svabhava in carvaka

8/10/2019 Svabhava in Carvaka

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Svabhvavda and the Crvka/Lokyata: A Historical

Overview

Ramkrishna Bhattacharya

Published online: 15 November 2012 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2012

Abstract svabhva (own being) and yadchh (chance, accident) are named as

two different claimants among others as the first cause (jagatkraa) in the vUp.

But in later works, such as Asvaghosas poems, svabhva is synonymous with

yadchh and entails a passive attitude to life. Later still, svabhva is said to be

inhering in the Lokayata materialist system, although in which sensecosmic order

or accidentis not always clearly mentioned. Svabhva is also a part of the

Sam

khya doctrine and is mentioned in the medical compilations. It is proposed thatthe idea ofsvabhva as cosmic order became a part of Lokayata between the sixth

and the eighth century CEand got widely accepted by the tenth century, so much so

that in the fourteenth century Sayan

a-Madhava aka Vidyaran

ya could categorically

declare that the Carvaka/Lokayata upheld causality, not chance. But the other

meaning of svabhva, identical with yadchh, continued to circulate along with

kla, time, which was originally another claimant for the title of the first cause and

similarly had acquired several significations in course of time. Both significations of

svabhvacontinued to be employed by later writers, and came to be used in another

domain, that ofdaiva (fate) vis-a-vis puruakra (manliness or human endeavour).

Keywords Carvaka/Lokayata first cause kla Medical compilations

Sam

khya svabhva yadchh

Introductory Remarks

We first read ofsvabhva (lit. own being) as one of the several rival claimants for

the title of being the first cause (jagatkraa) in the vUp (c. sixth century BCE),

R. Bhattacharya (&)

Pavlov Institute, 98 Mahatma Gandhi Road, Kolkata 700 007, India

e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]

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J Indian Philos (2012) 40:593614

DOI 10.1007/s10781-012-9168-x


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1.2. Thereafter more and more of such claimants are made to appear on the scene.

Asvaghosa (first century CE) in his Sau, 16.17 writes:

And the cause of this suffering from active being in the world is to be found in

the category of the vices such as desire (t) and the rest, not in Creator

(vara) or Principal Matter (prakti), or Time or the Nature of Things

(svabhva) or Fate (vidhi) or Chance (yadcch) [Sau, 90 (text), 114

(translation)].

No fewer than 28 such claimants appeared in course of time (Bhattacharya,

December 2001, 1923. See also the Appendix below). Apparently the six

mentioned in the Sau were some (if not all) of the first causes that were current in

the first century CE. It is interesting to observe that although the lists found in

different sources are far from being identical, two of the claimants, svabhva and

kla, are often present in such lists. Yet neither Dasgupta (1922) nor Frauwallner(1956) in their respective histories of Indian philosophy deals with svabhva.

Dasgupta (1922) merely mentions it once (I: 78), quoting vUp, 1.2, and, although

Frauwallner writes about the doctrine of time, kla, at some length ( English trans.

II: 7578), he does not mention the other claimants for the title ofjagatkraaat all.

It is necessary to study the significance ofsvabhvafor a particular reason. Quite

a number of writers on Indian philosophy have accepted this doctrine as a part of the

Carvaka/Lokayata, not always making clear what svabhvastands for in the context

of this philosophical system: causality or accident. Both the meanings ofsvabhva

are encountered in ancient as well as modern philosophical works.

Different Views on Svabhavavada vis--vis the Crvka/Lokyata

Let us take a few instances. Louis de La Vallee Poussin believes that the materialists

in India (philosophers without philosophy he calls them), by denying induction

were forced to deny causality (8:494). He then relates svabhva-as-accident to

materialism:

The name Svabhavikas is given to the scholars who believe that things, thecolour of the lotus and the sharpness of thorn, are born from the svabhvo,

own nature. Much could be said on the exact value of the word: it probably

means; Things are not produced by causes; they are because they are. (8:494)

Louis de La Vallee Poussin, it is evident from the sources he refers to, relies heavily

on Buddhist works in his exposition of the meaning ofsvabhva.

On the other hand, speaking of the Carvaka/Lokayata ontology, Eli Franco and

Karin Preisendanz write:

The world in all its diversity is only the result of various combinations of thematerial elements. There is no determinative principle, such as God or karma,

which is responsible for the properties of things. They are due to their own

nature; no agent makes fire hot or water cool. Lokayata causality operates with

material causes only, and efficient causes are not recognized (179).

594 R. Bhattacharya

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The Carvaka/Lokayata then admits causality in the svavvavdin way, rejecting

other rival jagatkraas. Apparently in this respect Franco and Preisendanz have

S-Ms SDS, chap. 1 and other sources in mind.

Similarly, speaking of the Carvaka/Lokayata ethics, Franco and Preisendanz

revert, though not explicitly, to the doctrine ofsvabhva:

That we could have an unequal share of pleasure and pain is not due to any

unseen force like karma, but to the different capacities of things caused by

different combinations of the elements, just as bubbles on the ocean display a

diversity of size, hue and duration (180).1

Thus we have two diametrically opposite views on svabhva vis-a-vis the

Carvaka/Lokayata. But this is not all. At least one modern scholar, Kavel Werner,

has identiedthe Carvaka and svabhvavda: While there are other materialistic

and realistic schools in Indian philosophy, the Carvaka is the only naturalist(svabhava vadin) (Werner 1997, p. 274).2 Werner in all probability was following

Vidyaran

yas VPS, 210 (or some secondary source) in identifying svabhvavda

with the Carvaka/Lokayata.

Let it be noted that the authors of these three views have one or the other ancient

authority in their support.

Other Modern Views on Svabhava

It is neither possible nor necessary to review all the interpretations that have been

offered by modern scholars. We propose to discuss someof the more representative

and well-known works that deal with svabhvain relation to the Carvaka/Lokayata.

Speaking of the Carvakas, Seal (1915) writes:

Among the Charvakas there were two classes, the cruder school of materialists

who accepted perception (pratyaka) as a valid source of knowledge, as well

as the reality of natural law (svabhva), and the finer school of sceptics, who

impugned all kinds of knowledge, immediate as well as mediate, and all

evidence, Perception as well as Inference. (p. 252)

Seal quotes Jayantabhatta (NM, chap. 1) as the authority who speaks of the

suikitacrvk (the well educated Carvakas) and crvkadhrta (cunning

Carvaka). Such a division of the Carvakas, now we know, is baseless, for

Cakradhara in hisGrBhcommentary on theNMhas explained that by both the terms

Jayanta was referring to Udbhatabhat

ta and his followers (GrBh I: 52, 100). Before

1 The reference to bubbles is obviously derived from a Carvaka aphorism:jalabudbudavajjv, Souls

are like water bubbles (Bhattacharya, I. 9.2009, pp. 79, 87). Franco relates this aphorism to the doctrineof epiphenomenalism and cites S. Hodgsons description of the mind-body relationship as the foam

thrown up and floating on a wave (Franco1997, p. 99).2 Cf. also his comment: Buddhism steers between the extreme asceticism of Upnis

adic teaching and the

extreme indulgence of the senses taught by the naturalists (svabhva vdins) of whom Carvaka is an

example (p. 275).

Svabhvavda and the Carvaka/Lokayata 595

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the discovery of this commentary (1972), scholars like Dasgupta (1922, 1, pp. 78

179, 362) and Shastri (1959, pp. 104105) too were deceived by Jayantas irony.

This, however, is not the point. Seal, it should be noted, takes svabhvato mean

natural law, that is, causality. He further writes that while the Buddhists assumed

the principle of causality to be the ground of induction, the Carvakas did not (pp.252253). Apparently, according to Seal, one group of Carvakas admitted natural

law, and the other, like the Buddhists, took their stands on the principle of the

Uniformity of Nature (prativandha,svabhvaprativandha, as the Nyyavindusays).

The problem is that ahetu cannot be the basis of the Carvaka/Lokayata. No

aphorism or verse has yet been found that could associate the Carvaka/Lokayata with

ahetuvda. So ifsvabhva = ahetuvda, Carvaka/Lokayata cannot be =svabhva, a

view that Vidyaran

ya in his refutation of the Carvaka holds: sarva krya

svabhvd ebotpadyate iti brhaspatyo manyate, the brhaspatya (the follower of

Brhaspati) thinks that all effects originate fromsvabhva(VPS, p. 210. See also SinhaIII, pp. 221222).

Similarly, Kaviraj (1923) dividessvabhvavda into two varieties: extremist and

moderate (pp. 4647; reprinted in C/L 442443), labels reminiscent of Indian

National Congress leadership of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

This division too is not in conformity with available evidence. Kaviraj assumes that

the earliest representatives of the extreme form of svabhavavada seem to have been

a set of free thinkers in ancient India who were originally called lokyatikas, but

subsequently came to be more widely known under the name ofCrvkas (pp. 47

48;C/L 443). He refers to the evidence found in Pali literature, to the Jabali episodein the Rmyaa (Ayodhyakan

d

a, 100. 3839 in vulgate ed. = 94. 3233 in crit.

ed.) and the Jain Bhagavatstra, 2. 248.

In the whole of Pali literature, the word lokyata means vitaasattham, the

science of disputation, not materialism (see Bhattacharya 2009, pp. 187192;

Franco2011, p. 630). The same meaning holds true for the passage in the Rmyaa

as also for the Bhagavatstra. Jabali does speak like a materialist but he represents

some pre-Carvaka school of dehtmavda, not the Carvaka, which appears much

later (the name to designate this school is seldom encountered before the eighth

century CE. The name along with Lokayata as its namesake occurs in Haribhadras

DSam, verse 85d, and Kamalaslas TSP, gloss on TS, verse 1885.

There is no mention of Lokayata along with svabhva before the sixth century

CE. It first occurs in the oldest known commentary on theSK(Suvarasaptatistra,

cited by Bedekar1961a, p. 10).3 Speaking of the rival claimants for being the first

cause (as found in SKverse 27), Paramartha quotes a verse: What produces the

white colour of the ham

sas [swans], the green colour of the parrots and the

variegated colour of the peacocks, it is from that I too am created. Paramartha

quotes the verse again in his commentary on SK verse 61 and adds: Thus

spontaneity (svabhva) is the cause of the entire world; Deliverance is effectuated

then spontaneously and not by Nature (prakti). Earlier still, in Mbh, 12. 224. 50,

3 This text not being available to me, I have used Sastris rendering (p. 36). Instead of writing the

earliest known commentator of the SKwhose work was translated into Chinese by Paramartha every

time, I shall henceforth use the shorthand Paramartha.

596 R. Bhattacharya

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svabhva is associated with the bhtacintak, those who think in terms of the

elements. However, in another verse in the same book (12.230.4) bhtacintak is

replaced by apare jan, other people, not identified with any school of thinkers.

The reading then is doubtful and the implication of the term bhtacintak is

uncertain (see Bhattacharya2002a, 2007b, pp. 275277).Following Louis de La Vallee Poussin, Johnston (1928) declares that he would

identify the svabhavavada with the adhiccasamuppanna [adhtyasamutpanna in

Sanskrit] school of the Brahmajalasutta of the Dghanikya (Sau 60n). In a later

article (1931), Johnston explains adhiccasamuppanna as akraasamuppanna,

originating without any cause, as opposed to the Buddhist doctrine of paicca-

samuppanna [prattyasamutpanna in Sanskrit], interdependent origination, which is

one of the basic tenets of Buddhist philosophy that provides the first inkling of the

modern formulation of the law of causation, of the law of universal causation, as

T. W. Rhys Davids puts it (pp. 42, 47).4

Johnston takes svabhva to meanaccidentalism but does not consider why it is mentioned as a separate item, not

identical toyadcch, chance, both in thevUp and theSau. As we shall see, many

of the handbooks and sundry popular works on Indian philosophy follow his view.

At the same time, however, there was a divergent view which explainedsvabhvaas

causality, quite distinct from svabhva as accident. Curiously enough, both the

views have been attributed to the Carvaka/Lokayata: some believe that the Carvakas

were materialists and accidentalists at the same time; some others speak of them as

materialists believing in causality, in the material cause (updnakraa), not,

however, in the efficient cause (nimittak

raa). The earliest list of jagatk

raas(SvUp 1.2) mentions three such efficient causes, namely, time, destiny and purua

(primeval man or the spirit or God) and one material cause, elements ( bhtni),

while yadcch denies causality altogether.

It is also too much to claim, as Hiriyanna (1949) does, that the Carvaka/Lokayata

is a lineal descendent of that doctrine (sc. svabhvavda) (1949/1974, p. 57).

What is worse, in spite of making a clear distinction between svabhva and

yadcch, Hiriyanna tends to associate the Carvaka with both (1932, pp. 103104;

1974, p. 181)!

Hiriyanna (in an article written before 1952) again observed that there were two

non-Vedic currents of thought in the Early Post-Vedic period: One known as

Svabhavavada or naturalism which repudiated belief in the spontaneous and the

supernatural; and the other, dualistic or pluralistic in its character which gave rise to

doctrines like Jainism in the course of this period (1952, p. 110). This, I am afraid,

accords too much credit to svabhvavda as a parallel source of the Vedic currents

of thought such as Saivism and Vaisn

avism. Similarly it is difficult to accept

Hiriyannas view expressed elsewhere (1932) that the Carvaka doctrine ascribes

the events of life to mere accident and that is how svabhvavda is to be

understood as the main source of later sensualist doctrine of Carvaka (1932,

4 Chattopadhyaya was very much impressed by Rhys Davidss Introduction to the Mah-nidna-

suttanta, as is evident from his preference for using the phrase laws of nature (or natural law) in

relation tosvabhva(see below). He reprinted this Introduction in Chattopadhyaya (ed.)1982, pp. 64

72, renaming it Causality asWeltanschauung: Early Buddhism. Chattopadhyaya also quotes extensively

from this Introduction in 1990, pp. 128131).


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p. 104). When S-M associates the Carvaka/Lokayata with svabhvavda, he rejects

the concept of chance, yadchh at the same time (SDS Joshi (ed.), 11). Writing

under the name of Vidyaran

ya, S-M again identifies svabhvavda with the

Carvaka: svabhvavda eba pramrthika iti manyomnasya, (The Laukayatika)

considers svabhvavda to be the supreme reality. (VPS, 211). Svabhva thus istreated as causality. If we accept S-Ms view in this regard, Hiriyanna cannot be

right.

Basham in his study of the Ajvikas (1951) writes, Some heretics exalted

svabhva to the status ofNiyati in the regular Ajvika system (p. 226). Following

the Jain representation ofsvabhva, he brands the svabhvavdins as akriyvdins,

who agreed with the niyativdins on the futility of human efforts (p. 226). In

which way then did the former differ from the latter? Basham says: while the latter

viewed the individual as determined by forces exterior to himself, for the former he

was rigidly self-determined by his own somatic and psychic nature (p. 226). So far,so good. Basham then goes on to observe that [t]hese ideas have much in

common, and suggests that svabhvavda was a small sub-sect of Ajvikism

(p. 226).

Bashams total involvement with the Ajvikas led him to include every heretical

view as a part of Ajvikism. There is absolutely no evidence to suggest that the

doctrine of svabhva was adopted by any community, religious or secular. If the

evidence of thevUpand theSauis to be believed,svabhva, along with but distinct

from the doctrines of time, destiny, etc., was proposed by a set of philosophers

whom the author/s of the

vUp did not approve of. Svabh

va is mentioned thereonly in connection with the origin of the universe, the first cause, so to say. In

later works svabhva is endowed with another dimension: whether or not free will

and hence human endeavour have any role to play in shaping the course of human

life. The basic point here is to deny the existence of any power or force beyond

nature and man. Implicitly svabhva involves the rejection of God or any

supernatural agency such as time, destiny, accident, the four (or five) basic

elements, and purua. Now all these words have some special technical sense.

Purua, for example, means the primordial person in the gveda (10.90.11), the

spirit in the Upanisads, and the human body in the medical texts. When we come to

Sam

khya it carries a sense far away from all this (for the various significations of

purua, see Chattopadhyaya 1985, pp. 286287). Svabhva too is explained in no

fewer than eight different and quite unrelated senses in Haricarana Van-

dyopadhyayas Bangla-Bangla lexicon, Vagya abdakoa. Such a variety of

meanings are also found in case of the English word nature (see Oxford English

Dictionary, s.v.). Lovejoy (1952, pp. 7273) shows that Nature as the cosmic order

as a whole could mean both regularity and irregularity. Randle once noted the

possibility that names which later applied to a specific school were used in an early

period in a different or in a much more general sense (p. 3). We learn of all these

rival claimants from the works of those who are mostly intent on refuting the

atheistic doctrine. Yet all of the opponents certainly did not understand svabhva,

kla, etc. in the same sense. Occurrence of the same set of words should not deceive

us.

598 R. Bhattacharya

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The crux lies in the fact that some of the opponents take svabhva to mean not

onlyahetuvda, accidentalism, but also its logical corollary,akriyvda, inactivism,

while some other opponents understand svabhva as rigid causality, svabhva

(instead of God or time or destiny or any other agency) being the cause of every

change in the world as also in human life. The logical corollary should then bekriyvda, activism, or faith in human endeavour or resoluteness (puruaakra),

although this is not always explicitly mentioned in relation tosvabhva-as-causality.

Riepe (1961) seems to have accepted Bashams views in toto and ventures on

some speculations:

The Ajivikas believed that all beings are developed by niyati, by destiny,

according to chance (sagati), and nature (bhva). The ripening of the world,

unlike the evolution of prakriti (sic) in Samkhya philosophy, is completely

predetermined. Evidently the niyativdins like the svabhvavdins (whose

view is that all things happened according to nature) together made up a group

called akriyavdins (those who did not believe in the effectiveness of

puruaakra) who believed works cannot effect any change. Niyatiis not one

of a number of causes but is the only cause. (44).

Here we have a melange, a strange amalgam of several contradictory doctrines,

not in the least supported by any positive evidence in the literature of the Ajvikas.

Some Indian philosophers, more particularly the Jains, did have a penchant for

reconciling the irreconcilables, but, to the best of my knowledge, nobody would

care to associate svabh

vawith both destiny and chance, except perhaps some Jainphilosophers and may be a few others (Bhattacharya 2001b, pp. 4652).

Bedekar (1961a, b) has dealt with the doctrine of svabhva at a considerable

length. He notes several significant facts but what concerns us here is that he, too,

associates the doctrines ofsvabhvaand klawith what he calls crass materialism

(1961a, p. 5), presumably because according to these doctrines everything in the

world including human life is the product of the Material Elements (Earth, Water,

Fire, Air and Space) which come together and go off at the behest of Svabhava,

Kala etc. (Bedekar1961a, pp. 56). Materialism does begin and end with material

elements, which is why it is also called bhtavda. But the elements do not come

together and go off at the behest of anything or anybody, that is, any efficient

cause, as has already been noted above. So, when Bedekar speaks of svabhva

conceived as a mythopoeic personification invested with a will of its own,

governing in its supreme sway, the whole course of the world and the human life

(1961a, p. 6),svabhvatends to become a mystic force like time and destiny, a view

quite alien to materialism. Materialism does not admit such mythopoeic person-

ifications. Moreover, in the Mbh, 12.172.11 and elsewhere svabhva invariably

suggests accident or absence of any cause; no efficient cause is allowed

(animittata) (for further details see Bhattacharya 1999, pp. 99101).

In spite of its excellent documentation, especially of Jain sources, Kulkarnis

study of svabhvavda (1968) suffers from the same mix-up. He rejects the view

that Svabhavavada was a small sub-sect ofjivikism (Basham, p. 226). However,

the alternative he proposes is equally unacceptable. In his opinion svabhvavda

was more intimately connected with Materialism orCrvkadaranain as much


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as both deny a transmigrating soul. (p. 18). This is all the more astonishing

because the few verses which represent the doctrine of svabhva (for a collection

see Bhattacharya 2002b, pp. 7680) are absolutely silent about the soul. The

epigrams neither affirm nor deny its existence.

Kulkarni further suggests that it would be more proper to regard Svabhvavdaas part and parcel of Materialism as has been done by tradition (p. 18). Herein lies

the chief crux: tradition associatessvabhvavdawith materialism but no ground for

doing so is ever stated clearly, except perhaps for the reason that both are atheistic.

The Vedantins consider causality as part and parcel of materialism. S-M has been

the most influential in giving currency to this tradition and modern scholars like

Chattopadhyaya (1969, pp. 5568, etc.), Malvania (1982, p. 125) and others have

followed suit. We are thus left to account for the other implication ofsvabhva as

mere accident.

Warder (1971) follows the Buddhist tradition and accepts the view ofsvabhva(own nature, in his rendering) as a rejection of the concept of causality. He does

not care to notice the implication of the separate mention ofsvabhvaand yadcch

in the vUp I.2 and other sources (although in addition to the vUp he refers to the

BC, the Mbh, and some later works). He says:

In the earliest Buddhist sources, such as the Dgha Nikya, the theory of

phenomena originated without causes is generally known as adhiccasamupp-

anna, originated spontaneously, originated independently, and later this is

explained as yadicch (Sanskrit yadcch), chance, spontaneity, at will

(35).

This is a mere rehash of Johnstons view mentioned above.5

Chattopadhyaya (1969, pp. 5568; 1977, pp. 175186, etc.) all along insists on

the concept of svabhva-as-causality. Svabhva to him means not just inherent

nature but the Laws of Nature. In one of his last works (1991) he writes:

We have seen that it (sc. svabhva) formed an important feature of the new

intellectual climate ushered in the Second Urbanization and further, notwith-

standing differences among the modern and medieval scholars of looking back

at it, the concept itself at least foreshadowedwhat came to be known in latertimes as the Laws of Nature (II:6970. Emphasis added).

From the twenty three verses pertaining to svabhvavda (Bhattacharya 2002b,

pp. 7590) it is evident that since the composition of the Moksadharma section

(Santiparvan) of the Mbh (see Bhattacharya 1999) and the Sau (that is, the first

century CE onwards) the concept ofsvabhva had become quite indistinguishable

from ahetu, denoting both akriyvda and atheism. This is also the view of all

Buddhist philosophers. For instance, in course of commenting on PV, verses162cd

163ab, Manorathanandin identifies the vague wordkecitas svabhvavdina(p. 64).

Although Dharmakrti does not mention the word svabhva, the doctrine itself

5 Warder does not specifically mention the Carvaka/Lokayata in connection with svabhva, although he

discusses it in a chapter entitled Lokayata, Ajivaka and Ajnana Philosophy. The section on svabhva

occurs in the first part of this chapter, before the Ajivaka. Hence it can be assumed that he too believes

that Lokayata and the doctrine ofsvabhva are one and the same.

600 R. Bhattacharya

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denying causality and providing the stock example of the sharpness of the thorn to

boot (taikydnm yath nsti kraam kaakdiu tathkraametat syd)

cannot but be reminiscent of svabhva-as-accident. On the other hand, in the

Upanis

adic tradition and some later Naiyaikas and Vedantins works (for

references see Bhattacharya 2006, pp. 3740), it is equally evident that there wasanother view which claimedsvabhvato be thecauseof all things. Both approaches

are recorded in TS, 4.110:

sarvahetunirasa bhvn janma varyate |

svabhvavdibhiste hi nhu svamapi karan

am ||6

The proponents of the doctrine ofsvabhva describe the origination of things

as being independent of all causes. They do not declare even the thing itself to

be its own cause. (Emphasis added)

Apparently there was a group of svabhvavdins who no longer acceptedsvabhvaitself to be the cause of everything (the earlier position) but reverted to the

position ofahetuvda. Kamalasla in his comment on this verse clearly mentions the

existence of two schools ofsvabhvavdins. The passage runs as follows:

nanu ye svata eva bhv bhavantiiti varayanti, tebhya e ko bheda?

ityha te htyadi. te = svabhvavdina. svamiti svarpam. apiabdt

pararpamapi. purbakastu svabhavam

karan

amicchanti, ete tamapi nec-

chantti bhedah

.

Question:What is the difference between these people and those who ascribe

the origination of things to themselves?Answer: They do not, etc. They, i.e. the upholders ofsvabhva; the thing itself,

i.e. its own nature (prior to origination); eventhis implies that they do not

accept the form of any other thing to be the cause; the difference thus is that

while the previous people hold the nature of the thing itself to be its cause, these

other people do not accept even that as the cause(Emphasis added).

On the basis of this passage Bedekar rightly concluded: Thus Kamalasla seems

to suggest that there were two schools of Svabhavavadins: One school maintain at

least Svabhavathe nature of the things itselfas the cause to denial of other

things as causes, the other school denying even Svabhava as the cause (1961a,

11n46). However, in the very next sentence he dismisses this highly significant

point rather summarily by saying, The distinction tends to be metaphysical and

abstract. We shall see later that instead of being metaphysical and abstract it is

the key to the crux.

That there were two groups of svabhvavdins can also be inferred from the

variant readings of the classic, oft-quoted verse expounding the basis position of

svabhvavda. Asvaghosas version of a couplet rules out any role of human

endeavour and represents the later position:

6 The TS verse (along with the two following) is also quoted in Prajnakaramatis commentary on the

Bodhi, 9.117 and in Maladhari Ratnaprabha Vijayas commentary on GV, 2.25 (1643). Kulkarni, using a

different edition, gives the verse number in the GVas 1963 (13. n. 10). He thinks: it is not unlikely that

they (sc. TS, 4.110-112) are derived from a common source (p. 20).


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ka kaakasya prakaroti taikya vicitrabhva mga-paki v

svabhvata sarvamida pravtta na kmakrasti kuta prayatna

Who fashions the sharpness of the thorn or the varied nature of beast and bird?

All this takes place by natural development. There is no such thing in

this respect as action of our own will, a fortiori no possibility of effort (BC,9.62, quoted in several other works. For details see Bhattacharya 2002b, 77,

verse 6).

Three other variants of the same couplet completely omit the conclusion urging

akriyvda and stops at asserting the role ofsvabhva, not of any other agency or

creator as the cause of all varieties. The first one reads:

ka kaakn prakaroti taikya vicitrabhva mga-paki ca

mdhurya iko kaut ca nimbe svabhvata sarvamida pravttam

Who fashions the sharpness of the thorns and the varied nature of beasts andbirds? Who fashions the sugarcane sweet and the margosa bitter? All this takes

place by natural development (SVi on BS, 1.7. Bhattacharya 2002b, p. 77,

verse 6a).

Other variants (Bhattacharya2002b, vv.714, 22) similarly proposesvabhva as

the cause of everything, either in the form of a series of rhetorical questions or as

denial of any creator god by implication. Here are a few examples:

badary kaakastka jurekaca kucita

phala ca vartula tasy

vada kena vinirmitam

Of the many thorns of a jujube tree, one is sharp, another is straight, yet

another is crooked. But its fruit is round. Say, who has made all this?

(Bhattacharya 2002b, p. 78, verse 7).

agniruo jala ta samasparastathnila

keneda citrita tasmt svabhvt tadvyavasthiti

The fire is hot, the water cold, refreshing and cool the breeze of morn; By

whom came this variety? From their own nature was it born (Bhattacharya

2002b, p. 78, verse 8).

A variant of this verse is also found in the SSS(chap. 2, verse 2):

agnair auyam ap atya kokile madhurasvara

itydyekaprakra syt svabhvo npara kvacit

The heat of fire, the cold of water, the sweet sound of the cuckoos, and such

other things happen to be (due to) the invariable nature (of those things), and

(they) are not anything else. (Bhattacharya 2002b, p. 78, verse 8, v.l.).

Denial of causality and free will then is the mark of one group ofsvabhvavdins

(see Bhattacharya2002b, verses 17, 19) while acceptance ofsvbhvaas the cause

of everything is the mark of the other (see Bhattacharya 2001a,b).That the word svabhva stands also for causality or universal order is also borne

out by some observations of Joseph Needham. Referring to one of Chat-

topadhyayas works (1977) Needham (1980) writes:

602 R. Bhattacharya

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A key word in the ancient Indian literature is svabhva, which could be

translated inherent nature, innate thus-ness, or the essential nature of

things. It must have had close relations with ta and even dharma in some

senses, meaning the Order of Nature or the way in which Nature worksall

recalling Tao in Chinese. The physicians were seeking the pattern-principlesin Nature, the ultimate reasons (ultimately of course inscrutable) why things

are as they are and behave as they do (1980, 25).

Needham in this context makes another significant point in relation to the rendering

ofsvabhva in Chinese:

It is interesting to see how these Sanskrit words came out when the

Buddhist philosophers needed to translate them into Chinese. Svabhva was

rendered as hsing, and defined as embodied cause, the unchanging,

independent, self-dependent, fundamental nature behind the manifestationor expression of anything. Sometimes this was amplified as tzu hsing, the

primary germ [verb. sap.] out of which all material appearances are

evolved, the first source of the material world of phenomena. Other more

curious locutions were ssu-pho-pho and tzu-thi-thi, own state, essential or

inherent property, innate or peculiar disposition, natural state or constitution

(1980, 25).

Thatsvabhva in the Chinese tradition meant hetu alone, notahetu is clear from

this instance.

Thus hetu and ahetu, kriy and akriy continued to be associated withsvabhvavda for centuries together. Most probably the group of svabhvavdins

who believedsvabhvato be the cause of everything and hence believed in activism

merged with the Carvakas at some point of time, although we cannot say exactly

when. It may be presumed that such a merger took place before Paramartha, i.e., in

or before the sixth century CE.

When Svabhvavda and Lokyata Came to Coalesce

Yet it is also evident from the works of both Santaraksita and Haribhadra that

svabhva and the Carvaka/Lokayata were not considered identical even in the

eighth century CE. These two most well-versed savants never associate the two

doctrines. Santaraksita criticizes them in two different and widely separated

chapters (TS, chs. 4 and 22), presumably knowing well that the twain were

unrelated, at least not identical; one was not a namesake for the other. It is also

worthy of note that at the very outset of his work he dispenses with six of earlier

doctrines (similar but not the same as enumerated in the vUp) and then proceeds to

examine other and later philosophical systems. In Haribhadras two compendiousworks, the LTNand the VS, too, all the doctrines are treated as distinct ones. The

only difference in the approaches of these two scholars is that while Santaraksita

does not mention yadcch at all (presumably because he calls the same doctrine


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svabhva), Haribhadra in both the LTN(chs.1 and 2), and the VS2.169-72), take

note ofsvabhva and yadcch as two different concepts, opposed to each other.7

It was then sometime after the eighth century CE that svabhva became an

integral part of the Carvaka/Lokayata. Paramartha had shown earlier that the

Laukayatikas quoted a verse presumably composed by a svabhvavdin (on SK,v.27), but the assimilation is first clearly noticed in Utpalas SVi(tenth century CE)

on BS, 1.5. Utpala does not explain what he understands by svabhva.

Nevertheless, we have at least one piece of evidence before the SDS that it was

svabhva-as-causality, not as chance or accident, which had got assimilated in the

Carvaka/Lokayata.

There are also at least two aphorisms attributed to the Carvakas which almost

definitely have their origin in svbhvvda. The stras are as follows: janmav-

aicitrya bhedjjagadapi vicitram and mayracandrakovat, The world is varied due

to the variation of origin and As the eye in the peacocks tail (II.1 and II.2 inBhattacharya 2009, pp. 79, 87). Jnanasrbhadra (late eleventh century) mentions

both aphorisms in hisLV, marking them asiti lokyatastre(qutd. in Namai1976,

p. 38 n11 on A2A8). The second simile is found employed in several verses

pertaining to svabhvavda: cf. What has fashioned the variegated plumage of

peacocks? TS, 4. 111c; It is due to svabhva like the variety of the peacock

(i.e., its plumage),NVV, 2: 10.8 Perhaps this is why some Vedantins could speak of

the Carvaka and svabhva-as-causality at the same breath. The other group of

svabhvavdins, on the contrary, clung to the later, altered view of svabhva-as-

accident. It is this group that is mentioned and refuted in the Nyaya texts andcommentaries as proponents ofkasmikat, without any reference to the Crvka/

Lokyata(seeNS4.1.221.24).Svabhvaand yadcchhad become synonymous to

some, as is evident from D

alhan

as view. He goes to the extent of explaining

yadcchas causality (onSS, Sarrasthana, 1.11, 340)! Perhaps he argued to himself:

Ifsvabhvacould meanyadcch, why couldyadcchnot meansvabhvaas well?

The words were semantically interchangeable to him.

Such a conclusion may appear to be partly conjectural, based as it is on the words

of Santaraksita, Kamalasla, and Haribhadra, and the absence of any reference to

ahetuvda and akriyvda in some verses expounding svabhvavda. But without

such a conjecture we cannot account for the reason why Somadevasuri could take

the Carvakas to be proponents of activism (YTC, I: 382).

Two Significations ofKla and Svabhva

How could the same name, svabhva, be attributed to so diverse and contradictory

views in two different domains, cosmology and ethics? We have to understand that

7 Pseudo-Sakara distinguishes between svabhva and yadcch as follows: By svabhva is meant thepower invariably belonging to the material objects, as for instance [the radiation of] heat by fireBy

yadcchis meant purely fortuitous origin (on vUp1.2). Sankarananda, Amalananda and S-M too make

the distinction between the two along the same line. See Bhattacharya 2006, 3940.8 Several verses attributed to the svabhvavdins contain this and similar examples. See Bhattacharya

2002b, pp. 7779.

604 R. Bhattacharya

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such changes in and additions to original meanings always happen to certain words,

not all at once but over the ages. Such radical changes in signification and

implication did not happen in case of svabhva alone. It happens in a number of

other instances too. Think of the knotty question: What is meant by stika and

nstika? To the Vedists, three non-Vedic systems, namely, the Buddhist, the Jainand the Carvaka, all are nstikas; to the Buddhists and the Jains, the Carvakas alone

are so. More relevant to this study is another question: What is yoga? The word,

even in the context of philosophy alone, signifies a wide spectrum of systems (see

Randle 3n1). I propose that the same happened in case ofsvabhva and kla too.

Let us look at the doctrine of kla. Erich Frauwallner has made a distinction

between the idea of time in the Iranian neighbourhood and India. Gopinath Kaviraj too

has pointed out that the original klavda was a fatalistic creed but in the work of

Srpati the astronomer (as quoted by D

allana or D

alhan

a) time became synonymous

with the lord-vara (Kaviraj 60). Yet there are reasons to believe that some sort ofklavdawas adopted by the astronomers as their own creed (Agnicit Purus

ottama on

S, 1.528). Here too we face a crux: did the concept of time in the works of astronomers

originate from the philosophical concept of kla as mentioned in the vUp? It is

equally probable that astronomers quite independently developed their concept of time

themselves. In other words, the klavda of the AV and vUp and that of the

astronomers are virtually unrelated; only the word klais common to both.

Klavdahas also been said to be the view of the paurikas, mythographers, by

Utpala (gloss onBS, 1.7). Was the commentator right in this? It is plausible but by

no means certain.

9

Apart from the astronomers, Vatsyayana in his KS, 1.2.39 too portrays the

klakraikas as believing that time alone is the determinant of human happiness

and misery. The arthacintakas alone uphold purusakra (human effort/manliness)

and, as the commentator says, denouncedaivamtravda, fatalism (Jayamagalon

KS1.2.39, 23).

Frauwallner has discussed klavda first by referring to some verses related to

time in a hymn (AV, 19.53) and then mentioned some Buddhist and Jain sources. He

concludes by saying:

But in general this doctrine remains in the background. Apart from anoccasional mention, the leading philosophical systems take no knowledge of

it. On the contrary, they discuss the question of Time in quite a different way.

9 Kern in his edition of the BShas questioned the statement of Varahamihira that Kan

abhuk (Kan

ada)

claimeddravyni, substance, etc. (that is, the six categories mentioned in theVaieikastra, 1.4) to be the

first cause: Althoughthey are the foundation of Kan

adas System, they are nowhere said, at least to

my knowledge, to be the cause of the Universe. It appears the statement of our author is not accurate

(172 n1).

Commentators on poems and narratives sometimes have to explain the philosophical views

occasionally found in the texts. Since they do not have any uninterrupted tradition to follow, theyhave to recourse to their own understanding and knowledge. Especially when the views are archaic and no

longer current, commentators and scholiasts are of little or no help. Sometimes they are totally unreliable.

Two commentators are not always unanimous on the actual signification of technical terms. N lakan

tha is

the worst offender in his glosses on the philosophical passages in the Mbh(see n11 below). We cannot

altogether dispense with the commentaries but blind faith in the glosses offered by them only leads to

further confusion.


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First of all we can say that the idea of Time vanishes where the proper

philosophical thought comes in; it emerges only comparatively later. The

nature-philosophy of the Vaisesika in their atomistic-mechanistic world-

picture had sufficiently proved the origin of all things so that there was no

room for Time as the World-cause (Frauwallner I: 76).

If this interpretation ofklais accepted, the same might apply to the origin of the

several mutually exclusive meanings of svabhva in medical and philosophical

works. It is interesting to note that an astronomer like Bhaskaracarya (Si,

Goladhyaya 5) and Srpati (Se 15.21) and even a grammarian like Durgacarya

[1.4.3 (on Nirukta 1.19), pp. 110111] resorted to the concept ofsvabhva in order

to explain how the planets continued to roam in the void and how words acquire

some special significations.

Hence it may be presumed that svabhva, like kla, was rather a concept

available for use by all and sundry without their ever being or even becoming

klavdins or svabhvavdins. There was no fixed connotations attached to these

words; anyone could take them in whatever sense one liked. Kla could mean an

abstraction or a namesake of lord-vara (as in Gt 11.32: kloasmi lokakayakt

prvddho lokn samhartumiha pravtta, Time I am, in fulness, the consumer of

creatures, here at work for the destruction of creatures. As the translator explains:

Time here stands for the divine power of causing change (Gt 174). Similarly

svabhvacould mean both causality and accident. Bothklavdaand svabhvavda

were lost philosophies, as Randle said (16n3). But the words,klaand svabhva,

remained in currency in classical Sanskrit and could be invoked as and whennecessary. Malvania (GV, 125) and Chattopadhyaya (2001, p. 56) apparently

presumed that svabhva had always stood for causality and had not, at a certain

stage of development, between the sixth century BCE and the first century CE,

become synonymous with yadcch. Like kla, svabhva too first appeared as a

jagatkraa (the first cause), a view of cosmology distinct from both the idea of a

creator as well as of an uncaused entity. Then the word in the sense of chance or

accident,haha, appeared in a different domain relating to the philosophy of life, as

a member of a triad or tetrad: daiva, puruakra, haha/svabhva, and kla (for a

detailed discussion see Bhattacharya2007b, 277281). This other domain, humanconduct, is not altogether unrelated to the first, for if the world is viewed as created

and moved by chance or accident, any human effort to achieve some end in life is

bound to be futile. Thus even cosmological speculations may and do influence

peoples philosophy of life. If, on the other hand, the world is conceived as an

ordered entity, every effect having a cause of its own, the philosophy of life that

would follow would uphold human endeavour and resoluteness. In the Indian

tradition, daiva, haha/yadcch, and niyati follow from the first world-view,

namely,ahetuvda, while the second world-view, upholdingkarman, would endorse

an activist philosophy of life.Karman, it is to be noted, admits rebirth, for actions ofprevious lives will have concomitant effects on succeeding lives: reward and

punishment will be commensurate with past actions, good and evil. Svabhva-as-

causality, on the contrary, dispenses with such unseen and unverifiable concepts as

it admits nothing supernatural beyond this world. Here causality is not something

606 R. Bhattacharya

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imposed from above or existing outside natural phenomena, yet every action would

have its natural effect. In short, svabhva-as-causality as a doctrine has every right

to be called proto-materialistic. Although it first appeared as an independent view, it

was latterly assimilated in the Carvaka/Lokayata materialist school.

Materialist Views in India: One or Many?

The relation ofsvabhva-as-causality to the Carvaka/Lokayata is well attested. Yet,

it is also known that the Carvaka/Lokayata was notthe only materialist philosophy

in India. Besides Sam

khya there was at least another materialist school which

thought in terms ofve elements as opposed to the Carvaka/Lokayata which spoke

offour(earth, air, fire, and water), thereby excludingkaorvyoma, space or ether,

presumably because it was not amenable to sense perception. Several Buddhist andJain sources as well as some verses in the Mbh confirm the existence of the school

which was not onlybhtapacakavdinbut alsoakriyvdinin its philosophy of life

(for details see Bhattacharya 2009, pp. 3343). It is possible that the doctrine of

yadcch was at some point of time renamed svabhva and had got assimilated in

the thoughts of this or some other pre-Carvaka philosophical school that is called

bhtavda in Manimekalai, 27.26527.275, the only extant Tamil Buddhist poem

(written between the third century and the seventh century CE).Mbh 12.267.4 also

speaks of time as the creator of all beings out of the pacamahbhtni, five great

elements. Another verse in the Mbh (13.50.11) says that all gods, human beings,Gandharvas, Pisacas, demons and monsters are created out of svabhva, having

neither any effect nor any cause. There was thus several approaches to the problem

of jagatkraa, combining kla, bhtas and svabhva-as-accident.

Thus svabhva-as-accident is as much a part of one or probably more than one

pre-Carvaka materialist view of svabhva-as-causality. Those who speak of

svabhvavda as related to the Barhaspatya or Carvaka are definitely not right in

their identification but not altogether wrong either. The latter being the only living

system of materialist philosophy known to them, they could not think of any older

or lost pre-Carvaka materialist school to which akriyvda and ahetuvda were

actually related. Barhaspatya or Carvaka or Lokayata was a sort of brand name

representing materialism in India after the eighth century CE. Hence the confusion

around the issue: whether the Carvaka/Lokayata upholds ahetu and akriy or hetu

and kriy.

The original doctrine of svabhva, it appears, was lost or merged in another

system of philosophy such as the Carvaka/Lokayata, whether in its first incarnation

as causality or in its second incarnation as accident, and thus persisted as a concept

found both in Sam

khya and the Carvaka/Lokayata. Johnston has noticed that that

svabhvawas still held worth shot and shell in the eighth century (Johnston 1928,

159n).10 We may add: and even long after, as found in VPS(fourteenth century CE),

10 Apparently he had in mind the lines from Alfred Tennysons poem, The Charge of the Light

Brigade: Stormd at with shot and shell, / Boldly they rode and well, / Into the valley of Death, / Into

the mouth of Hell (Stanza 3), p. 167.


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if not for anything else but merely for forms sake, or perhaps because it was

customary to establish theism and/or human endeavour/resoluteness (puruakra)

by denouncing all atheistic and/or fatalistic views. The doctrines ofsvabhva and

kla were two such targets, conventionally chosen by some later writers.

It is also to be noted that all those who identify svabhvavda with the Lokayatasuch as Utpala are not at all explicit about what they mean by svabhva: causality or

its negation. Therefore, casual remarks concerning svabhva and the Carvaka/

Lokayata quoted out of context by any author are not to be taken at face value. It is

obvious that commentators like Nlakan

tha were at a loss to explain some of the

technical terms of philosophy employed in the Mbh and were therefore forced to

provide wild and often wrong glosses.11 By the ninth century, the relation between

svabhvavda as a doctrine involving causality and/or as a component partof the

Carvaka/Lokayata (if not a synonym for it) was widely accepted as an established

fact, at least by most of the Vedantins.12

Thus we have a continuity of this viewidentifying svabhvavda with the Carvaka/Lokayata, right from pseudo-Sankara

(ninth century), Amalananda (thirteenth century), Anandagiri (fourteenth century)

in their respective commentaries on thevUp1.2, down to S-M (fourteenth century)

in SDS, chap. 1, Nrsim

ha Asrama (sixteenth century) and Agnicit Purus

ottama

(seventeenth century) in their respective commentaries on the S, 1.528, in whatever

sense they might have taken the word svabhva. We have also seen that in the

Chinese tradition svabhva was taken in the sense of causality alone (Needham

1980, p. 25 qutd. above). And it is this firm belief in causality that marks the

Carvaka/Lokayata.What is not to be overlooked is that the view ofsvabhva-as-accident or haha,

chance, too continued to exist side by side with the medical view of svabhva as

embodied cause or unchanging nature (see Chattopadhyaya1977, pp. 178184).

Even though the Indian medical texts are characterized by such a faith, there is

nothing to show that they had been influenced by the Carvaka/Lokayata. On the

other hand, as has been shown above, the Carvaka/Lokayata was not the only school

of materialism in India. The original Sam

khya was also materialistic in its approach

and the relation of the CS to Sam

khya is an established fact (Dasgupta II, pp. 273,

304, 312, 314, etc.). Yet it should not delude us into believing that the CS, in the

form it has come down to us, is wholly or even primarily influenced by Sam

khya. It

is true that the authors and successive reconstructors (pratisaskarts) and

redactors of the Indian medical texts, unlike their Greek counterparts, were not

hostile to philosophy (see Bhattacharya2003). Yet the philosophical speculations in

11 Sukthankar in his Prolegomena to the Adiparvan, Mbh (crit. ed.), 68, notes: Nlakan

tha has

misunderstood the text and gives doubtful, far-fetched or fanciful interpretations, such as offering a

Vedantic twist to 1.23.15 and suggesting an esoteric meaning of 1.232.1-7,19. Belvalkar in his Editorial

Note on the Santiparvan (crit. ed.), VIII, too complains that orthodox commentators like Nlakan

tha

gloss over the differences in the representation of the very large number of philosophical passages,

particularly Samkhya passages and interpret them all in consonance with Advaita Vedanta. Thecommentators by no means agree in their interpretations. See also Bhattacharya (2001a, pp. 182183),

cataloguing Nlakan

thas shifting positions regarding svabhva.

12 The only exception known to me is Madhusudana Sarasvat on S, 1.528. He does not identify the

svabhvavdins with the Carvakas but thinks that the svabhvavdins are accidentalists, who think that

the effect happens without any cause, kraa vinaiva krya bhavati. (p. 678).

608 R. Bhattacharya

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theCSand theSSare so hopelessly mixed up with Brahminical beliefs and so oddly

interpreted by the commentators (see Bhattacharya 2006, pp. 4142) that it is

virtually impossible to separate the right reading from the spurious, unless some

earlier and more authentic mss are discovered.13 Apart from the materialist trait

found in the medical texts, there were several proto-materialist views current inIndia from the Buddhas time, of which Ajita Kesakambala (Kesakambalin in

Sanskrit) is a very well-known representative (see Bhattacharya 2009, pp. 4554).

Some of such materialists may have been akriyvdins and ahetuvadins as well, a

fact attested by clear references to them in the Mbh and other sources (see

Bhattacharya2009, pp. 3343 and2007b).

Summing Up

The upshot of the whole discussion is then as follows:svabhvawas one of the oldest

concepts formulated somewhat vaguely before or during the sixth century BCE

which finds mention in vUp 1.2. It continued to be invoked, along with other

concepts such as time, destiny, chance,karman, etc., as one of the many claimants for

the role of the first cause. In course of time, definitely before the first century CE,

svabhva, instead of, or rather in addition to, signifying causality, became

synonymous with chance or accident and was derided as an inactivist approach to

life in the Moksadharma section of theMbh. The Buddhists (and the Naiyayikas too)

adopted this changedconnotation of svabh

va as a namesake for yadcch

, whilesome followers of Sam

khya and almost all Vedantins, right from the ninth century,

continued to hold the original view thatsvabhvastood for causality whileyadcch,

for accident. Till the eighth centurysvabhvavda(whether as a doctrine advocating

causality or chance) and the Carvaka/Lokayata were considered by some (Santa-

raksita and Haribhadra, for instance) to be unrelated to each other. At a certain point

of time (we do not know exactly when, but definitely before Utpala and

Jnanasrbhadra, i.e., between the eighth century and the tenth century CE)

svabhva-as-causality had already got associated with the Lokayata, perhaps

because of their common atheistic and anti-supernatural character. Svabhvavda

thereafter ceased to be a separate view and somehow got assimilated in the Carvaka /

Lokayata materialism. Other materialist views such as bhtavda in the mean time

seem to have withered away.

13 Chattopadhyayas plea for a new critical edition of the CS (1979, p. 235; 1986, pp. 569578) is

perfectly justified. In fact, such an edition of the Vimanasthana of theCSis under preparation, supervised

by Karin Preisendanz, Institut fur Sudasien-, Tibet- und Buddhismuskunde, Universitat Wien (see the

respective papers by Maas and by Pecchia). But if the proposed edition is prepared on the basis of

available mss along the line envisaged by Chattopadhyaya, the amount of emendation, not supported byms evidence, will be so large that text-critics would quite legitimately condemn the reconstituted text as

motivated by purely subjective considerations to suit the philosophical bias of the new editor(s). Therst

critical edition of the CSand theSScan never give us what Chattopadhayaya wished for. Maybe after the

secondor even thethirdcritical edition (as Sukthankar said about editing the Mbh in his Prolegomena to

the Adiparvan, crit. ed., 104), emendatio and higher criticism may achieve it. See also Bhattacharya

(2002a).


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In spite of all this, svabhva has its own place in the Sam

khya tradition. In the

medical literature toosvabhvaoccupies an important place. In the medical texts as

well as in the Brahminical and Jain philosophical literature, a syncretic doctrine,

which has been named kldismagrvda, involving time, svabhva, niyati and

karman (Dixit, ippan 45; VS, 2.191193. See also Bhattacharya2007) is alsoproposed bysomeJain writers, although by no means all.For all practical purposes

svabhva turned out to be, so to say, a lance free and readily available for use by

anyone and everyone; it was no longer attached to any particular school of thought.

In the fields of astronomy and grammar toosvabhvais sometimes invoked when no

plausible explanation of an odd phenomenon is available to the authors (Bhattach-

arya 2006, p. 45). More importantly, both the meanings of svabhva, namely,

causality and accident, continued to circulate simultaneously and anyone could

choose either of the two meanings. The same situation evolved in course of time in

relation to klavda as well.Another aspect ofsvabhvato be noted is that in the dispute between two forces,

daiva and puruakra, svabhva-as-accident is akin to the former, while svabhva-

as-causality, to the latter. Sometimes, however, two more forces, namely, chance

and time, are also added (see Bhattacharya 2007b). The confusion of significations

around the word svabhva in philosophical literature can be resolved if we

remember that besides Sam

khya and the Carvaka/Lokayata, other materialist views

were current in India long before the redaction of the first stra-work of the

Carvaka/Lokayata, which most probably took place before the eighth century CE;

between the sixth and the eighth, to be more specific.

Acknowledgment Thanks are due to Amitava Bhattacharya for reading the draft and offering valuable

suggestions for improvement. The usual disclaimers apply.

Appendix

Besides the mention of one or the other of the first cause, (see Bhattacharya 2001c)

several lists of the competing causalities [in Wilhelm Halbfasss (p. 291) words]

are available. In addition to the first of such lists provided in vUp, 1.2, we haveJM,23.1720 (svabhva, vara, prvakta karma, ucchedavda), VS, chap. 2 (kla,

svabhva, niyati, karman), Siddhasena Divakara, qutd. by Kulkarni, 16 n22 (kla,

svabhva, niyati, prvakarma, puruakra), TS, chs. 16 (prakti,, vara, both the

two, svabhva, abdabrahman, tman), SVon S, 1.1.3 (kla, niyati, svabhva,

vara,tman), Mathara and Gaud

apada on SK, 61 (vara,purua,svabhva,kla),

GS, verses 679683 (kla, vara, tman, niyati, svabhva), SS,1.1.11 (svabhva,

vara, kla, yadcch, niyati), SK, 548 (vara, niyati, karman, svabhva, kla),

Kumbhaka, as quoted by al-Brun, I:321 (mahbhta, kla, svabhva, karman),

Kriykalpataru, as quoted in YTC, Book 5, 458 (vidhi, vidht, niyati, svabhva,kla,droha,daiva,karman), andTRD, 1115 (kla,vara,tman,niyati,svabhva,

yadchh).

Thus from the fourth century CE to the fifteenth century, we have some such lists

that however, intentionally or not, confuse the two domains, cosmological and

610 R. Bhattacharya

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ethical, in which svabhva and kla are generally common (I have omitted such

texts as the HV, Bhavisyaparvan, 20.22 (vulgate ed.), which too mentions kla and

svabhva). We also have references to svabhva in various parvans of the Mbh

(Bhattacharya 2007b, pp. 275277) and stray references to the bhtacintakas,

klakraikas, hahavdakas, and syncretic views in various sources (seeBhattacharya2001a, b, and2007bpassim).

In order to understand what svabhva means in a particular base text and

commentary we have to determine at first which domain is being referred to,

cosmological or ethical, and then decide whatsvabhvathere stands for, causality or

accident. All the syncretic views may be safely ignored, for they are expressions of

mere wishful thinking: excepting a few Jains none used to think in such syncretic

terms. Even all the Jain philosophers did not hold the same view in relation to

svabhvain either domain, cosmological and ethical, and some viewedsvabhvaas

causality, others as accident (Bhattacharya 2005, 2006). As to the relation betweensvabhvavdaand the Carvaka/Lokayata, too, the Jains were not unanimous in their

opinion.

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