MC-70 policy, the federal Cabinet agreed on 22 March 1960 to

increase the Canadian defence budget from its present level of approximately

$1.5 billion annually to $2 billion by fiscal year 1964/65.40 Within NATO

strategy the MC-70 concept entailed a policy of forward engagement for

maritime forces as developed by the RN and USN. Tactical ASW in the western

Atlantic was troubling for the Navy, but was neither the true end of NATO

strategy (which was to deter aggression) nor the most efficacious means of

counter-acting Soviet submarine operations. Keeping the Bear in its pen was

better than dealing with it on the loose – at least that is where SACLANT’s naval

strategy was pointed, whether or not Canada participated.

Requirements for support of MC-70 had influenced NATO fleet planning since1958, but Canada did not move to increase its participation in forward

operations. Subtle pressures through SACLANT had been brought to bear on

the cabinet for the deployment of a second Canadian aircraft carrier. Whatever

the cabinet’s reluctance to contemplate contributing to strike operations, the

financial requirement proved decisive in killing further talk of a second carrier.41

There were enough financial, operational, and political difficulties dealing with

the submarines in Canada’s coastal area of responsibility.

Within the Navy, the long delays in obtaining approval for any fleet replacement

plan had caused grave concern. Concern also developed over the specialization

in the ASW mission. General purpose forces had been pared away in pursuit of

a better ASW force at a time when allied navies were changing their approach to

the submarine problem by building strike forces. Once it appeared to the naval

staff that some form of submarine program would be authorized, attention turned

to developing designs for follow-on surface vessels that would preserve the

general surface capacity of the fleet.42

Through 1960, however, with Cabinet


40 “MC 70 The Minimum Essential Force Requirements 1958-1963,” Cabinet minutes, 22 March 1960,LAC, RG 2.41 “NATO Annual Review. Draft Comments for Guidance of Canadian Delegation on Prepared List of Questions,” 23 October 1958, LAC, RG 49, vol 708, file 247-5 vol 4.42 On the alternate ship designs see esp, “Minutes of Special Meeting of the Ship Characteristics Panel,”NSS 8885-1, 12 November 1958, Project D-4, DHH 79/249.

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approval of any submarine program uncertain, the naval staff still listed a low

cost “austerity” ASW frigate as the top priority building requirement. 43 But then

it was an either-or proposition: either submarines or ASW frigates.44

However, the replacement program sent forward on 18 May 1961 discarded the

austerity frigate, and sought instead permission to undertake simultaneously the

construction of submarine and new surface vessel programs. These were elaborated

in the Ad Hoc Report on Naval Objectives45 sent to the minister in December 1961.

The Report bore the hallmark of the incoming Vice-Chief of Naval Staff, Vice-

Admiral Jeffry V. Brock. By his own later admission, it was the “first opportunity

to put my own hands on the helm after all these years.”46 The Brock Report

identified most of the recent trends in naval technology confronting the Naval

Board. Transitions in air, surface, and sub-surface operational requirements were

portrayed as calling for many new surface and sub-surface vessels.

In sum, the report endorsed a fleet based on the concept of “cheap and many.”

To forestall serious deficiencies in the Navy’s escort forces, the Brock Report

called for a replacement and modernization program. The future fleet required

replenishment vessels to allow the fighting units to stay within their patrol

areas longer. The fighting fleet required six Barbel class conventional

submarines and eight general purpose frigates. These frigates would replacethe Tribals and were to be capable of shore bombardment, limited air-defence,

and ASW missions. To replace the old, slow, ocean escort Prestonians as well

as the aircraft carrier Bonaventure, the Brock Report called for construction of

a number of “heliporters”: frigates only marginally larger than the

Prestonians, but capable of operating three helicopters in the ASW role. These

heliporters also could be converted to provide moderate troop lift capacity –

something that would be greatly reduced with the retirement of Bonaventure in

1975. Finally the RCN was to continue an extensive research program intounconventional ASW craft, such as hydrofoils and hovercraft. This new

construction, argued the Report, could be funded through a modest increase in

naval appropriations. The funding goal was one per cent of the Gross National

Product annually for fifteen years.47 In dollar terms, the fifteen-year program

called for naval capital expenditures to increase from $275 million to a peak

in 1972 at $525 million.48


43 Minutes PPCC, 192-2, 3 May 1960, DHH 79/249; Memo to CDC, “Ship Replacement Programme,”

21 January 1960, which called for a six ship program with the vessels expected to cost $20 million each,LAC, RG 24, Acc 83-84/167, box 3549, file 8000-35, pt 3.44 COSC Minutes, meeting 649, 19 November 1959.45 Ottawa, 1961 (DHH), commonly referred to as “The Brock Report” after its principle author.46 Jeffry V. Brock, The Thunder and the Sunshine (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1983), 80.47 During the Korean War naval expenditures represented 1.24 per cent of GNP; over the decade of the1950s they declined to a low of 0.7 per cent of GNP but the ten-year average was 0.98 per cent of GNP.48 Brock Report, 95-98.

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The developing submarine threat, the limitations of current underwater

surveillance techniques, and the almost prohibitive expense of modern surface

ASW vessels, combined to suggest the force requirements and building program

outlined in the Brock Report. Although the Brock Report is given to diverse

interpretations, 49 the acceptance of the Report by the entire Naval Board

demonstrated a shared belief that, unlike most other NATO navies, the RCN

should not (or politically could not) restructure around carrier task groups or

strike forces. That it included a call for the maintenance of a general purpose

capacity does not contradict that trend.

The genesis of the GPF program illustrates these points. In developing the

design, the naval staff turned to the characteristics of new general purpose

designs being developed by the RN and USN.50 Both these navies developed

these vessels in light of new missile technologies and a concept of operations

that illustrated the precarious place that strictly ASW forces occupied in their

strategies. From the late 1950s, both navies increased their reliance on strike

operations. For their attack-at-source missions, or the imposition of near-source

ASW barrier operations designed to hold Soviet submarines in the eastern

Atlantic, surface fire and anti-aircraft forces were essential. Their general

purpose vessels were designed for those operations.

However, in seeking a general purpose Canadian vessel the strike mission was

not a stated goal of the Naval Board. A memorandum from the Director of

Naval Operations indicates at least one primary interest. In light of the

possible acquisition of nuclear weapons51 and submarines, the guided missile

frigate would be far better for morale “than our obsession with the submarine

threat.” The present ASW forces could hold “the thin red line” until relieved

by the submarines.52 Further, the guided missile ships would also improve the

balance and flexibility of the RCN by replacing the aging Tribal classdestroyers. As well, their air defence capabilities would soon be essential for

defence of the Canadian carrier task force. The Bonaventure’s Banshee


49 Some observers regard it as calling for a “quantum leap” in the Navy’s capabilities. In thisinterpretation the Report marks a radical departure from previous naval policy – calling for a return toa balanced fleet for the RCN and a move away from the emphasis on ASW operations. Others portrayit as simply a re-statement of the navy’s primary anti-submarine warfare role, specifying new vesselsrequired to fulfil that role. See, Peter Haydon, “When Military Plans and Policies Conflict: The Caseof Canada’s General Purpose Frigate Problems,” The McNaughton Papers (vol II) (Toronto: CISS,1991), 59; and Brian Cuthbertson, Canadian Military Independence in the Age of the Superpowers

(Toronto: Fitzhenry & Whiteside, 1977), 129-30.50 The RN recently produced a new Tribal class, the Type 81 Frigate, and the USN the guided missileCharles F. Adams class destroyer.51 The possible acquisition of nuclear weapons was under constant study through the late 1950s.However, no major steps were taken to actually retain nuclear depth bombs in Canada or on its warshipsuntil 1964. See COSC min 667-VI, 11 August 1960, DHH; PPCC Min. 293-1, 4 March 1964.52 Memo DNOPS Capt. J.C. Littler to ANCS(P) Commodore D.W. Piers, 11 August 1960, LAC, RG 24,Acc 83-84/167, box 3549, file 8000-35, pt 4. See also Pier’s reply attached.

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fighters, scheduled for retirement in 1962, were not going to be replaced. 53

Consequently, steps were taken to plan the carrier’s conversion into a

commando or heliporter carrier.54 The decision to develop the carrier along

these lines marked a loss for the proponents of carrier aviation within the

Navy. The decision not to retain the fighters marked a step away from

operations in the eastern Atlantic and was closely tied to acquisition of the

GPF.55 Funds not used to replace the Banshee fighters would be turned to new

ship construction.56

In seeking authority for the GPF, two further arguments were marshalled. First,

champions of the General Purpose Frigate pointed to its potential contribution to

United Nations operations, and possible use in brush-fire wars. Although the

Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee had been wary of recommending

construction of the GPF because it threatened to move the RCN toward

participation in strike operations in the eastern Atlantic, the UN and small war

argument won him over.57 The argument was not without merit. Canadian

destroyers were among the first Canadian forces to participate in UN operations

during the Korean War. In 1956, the RCN had transported a Canadian battalion

to Suez for UN deployment. Given the contemporary UN military actions in the

Congo, possible participation in brush-fire crises was not easily discounted. Just

so no one missed the point, a line was inserted into the RCN long term planningguide noting that the “successful deterrent in global war will tend to increase the

likelihood of limited war.”58

The second major argument marshalled in favour of the GPF was the RCN’s

newly developed concept of a balanced ASW force. By April 1961, the Naval

Board had developed the concept of what constituted a modern, balanced ASW

fleet. Their ideal force required one-fifth submarines, three-fifths ASW escorts,

and one-fifth general purpose ships. With Canada committed to provide a forty-three-ship ASW force to SACLANT, the required force mix would yield a fleet

of twenty-six A/S escorts, nine A/S submarines, and eight General Purpose

Frigates – this was the precise mix later included in the Brock Report. 59 Through

circuitous means the naval staff succeeded in having SACLANT recommend just


53 See the subsequent paper in this volume by Jason Delaney on fighter aircraft procurement.254 Naval Board minutes, “Special Meeting”, 22 July 1960, DHH; Memo VCNS to CNTS, 8 August1960, LAC, RG 24, Acc 83-84/167, box 3549, file 8000-35, pt 4.55 Maintenance costs of the naval air arm consumed approximately twenty per cent of the annual navalappropriation. It was a large share of the budget for a rather small force. The VCNS in early 1960,Vice-Admiral Tisdall, certainly questioned the worth of maintaining the entire fixed wing force, notingin a presentation to the incoming CNS that Australia planned to eliminate its carrier arm over 1962-63,Naval Board, Special Meeting, 22 July 1960; 12th Senior Officer’s Meeting, 20-21 November 1961.56 COSC min, 686th meeting, 16 March 1961.57 COSC min 692, 18 May 1961.58 DHH. PPCC/NPCC Min. 255-2, 18 December 1962.59 Naval Board Min. 648 meeting, 21 April 1961.

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such a fleet structure to the Chiefs of Staff Committee when generating new

force requirements in support of the MC-70 Medium Term Defence Plan.60

All of these diverse strands came together in the building program proposed to

the Chiefs of Staff Committee in early May 1961. The RCN gained permission

to include the GPF in its annual estimates for fiscal year 1962/63. But unknown

to the planning staff, the RCN instead was approaching nadir. Program planning

and budgeting problems associated with this new program were only part of the

Navy’s undoing. By early 1963, the GPF program estimates had risen from $275

million to $450-500 million, and design refinement was still at an early stage.61

The growing concern of the Department of Finance and the Treasury Board was

soon shared by a new government, after the Diefenbaker Conservatives lost a

vote of confidence in the House on 5 February 1963.

Prevarication by Diefenbaker’s government over the adoption of nuclear

weapons and dithering during the Cuban Missile Crisis raised defence policy as

a major issue in Canadian political circles. The Liberals won the election under

the banner of reform, and the “sixty days of decision” Pearson promised the

electorate heralded a commitment to action and reform. The reforms then set in

train took much longer than sixty days to implement – but the new Minister of

National Defence, Paul Hellyer, turned his immediate attention to the GPFprogram. Program review began in May. In June, all government capital

programs were suspended pending a full review of expenditures. By early

October, cabinet had agreed to cancel the General Purpose Frigate. The

cancellation cannot be explained as simply a response to the expected cost

overruns. Rather it was directly tied to the more fundamental reforms of defence

policy and defence spending undertaken by the new government.

In outlining these cuts to the full cabinet, the Chief of the Naval Staff pointedout that the RCN would effect savings of $280 million as requested by the

minister by taking $197 million over the next two and one half years from

capital programs, the balance to be reduced by cutting the uniformed strength

from 21,324 to 20,500 and removing four Tribal class destroyers from service.

By 1970, the RCN would be reduced to twenty-seven warships, sixteen of

which would be obsolete and overdue for replacement, and with eleven of the

twenty St. Laurent/Restigouche/MacKenzie class vessels lacking the most

effective ASW equipment. The ramifications of the proposed cuts were spelled


60 COSC Min. 680th meeting, 9 January 1961.61 For these developments see Report of A.W. Allan, J. Longhurst, G. Hughes-Adams to J.C. Rutledge,Director of Shipbuilding, Dept of Defence Production, 28 June 1962, LAC, RG 49, vol 1, file 39-N-1521-2; Letter Director General of Ships to A.J.C. Pomeroy, Defence Supply Naval Shipbuilding Panel,14 December 1962; letter G.W. Hunter, Deputy Minister Defence Production to Secretary TreasuryBoard, 29 January 1963.

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out in detail to the cabinet, wrote Hellyer, so that they could adequately judge

the “order of magnitude.”62

The cabinet minutes indicate the prime minister was moved by the passion of the

arguments presented by the service chiefs as they outlined the consequences of

reducing the defence appropriation. But the minutes also record Pearson’s

conclusion: “in order to get public support for the defence programme, there

would have to be radical change in its character.”63 The GPF took the first real

blow in this long process of radical reform. 64

Although the minister’s personal emissary investigating the GPF found it as

capable of effectively contributing to ASW operations as any other unit in the fleet

(or proposed design), the need to reduce the general defence budget drove the

issue.65 The proposed cuts soon sparked the recommendation from the deputy

minister of defence to cancel the GPF and retain the Oberon building program. The

British had already agreed to offset the submarine sale by contributing fifty per cent

of the development costs (some $10 million) to the development of a small drone

aircraft that had “a good prospect of sizable export sales for Canada.”66 The

minister’s recommendation to cancel the GPF and maintain the Oberon building

program did not shield the ramifications from cabinet. Cancellation would yield a

fleet “incapable of meeting current NATO commitments....” There would be no“satisfactory anti air defence for the fleet.” SACLANT considered the move would

reduce the effectiveness of the Canadian carrier ASW group. The twenty-three

surface vessels of Second World War construction would remain in service for

years past their effective life. But as the minister’s memo to cabinet noted, “in view

of the reduced resources available for defence” cancellation had to be

recommended.67 All that remained to be determined was how to sugar coat the pill.

Cabinet turned its attention to this matter on 18 and 22 October. In discussion it

was agreed to state the reduction came as part of a current NATO review of policy,even though the two matters were unrelated. Further, press announcements would

stress that no jobs had actually been forfeit. Lastly, the public statement was

delayed so that the Department of Transport could prepare an announcement that its

shipbuilding program would be expanded. The expanded DOT program and

cancellation of the GPF were announced on 25 October 1963.68 Although these cuts

were the first of major reforms to come, Minister of Finance Walter Gordon noted


63 Privy Council Office (PCO) Cab doc 195-63, 1 August 1963; Cab min. 2 August 1963.64

PCO Cab Minutes, 2 August 1963.65 PCO Cab minutes, 10 October 1963.66 R.J. Sutherland, Chief of Operational Research to the Minister, “The General Purpose FrigateProgram,” 31 May 1963, 34, DHH 73/1223, series 1, file 403.67 Letter, Deputy Minister Department of Defence, to Secretary Chiefs of Staff Committee, 27September 1963, LAC, RG 24, Acc 83-84/167, box 3549, file 8000-35, pt 5.68 PCO, Cabinet Defence Committee Doc D9-63, 27 September 1963, attached to Cab doc 293-63,“Naval Ship Procurement”, 4 October 1963, and Cab Minutes, 10 October 1963.

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the excellent job Paul Hellyer was doing in reversing the upward curve in defence

expenditures, adding enigmatically that the move was all the more difficult in light

of it being done “before long-term policy decisions were reached....”69

But for the RCN it was portent enough. Operation “cut back” continued into

1964.70 Efforts by the naval staff through early 1964 to devise a plan for the

future shape of the fleet maintained the assumption that the RCN should be

primarily an ASW navy, but also have a capability for UN peacekeeping

operations and limited war commitments.71 The lack of suitable air-defence

capabilities remained a pressing concern, as did long term planning for the

introduction of nuclear submarines and helicopter carriers.72 But running

parallel to those studies were others being prepared for the minister as he set

about to draft the 1964 White Paper on Defence. However, even the financial

predictions prepared in those studies would prove too optimistic. Where the

reductions would cease remained unknown on 1 August 1964, when in

accordance with the White Paper, the Chiefs of Staff Committee, independent

service heads, Naval Board and Naval Staff were struck down as the first step

in integrating the Department of National Defence. Operation cut back

continued – how the now-headless Navy fared after 1964, however, is beyond

the scope of this paper.73

The rate of technological change being experienced by the RCN through this period

is perhaps unprecedented. That the RCN faced the demands of the postwar naval

revolution with dispatch and professionalism is not in doubt. That efforts were made

to stay abreast of all the technical trends and to do so without increasing dramatically

the naval appropriation called for numerous trade-offs. Aware that major increases to

their budget would not be forthcoming, the Naval Board and lower levels of the Naval

Staff held many pressures in check. The institutional pressures for more aircraft,

another aircraft carrier, nuclear propelled submarines, and surface-to-air missileequipped frigates were generated as often by the Soviet threat as by reading trends in

allied weapons development and capabilities. Even so, efforts were made to employ

supply-side pressures on the government through manipulating SACLANT’s force

requests – first for an additional aircraft carrier and then the General Purpose Frigate.


69 PCO Cab minutes, 18 and 22 October 1963.70 PCO Cab min, 4 December 1963.71 “Naval Programmes”, DHH VCNS files, vols 1 & 2, are devoted exclusively to the reduction of forces.72 Naval Staff minutes 1/64, 7 January 1964, DHH; and “Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Naval

Programmes 1964-1974,” 4 January 1964.73 Project AA-3 “Ad Hoc Working Group”, and Project AA-4 “Studies on the Future Composition of theFleet”, DHH NPCC files.74 A. Keith Cameron, “The Royal Canadian Navy and the Unification Crisis,” in James Boutilier (ed),The RCN in Retrospect, 1910-1968 (UBC Press, 1982), provides a very solid analysis of unification andthe navy response.

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However, only the appreciable demand-side pressures resulting from the

increased Soviet submarine presence and the demand-side pressure imposed by

a changing NATO strategy resulted in the Navy apparently achieving real

increased funding – as witnessed by the announced acceptance of the submarine

and GPF program. That those systems’ designs reflected the latest of allied

technologies and capabilities must be accepted. That they had been designed to

support a forward defence strategy not accepted by the government proved only

a short-lived problem – solved by the Liberal’s reforms that in short order

eliminated the RCN as an independent service.

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