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INFANT MENTAL HEALTH JOURNAL, Vol. 22(1–2), 95–131 (2001)� 2001 Michigan Association for Infant Mental Health

A R T I C L E

INTRINSIC MOTIVES FOR COMPANIONSHIP

IN UNDERSTANDING: THEIR ORIGIN,

DEVELOPMENT, AND SIGNIFICANCE FOR

INFANT MENTAL HEALTH

COLWYN TREVARTHENDepartment of Psychology, The University of Edinburgh

ABSTRACT: Human beings are not merely social, they are inherently cultural. Infants are born withmotivesin their complex brains that lead them to learn through communicating about intentions, interests, andfeelings with trusted companions, and to interpret with them a common reality. A baby is weak, immaturein behaviour, and dependent on parental care and external regulation of emotions and protection fromstress. But the baby is also capable and interested from birth in engaging “protoconversationally” withthe dynamic thoughts and enthusiams of caregivers. Long before speaking, infants imitate purposefulactions and recognise objects that others treat as meaningful, responding sympathetically to emotionsthat evaluate these objects. How they do this, their motives for cooperative intersubjectivity or jointconsciousness incompanionship,has been elucidated by detailed analysis of the purposeful regulationof expressions between parents and infants from birth to the threshold of language.

The emotions of relating to share intelligent awareness of a world are additional to those self-regulatory emotions that express pleasure or pain, interest, fatigue, hunger, and so on. They are “relational”emotions, anticipating contingent rhythms and sympathy of interest from others, and collaboration inpurposes. The so-called “complex” emotions, the interpersonal sense of “pride” in admired accomplish-ment, and “shame” in being misunderstood or disliked, are part of the innate human moral condition.Powerful innate emotions of human relating, evident in infants, and different from those that establishand regulate attachment for care and protection, bring risks of mental illness associated with failure incollaborative intersubjectivity. The principles of infant mental health define the fundamental interpersonalneeds for the whole life cycle.

RESUMEN: El ser humano no es solamente un ser social sino que inherentemente tambień es cultural. Losinfantes nacen con fuerzas motrices en sus complejos cerebros, las cuales los llevan a aprender por mediode comunicarse sobre sus intenciones, intereses y sentimientos con personas en quienes confıán, y ainterpretar con esas personas una realidad comuń. En cuanto a su comportamiento, todo infante es de´bily no ha alcanzado la madurez necesaria, y tambień depende del cuidado de los padres, de regulacionesexteriores de las emociones y de la proteccioń contra la tensioń. Por otra parte, desde el nacimiento elinfante es capaz de y se interesa por participar “protoconversacionalmente” en los pensamientosdina´micosy el entusiasmo de quienes lo cuidan. Mucho antes de poder hablar, los infantes imitan intencionalmentelas acciones y reconocen los objetos que otros consideran importantes, respondiendo ası´, comprensiva-

Direct correspondence to: C. Trevarthen, Department of Psychology, University of Edinburgh, 7 George Square,Edinburgh, EH8 9JZ, Scotland.

96 ● C. Trevarthen

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cap heightbase of textmente, a las emociones que evaluán estos objetos. Co´mo lo hacen, cua´les son sus intenciones demantener

una intersubjetividad cooperadora o una consciencia conjunta en lo que respecta al estar acompanãdo hasido aclarado por medio del ana´lisis detallado de la intencionada regulacioń de las expresiones entre lospadres y sus infantes, desde el nacimiento hasta el momento en que aparecen las primeras senãs del habla.Las emociones de asociarse para compartir el despertar inteligente de un mundo van ma´s allade aquellasemociones autorregulatorias que expresan placer o dolor, intere´s, fatiga, hambre, etc. Son emociones dela relacion, anticipando eventuales ritmos y comprensioń de intere´s de parte de otros, ası´ como la cola-boracion en cuanto a los propo´sitos. Las ası´ llamadas emociones “complejas,” el sentido interpersonalde orgullo en la admiracioń del talento, y la verguënza de que no se le entienda o se le acepte, son partede la innata condicioń moral humana. Las poderosas innatas emociones de relaciones humanas, evidentesen los infantes, y diferentes de aquellas que establecen y reglamentan la unioń afectiva en cuanto alcuidado y la proteccioń, presentan riesgos de enfermedad mental asociados con las fallas en la intersub-jetividad de colaboracioń. Los principios de la salud mental infantil definen las necesidades interperson-ales fundamentales para el ciclo vital completo.

RESUME: Les etres humains ne sont pas uniquement des tre`s sociaux, ils sont fondamentalement culturels.Les bebes sont ne´s avec des motifs dans leurs cerveaux complexes, motifs qui les ame`nent aapprendreen communiquant les intentions, les inte´rets et les sentiments, avec des compagnons de confiance, et quiles menent ainterpreter avec eux une reálite commune. Un be´beest faible, manque de maturite´ dans soncomportement, et il de´pend du soin parental et de la re´glementation exte´rieure des e´motions et de pro-tection contre le stress. Mais le be´beest aussi capable de et veut de`s la naissance confronter “protocon-versationnellement” les penseés dynamiques et l’enthousiasme des modes de soin. Bien avant de parler,les bebes imitent des actions de´terminees et reconnaissent des objets que d’autres traitent comme impor-tants, re´pondant avec compre´hension aux e´motions qui e´valuent ces objets. La manie`re dont ils le fontet leurs motifs d’intersubjectivite´ cooperative ou de conscience conjugueé ont ete elucides par une analysedetaillee de la re´gulation determinee d’expressions entre les parents et les be´bes, de la naissance a`l’apparition du language. Les e´motions liees au rapport afin de partager la conscience intelligente d’unmonde s’ajoutent aux e´motions autore´gulatrices qui expriment le plaisir ou la douleur, l’inte´ret, la fatigue,la faim, etc. Ce sont des e´motions “relationnelles”, anticipant des rythmes contingents et la sympathied’interet de la part des autres, et la collaboration dans les motifs. Les e´motions soit-disant “complexes”,le sens interpersonnel de “fierte´” dans la reussite admireé, et la “honte” a` etre mal compris ou mal aime`font partie de la condition morale humaine inneé. Les puissantes e´motions inneés des relations humaines,evidentes chez les be´bes, et differentes de celles qui e´tablissent et re´gulent l’attachement pour le soin etla protection, entraıˆnent des risques de maladie mentale associe´s a l’echec de l’intersubjectivite´ collab-orative. Les principes de sante´ mentale du nourrisson de´finissent les besoins interpersonnels fondamentauxpour le cycle de vie entier.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG: Menschliche Wesen sind eigentlich nicht sozial, sie sind angeboren kulturell. Kinderwerden in ihrem komplexen Gehirn mit dem Motiv geboren u¨ber Absichten, Interessen und Gefu¨hle mitvertrauenswu¨rdigen Gefa¨hrten zu kommunizieren, und mit ihnen die gewo¨hnliche Realita¨t zu beurteilen.Ein Baby ist schwach, unreif im Verhalten und von elterlicher Betreuung, der aüssern Regulation vonGefuhlen und dem Schutz vor Stress abha¨ngig. Aber das Baby kann und will sich ab Geburt mit dendynamischen Gedanken und der Begeisterung der Betreuungspersonen in einer „vor-dialogischenWeise“auseinandersetzen. Lange vor dem Sprechen machen Kleinkinder nu¨tzliche Aktionen nach, erkennenObjekte, die von anderen als bedeutend behandelt werden und reagieren gleichsinnig auf die Emotionen,die diese Objekte beurteilen. Wie sie das machen, ihre Motive fu¨r die kooperative Intersubjektivita¨t, oderdie gemeinsame Erkenntnishaltung in der Gemeinsamkeit, wurde in detaillierten Analysen der absichts-vollen Regulation der Ausdru¨cke zwischen Eltern und Kleinkindern von der Geburt bis zum Erlernen derSprache feinsinnig untersucht.

Die Gefuhle des Bezogenseins, um intelligente Wachheit in einer Welt zu teilen, sind zusa¨tzlich zuden selbstregulierenden Gefu¨hlen, die Lust, Schmerz, Interesse, Mu¨digkeit, oder Hunger und so weiter,ausdru¨cken. Dies sind „bezogene“ Gefu¨hle, die kontingente Rhythmen und die Einfu¨hlung durch dasInteresse von Anderen und die Zusammenarbeit bei Aufgaben voraussehen. Die sogenannten „kom-

Motives for Companionship in Understanding ● 97


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„Scham“, wenn man missverstanden, oder nicht geliebt wird, all das ist ein Teil dessen, um menschlich-moralische Kenntnisse zu etablieren. Ma¨chtige angeborene Emotionen menschlichen Bezogenseins, deu-tlich vorhanden bei menschlichen Kleinkindern und unterschiedlich von denen, die die Bindung fu¨r dieVersorgung und den Schutz aufbauen und regulieren, bringen das Risiko von seelischer Krankheit inVerbindung mit dem Versagen in den gemeinsamen Intersubjektivita¨t mit sich. Die Prinzipien der see-lischen Gesundheit des Kleinkinds definieren die fundamentalen zwischenmenschlichen Bedu¨rfnisse furdas gesamte Leben.

* * *

A LARGER VIEW OF HUMAN NATURE

In 30 years it has become clear that a newborn human is by no means psychologically inco-herent, and the developments that occur in the first year of infancy give further testimony tothe adaptive organization of innate human motives that guide knowing and learning (Trevar-then, 1982a, 1993a, 1998b). From the start, these motives are intersubjective they attract andengage with other persons (Bra˚Eten, 1988; Trevarthen, 1979, 1998a; Trevarthen & Aitken,2000). The emotions that infants express, as well as those expressions of emotion they excitein parents and others, young or old, are powerful signs of their complex readiness for engage-ment of purposes and consciousness by means, which, incertain important respects, changelittle with age (Izard 1994; Rothbart, 1994; Trevarthen, 1984a, 1993a, 1998c; Tronick, 1989).

These same human motives and emotional regulations that motivate development ofknowledge, skill, and personality carry potential for pathology, and infants can display psy-chological disorders of self-regulation and of relating to objects and persons (Aitken & Tre-



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of the primary motive mechanisms of the mind are such that it is inevitable that they will haveeffects, some potentially very serious, in the future life of the child, adolescent, and adult. Toperceive how such mental health problems can be caused, and how they might best be re-sponded to in therapy or education, we must possess a comprehensive and accurate idea ofwhat the infant’s motives are adapted to achieve in their transactions with the outside world,and, especially, we must know how understanding with other human beings is achieved (Beebe& Lachmann, 1988; Brazelton, Tronick, Adamson, Als, & Wise, 1975; Fogel, 1993; Fogel &Thelen, 1987; Gergeley & Watson, 1999; Neisser, 1994; Papousek & Papousek, 1997; Schore,1994; Stern, 1985, 1993; Tronick & Field, 1986; Tronick & Weinberg, 1997).

Advances in brain science bring greater appreciation of the intricate relations between in-trinsic hormonal and neuro-humoral systems that link the internal physiological systems of thebody and its viscera to the cognitive systems that engage with the environment (Damasio, 1994,1999; Panksepp, 1998a; Pennington & Ozonoff, 1991; Schore, 1994, 1998; Tucker, Derryberry,& Luu, 2000). Brain functions have an organization in themselves that determines what theeffects of experience will be. It is also becoming very clear that the human central nervoussystem, with the human body, is designed for an exceptionally elaborate brain-to-brain linkingso the motive regulations of one brain can powerfully interact with those of the brain in anotherperson (Aitken & Trevarthen, 1997; Trevarthen, 1989, 1990b). A major change in brain theorynow gives emotions and their interpersonal transmission a regulatory role in both brain growthand cognitive mastery of experience (Damasio, 1999; Panksepp, 1998b; Tucker, 2000).

The expressive-receptive channel of communication for mind processes has a special im-portance for an infant, when growth of brain and body are most rapid. Elaborate intuitivebehaviors on both sides facilitate communication between the infant and adult caregiver, andwhen there is a fault in either one, the infant is unable to benefit from care, and its psychologicaldevelopment will be affected (Aitken & Trevarthen, 1997). Young infants are usually caredfor by their mothers, but whether it is the biological mother or a mother substitute who attendsto the needs of the infant, the same principles apply. The adaptive motives of the infant specifyneeds that can only be met by a sympathetic person who is ready to intuitively respond withenhanced expression of feelings in immediate, though varied, contingent response to what theinfant expresses (Biglow, 1999; Fogel, 1985, 1993; Hobson, 1993a; Papousek & Papousek,1987; Stern, 1995; Tronick, 1989; Tronick, Als, & Brazelton, 1980). The importance of motivecoordinations between infants and adults is demonstrated by research on the early stages ofneurodevelopmental disorders, such as autism, Rett syndrome, and Specific Language Impair-ment, as it is by work on the effects of maternal emotional illness on infant emotions andpsychological growth (Aitken & Trevarthen, 1997; Burford & Trevarthen, 1997; Field, 1992,1998; Fraiberg, 1980; Hobson, 1993b; Murray & Cooper, 1997; Papousek & Papousek, 1997;Tager-Flusberg, 1999; Trevarthen & Burford, 2000; Trevarthen & Aitken, 1994, 2000; Tre-varthen, Aitken, Papoudi, & Robarts, 1998; Tronick & Field, 1986).

Anatomical research on human brains at all stages of development, from the early embryoto senescence, brings out the pervasive role of intrinsic motive systems in the core of the brain.These extend forward from the junction of the hindbrain with the spinal cord to the prefrontalcortex (Holstege, Bandler, & Saper, 1997; Morecraft, Geula, & Mesulam, 1993; O’Rahilly &Muller, 1994; Tucker, Derryberry, & Luu, 2000). Limbic structures of the forebrain are recip-rocally coupled to a network of neurons in the brain stem, and these same brain stem neuronsproject monoamine regulator transmitters throughout the cerebellar and neocortical mantles(Panksepp, 1998a; Trevarthen & Aitken, 1994). The potential of early regulation, by genes andgene products, in the formation of these core neural systems is indicated by research on Rettsyndrome (Kerr & Witt-Engerstro¨m, 2000), and by the recent discovery of faults at the level



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cap heightbase of textof the facial nucleus and superior olive in autism, anatomical deviations that point to a mor-

phogenetic error in the embryo within three weeks of conception (Rodier, 2000; Rodier, Ingram,Tisdale, Nelson, & Romano, 1996).

New understanding of the role of the prefrontal cortex in higher intersubjective processesand in their development in the final phase of infancy, before language is learned, prove that thehuman mind is endowed with mechanisms for “mirroring” narrative thought through the medi-ation of vocal and gestural expression, and by interactants monitoring each other’s shifts of bothattention and emotion (Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998; Schore, 1994, 1996, 1998). There is evidencethat infants as young as six months are motivated to share cognitive topics, or purposes andinterests, directed to the surrounding environment as well as to persons, and not just emotionsrelated to regulation of physiological states or levels of arousal and excitement or direct inter-personal exchanges (Adamson & Russell, 1999; Hood, 1995; Johnson & Morton, 1991; Moore,1999; Muir & Hains, 1999; Posner & Rothbart, 1998; Trevarthen, 1982a; Trevarthen, Murray,& Hubley, 1981). This gives a different significance to “relational emotions” (Stern, 1993, 1999),the intricate blends and transitions of expression that affect the way a person relates to changingconsciousness of themselves in a companion (Adamson & Russell, 1999; Reddy, 1991; Draghi-Lorenz, Reddy, & Costall, 2000). The discovery, in the 1960s, of “conversational” abilities ininfants only a few weeks old (Bateson, 1979) paved the way for acceptance that human mentaldevelopment begins with anticipation of shared purposes and interests through rhythmicmirroringof expressive movements. This adds a new chapter to the story of human needs for sympatheticrelationships, and must carry implications for how emotional disorders, especially those affectingthe infant or young child, may be understood and treated.

INFANTS AS PERSONS WITH PERSONS: INNATEINTERSUBJECTIVITY THEORY

Descriptive microanalysis of film records of spontaneous play between infants and their moth-ers begun in the 1960s gave indications for a radical new approach to human communicationand a new concept of social experience (Trevarthen, 1998a). The theory that grew from thiswork aimed to change the view that human social awareness is mediated by instructive orcorrective actions of adults who are intending to constrain impulsive self-serving actions ofchildren, so they become more socially responsible. New value was given to a primary sharingof subjective impulses behind conscious experience and intentions, and an understanding wasdeveloped of why a set of motives for this sharing, and for regulating both cognitive andemotional contacts with other persons, must be innate in their origins and in their strategy ofdevelopment (Trevarthen, 1974, 1979, 1982a).

The theory of innate intersubjectivity has been further developed, and its foundationsexplained (Trevarthen, 1998a, 1999b). It claims that human beings are equipped at birth withabilities prepared for sympathetic and cooperative mental life in a society that creates culturalmeanings, seeks to be governed by them, and transmits them to the young (Trevarthen, 1980,1988). Detailed descriptions of how infants behave in spontaneous response to the intuitiveexpressions and shifts of attention of adults who address them as if they were aware and sociallyinterested persons helps explain the path of development to cultural responsibility and language(Adamson & Bakeman, 1991; Bruner, 1983; Butterworth & Cochran, 1980; Halliday, 1975;Locke, 1993; Rommetveit, 1998; Rynn, 1974; Tomasello, 1988; Trevarthen, 1987, 1990a,1994). The primary aim of this development appears to be to sustain mutually supportivecompanionship in experience and purposes, thus preparing the way to a life in a culturalcommunity with its inventions and history (Bruner, 1996; Trevarthen, 1988).

The key facts are these. Even at birth, an infant may respond with discrimination to expres-



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and emotional evaluations (Als, 1995; Blass, 1999; Hofer, 1990; Trevarthen, 1997). Newbornsmay use all their senses, some more effectively than others, to perceivemanifestations ofmotivesin movements of another human body. They are not only selecting support for internal physio-logical regulations, nor are they only responsive to caregiving that aims directly to regulateemotional displays—to stimulate pleasure and to assuage distress or discomfort. Even a pre-maturely born infant can, if approached with sufficient gentleness, interact within rhythmic“proto-conversational” patterns in time with the adult’s vocalizations, touches, and expressionsof face or hands, turn-taking with the evenly spaced and emotionally enhanced movements thatare characteristically displayed by an attentive and affectionate adult (Trevarthen, 1999a; Tre-varthen, Kokkinaki, & Fiamenghi, 1999; van Rees & de Leeuw, 1987).

It is important to stress that the psychological state of a human baby at birth is much moredeveloped than that of a rat pup or kitten, the species of newborns that have been intensivelyresearched to reveal the intricate signaling and neurohumoral regulatory mechanisms of phys-iological care and attachment between a mammalian mother and her offspring (Blass, 1999;Hofer, 1990; Rosenblatt, 1994). This kind of regulation is similar in all mammals, but a humanbaby’s interest in interactions mediated by vocal expressions and eye contact is different inimportant respects.

This human competence must come from prenatal developments (Als, 1995; Trevarthen,1997). Indeed, as will be discussed below, preferential recognition of the voice of a motheracquired in utero can be demonstrated by the baby in appropriately timed and well-directedorienting and attending behaviors from a few hours after birth. Often a newborn smiles whenit hears the mother’s voice. Immediately after birth this hearing the mother, backed by recog-nition of her odor and touch, attracts the infant to look at her face, recognition of which isthen quickly learned (Bushnell, Sai, &Mullin, 1989; Field, Cohen, Garcia, &Greenberg, 1984).

Observation of the systematic, age-related transformations in infants’ skills and preferencesthrough infancy and toddlerhood to culture-related play and language shows that every changein the infant’s interests and motor powers transforms communication with attentive parents,and siblings too, affecting their attempts to gain playful reactions until, by the end of the firstyear an infant is expected to be an alert partner in many recognized games and collaborativeactivities, and to have interesting ideas of how to do things (Adamson, 1996; Bruner & Sher-wood, 1975; Fivaz-Depeursinge & Corboz-Warnery, 1999; Nadel & Tremblay-Leveau, 1999;Trevarthen, 1990a; Trevarthen & Hubley, 1978). A sequence of elaborations has been definedby descriptive research that constitute the unique human capacity for generating and acquiringarbitrary meanings by joint purposeful and cooperative interest in objects and situations. It hasbecome clear that the young child’s antecedent motives for joint interest with companions inthe common environment is no less than the key to language learning, both declarative iden-tification of objects or actions of interest and narrative cohesion in social and mimetic fantasyplay being thoroughly mastered at least a year before any words are used (Halliday, 1975;Harris, 1998; Trevarthen, 1987, 1990a, 1994, 1999a).

THE EMOTIONAL VALUE OF MEANING SHARED BYMIRRORING PURPOSES

It was seen early on that a need exists in infants for joyful dialogic companionship over andabove any need for physical support, affectionate care, and protection (Stern, 1974; Trevarthen,1979). A capacity was perceived in the infant for negotiation of contingencies of communi-cative response, and an appetite for play with assertive expressions. The infant’s dynamicemotions can even be seen to give communicative assertions particular relational or moral



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cap heightbase of textvalue (Emde, Biringen, Clyman, & Oppenheim, 1991; Trevarthen, 1995). Early recognition by

the infant of a partner’s intentions, detectable from their goal-directed actions, shifts of interest,and emotional expressions signifying different qualities of interest and different expectations,was demonstrated (Trevarthen & Hubley, 1978; Trevarthen, Murray, & Hubley, 1981). Ex-perimental studies with two-month-olds showed that unresponsive or noncontingent behaviorfrom the mother precipitated well-organized negative emotional reactions, indicative of frus-tration, depression, or shame (Murray & Trevarthen, 1985; Tronick, Als, Adamson, Wise, &Brazelton, 1978).

Age-related changes were charted in the infant’s “awareness of self” as the target of thefamiliar other’s interest and evaluation, and in the pleasure taken from the other’s recognitionof declarations or demonstrations of the self (Stern, 1985). These developments were found tobe linked to changes in appraisal of invitations to communication by strangers, as well aschanges in the infant’s demands for emotional regulation from a sympathetic caregiver (Tre-varthen, 1990a). Infants’ appeals for adults’ help to contain or calm the infant’s negative statesof feeling, caused by fatigue, hunger, or thirst, physiological distress, or pain, and frustrationsleading to demonstrations of fear or anger (Rothbart, 1994), are different in form and functionfrom joyful behaviors that attract and regulate play (Emde, 1992; Stern, 1990).

Further transformation in capacity to perceive and meet cooperative intentions and to takepart in shared tasks observed towards the end of the first year (Trevarthen & Hubley, 1978)were followed by increasing recognition of the “permanence of meaning.” That is to say, oncean expressive behavior or intentional gesture is taken to be an agreed sign and it is representedas such in memory, the infant can see the value of repeating signs that take the form ofpreviously recognized actions, rituals, or ways of taking up objects intentionally (Bruner, 1983;Bruner & Sherwood, 1975; Meltzoff, 1995; Trevarthen, 1990a, 1998a). Any well-defined in-strumental action becomes a potential “act of meaning” (Halliday, 1975).

A foundation for all these sensibilities of infants for other persons’ mental life was hy-pothesized to reside in an intuitive mirroring of the impulses and felt values behind otherpersons’ body movements—i.e., in a matching of the motives and emotions that generated themovements through detection of their transmodal dynamic invariants and physiognomic signs.Imitations, even those performed by newborns, were seen as offerings in a transaction ofmotives to communicate, or to gain purposes and “ideas” in common. No clear transition wasseen to a stage where “representation” of the other’s motives could be said to “begin.”

In summary: cultural learning was seen as the outcome of a natural progression: fromimitation of salient expressions by neonates, to imitation of histrionic displays andmannerisms,and then to imitation of purposeful object use (Trevarthen, Kokkinaki, & Fiamenghi, 1999).Awareness of acts of object use by another is founded on the capacity to imitate significantmovements, and communication of exploratory activities or problem solving depends on de-tection of the “syntax of attention” that reveals a purposeful strategy.

PROTOCONVERSATIONS ARE ACTIVE BEFORE THEOBJECT CONCEPT

The first significant discovery was that an infant could, in the second month after birth, enterinto an intricately timed, sympathetic face-to-face dialogue with an affectionately attentiveadult. At this stage the capacity of the infant for visual capture and tracking of objects followedby reaching and grasping is rudimentary, indeed essentially ineffectual, a fact that leadPiaget (1954) to conclude, erroneously, that eye–hand coordination is achieved only in thesecond three months. We now know that newborns can coordinate gaze and a rudimentaryprehensile movement in “prereaching,” which “regresses” in the second month (Trevarthen,



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cap heightbase of text1974, 1984b; Trevarthen, Aitken, & Plooij, 2000; von Hofsten, 1983), but Piaget did not

observe newborns.The beginning of the so-called “social smile” had been identified with the maturation of

the infant’s focused attention to the adult’s eye region (Rochat & Striano, 1999), and it hasoften been conceived as a “reflex” smile to a “sign stimulus.” It was not until the timing andsequencing of vocal, gestural, and facial emissions of adult and infant in early interactions hadbeen accurately observed and charted that it was understood that the infant can be involved,even at six weeks, in a comprehensive mutual and reciprocal engagement of motive statescolored by subtle emotional expressions.

The pioneering reports of Mary Catherine Bateson (1979) gave definitive recognition andthe name of “proto-conversation” to this behavior, and she identified it as a form of instinctivecommunication that lays the ground for learning of language and “ritual healing practices.”Dissanayake (1999, 2000) now claims that it is the foundation for all the temporal arts, andwe have found it to give abundant evidence of the innateness of “communicative musicality”(Malloch, 1999; Trevarthen, 1999a). Its sympathetic vitality is creative and attractive.

PLEASURE IN DYNAMICS OF PLAY AND“MUSICALITY,” AND EMOTIONAL NARRATIVES

Observing mothers at play with slightly older infants, in the third and fourth month, Stern andcolleagues pioneered discovery of the importance of more animated emotional displays andrhythmic collaboration (Beebe, Jaffe, Feldstein, Mays, & Alson, 1985; Felstein et al., 1993;Stern, 1974; Stern, Beebe, Jaffe, & Bennett, 1977; Stern, Hofer, Haft, & Dore, 1985). Theydescribed vocalization in synchrony and alternation, intermodal coordination in the productionand perception of facial gestural and vocal expressions, and the amplifying effects of maternal“affect attunement,” which Stern felt was primarily used by the mother to help the infant gaincoherence and definition of felt emotions, after, as he puts it, the infant has gained a capacityto represent his or her own mental states (Stern, 1985).

In our longitudinal studies, we found that new more lively playfulness appeared at thesame time as the infant was becoming much more adept at searching into space away from thebody, following objects and attempting to capture them in the hands, which new kind of interestwas clearly at the expense of sustained attention to the mother in face-to-faceprotoconversation(Trevarthen, 1982a, 1986; Trevarthen & Marwick, 1986). In fact, the infant had already showna tendency to look away from the mother at moments of excitement in the first weeks, butaround 12 weeks after birth and in the following months, curiosity about surroundings andnearby objects greatly intensified, and mothers found that they could attract the attention ofthe infant to themselves best by more animated vocal, facial, and gestural displays, and bytaking hold of the infant’s body and moving it in “action games” (Trevarthen & Hubley, 1978).At the same time, the infant’s quick response to rhythmic and melodic chanting and singingand shared expressions of joy greatly encouraged the singing of nursery songs (Trevarthen,1986, 1987).

In recent years this evident interest of the infant in mothers’ speech and singing has ledus to explore and give definition to the “communicative musicality” of maternal behavior andto use acoustic analyses of vocal interchanges with infants to identify the temporal and emotive/expressive parameters of the most satisfying performances (Trevarthen, 1999a; Trevarthen,Kokkinaki, & Fiamenghi, 1999), which are characterized by what Stern (1993, 1999) calls“dynamic narrative envelopes.” We see the mother eliciting the infant’s recognition and par-ticipation in “emotional narratives,” which carry rich evidence not only of the infant’s discrim-inating awareness of many features of musical emotion in the mother’s voice and the concurrent



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“emotional syntax” that enables appreciation of the “story” in the beginning, development,climax, and resolution of a baby song (Malloch, 1999; Trevarthen, 1999a). The infants accurateanticipations in response to games and songs show that the mind is already capable at this stageof “thinking ahead” for many seconds.

Musicality of expression and human relating is exploited in improvisational music therapy,which can assist establishment of relationships and self-regulation with affective disturbancesover all ages, from prematurely born infants to the aged and senile (Aldridge, 1996; Wigram& De Backer, 1999).

THE MUSIC OF “MOTHERESE”

In the 1970s, research began on the special characteristics of mother’s speech to infants, largelyin an attempt to find evidence that mother’s were giving systematic graded “instruction” in thefeatures of speech and language (Snow, 1977). A more fruitful theory came from the obser-vation that the communication with an infant is, from the beginning, fundamentally intersub-jective and emotional, valuable to both infant and adult in itself as an interpersonal exchangeof feelings and states of animation, no matter what the language content (Bateson, 1979; Stern,1974; Trevarthen, 1979). Experimental studies of infants perceptual discriminations and pref-erences for maternal voicing have since made it clear that the infants are not so much studyingthe mother’s speech as attending and replying to her affection, eagerness, purposefulness, andrepetition of the harmonies, melodies, and phrases of her performance (Fernald, 1989, 1992;Kitamura & Burnham, 1998a, 1998b; Rollins & Snow, 1998). The infant is quickly learninghow to anticipate salient developments in the “drama” of mother’s melodious talk (Trevarthen,1999a). That said, it is also evident that the measured rhythms and “melody” of “motherese”vocalizations, or “infant-directed speech,” with repetitions and accented and prolonged vowelsand rhyming, is giving clear pointers to the basic phonology of the language in the humanworld of the child (Grieser & Kuhl, 1988; Papousek, 1994; Papousek & Papousek, 1981;Papousek, Papousek, & Symmes, 1991). When infants vocalize in response to the mother’ssinging or repetitive speaking, they target the prolonged vowels at the ends of phrases, andimitate them (Malloch. 1999; Trevarthen, 1999a; Trevarthen, Kokkinaki, & Fiamenghi, 1999).

Recent analysis of infant’s body and hand movements when they are listening to song ormusic takes up an observation first made by Condon and Sander (1974), that even newbornsare capable of becoming “entrained,” i.e., synchronizing oscillatory movements of their bodieswith the rhythms and expressive changes in speech. As we now know, they do so to the samefeatures of song or music (Trevarthen, 1999a). The response to the impulses within humancommunication of this affectively loaded kind is made by “the whole baby” (Stern, 1974;Weinberg & Tronick, 1994).

INTERSUBJECTIVE READINESS OF NEWBORNSMADE CLEAR

Medical science, concerned for the survival and the bringing to physiological health of trau-matized or sick newborns, and psychologists primarily occupied with the measurement andexplanation of sophisticated adult perceptions, thinking and language, or differences of tem-perament and personality, have given a negative or impoverished description of the infant mindat birth. Careful observation of infants’ optimal voluntary performances in supportive circum-stances has been correcting this view of modern science (Als, 1995; Blass, 1999; Hepper, 1995;Fifer & Moon, 1998; Zeifmann, Delaney, & Blass, 1996; Trevarthen, 1997). One can now see



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cap heightbase of textjustification for acceptance of the newborn as a subject capable, in a rudimentary but effective

degree, of prospectively conscious purposes, and learned representations of benefits in expe-rience—and endowed with complex emotions for a vital intersubjectivity, emotions that esti-mate and activate affectionate and alert engagements with caregiving persons.

In the 1970s and 1980s, two kinds of evidence of the readiness of newborns for commu-nication of motives and emotions radically challenged the traditional conservative view. Al-though neonatal imitation had been observed earlier, notably by Zazzo (1957), it was author-itatively rejected on theoretical grounds by Piaget and Guillaume as well as Skinner, and itwas not until the projects of Maratos (1982) and Meltzoff (1985; Meltzoff & Moore, 1977)that irrefutable demonstrations of its existence were presented. Kugiumutzakis (1993, 1998,1999), by using skilled demonstrations of imitation dialogues with newborns, brought attentionto the interpersonal or communicative function of the imitations, a function identified for infantimitation by Uzgiris (1981). Other researches have confirmed the ubiquitous potential for neo-natal imitation, and gained information on its variations, regulation, and development (Field,Woodson, Greenberg, & Cohen, 1982; Field, Woodson, Cohen, Greenberg, Garcia, & Collins,1983; Heimann, 1989, 1998; Reissland, 1988). A most recent advance has been made by Nagyand Molnar (1994), who have shown that the different motive states for making an imitationin response to a model made by the adult, and for repeating it to the adult as an invitation or“provocation,” are associated in the newborn with different autonomic adjustments. Preparingto imitate is accompanied with heart-rate acceleration, and provocating with an anticipatorydeceleration of the heart. It may be concluded that neonatal imitation is an intentional behaviorin the sense that it is part of a coordinated activation of the body that seeks certain consequences,and adjusts both internal functions and externally directed body action to obtain them. Severalresearchers have recorded newborns repeatedly emitting imitative activities in a progressivelyimproved approximation to match the model act. This is one more sign of the intention behindthe performance.

The second research finding also affirmed the capacity of the newborn to make voluntaryreactions to communicative signals. DeCasper and colleagues (De Casper & Fifer, 1980; DeCasper & Spence, 1986; Fifer & Moon, 1995) have employed a non-nutritive sucking rein-forcement paradigm to record newborn’s discrimination of, and preference for, the mother’sheartbeat sounds and voice, and preference for the voice sounds has been shown to extend toa preference for the prosodic and phonetic characteristics of the mother’s language (Mehler,Jusczyk, Lamperz, Halstead, Bertoncini, & Amel-Tison, 1988). These preferences must havebeen acquiredin utero. Thus, auditory recognition by the newborn child of expressive char-acteristics of the human voice as these are transmitted through themother’s body, with selectiveattention to indexical features of her voice, has a clear precedence over any visual recognitionof the mother as a conversational partner (Hepper, 1995; Hepper, Scott, & Shahidullah, 1993).This fact is overlooked in standard accounts of how attachment is established, which giveprimary importance to visual recognition of the mother, thought to require a period of postnatallearning (Bowlby, 1978; Schore, 1999). Nevertheless, despite the visual deprivation of the fetalcondition, newborns can be visually as well as acoustically alert, and ready to see and to drawemotional support from a mothers eyes (Blass, 1999; Goren, Sarty, & Wu, 1975; Zeifman etal., 1996). They enter an entirely new visible world equipped to make sense of certain thingsthey see, and are especially ready to see their mother. They have been shown to rapidly learnto recognize her by appearance, within a few days (Blass, 1999; Bushnell et al., 1989; Fieldet al., 1984). Clearly, hearing and seeing are used together to set up mutual awareness, to beginan attachment, and to regulate the first communicative exchanges.

The dominance of scientific interest in the visual sense in psychological research on dis-crimination, attention, and memory favors the theory that realistic images of things outside the



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cap heightbase of textbody are the first elements of consciousness in a baby. The auditory and tactile senses, which

are particularly well developed in a newborn, give more information on dynamic states of themotor impulse, and to qualities, “tones” or “colors” of moving that can be called “expressive.”They transmit more direct evidence of the energy of internal impulses that make images of thebody moving and the marshalling of its physiological resources, images that serve also as theevaluative foundations for all of the subject’s awareness of the outside world (Trevarthen,1999a).

“Experience,” as the etymology of the word shows, comes from the effort to do, and thencethe need to know how. Strategies of purpose arise from narratives of an agent seeking to finda way through contingencies of experience. Sympathy for these inner motive factors in anothersubject is at the source of intersubjective communication (Trevarthen, 1998a, 1999b).

EXPERIMENTS TO TEST YOUNG INFANTS’EMOTIONS IN CONTACT WITH A PERSON

Soon after the discovery of protoconversation, experiments were made that demonstrated itsdependence on contingent rhythmic timing, and that tested its emotionality. These involvedobserving the reactions of the infant to the mother becoming “still faced” and silent while shekept looking at her baby (Murray & Trevarthen, 1985; Trevarthen et al., 1981; Tronick, Als,Adamson, Wise, & Brazelton, 1978; Weinberg & Tronick, 1996). The infant’s reactions (re-moval of gaze from the mother, and expressions of agitation, confusion and distress, thenwithdrawal into a depressed state) clearly demonstrated that the infant had expectations ofaffectionate or friendly expressions, and that absence of these signals was disturbing. Thebehaviors of these very young infants resembled the sequence of emotional states that JohnBowlby described for much older infants after loss of maternal attention (Bowlby, 1978).Observations of the young baby’s reactions to strangers indicated that a specific emotionalattachment to the mother exists much earlier than had been hypothesized (Trevarthen, 1984a).

A more stringent experiment by Murray demonstrated, with the aid of mother– infantcommunication mediated by a Double Television link, that a replayed televised image of themother, talking in an attentive and friendly way, could not satisfy the motives for coordinatedand happy response from a two-month-old infant (Murray & Trevarthen, 1985; Trevarthen etal., 1981). The replay situation, in a similar way to the still face test, caused the infants tobecome withdrawn and distressed. This proof of the young infant’s sensitivity to thecontin-gencyof a mother’s responses has been challenged very recently, largely on theoretical grounds(Rochat, Neisser, & Marian, 1998), but the evidence has been replicated, with identical resultsto those reported by Murray and Trevarthen, after the institution of important controls for otherpossible explanations of the infant’s distress (Nadel, Carchon, Kervella, Marcelli, & Re´serbat-Plantey, 1999; Nadel & Tremblay-Leveau, 1999) and after taking account of changes in theinfant’s response beyond three months (Muir & Harris, 1999). The original interpretation, thatthe communicative one- to two-month-old is anticipating a sympathetic and immediately re-sponsive reaction from the mother, is proved correct.

THREE FUNCTIONS OF EMOTION: REGULATINGACTION WITH THE BODY, THINGS, AND PERSONS

Human sympathy and shared consciousness is governed by powerful emotions of pride andshame, of generosity and guilt, of moral goodness or evil. A case can be made that such“complex emotions” have primary importance in the development of human consciousness(Draghi-Lorenz et al., 2000).



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cap heightbase of textTwo points require clarification. These feelings of human relating can neither be reduced

to, nor derived from, the cognitive emotions of surprise, curiosity, and pleasure in mastery,which are appropriate for regulating actions on nonsentient objects. As Papousek (1967) dem-onstrated long ago, emotions of satisfaction, or of disappointment and annoyance, expressedby young infants solving, or failing to solve, instrumental problems, are significant to othersas manifestations of knowing and discovering “in a human way.” They “communicate” whatis going on in the infant’s mind. The second point is that relational emotions are, from earlyinfancy, elaborate enough to signal subtle equilibria between “assertion” and “apprehension,”between bold confidence and sad or angry fear of being misperceived by the other (Trevarthenet al., 1999).

The emotions of infants, like those of adults, appear to be organized in a set of opponentpairs, or along gradients between contrasting extreme states (Plutchik, 1980). Two main axesare the easiest to define. The first, which can be labeled “ergic” or work related following aclassification of the physiologist Hess (1954), defines a range between the most attentive andstrong or forceful energetic states and the weakest inattentive states. Orthogonal to this maybe states, which Hess (1954) labeled “trophic” or “nurturing,” that, at one extreme, are stronglypositive between the subject and the objects or other persons that they are attending to, andopposite states that are negative or avoidant. With these two axes one can define a two-dimen-sional field of emotions in which most descriptive categories of emotion can be placed (Tre-varthen, 1993a). These can be related to four basic functions of animal emotions in regulationof behaviour and of the organism: seeking/curosity; fear/escape; rage/attack; distress/affection(Panksepp, 1998a).

However, such a spatial array of emotions, while it may fit well the impression obtainedfrom relations between discrete categories of facial expression, does not grasp the features andrelations of dynamic emotions. These are much more evident in acoustic plots of vocal ex-pression, or in continuous recordings of postures and gestures, which bring out the rhythmicand prosodic or tonal variations by which emotion is conveyed. Stern (1993, 1999) has insistedon the importance for communication with infants of “dynamic” and “relational” emotions thatcannot be described by the names of “categorical” emotions. For the former Stern uses thedescriptive terms: “crescendo,” “decrescendo,” “fading,” “exploding,” “bursting,” “elongated,”“fleeting,” “pulsing,” “wavering,” “effortful,” “easy.” These invite comparison with the “senticforms” of the musician Manfred Clynes, which attempt to identify specific momentary feelingsconveyed by musical sounds with a set of different force curves or gesture shapes (Clynes &Nettheim, 1982).

Infants as subjects can act voluntarily in the world in two ways, with different expectations.They can at any moment be anticipating the consequences that arise from attending to andacting upon an object, or they can be looking and listening to what will happen from com-municating with another person (Trevarthen, 1993a, 1998a; Trevarthen & Hubley, 1978). Theycan be expected to have different emotions in anticipation in these two kinds of encounter, andto evaluate their progress differently. I have called the emotions that appraise objects “aes-thetic,” and those that engage with the potentialities for purposeful and self-regulated con-sciousness of other subjects “moral.” A third kind of emotional regulation is concerned withinternal states and feelings of the subject’s body. These I have called “autonomic.” The termsare just convenient labels for theoretical differences between the anticipatory and regulatoryfunctions of emotion when a subject is acting in different ways, with different expectationsand different goals (see Figure 1, top; Trevarthen, 1998a). They are not adequate descriptionsto explain the different way the emotions actually work together and in sequence in the subject’smind.

As they are actually expressed in patterns of muscular activity of the body, hands, eyes,



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FIGURE 1.1. (Top) The three primary facets of emotion and action of the self; in relation to the bodyand its internal physiology, to objects of the inanimate, asocial world, and in social communication withlive partners (see Trevarthen, 1998a). (Bottom) Coordinations between these adaptations of behavior tothe body (A), to objects (B), and to other persons (C) define three realms of psychological life: respec-tively, these integrate bodily self-regulation with “cognitive and practical action” on physical reality, (I);“attachment” to persons that offer care and comfort to the body (II); and “companionship” with partnersin experience and purposes (III).



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cap heightbase of textface, and voice, emotions appear to be naturally much more concerned with integrating across

these three facets of the active self. The affective domains of purposeful psychological activitylabeled Cognition, Attachment, and Companionship in Figure 1 (bottom), may be of morefundamental functional importance (Reddy, Hay, Murray, & Trevarthen, 1997; Trevarthen,1982, 1998a; Trevarthen & Aitken, 2000). Each of these integrates transitions between two ofthe three facets of brain output concerned with things, persons, and the subject’s body. Thus,emotions signify transitional equilibria in the whole subject’s changing motives and the ac-companying internal autonomic processes, and in the expression of outwardly directed actionsand interests that the motives are generating.

Evidently the “relational” emotions of companionship are by far the most elaborate andsignificant for human mental growth and integration of the child into society, even though theemotions implicated in the making and breaking of attachments may have greater immediateimportance in psychosomatic health and well-being.

COMPLEX EMOTIONS EVALUATINGSELF-OTHER AWARENESS

Coyness in front of a mirror, indicated by turning away from the mirror image with a smile,has been shown in three-month-old infants by Reddy (2000), who concludes that the emotionsof interpersonal relating are by no means as simple as the classical account would have it(Reddy, 1991). Self-other awareness is, even in the first six months, colored and regulated byexplicit relational states such as pride, coyness, shame, and mistrust. This accords with theobservation that after four months infants are drawn to look at their mirror images, and thatafter an initial period when they show staring as if fascinated, they may manifest momentarybut complex “self-conscious” reactions to their reflected selves, including, besides lookingaway, both “coyness” and “showing off” (Trevarthen, 1984, 1990a, 1998a; Trevarthen et al.,1999). Emotional expressions linked to displacements of gaze play an important part withbabies over three months in regulating the infant’s communication with peers, in family triads,and with strangers (Adamson & Russell, 1999; Fivaz-Depeursinge & Corboz-Warnery, 1999;Nadel & Temblay-Leveau, 1999).

It seems certain that awareness of the perfect synchrony of movements of self and theimage in the mirror is a factor in the infant’s evident awareness that the image is not anotherinfant (Biglow, 1999; Rochat, 1998). Mirror recognition of self-expressiveness (as distinct fromreaching to touch a spot on the face when looking in a mirror) evidently does not require along period of learning extending beyond infancy, as has been supposed (Kagan, 1981; Lewis,1993; Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979). The self-other awareness that has been active from birthprovides a foundation that can be used by the infant to discriminate the immediate feedbackof effects of the infant’s own expressive behavior seen in a mirror (Trevarthen et al., 1999). Ithas been demonstrated, by the way, that newborns distinguish the recorded sound of their owncries from those of another infant (Sagi & Hoffman, 1976).

After five months, if not before, infants can also display lively interest in a peer and engagein friendly, humorous exchanges in which imitation of postures, gestures, vocalizations, andgrimaces may occur (Fiamenghi, 1997; Trevarthen et al., 1999). There is too little researchwith younger infants, but we have clear evidence that interactions with peers and siblings areimportant for development of social impulses and ways of expressing emotions from the lasthalf of the first year (Dunn, 1994; Reddy et al., 1997).

The willfulness of six-month-olds is allied to a new demonstrativeness or “showing off ”(Trevarthen, 1990a, 1998a). Intense pleasure in repeating a “clever” action that familiar personsfind very entertaining, and to which they give praise, is linked to an apprehension that strangers



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cap heightbase of textwill not understand and are to be feared. From this age, infants may be very timid and cry

when a stranger approaches them, or they may make apprehensive attempts to show some trickthey have learned in play in the family. Such brave attempts usually fail to get comprehensionand a satisfying response from the stranger. “Social referencing” at this age, where the infantlooks to the mother for an emotional appraisal of a difficult or unusual experience (Klinnert,Campos, Sorce, Emde, & Svejda, 1983), arises from the increased occasions for distancingfrom the mother as the infant crawls about, and the need to be able to find her to get support.The fear of being separated is, of course, used in Ainsworth’s attachment tests to gain ameasureof the emotions of different infants in their relationships with their mothers (Ainsworth, Blehar,Waters, & Wall, 1978; Sroufe, 1996).

EMOTIONS AND ACTIONS IN THE NARRATIVES OFGAMES AND SONGS AND THE EDUCATIONALMERITS OF FUN AND AFFECTIONATE TEASING

Research on infants’ perception of songs and instrumental music (Fassbender, 1996; Trehub,1990; Trehub, Trainor, & Unyk, 1993), and particularly observation of how they activelyparticipate in musical play, led to the theory of “communicative musicality” as an intuitiveexpression of human vitality and feelings (Malloch, 1999). Humans have unique ways ofcoordinating their body parts that follow from their upright bipedal way of locomotion, and itis proposed that this confers new capacities for polyrhythmic expression in the body (Trevar-then, 1999a). The essential rhythmic periods and expressive dynamics of humanmoving appearto be already present in the motive machinery of an infant’s brain, and this confers immediatesensitivity for the beat and melody in human gesture and voice. Musical instruments mimicthis and can evoke strong responses in infants.

Of particular interest is evidence that the successive ordering of elements in a verse ofsimple song or poetry, their pulse and phrasing, rhyming, and melody composed of changesin the pitch and timbral quality, are attended to closely by infants, who often time their vocaland gestural responses to chime in with salient moments in the music, and change their ex-pression to match musical qualities of certain key sounds with their voice (Malloch, 1999;Trevarthen, 1999a). The musical quality of a happy mother’s voice, measured by acoustictechniques, has been shown to be important for sustaining mutually satisfying communicationwith an infant, and the lack of musicality in a depressed mother’s voice leads the infant toavoid joining in and to make depressed sounds (Bettes, 1988; Gratier, 1999; Robb, 1999).

Humor and teasing provide the bridge between the introspective/contemplative state ofisolation in object awareness, and communicated awareness that seeks company. In the periodof increased attention to objects and events outside the body and the development of behaviorguided by an “object concept,” i.e., in the second trimester after birth, infants are also becomingmore playful. Now pleasure can be shared with them in a teasing game. The motivation forsuch games is like that which leads other young mammals into “play fighting,” which, as theethologists say, is “affiliative” or constructive of collaborative social bonds. But, in the humancase the “fighting” begins early in life, and with the caregiver, and it is much more concernedwith tracking and dodging foci of attention, eliciting manifestations of surprise and pleasurein recognition, and making misleading variations in expression of intentions to manipulate, andto give or take, all of which bring out moments of coincidence in experience. In carnivoresand monkeys, this play is conspicuously developed as chasing and rough-and-tumble play withpeers, or real or imaginary prey (Hall, 1998). Human parents are more playful than monkeyparents, and they share fun with infants from early months.

Study of the games mothers and fathers play with infants in the second and third trimesters



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cap heightbase of textafter birth also shows how their attractive invitations and rituals are guided by the infant’s

changing interests and purposes (Bruner & Sherwood, 1975; Ratner & Bruner, 1978; Stern,1974; Stern et al., 1977; Trevarthen, 1986, 1987, 1993a, 1993b, 1999a; Trevarthen & Hubley,1978). Nakano, who has studied the playful teasing that is so characteristic of good affectionaterelationships with infants (Nakano & Kanaya, 1993), has introduced a Japanese concept of the“space of the We,” and he shows that it is not just cognitive—not just a participating inknowing that one another exists and that each may behave in a certain way. It is also, and morefundamentally, a space of sympathy in purposes, where images of body movement are trans-ferred and joined between persons emotionally. This is evident in the “communicative musi-cality” of interactions between infants of all ages in play with their parents. The cognitive,object-knowing component of shared interest only becomes strong when the infant has devel-oped more distinct powers of attending and more effective actions of manipulation. We de-scribed this as the transition from “person–person games,” to “person–person–object” games(Trevarthen & Hubley, 1978). Once joint purposes are defined with regard for particular objectsor objectives, the consciousness that is shared becomes a progressively enriched consciousnessof mutually recognized meanings, or “ways of doing,” which have been invented and givenvalue in companionship.

The incorporation of objects on which the infant’s attention is focused into a game ofteasing and joking with a “playmate” invites the invention of “routines” of activity and “roles”or “uses” for objects that can be remembered as mutually valued inventions. Thus, a baby’ssurprise reactions to “peek-a-boo” (Bruner & Sherwood, 1975), imitations of exaggerated“funny” faces, or the eager imitation of “clap a handies” become “signs” or “proto-symbols”that can be repeated to evoke laughter or admiration in companions (Trevarthen, 1990a). Thefirst developed of these “jokes” seem to be ways of moving expressively, or intended acts thatare marked by their exaggerated unusual form and by the purposeful way they are offered andadjusted to the attention of others. Soon afterwards, favorite objects become triggers for ritualuse in future games. These games can be played in a family triad, infants shifting gaze betweenfather and mother to share the pleasure of a game (Fivaz-Depeursinge & Corboz-Warnery,1999).

Winnicott’s “transitional objects” serve in this way—to make meaning out of things ex-perienced in a relationship, things that may come to “stand for” the relationship, as a softblanket may stand for the mother’s body (Winnicott, 1965). The consciousness that is sharedchanges as the infant understands new ways of acting and using experience, but the ability toshare purposes and interests, as well as the emotions that govern how the sharing is valued,remain the same as that which enabled a newborn to join in reciprocal imitation, or a two-month-old to play an active part in a protoconversation. This intersubjective part of conscious-ness is innate alongside the motives for subjective awareness of self and object. In this sense,the “superego” is present with the “ego” from the start!

THE “BIRTH OF MEANING”: SECONDARYINTERSUBJECTIVITY, THEN COLLABORATIVE,IMAGINATIVE PLAY, AND FINALLY MIMETIC

STORY-MAKING

When we followed infants’ companionship with their mothers through to the end of the firstyear, we were impressed with a big transformation in motives that occurs around nine months(Trevarthen & Hubley, 1978). This was first recorded as a deliberate acceptance by the infant,for the first time, of a systematic combination of purposes and attentional orientations of twokinds: to act on things, and to communicate with the mother. We called it Secondary Intersub-



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cap heightbase of textjectivity, “person–person–object awareness” or “cooperative understanding,” and noted that

it transformed the confidence of purposes and confiding of experiences between adult and baby.The change brings independent experience into purposeful coordination with others’ interestsand actions, and identifies both the gestures of object use and the chosen objects themselvesas having attractive meaning. Actions by the infant to either attract others’ interest, or to acceptit, are becoming routine at the end of the first year, and expressions of interest and emotionalevaluation are coupled with purposeful object use in “declarative” as well as “instrumental”expressions (Adamson, 1996; Adamson & Bakeman, 1991; Akhtar & Tomasello, 1998; Breth-erton, McNew, & Beeghley-Smith, 1981; Halliday, 1975; Stern, 1985; Tomasello, Kruger, &Ratner1993).

It is now accepted that at the mid-point of infancy the infant is gaining a new capacity for“cultural learning” and the willingness and ability to make “acts of meaning” to which othersreadily respond (Tomasello er al., 1993). The change of cooperativeness has profound effectson the forms of communication used by those adults who are familiar companions with theinfant. Thus, for example, the “speech acts” of the mother change for soliciting questioningand appealing forms, or “attractives,” to matter of fact requests and instructions or “directives”(Kitamura & Burnham, 2000; Trevarthen & Marwick, 1986).

The second year sees the emergence of increasingly elaborate imaginative play and mi-mesis, with, at first, gradual incorporation of imitated word-like sounds applied to objects andactions and mingled with expressive sounds the meaning of which can only be translated byattention to the concurrent orientations and manipulations of the toddler (Bruner, 1983; Hal-liday, 1975; Papaeliou, 1998). Thus, for a 14- or 15-month-old, vocal expression is as muchemotional as referential, serving to share purposes, interests, and feelings of interest, pleasure,surprise, etc., with a closely involved partner. Vocal expression and vocal imitation are quitelimited in comparison with miming of actions and roles, as is very evident in the “immediateimitation” that toddlers, who can speak little, show in play when they have the opportunity tochoose matching objects and to do matching actions (Nadel & Peze´, 1993).

WHY INFANTS AND TODDLERS CARE TO SHARE

The motives we find in infants when they are confidently sharing consciousness with sympa-thetic and admiring adults are not expensive luxuries burdening the initial state of the humanmind, but essential factors promoting change that will regulate development of a cooperativecultural intelligence. Infants are born ready to begin learning collaboratively how the societyaround them knows and uses meaning in the world, and how it makes a narrative of thecircumstances in which collective life can be sustained and transformed from generation togeneration (Harris, 1998; Trevarthen, 1988; Trevarthen & Logotheti, 1987). They are emo-tionally involved with meaning, and with being persons whose sense of meaning is valued byothers.

From this perspective it is not surprising that there is transgenerational continuity of per-sonality characteristics and mental health or mental style (Fonagy, Steele, Steele, Higgittt, &Target, 1994; Main & Goldwyn, 1984). This is not a sign of weakness or “plasticity” of humanmoral fiber, nor is it evidence in every case of carry over by a gene factor, but it is evidencethat the emotions we use to relate to one another epigenetically can become part of the sub-consciously defined traditions or personal narratives by which we build dependable relation-ships and gain “roles” in a collaborative life. We do, in a sense, learn our roles in the dramaof life in the family and community, and we do tend to adopt both imitative and complementaryhabits of self-expression in relation to our principal companions or mentors.

But, these acquired characteristics of personality are modifications of a universal human



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cap heightbase of textneed to be in relationships that are qualified by feelings of pride and shame, love and hate,

celebrating and grieving, triumph and despair. We are born with a degree of readiness for allthis, and that is what makes an infant such a potent companion in spite of his or her rationalinnocence and wordless thinking. It is also what makes it possible for an infant to suffer froma disorder of emotions and understanding in relationships (Gillberg, 1991). In some cases, thedisorder can be related to an identified genetic factor inherited from parents that affects theway the brain is formed (Tager-Flusberg, 1999). In most, there will also be a large componentthat represents the individual’s learning of how to be a person in relation to others, with acharacter and emotionally valued beliefs, knowledge and skills.

THE PSYCHOBIOLOGY OF INSTINCTSFOR CULTURE

Comparative and developmental brain science has long possessed evidence to support the ideathat unconscious motive processes in the subcortex have the power to regulate the prenatalmorphogenesis of cognitive and learning systems of the forebrain, and that they also, by acontinuation of this process, play an essential role in the motivation of postnatal learning(Maclean, 1990; Ploog, 1992; Porges, 1997; Trevarthen, 1990b, 1996, 1989; Trevarthen &Aitken, 1994). In the past few decades such evidence has been augmented and summarized insuch a degree that it is now necessary to make a new theory of the relationships betweenphysiology of the whole body, brain anatomy, emotion, and cognition (Damasio, 1994, 1999;Panksepp, 1998a). Now we see that the enormously complex neocortex is impressionable fromwithin the body and brain, as well as from stimulation coming from the environment outside(Trevarthen & Aitken, 1994; Tucker, 2000; Trevarthen, 2001). Its circuitry is woven by neu-rochemical influences from inside to take in the pattern of experiences.

An evolutionary process can be traced that enlarged and transformed ancient brain stemmechanisms of brain morphogenesis and motive regulation. In primitive vertebrates, thesewereformed to serve coordination of visceral and autonomic functions in the body with impulsesof the individual to act. With evolution of the head carrying more powerful distance receptorsthat contribute to an elaboration of richer anticipatory images of the world outside the bodyand more discriminatory evaluation of environmental affordances, the midbrain, diencephalon,and telencephalon have gained ever increasing complexity and psychological power (Trevar-then & Aitken, 1994). At the same time, new components around cranial nuclei became centersfor making the internal self-regulatory events perceptible on the surface of the body, so theymay also serve in social signaling and thus allow mutual regulation of motives and concertedaction between individuals (Porges, 1997). These expressive body movements evolved fromself-regulatory mechanisms. They became capable of engaging through communication withmotive processes in other individuals that are made manifest by the ways their bodies move.At the end of this evolutionary trend, mammals deploy intricate postural, gestural, vocal, andfacial signaling powers that serve intense social collaborations, and that entail a need for ex-tended periods of social learning in the young. Human conversation is a brain–brain regulation,mediated by an exceptionally elaborate array of special expressive movements that instantlyreflect motives (Trevarthen & Aitken, 2000; Trevarthen, 2001). It engages dynamic purposes,interests, and feelings between the participants, and it does so according to innate parametersof timing and expressive morphology that are built into the motive activity of all human brains(Trevarthen, 1999a).

We have seen that infants have motive processes and expressions that can integrate theirinternal states of body and mind with those of another person, and that they develop ways ofcoupling their explorations and actions in the world with the impulses of companions. This



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cap heightbase of textentails evolutionary adaptations of every level of the hierarchically organized brain, from the

hindbrain to the most recently evolved and slowmaturing “association” or “transitional” limbic/cognitive cortices in frontal, temporal, and parietal lobes. Of these, the prefrontal cortex hasspecial importance as a center of integration between limbic/emotional processes and the cog-nitive elaborations of intention and experience in the rest of the neocortex (Schore, 1994, 1996,1998; Trevarthen & Aitken, 1994; Trevarthen et al., 2000). The frontal lobes have anatomicalsystems that represent actions of all the expressive organs—the eyes, vocal apparatus, hands—which are also organs that have special responsibilities in deploying the subject’s consciousexperience and strategic action on the world. Thus, this part of the brain, but certainly not onlythis part of the brain, is important in the making of purposeful narrative thought and theexpressions by which it is conveyed to others (Rogers, 1998). Development of functions in theprefrontal cortex occupies years of a child’s life and through adolescence. It begins in a highlysignificant way at the end of the first year, when cooperative awareness is coming to effectiveactivity, changing memory capacities, triggering acquisition of meaningful understanding andcultural learning, paving the way for language (Dawson & Fischer, 1994; Diamond, 1990;Goldman-Rakic, 1987).

The frontal lobes organize the deployment of organs that assimilate sensory informationintelligently—intelligent looking, reaching, and manipulating, taking with mouth, teeth, andtongue. They mediate what is called “executive functioning” (Shallice, 1988). Rizzolatti andArbib (1998) have found that neurons, which are the apparent antecedents in the monkey brainof the frontal language expressive system of humans, and that are active when the monkeymakes a reaching movement, can mirror the same form of purposeful hand movement thatanother individual, such as a human experimenter, is directing to an object. Jeannerod (1994)presents physiological and behavioral evidence for the dependence of perception on the cou-pling of autonomic and somatic expectancies in “motor images,” images that anticipate theinformation that will be needed to guide the coming movement. Mirroring these motives andstrategies of purpose lies at the basis of intersubjectivity (Trevarthen, 1999a). The evidencefrom infant psychology, and from comparative neurology, indicates that there must also beextensive mirroring mechanisms operating at subcortical levels, and in all modalities of aware-ness, from the hindbrain to the diencephalon, to account for the imitative and conversationalabilities of subjects whose prefrontal cortices are still very immature and rudimentary in or-ganization (Heimann, 1991; Sparks & Groh, 1995; Stein & Meredith, 1993).

THE FUNDAMENTAL COHERENCE OF SELF-AND OTHER-AWARENESS, AND THE

SELF-WITH-OTHER SYSTEM

All of the cognitive and learning functions of themammalian brain are transformed by evolutionof the capacity for intersubjectivity, which makes possible social collaboration in anticipatingand using environmental affordances (Trevarthen, 1998b, 1999b, 2001). Young humans areadapted to elicit sympathetic action by caregivers who know more and have greater powers ofeffective action in obtaining benefits and giving protection. But from birth, an infant human isalso building his or her own purposes and awareness. Therefore, part of the adaptations ofintersubjectivity that enable the infant to engage with the motives of a parent is on the parent’sside. It is concerned with perceiving the infant’s motives, with generously shared cognition,and participation in sympathetic narratives of action and discovery aimed to engage with theworld from the infant’s point of view. For this to work the infant, for his or her part, has to beable to detect and interpret the adult’s orientations of interest, actions of commitment or inten-tions, and emotional evaluations, and link them with his or her experiences in the shared



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cap heightbase of textproximal reality. It is, from the start, a mutual adaptation. In time, the reality they build together

extends away from the present in both time and space, and the engagement becomes increas-ingly occupied with things that had been appreciated together somewhere at a previous time,or that can be anticipated to become shared sources of pleasure in a future reality.

Throughout all the developments in cognitive systems and language, emotions hold theself together—they link embodied agency with evaluations of environmental affordances andgive sense to objects and constructions (operations) of intention. Intentionality gives individualexperience the incentive and the means to define categories of objects in the environment thatcan be relied on to provide particular benefits, to satisfy needs that arise first from vital re-quirements for sustaining life and well-being. Because the signs of benefits in a natural worlddepend upon the patterns of a complex terrain and its ecological structures, seeking benefitsrequires remembering layouts and causal relations between real objects their aggregations andthe processes that change them. Time for acting becomes translated through experience andremembering to time of planning over longer and longer spans, more and more complex pat-terns of event. The intrinsic dynamic and structural potency of phenomena in the environmentbecome part of the world anticipated in the mind. All these potentialities are relative to thesubject’s agency and capacity to anticipate consequences of acting in particular ways. Theirphenomenology is essentially subjective as the subject learns to live with the consequencesof doing things, and develops strategies for findings benefits, and evading mishaps, ill health,and injury.

TOP-DOWN RATIONALISM HAS MADE THEINFANT’S MOTIVES INCOMPREHENSIBLE

To perceive why the psychological endowment of infants has been so misrepresented or over-looked, we must examine the cultural orthodoxy of the modern world, with its elaborate socialand practical organization, which entails formal discipline of individual impulses, and educationof citizens in an intricate partnership of beliefs and skills.

Great conceptual difficulties have resulted from the rational empiricist position that acoherent, socially situated self-awareness must be acquired from experience and training—that subjectivity of the individual is primary, and that all intersubjectivity is an acquisition ofsocial experience (Trevarthen, 1999b). Our philosophers and psychologists have asserted overand over again that a newborn infant is not merely devoid of any symbolic communication,but indeed lacking a capacity for psychological representations of any kind. As reactive bio-logical matter, it must accumulate instances that affirm regular recurrent consequences of en-gaging with events and objects in the environment, and build up “representations,” “models,”or “schemata” to recall and recognize them. It follows, and so it has been assumed, that beforethis self-object differentiation has been learned, no child can have any notion or selectiveawareness of other persons as beings like the self, and yet separately active. The infant, ac-cording to this argument, comes to the world with many senses and moving parts, but isincoherently mindless, reflexively acting, lacking all sense of time and space, and lackingmorality.

Now we know that these assumptions are false. Moreover, it is increasingly clear that theyhave closed our minds to perception of the fundamental motives of human life that are notonly active at birth, or even some time before, but that remain in that essential form throughoutthe life cycle. The evidence that refutes the reductive conception of the human mind’s initialstate is in part behavioral, in part the result of careful experimentation with infants’ preferencesand problem-solving inclinations, and in increasing part also from a new more inclusive un-



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cap heightbase of textderstanding of the anatomical and physiological organization of the human brain, and its re-

lation with the body.The nativistic theory of Chomsky might seem to offer a way out, but this is explicitly a

theory of an endowment for acquiring language, andmore specifically the grammatical structureof text, and infants, as Pinker (1994) is pleased to remind us, do not speak or understandspeech. Structural linguistic theory does not seek to explain intersubjective communication.Nor has the “cognitive revolution” brought enlightenment. The cognitive powers of infantsdemonstrated since the 1970s by laboratory experimentation (almost exclusively with theirvisual and manipulative discriminations, preferences, and problem solving propensities) haveleft the impression that younger infants are unclear about their separateness of their selves fromthe world, and, of course, unable to conceive and prospectively regulate any communicationwith the mental processes in another person.

Inadequate observation of the psychological capacities of newborns and infants too youngto look cleverly and manipulate objects leaves us in ignorance of the all important “initialstate.” In the logic of dynamic systems theory, this is a cardinal sin. We are at sea about whatan infant needs to function consciously while it can count on adult care and support. Thefeebleness of a human baby can be seen as adaptive simply because the its social readiness isso advanced. A robust and autonomously mobile body is not needed for an intimate humancommunicator. Indeed, human parental attention and foresight frees an innate capacityfor intersubjectivity that goes far beyond any instinctive appetites of other species, eventhe sociable and family-supported primates (Freud, 1911; Macmurray, 1961; Winnicott,1965).

Innate psychological properties endow a human newborn individual with purposes andexperiences, and they grow in such a way that systematic age-related changes occur that canbe seen to be intrinsically adaptive for emergence of the full range of human cultural achieve-ments. In a real and unique way, the human brain is born for a new kind of brain-to-braininteraction and for a unique capacity for cultural learning. The motives and emotions of thehuman mind and the ways they influence both evaluation of the objects or goals for purposefulaction of the individual and the communication with other human beings have a central rolein governing brain growth and differentiation. They determine the direction of development ofpsychological functions by seeking specific satisfactions from experience.

Problems arise in mental health, learning, and the establishment and maintenance of re-lationships as a consequence of what the human brain has evolved to do. They can neither beunderstood nor treated effectively without an accurate conception of the initial state of thehuman mind, and its capacity for directed change.

“FALSE STARTS,” AND INTRINSIC DEVELOPMENTALTRANSFORMATIONS OF THE INFANT’S MIND

Claims of the moment of the “psychological birth of the infant” vary from several years afterbiological birth to 18 months, one year, ten months, seven to nine months, three months, sixweeks. As we make more detailed observations, there is a trend for it to be earlier! All suchclaims are supported by negative statements drawing attention to what younger infants lack—in awareness, motor coordination, and volition, cognitive representation of objects separatedfrom the image of a “self,” intersubjectivity or awareness of an “other,” memory, problem-solving ability, and at length, language. The infant’s activities are viewed from the position ofa thinking, believing, and speaking adult, who is capable of making rational and articulateexplanations, and exercising reasoned control over emotions.



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cap heightbase of textA recently popular idea is that consciousness of mental life in another depends upon a

metacognitive ability to recognize one’s own mental images, and thence to have beliefs thatothers have beliefs (Baron-Cohen, 1994). But such a Theory of Mind, or the argument that, “Ithink that I think, therefore I am conscious and can believe you too have beliefs,” is notnecessary for most adult communication and cooperative awareness, which is too spontane-ously efficient, and it would not work for a young child. This would appear to be a notiondependent upon language, and especially on that special meta-language fostered by text andacademic/philosophical analysis of text. Narratives of other persons feelings and purposes arecertainly conceived by infants, even those only a few months old, in some inarticulate formthat nevertheless enables them to predict and evaluate the contingent behaviors of adults withwhom they are fully involved in a reciprocal mental engagement. The adults are, for their part,acting with intuitive respect for, and “belief in,” the infants initiatives and consciousness ofthem, and they enjoy this activity.

Periods of Rapid Change in the form and functions of developing organisms certainlyoccur, as in the extreme case of insect metamorphosis (Trevarthen, 1982b). They signal criticalintersections between intrinsic, autopoetic processes, and the molding and differentiatinginfluence of the environment. They have adaptive power by virtue of their geneticallyor morphogenetically regulated anticipation of functional growth, or “environmental expect-ancy.”

In the life of a young child, there are “critical periods” in which dependency on parentalcare changes (Brazelton, 1993; Rijt-Plooij & Plooij, 1993). Such events are manifestations ofthe motives and impulses that seek experience, and that seek to engage with the motives andexperience of other human beings to obtain social validation of experiences according to es-tablished understanding or uses. They reflect changes in the balance between body-sustaining“trophotropic” activities of the brain, and motives that seek to engage with and transform theenvironment by “ergotropic” movements of the body directed by the exteroceptive senses(Trevarthen et al., 2000).

Although many motor skills and powers of perception and understanding of developinghumans change, aspects of motives and emotions remain as constant factors in regulation ofaction and awareness. Among the principles of mental life that are conserved through devel-opmental transitions are the following: (1) a hierarchy of rhythms of moving and attending(Jasnow & Feldstein, 1986); (2) the temporal scope of immediate consciousness, or the “psy-chological present” (Po¨ppel, 1994; Trevarthen, 1999a); (3) the coordinates of body-relatedaction-space extending out beyond the surface of body; and (4) the opponent values of emotionthat modulate both individual action and experience, and contacts and relationships with otherpersons (Trevarthen, 1993a, 1999a).

These age-invariant motive principles intrinsic to the mind in body constitute the funda-mental regulators of cognitive change and learning. If there are growth errors in them, or iftrauma changes their functioning significantly, the whole organization of the mind will be atrisk (Aitken & Trevarthen, 1997). On the other hand, they are potentially key factors inany strategy of education or therapy, as they will, if supportively engaged, give energy forrecovery of improved functioning, and this may restart positive developmental change (Hun-deide, 1991). This is the foundation for any form of “intersubjective therapy” (Burford, 1998;Burford & Trevarthen, 1997; Trevarthen & Aitken, 2000; Wigram & De Backer, 1999).

PROTECTING EMOTIONAL HEALTHIN COMPANIONSHIP

Self-related emotions and other-related emotions are inseparable in the economy of adult humanfeelings. Well-being and the enjoyment of life depend on how “private” experience is built



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cap heightbase of textinto memories of events that have been shared. Pain or sickness in one’s body or mind can be

endured more peacefully if there is sympathy from the other for the awareness of it. Exuberantdiscovery and skillful mastery of object use gains value if it becomes part of a project thatothers value. The misery of depression may debilitate the body and reduce the capacity fornoticing or doing anything, but the more grievous effect is that it brings a sense of poor worth,of shame in relation to the will that others have to share and act together.

In early life, too, mental health depends on an active balance between a child’s naturaleagerness, activity, affection, calm attentiveness, playfulness, and need for sympathy. Along-side frankly sensory or motor problems of childhood we identify disorders of empathy (Gill-berg, 1991), of hyperactivity and deficits in attention and social sensitivity (Pennington &Ozonoff, 1996), of disordered emotional self-regulation (Hobson, 1993a, 1993b; Schore, 1994,1996), and we find that in any individual case all these are present in some degree (Tager-Flusberg, 1999). Effective treatment compensates by meeting the child’s deficient or distortedmotivations with stimulation of experiences and activities, emotional containing and modulat-ing, affectionate imitation and playfulness, and by demonstration and instruction that fits thechild’s capacities in “the zone of proximal development”—where the child “is.” Purely cog-nitive intervention, aimed to facilitate intelligent mastery of objective situations, or training insocial skills that reinforces acceptable behaviors and seeks to train out unacceptable ones, ortherapeutic engagement with strong emotions to give them a realistic context for purposefulexternal regulation, all may leave the core need for “pride in meaning” with and for othersweak, and a persistent source of sadness or anger.

Rich and accurate accounts of how different infants take the path to understanding of themeaning in the language, tools, and tasks of their familiar social world portray impulses formixing attentive exploration and cognitive discovery with enjoyment of companionship. Theygive us a standard against which the demoralization of isolated children can be understood.They provide indicators for diagnosis of the problem and guidance for therapy. The relationshipbetween the child and parents and others in the family is a component of the child’s conscious-ness and emotions because a human being is born motivated to discover a common world ina small group of close companions.

What additional emotional investment is there in this kind of intersubjectivity, where thefeelings that are shared, right from the earliest experiences of relationships, include those thatevaluate common experience, not just self-sustaining nourishment, comfort, security, and afeeling of familiarity with the caregiver?

The responses that the infant seeks must minister to more than the infant’s expressions ofpleasure and displeasure with the state of his or her body. They must notice fascination withorientation to objects and events, and the fun of games that play with intentions, expectations,and cognitive recognition. They will bring together the consciousness and willfulness of atleast two persons, and enable them to collaborate in making the world a place they can knowtogether. The emotions of vitality and depression have more to do with actions made in thisshared reality than they have with the integrity of the infant’s biological organism, or evenwith the dependability of the caregivers attentions.

I submit that emotions of companionship play a crucial part in emotional health of infantsas well as adults, because they are part of the innate motive machinery and needs of the humanmind. It is much easier to conceptualize emotions and attitudes of pride and humiliation, ofguilt and virtue, of love and hate, of jealousy and admiration, of cleverness and stupidity, ofboldness and timidity or shyness, of joy and sadness, if we accept that human emotions areboth relational or interpersonal and referential from the beginning of experience—that theyinclude the prospect of a shared conscious life and enterprise.

All the states of mind and temperament that have been described for an infant can be



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cap heightbase of textrelated to what the character in question, the infant’s “Me,” knows in common with other

persons. They have “aboutness” oriented to a reality outside the self that is potentially registeredand assessed by another who is a known friend, or by others in a community of understanding—a reference that could be missed or devalued by someone with different shared reality (Hobson,1993a). I think there can be no mental illness of an adult or a child that does not interfere withthe management of what one is “about” in a world of shareable meanings, and reduce its value.The worst feelings of depression seem to relate to a sense of worthlessness, of meaninglessnessin purposes and in the expectation of others’ regard. I think that even an infant can feel thiskind of diminishment. The evidence of the effects of a mother’s depression on an infants moodand behavior with others, which is capable of passing on the stress and depression from theinfant to other persons, bears out this conclusion.

The efficacy of therapies that engage and lift the spirit of action and awareness, and thatespecially support sharing of any vitality, confirms the diagnosis (Rollins, Wambacq, Dowell,Mathews, & Reese, 1998). Improvisational music therapy, for example, modifies emotionalstates by engaging them in dialogues of action, with no attempt to rationally or verbally interpretor explain (Wigram & De Backer, 1999). Similarly, personal narrative therapy allows therevision of past opportunities for pride and affection, and reinstatement of belief in these, withno elaborate rational interpretation (Cooper & Murray, 1997).

I am not persuaded that the lasting effects of early emotional insecurity or suffering canbe centered around what happens in the single mind and body of the individual sufferer. In thelight of what we have learned about infants’ motives and emotions for companionship inexperience and action, I believe that the quality of friendship, of moving events shared, willbe a crucial component in affection for a parent, sibling, or other close acquaintance, even foran infant. Daniel Stern (1985, 1995) speaks of “climactic moments” of high intensity in theemotional life of an infant with the mother, and of their representation in the infant’s memoryof life shared with the mother. But, the infant’s favorite companion may not be the same personas the preferred caregiver or attachment figure, and their roles may be quite different. Of course,health, comfort, pleasure, and general well-being are important, but much can be endured ifthere is complete confidence in the fellow-feeling and good will of a firm friend. Being “mean-ingful” to someone important is what a young child strives for from the first protoconversations.

THE PSYCHODYNAMIC APPROACHAND THE INFANT THAT ATTACHMENT THEORY

DOES NOT EXPLAIN

Bowlby, by his detailed analysis of the effects of loss of maternal care on the emotional healthand development of infants, revolutionized medical scientific awareness of the psychologicalneeds of infants (Bowlby, 1958, 1988). He was witness to the young child’s intense distressand hopeless resignation following loss of a mother’s care and he saw this as a potential sourceof future emotional disorder. His Attachment Theory necessarily focuses on parental protection,especially maternal protection, as a provider of vital support and external emotional regulationfor the young child. He conceived the primary emotions in the traditional way, as agents ofbiological self-regulation in a being lacking representations of things outwith its own body.Affectionate representation of the mother as an object of attachment is, he concluded, acquiredtowards the end of the first year. Research on the separation distress of a one-year-old whenthe mother leaves the child in a strange place and with a stranger, and the child’s reactionswhen the mother returns has demonstrated strong correlatiuon with the sensitivity of maternalresponses to the infant’s calls for contact (Ainsworth & Bell, 1970; Ainsworth et al., 1978).Maternal sensitivity and infant attachment are significantly related to the child’s subsequent



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cap heightbase of textconfidence in social life (Sroufe, 1996). Transgenerational effects (Main, 1991; Main & Gold-

wyn, 1984) confirm that lasting features of emotional health can be acquired, and that theparents can transmit the insecurity of their representations of childhood attachments to theiroffspring (Fonagy, Steele, Steele, Moran, & Higgitt, 1991).

Psychoanalysts have all been protective of the infant’s need for psychological support or“holding.” Klein (1952) saw displays of distress and depression as evidence that the infant hada psychic life, but one that was anarchic and demanding of maternal services. Bion (1962) seesthe mother as a “container,” more or less receptive in form, and the infant as falling to piecesif not contained. Mahler describes the relationship of mother with baby as a symbiosis, some-thing akin to that between a parasite and its host (Stephansky, 1988). Fairbairn (Grotstein &Rinsley, 1994) gave the infant more independent awareness, and ego from the start, and Win-nicott (1965) brought light to the creativity of play, which he appreciated even in the earlystages when the infant is receiving essential life support within the maternal container.

None of these portraits takes full account of the young infant’s sensitive and joyful ap-preciation of expression in the human voice, nor were infants’ expressive and gestural behaviorsnoticed that are adapted to “talk to” the ongoing imaginations and narratives of purpose thatare implicit in talk and gesture addressed to them by their playful parents. They mostly missedthe baby’s need for exuberance and enthusiasm with clear anticipation of success, and evidentpride, though Winnicott did share this part of the baby’s life. Sympathy and shared pleasurein the trials and risks of experience are companions to adventure in meaning (Emde, 1992;Stern, 1990). The infant hero can suffer shame if submitted to the dull gaze and tuneless voiceof indifference, even if kept warm and well fed (Field, 1992; Murray &Cooper, 1997; Papousek& Papousek, 1997; Stern, 1985, 1995).

Modern psychodynamic accounts, better informed about the capacities of normally de-veloping child for relating to persons, and for cultural learning under the tutelage of “intuitiveparenting,” acknowledge that the classical theory of Anna Freud, Mahler, or Klein underesti-mates the self-organized motivations and interpersonal shrewdness of the young infant (Stern,1985/2000). Methods of supporting emotional functioning, communication and learning indistressed, neglected, abused, or handicapped children now address the sociable motives thatthe child can be assumed to have been born with—motives that seek “live company” (Alvarez,1992).

Bowlby’s synthesis of theories about animal and human motives and the creation of con-scious understanding magnificently defined the specific affective dependency of the infant, andits evolutionary purpose or adaptation (Bowlby, 1958; Soumi, 1997). Schore (2000) has madeclear the range of this achievement, and its importance for understanding the human brain, andhow it grows in good fellowship. However, the sharing of consciousness Bowlby could envis-age has been generally undervalued by subsequent developmentalists who, in taking up At-tachment Theory, have focused on the dependence of the infant for emotional regulation andsecurity within an attachment relation. Bowlby, we must conclude, though he himself wasinterested in these motives in a generous way, as was Winnicott, left the way open for thislimited view of infant motives.

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